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ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE: „Atheneum. Polish Political Science Studies”, Faculty of Political Science and Security Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University, Batorogo 39L, 87–100 Toruń, Poland (in Polish: „Atheneum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne”, Wydział Nauk o Polityce i Bezpieczeństwie UMK, ul. Batorogo 39L, 87–100 Toruń); e-mail: athena@umk.pl; web: www.atheneum.umk.pl

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e-mail: info@marszalek.com.pl, www.marszalek.com.pl Drukarnia, ul. Warszawska 54, 87-148 Łysomice, tel. 56 678 34 78

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EUROPEAN STUDIES



GREAT BRITAIN AFTER BREXIT – IS BRETURNS POSSIBLE?

WIELKA BRYTANIA PO BREXICIE –
CZY MOŻLIWY JEST BRETURNS?

*Łukasz Danel** 

— ABSTRACT —

The article is devoted to the problem of further steps that Great Britain could take to break the stalemate in which it found itself after June 2016 when the British decided to leave the European Union. Despite making this decision, it turned out that its implementation was unexpectedly difficult, which in turn caused a political crisis in Great Britain that has not been seen in this country for a long time.

The aim of the article is to try to find answers to two research questions. First of all, could the Brexit process – both from a legal and political point of view – have been stopped and reversed, for example, by holding a second referendum? Secondly, whether, since Brexit has become a fact, we can expect a quick return of Great Britain to the European Union (“Breturn”).

Using the method of institutional and legal analysis and the content analysis method, the Author tries to prove the thesis that the idea of a second referendum seemed unlikely, and hence – Brexit was rather inevitable. As for

— ABSTRAKT —

Artykuł poświęcony jest problemowi dalszych kroków, które Wielka Brytania mogła podjąć, by wyrwać z impasu, w którym znalazła się po tym, gdy Brytyjczycy w czerwcu 2016 roku podjęli decyzję o wyjściu z Unii Europejskiej. Mimo podjęcia tej decyzji okazało się, że wprowadzenie jej w życie było nadspodziewanie trudne, co kolei wywołało w Wielkiej Brytanii kryzys polityczny, jakiego w kraju tym nie było od bardzo dawna.

Celem artykułu jest próba znalezienia odpowiedzi na dwa pytania badawcze. Po pierwsze – czy proces Brexitu, zarówno z prawnego, jak i politycznego punktu widzenia, mógł zostać zatrzymany i odwrócony, przykładowo – w drodze drugiego referendum. Po drugie zaś, czy w związku z tym, że Brexit stał się faktem – możemy się spodziewać szybkiego powrotu Wielkiej Brytanii do Unii Europejskiej („Breturn”).

Wykorzystując metodę analizy instytucjonalno-prawnej oraz metodę analizy treści, Autor stara się wykazać, że idea drugiego referendum wydawała się mało prawdopodobna, a co za tym

* Cracow University of Economics, Department of Political Studies.

“Breturn” – this scenario also looks unrealistic, as it would involve various legal and political obstacles as well as practical inconveniences for Great Britain.

idzie – Brexit był raczej nieunikniony. Jeśli zaś chodzi o „Breturn” – scenariusz taki również wygląda na mało realistyczny, gdyż jego ziszczenie wiązałoby się z różnego rodzaju przeszkodami natury prawnej i politycznej, jak również z praktycznymi niedogodnościami dla Wielkiej Brytanii.

Keywords: Brexit; Breturn; Great Britain; European Union; referendum

Słowa kluczowe: Brexit; Breturn; Wielka Brytania; Unia Europejska; referendum

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

When in June 2016, in a nationwide referendum, the British decided to leave the European Union, it could be predicted that the process of leaving the Union – for many reasons – will not be easy. It is enough to mention that this is an absolutely unprecedented situation, because so far the European Union has only accepted new members. And even if Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union introduced for the first time a procedure for a member state to withdraw voluntarily from the EU, this has never been put into practice before.

Nevertheless, probably no one was able to predict that Brexit would be so complicated that even postponing its deadline two times made it so difficult to bring the intended results. This was undoubtedly a problem for both parties. From the Brussels perspective, this impasse showed that the European Union could not bring the whole process to an end, which only intensified the already noticeable divisions within it, at the same time strengthening the Eurosceptic political parties and movements in EU member states. In London, in turn, we were observing a growing political and constitutional crisis, manifesting itself in the change of the prime minister, a paralysis of the functioning of the British parliament, as well as a radical conflict between the government and the opposition. The confusion of British citizens was rarely mentioned, although it seemed that they were increasingly losing faith in their institutions, as well as trust in political elites and the entire political system. British democracy, which had long been a role model in Europe and beyond, gave the impression of being in a serious crisis, which until recently seemed almost unimaginable.

In parallel to the debate about the date and conditions of Brexit, as well as very advanced preparations for this process, there was also a discussion in Great Britain on the annulment of the decision to leave the European Union, in other

words – the revocation of Article 50 invoked on 29 March 2017. And even if it was legally possible, it was hard to imagine that British politicians would have taken such a step without prior approval from the citizens expressed in a second referendum. The second referendum initiative appeared soon after the 2016 referendum results had been announced. There were in fact a couple of different options that could have been put to such a referendum. And though it was usually said, that a further Brexit referendum could have particularly been aimed at approving the withdrawal agreement negotiated by the British government in Brussels, one of its viable options was also a direct question whether the United Kingdom should have remained a member state of the EU. That could have, if the majority of voters answered ‘yes’, led to the cancellation of Brexit. On the other hand, assuming that Great Britain – regardless of the content of the agreement, or even whether it was concluded at all – would leave the European Union anyway, the “Bretturn” initiative appeared, boiling down to the fact that after some time Great Britain could simply return to the EU.

The aim of the article is to try to find answers to two research questions based on the problems outlined above. First of all, could the Brexit process have been stopped or even reversed from a legal and political point of view? Secondly, assuming that Great Britain would eventually cease to be the member state of the European Union, can we expect its return to this organization in the near future, and if so – under what conditions and on what terms?

The author will try to prove the thesis that the idea of a second referendum was highly unlikely, because it would have led to even greater chaos than the one experienced by the British in their country. Similarly, the rapid return of Great Britain to the European Union also seems unlikely – it is not so much legal issues or treaty restrictions as practical and political factors that can stand in the way. To address the research problem outlined above, both the institutional and legal analysis method and content analysis method are used.

THE POTENTIAL REVOCATION OF ARTICLE 50

The question whether Brexit could have been stopped is actually a question whether the invocation of Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union is a reversible or irreversible decision. This article – enacted by the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 – recognises the right of a member state to withdraw from the European Union as well as depicts the procedure according to which such

a withdrawal may be carried out. The Treaty makes no mention of what happens when a member state wants to revoke an earlier decision. Therefore, in order to answer the question whether the notification of the decision to leave the EU – after such notification had been made by a member state – can still be annulled, we must consider this situation both in legal and political terms.

From a legal point of view the answer to this question seems pretty obvious – of course it still can be annulled. This is primarily in line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – a special agreement which entered into force in 1980 and regulates treaties between states. The Convention allows a state to revoke its decision to withdraw from any international treaty which means that this provision could also have been applied to Brexit. In December 2018, the European Court of Justice confirmed this interpretation when it ruled that the United Kingdom could unilaterally, by simply writing a letter to the European Council, revoke Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union. And it could have been done without the unanimous consent of the remaining 27 member states represented in the European Council (Judgment in Case C-621/18, 2018). Moreover, according to the ruling, the decision to revoke Article 50 is expected to be “unequivocal and unconditional” what should be understood in such a way that a given state must clearly indicate that its will is to retain its status as a member state of the European Union. It also suggests that the UK could not have revoked Article 50 in order to extend the transition period for more than two years buying this way more time to prepare itself for the whole process.

Regarding time limits, one more point of the court decision should be emphasized. The European Court of Justice ruled that the possibility to revoke Article 50 exists for as long as a withdrawal agreement – which sets the terms of departure – concluded between the EU and that member state has not entered into force. If no such agreement has been concluded, revocation may take place for as long as the two-year period from the date of the notification of the intention to withdraw from the EU has not expired. In case of any extension of that two-year period given by the remaining member states, the potential revocation of Article 50 may also take place during this extended period (Judgment in Case C-621/18, 2018).

As it has been rightly noted by some lawyers, the ruling of the European Court of Justice was not surprising at all. If – according to the Treaty on the European Union – it is each member state’s sovereign decision to leave the EU, then exactly the same sovereign decision should be to revoke that intention. In other words, the final decision on further membership in the European Union belonged only to the United Kingdom. If it finally decided to revoke Article 50

and remain in the EU, it would have basically happened automatically and the EU could not have imposed any additional conditions in this regard (Petrucci, 2018). What is more, the European Court of Justice ruled that such a revocation confirms the EU membership of the member state concerned under terms that are unchanged, which means that the United Kingdom would then have remained a member state of the European Union on exactly the same terms as it had before (so including keeping, e.g., its opt-outs or the famous budget rebate). If it happened, that would have simply brought the withdrawal procedure to an end as if nothing had happened.

So from a legal point of view, Great Britain's decision to leave the European Union could have been reversed, and therefore Brexit could have been stopped. For this to have happened, first of all, political will and, secondly, formal notification of this intention were needed. The legal perspective is, however, only one side of the coin. The other one is definitely more complicated and it is related to political conditionings of the potential revocation of Article 50. According to the European Court of Justice, the revocation must be decided following a democratic process in accordance with national constitutional requirements. Given the fact that the British constitutional system is relatively complicated, this opens up room for new discussion.

Naturally, the European Court of Justice has in no way suggested which institution of the British political system should have made a potential decision to revoke Article 50. Whether it was to be the parliament or the government would have had to be determined by the British themselves. Theoretically the government could have done it itself (so without consulting parliament) by using Royal Prerogative. However, the use of prerogative was already challenged during the course of the Brexit process. It happened at the beginning of 2017 when the government intended to invoke Article 50. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom ruled then that triggering the EU exit process required the consent of the parliament (*R [on the application of Miller and another]*, 2016). In other words a special act of parliament was needed for this decision to be effective. It can therefore be assumed that in the case of the potential revocation of Article 50 the procedure would have been the same – such a decision probably could not have been made by the government without the prior consent of the parliament. If, in turn, the parliament wanted to force the government to revoke Article 50, that could have happened if majority of MPs were able to take control of parliamentary business and instruct the prime minister to do so. Such a situation had also already taken place in the Brexit process (Schraer, 2019).

One should also remember about potential political and social implications of such a decision. The revocation of Article 50 could surely have been interpreted as the violation of the will of the British people expressed in the referendum. This in turn would have carried the risk of social protests and maybe even revolt. On the other hand, it is also worth emphasizing that a petition submitted to the UK Parliament petitions website calling on the government to revoke Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, and remain a member state of the European Union (so called “Revoke Article 50 and remain in the EU petition”) received more than 6 million signatures, which is a record number in the history of the British parliament (Petitions UK Government and Parliament, 2019).

THE IDEA OF A SECOND REFERENDUM

The potential revocation of Article 50 – no matter who would ultimately be entitled to make such a decision – could have been preceded by another Brexit referendum. To the question whether another referendum on Brexit was still possible there is only one correct answer – of course it was. According to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, that would have only required special legislation passed by the British parliament, just like in case of the Brexit referendum that was held on 23 June 2016.

In fact, the first calls for a further referendum on Brexit (called by some a ‘People’s Vote’) appeared shortly after the original vote. Initially, these calls resulted from the expectation that British citizens would be able to have the final say on the withdrawal agreement, that is, the deal negotiated between the British government and the European Union – that they would be able to either accept or reject it. Such expectations were expressed by both politicians and representatives of different pressure groups and well as other socio-political movements or expert groups. On the contrary, the opponents of the referendum argued that another vote would lead to even greater social divisions and social unrest and would undermine the idea of democracy.

The first e-petition calling for a second referendum received more than 4 million signatures. It is worth explaining that the petition was started yet before the first referendum by leave activists who were expecting another result (at that time polls suggested ‘remain’ would win). The petition opted for the second vote in case the turnout did not exceed 75% and the winning option did not get more than 60% of a vote (Petitions UK Government and Parliament, 2016). However,

after the debate in parliament, the petition was rejected. The government argued that it was a “once in a generation vote” (Slawson, 2016). What is more, at that time opinion polls indicated that only around 30% of the public supported the idea of a second referendum.

In 2017, in the electoral campaign before the United Kingdom general election, the Liberal Democrats (though earlier fairly divided on this issue), the Green Party as well as several minor political parties publicly advocated a second referendum. Individual Tory and Labour politicians expressed similar opinions, though this was not the official agenda of any of these parties. In April 2018, a pressure group “People’s Vote” was launched by pro-European activists, ‘remain’ supporters as well as local politicians, individual MPs, public figures and some celebrities. It called for a public vote on the final text of the withdrawal agreement negotiated between the United Kingdom and the European Union (People’s Vote, <https://www.peoples-vote.uk>). At that time some of the polls showed that in case of a second referendum around 60% of voters, if they had the chance to do so, would vote in favour of staying in the European Union. That would mean that, compared to the first referendum, more than 2,5 million Britons changed their minds and withdrew their support for Brexit. That is why “People’s Vote” organized several multi-million demonstrations and held lots of campaign rallies – primarily in London but also throughout the UK – during which people demanded a second referendum. They were accusing the leaders of the ‘leave’ camp of misinformation and emphasized the need for a referendum using the argument that the terms of Brexit were unknown to the public at the time of the original referendum. When they are finally known, the British should be able to make a final decision regarding their country. “People’s Vote” proposal was to allow a choice between ‘accept the deal’ (and thus – leave) and ‘remain’. Such subject of the referendum was also accepted by almost all of the third parties.

Within the Conservative Party two groups emerged representing two different, clashing positions. One of them were supporters of hard bargaining with Brussels, who in the event of failure of these talks were ready to accept the so-called “no-deal Brexit”. The other group, led by the Prime Minister Theresa May, showed more conciliatory attitude towards Brussels and opted for a compromise with the EU that would be acceptable to most of the MPs. Neither of these two groups officially supported the second referendum because – according to May’s famous expression – “Brexit means Brexit”.

For the Labour Party, in turn, the idea of the second referendum, just like the whole of Brexit, has become, over time, an extremely difficult political problem.

In the fight for party leadership in 2016, Jeremy Corbyn rejected the idea of a second referendum whereas his opponent – Owen Smith – pledged to support it. One of the turning points in this process was the declaration issued in September 2018 by Frances O’Grady, the leader of Labour’s close ally – Trades Union Congress (TUC). She said that she would demand “a popular vote” unless the government struck “the deal that working people need” with the EU (BBC News, 2018). Soon after, at the party conference, delegates voted overwhelmingly for a motion that calls for a second referendum in the event that parliament fails to approve an eventual deal. This was a significant change in the position of the party leadership though still without a clear call for a second referendum. The situation changed even more after seven MPs decided to leave the Labour Party and establish “The Independent Group” (TIG)¹. They were soon joined by one more Labour MP as well as three Tory MPs. What brought them all together was dissatisfaction with how their party leaders were dealing with Brexit and their support for a second referendum on EU membership (The Independent Group for Change, n.d.). This forced the Labour leadership to take a risky move and officially back a second referendum (with ‘remain’ as an option) if the party should fail to get its own version of a Brexit deal passed (Elgot, 2019). In September 2019, the Labour Party went a step further announcing that the next Labour manifesto would include a commitment to hold a referendum in which people will be able to decide whether they want Great Britain to leave the EU in accordance with the negotiated agreement, or whether they want Great Britain to remain the EU member state.

It is also worth mentioning that the proposal for a second referendum was three times rejected by the British parliament in March and April 2019. On 14 March, MPs rejected an amendment (tabled by one of the members of TIG) which called for a second Brexit referendum. The motion was rejected by 334 votes to 85 with vast majority of the Labour MPs abstaining (Votes in Parliament, <https://votes.parliament.uk>). On 27 March and 1 April, two rounds of so called ‘indicative votes’ took place. Each time they included a proposal for a second referendum but both of them failed to get enough support in the House of Commons (268–295 and 280–292).

The public opinion on the second referendum has also shifted since 2016. According to different polls, the number of referendum supporters equalled the one of its opponents. The results of the polls differ slightly because they depend

¹ Its current name is “The Independent Group for Change”.

on the content of the question about the various referendum options given to the respondents, but regardless of this the British citizens seem to be much more willing to have the final say on Brexit in 2019 than they were in 2016–2018².

As for the subject of the referendum, and thus the possible referendum question, many different ideas and suggestions have emerged. The most popular of them was a potential choice between remaining in the European Union and approving the negotiated withdrawal agreement, though other options were also taken into consideration. The authors of a report prepared in October 2018 by the Constitution Unit of the University College London emphasized that any further referendum must first and foremost be very carefully designed to maximize public legitimacy for the final decision, no matter what it would be. This was particularly important at a time when the political divide in the United Kingdom was so deep that politics was evoking very negative and often even confrontational emotions among citizens (Sargeant, Renwick, & Russell, 2018, pp. 3–4). The report identified three viable options that could have been put to a second referendum: accepting the deal negotiated by the government, remaining in the EU, or leaving without a deal. The option of negotiating a different deal was excluded as unsuitable for such a referendum. Regarding different question formats that could have been presented to voters, in principle two scenarios seemed most likely – either a choice between ‘deal’ and ‘remain’, or a three-option referendum: the two above-mentioned and additionally ‘no deal’ (Sargeant et al., 2018, p. 58).

Holding a second referendum on Brexit, which is also worth remembering, would have carried some risk. No matter which option would ultimately have been chosen and what question would ultimately have been put before the voters, this would have caused controversy among the British. To make sure that the result of such a referendum would have been accepted by all sides of political discourse, the whole process would have had to be as legitimate as possible. That included the principles of running a referendum campaign, proper conduct of voting as well as asking a clear question with unambiguous and precise answer options (Sargeant et al., 2018, p. 8).

² For detailed results of different polls regarding the second referendum and Brexit, see e.g.: <https://whatukthinks.org/eu/>.

BRETURN – FICTION OR A REAL SCENARIO?

Taking into consideration everything that has happened in the British politics since the 2016 referendum, it could be assumed that the chances of calling a second referendum were, for many reasons, rather low. All signs pointed to great determination of the British government, and above all the Prime Minister Boris Johnson himself, to finalize Brexit as soon as possible, even if it meant leaving the European Union without any deal. That is why Brexit seemed inevitable. No politician, especially the leader of one of the two main parties, would have been brave enough to play *va banque* and, for example, revoke Article 50 or strive for another referendum at all costs. Authorization to do this had not been granted to the government even once – neither by the parliament (above-mentioned ‘indicative votes’), nor by the British society, invariably very divided on Brexit. Therefore, mainly for this reason, making such decisions would have been definitely too risky and maybe even politically suicidal.

In general, there was no favourable climate in Great Britain to take such action. The political configuration in the British parliament meant the continuation of Theresa May’s government policy, and perhaps even a more demanding attitude and a more radical approach to talks with Brussels. On the other hand, it was also hard to expect another snap election, as for both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, its results could have been devastating. Therefore, Prime Minister Johnson did everything to deliver the will of the British people, i.e., bring Brexit to an end.

However, quite unexpectedly, another snap election was called, and after the landslide victory of the Conservative Party, the entire Brexit process significantly accelerated. The United Kingdom left the European Union on 31 January 2020. A transition period during which the UK must comply with all EU rules and laws is expected to last until 31 December 2020. A question can therefore now be asked whether we should expect UK’s return to the European Union after some time. In this context, it is also worth mentioning the declarations of some European politicians like Jean-Claude Juncker or Donald Tusk who had repeatedly, yet before Brexit happened, expressed the hope that Great Britain would reconsider its decision because its withdrawal from the EU would lead to mutual losses and would be economically devastating for both sides.

The idea of so called “Breturn”, as it was dubbed on some social media, could come true under several conditions. First of all, the post-Brexit reality would have to be definitely more difficult for Great Britain than even the most pessimistic

forecasts and predictions made by some experts and economists. It is worth remembering that, according to the architects of Brexit, Great Britain decided to leave the European Union not without a reason. In their vision Great Britain is supposed to be stronger outside the EU than it was as its member state. However, if it is not going to happen, there is a huge chance that after some time the British could be willing to return to the European Union.

Of course, in the current situation, this can only be seen as one of the potential scenarios for the future. Many factors will determine whether this scenario becomes reality. Much will depend on what kind of losses – both the economic and political ones – Brexit will bring for Great Britain. This, in turn, is very difficult to predict, especially when it comes to economic repercussions. It is no secret that this area is the most sensitive for the British. In fact, since the referendum, there have been serious warnings expressed by different economists that the Brexit's side effects may be very far-reaching and devastating for both the British and even the global economy. The most serious warnings are about the British currency, the London stock market and the banking sector – some banks have already started to look for new offices on the European continent, e.g., in Paris or in Frankfurt. What is more, due to the high uncertainty about the future, a lot of companies have postponed making investments in the United Kingdom (Lynn, 2016). And this was just the beginning.

From the legal point of view – according to the Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union – if one day Great Britain decides to rejoin the European Union, having formally left, it would be able to apply for re-admission to the Union practically at any time. It is very likely that such a decision would have to be taken by the British in a referendum. However, regardless of the procedure, this would involve the need to negotiate the terms of such new membership, like in the case of any other state that wants to join the European Union.

Even if one day the British are willing to re-join the EU, the Union will probably not be as generous as before and will not agree to such opt-outs that have so far allowed Great Britain to keep its currency or to stay outside the Schengen zone. Let alone the famous British budget rebate negotiated by the Margaret Thatcher's government. Such issues and complexities, as well as many additional ones, would be on the table once again. From this point of view, it was probably better for the British not to leave the European Union at all than to leave and after some time try to come back to it.

SUMMARY

On one side, it could have been predicted that the process of leaving the European Union, after being part of it for more than 40 years (originally within the European Communities, since 1993 within the EU) would not be smooth and easy for Great Britain. Obviously, it should be taken into account that the European Union, as a political entity, may be characterized as a supranational organization, which means that the integration within it is very advanced. In certain areas the EU has exclusive competence to make European law which, according to one of the basic principles of the European integration, is superior to the national law of EU member states. EU's institutions have very broad powers that go far beyond the classical scope of competence known from other international organizations.

On the other side, however, it could not have been predicted that Brexit would bring so much complications. Over the three and a half years since the 2016 referendum, it turned out that neither the British government nor the British parliament could bring this process to an end. During this period of time various politicians were responsible for negotiations with the European Union on behalf of the government and – as a result of the political deadlock – even a change of prime minister took place. Let alone a snap election or the UK's Supreme Court ruling that the suspension of parliament was unlawful. The British parliament, which shortly after the referendum reserved itself the right to finally accept the withdrawal agreement, rejected three different versions of such an agreement, which forced the government to ask the EU for two extensions – the second of which until 31 October 2019. The parliament itself was not able to come up with any alternative scenario. In three memorable series of so called 'indicative votes', none of the options obtained the required majority in the House of Commons. What is more, the famous Benn Act (European Union [Withdrawal], 2019), passed by the parliament in September 2019 required the prime minister to seek another extension if (by 19 October) no new deal was reached. Once again it strengthened the parliament which had to give its consent not only to a withdrawal agreement but also to a potential no-deal Brexit.

All these complications led to a situation in which considerations on whether Great Britain should revoke Article 50, and therefore remain in the EU, became more and more serious and took on new meaning. More and more discussions also began over the possible second referendum, which could have also resulted in Great Britain remaining a member state of the European Union. All these

discussions ended with the UK snap election held on 12 December 2019. After the victory of the Conservative Party, the final decision to leave the European Union was only a matter of time. This in turn has led to the growing popularity of the idea of “Bretturn” which would make it possible to treat Brexit only as a transitory phenomenon.

The aim of the article was to prove a thesis that the idea of a second referendum was highly unlikely. One might say that so many strange and difficult to predict things had happened around Brexit, that nothing was excluded. However, a second referendum, even though expected by a significant part of the public opinion, would have probably been a step too far and led to even greater political chaos. On the other hand, it was also hard not to take into account the arguments that the British should be able to have the final say on Brexit – once the terms of the withdrawal agreement were known or once it was known whether such an agreement would be signed at all. There were no legal obstacles for such a referendum to take place, just as there were no legal obstacles for the British government to decide by itself to revoke Article 50. Nevertheless, the legal perspective would not have been sufficient to justify such a decision. In this particular case, political circumstances were far more important than the legal ones. And these were extremely complex and risky since Brexit – with a withdrawal agreement or without it – seemed to be inevitable.

As for the possible “Bretturn”, its most important determinant is time, i.e., how Great Britain will be doing outside the EU and whether the pessimistic scenarios written by some politicians, experts and economists will become reality. If so, everything is possible, though there are lots of procedural and political factors that could stand in the way.

Once it seemed that accession to the European Union has such far-reaching consequences that no country will decide to voluntarily leave this organization. It turned out that is not necessarily true anymore. That is why also a return scenario should not definitely be ruled out.

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION URBAN AGENDA: A HARD PATH TOWARDS A CITY-ORIENTED POLICY?

EWOLUCJA AGENDY MIEJSKIEJ UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ: TRUDNA
DROGA DO POLITYKI MIEJSKIEJ?

*Liliia Hrytsai** 

— ABSTRACT —

During the last decades, alongside the growing role of cities, the process of urbanization has been receiving more and more attention from the European policy-makers. This study analyzes the evolution of the EU urban agenda establishment since 1970* till the present times. In the first part, the paper presents five stages, most important milestones and core programs regarding the urbanization process in Europe. In the second section, the author pays a special attention to the Urban Agenda for the EU (the Pact of Amsterdam) as one of the key documents promoting the sound cooperation among the European urban policy stakeholders. In the final part, the paper provides the evaluation of the EU urban agenda's genesis by indicating the main features of this process.

Keywords: European Union; Urban Agenda for the EU; urbanization; cities

— ABSTRAKT —

W ostatnich dziesięcioleciach, wraz z rosnącą rolą miast, proces urbanizacji cieszy się coraz większym zainteresowaniem europejskich decydentów. Niniejsze badanie analizuje ewolucję tworzenia agendy miejskiej UE od lat 70. XX wieku do czasów obecnych. W pierwszej części artykułu przedstawiono pięć etapów procesu urbanizacji w Europie, jego kamienie milowe oraz główne elementy programowe. W drugiej części autorka zwraca szczególną uwagę na Agendę Miejską dla UE (Pakt Amsterdamski) jako jeden z kluczowych dokumentów promujących solidną współpracę pomiędzy interesariuszami europejskiej polityki miejskiej. W końcowej części artykułu poddano ocenie przebieg tworzenia agendy miejskiej UE, z uwzględnieniem głównych cech tego procesu.

Słowa kluczowe: Unia Europejska; agenda miejska dla UE; urbanizacja; miasta

* Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Faculty of Political Science and Journalism.

INTRODUCTION

Cities are important players in the European Union¹ social, political and economic life. As of 2019, urban areas account for 75% of the total EU population. The level of urbanization varies from country to country – in Austria, it estimates only 59%, while the Belgian urbanization reached 98% (World Bank, 2020). In comparison, globally the amount of people living in cities and towns amounts to 55% of the world population or 4.1 billion people (Ritchie & Roser, 2018). Besides the urban areas occupy only 3% of the total Earth surface, they are responsible for 80% of global GDP, two-thirds of global energy consumption, 70% of global waste and 75% of global GHG emissions (REN21, 2019, p. 19). During the period of 2012–2016, the urban population growth in Europe estimated 2.4%. The number of people living in the European cities and towns is expected to amount 83.7% in 2050 (European Commission, 2020).

At the beginning of 1970s, the European Community, instead of creation of the urban agenda, was focusing on cohesion and regional policies. Cities always have been sources of wealth, human capital and innovation, but at the same moment, they have been continuously facing a number of social, environmental and economic challenges, such as urban poverty, air and water pollution, high criminal rates, etc. The relevant regulations in the urban area were necessary at both supranational and national levels, but it took about three decades to initiate and then formalize the EU urban policy-making process. A range of informal ministerial meetings (1999–2016), a number of declarations adopted, three rounds of the URBACT program (2002–2006; 2006–2013; 2014–2020), and the Urban Agenda for EU (2016) constitute the main legacy and basis of the European urban policy-making. Nowadays, the urban dimension receives a special attention from the EU institutions, which support cooperation and knowledge exchange between local policy-makers and stakeholders (González Medina & Fedeli, 2015, pp. 3–9).

The main aim of this article is to research the evolution of the EU urban policy, as well as to analyze and characterize this process from its beginning to the present time. Moreover, the author pays special attention to the Urban

¹ The geographical scope of this research, first of all, encompasses the European Union, because the EU is presented here as a leader of the European urban policy-making. Nevertheless, the term 'Europe' is used here interchangeably, because many EU programs also contain non-EU Member States, such as Switzerland and Norway.

Agenda for the EU (the Pact of Amsterdam), which takes a particular place in the EU urban policy-making. The paper aims to answer on the following three research questions: (1) What is the genesis of the EU urban policy-making? (2) How does the Urban Agenda for the EU support the urban dimension of European policy? (3) What are the most important features of the EU urban policy-making through decades? The research paper provides answers within three sections: the first one evaluates five stages and most important milestones of the European urban policy-making; the second section analyzes the Urban Agenda for the EU; the last part characterizes the evolution and present features of the European urban agenda.

The research method of this paper is based on a desk review of the topic-relevant scientific articles, i.e., González Medina & Fedeli (2015), Parkinson (2005), and Olejnik (2017), as well as the EU strategic documents and declarations. The research material was supplemented by a number of official webpages with information of currently performed programs, the EU statistic databases, and the latest reports and guidelines provided by the EU. The received information from several diverse sources differs, thus the author compares, analyzes and presents her own vision of the evolution and main features of the EU urban policy-making.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN URBAN POLICY

There is a lack of commonly accepted evolution stages of European urban policy-making. On the basis of a study conducted by Van den Berg et al. for the Dutch Presidency, Parkinson (2005) claims that the European urban policy development might be divided into the following four stages: Stage 1: 1975–1988; Stage 2: 1989–1993; Stage 3: 1994–1999; Stage 4: 2000–2006. According to the newest research presented by González Medina & Fedeli (2015), the development of urban policy in Europe can be seen through four phases: Phase 1: 1990–1999; Phase 2: 2000–2006; Phase 3: 2007–2013; Phase 4: 2014–2020. Furthermore, there are various opinions regarding the formal beginning of the integration of urban dimension into the European policy. González Medina & Fedeli (2015) argue that the Treaty of Rome (1958) became the first document which addressed the goal of “harmonious development” and thus entered the urban dimension into the debate. Olejnik (2017) believes that the first document presenting territorial and urban development to the European agenda was the Leipzig Charter on

Sustainable European Cities (2007), which focuses on the involvement of the European stakeholders in the urban development policy. In turn, according to URBACT (2017), “Urban policy is not of itself an EU level responsibility [...] but in the Lisbon treaty of 2009, the notion of territorial cohesion appeared for the first time”. Moreover, URBACT does not divide the European urban policy on a several stages or phases, but lists the most important milestones of the development of this policy. This section aims to specify the stages and investigate the most important milestones of the European urban policy.

The First Stage: 1975–1988. At this stage, González Medina & Fedeli (2015) consider cities as the main sources of unbalances and socio-economic disparities both at a national level and between Member States. From the beginning it became clear that urban areas were experiencing a significant decline due to the globalization and deindustrialization movements. Since the establishment of Monetary Union in 1969, cities started to be considered as key players to perform new integrated actions, where social, economic and spatial dimensions could be tightly interconnected. On the other hand, due to the growing territorial unbalances, Member States payed a special attention to the spatial dimension at a supranational level. Since the establishment of the Club of Rome and their prominent publication *The Limits of Growth* (1972), cities started to be considered as important players in the emerging environmental crisis. Parkinson (2005) stresses that at this period the European Union was focused on regions, not at cities. Starting from its beginning, the European Community aimed to achieve political integration through economic integration. In the mid-1970s, the Community discovered that the realization of this ambitious plan can be threatened by the large economic gap between the rich and poor regions. To overcome this challenge, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was initiated in 1975 with 5% of the Community budget. The Single European Act established the basis for an authentic EU cohesion policy aiming to overcome the impact of the single market on less developed areas. In 1987, when the Act went into force, regional policy amounted to about 20% of the total EU budget. Besides the fact that the 1980s brought significant concerns regarding the differences between regions, there was no direct link to the urban dimension.

The Second Stage: 1989–1999. In the early 1970s, cities and local authorities were seeking for a stronger position and better consideration within Member States. In this aspect, urban areas were experiencing a new autonomy with the same limited capacities. Mayors of most important European cities demonstrated their interest in the European institutions through which they could make an

impact on the European agenda and policies (European Union, 2011, pp. 32–34). In this sense, the role of city networks was particularly important – the Eurocity manifesto (1989) stated that Europe is represented by its cities, thus there is a huge necessity to grant the urban areas with a greater responsibility for the EU development. In 1989, after the reform of Structural Funds and the revision of the Treaty of Rome (focused on social and economic cohesion), the European Union launched its very first urban initiative, i.e., the Urban Pilot Projects (1989–1994), which was followed by URBAN I Program (1994–1999; González Medina & Fedeli, 2015, p. 6).

Furthermore, the early 1990s were determined by a strong influence of the ideas and concerns raised at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, so-called Rio Summit (Dühr, Colomb, & Nadin, 2010, pp. 10–11). The “Rio spirit” was supported by the Aalborg Charter (1994), where the “urban issue” was formulated in terms of the Sustainable Development concept. Such prospective was recognized by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and was embodied in one of the EU objectives. The “Report on European Sustainable Cities” (1996) drew attention to the lack of coherent EU urban policy and the notable absence of the idea of European urban agenda (González Medina & Fedeli, 2015, p. 6).

The second stage also was marked by the development of a very first European urban agenda. The EU communication “Towards an Urban Agenda in the European Union” (1997) set four goals to be achieved by the European urban agenda, namely (1) competitiveness and employment; (2) economic and social cohesion; (3) transport and trans-European networks; and (4) sustainable development and the quality of life in cities (Atkinson, 2001, pp. 386–388). A year later, the aforementioned objectives were confirmed and specified in the following EU document titled “Sustainable Urban Development in the European Union: A Framework for Action” (1998). This framework addressed the issue of an improved coordination and targeted community action towards urban problems. It was presented as four interlinked policy goals: (1) Strengthening economic prosperity and employment in towns and cities; (2) Promoting equality, social inclusion and regeneration in urban areas; (3) Protecting and improving the urban environment: towards local and global sustainability; and (4) Contributing to good urban governance and local empowerment (Parkinson, 2005, p. 12).

The Third Stage: 2000–2006. At this stage, the European Union continued the above-mentioned development of comprehensive EU urban policies. The lack of formal EU competences in the area of urban and regional development made

this process strongly intergovernmental and participatory. Starting from 1999, the European Commission had been promoting informal meetings between ministers responsible for local issues and spatial planning. These meetings established a broad range of principles and agreements, which laid in the basis of the present EU urban policies. Table 1 demonstrates the most important informal meetings regarding the EU urban issues.

Table 1. Informal Meetings Regarding the EU Urban Issues

Year	Place	Ministers responsible	Documents adopted
1999	Potsdam (DE)	Spatial Planning	European Spatial Development Perspective
2000	Lille (FR)	Urban Affairs	Lille Action Programme
2004	Rotterdam (NL)	Urban Affairs	Acquis URBAN
2005	Bristol (UK)	Sustainable Communities	Bristol Accord
2007	Leipzig (DE)	Urban Policy	Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities
2007	Leipzig (DE)	Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion	Territorial Agenda of the European Union
2008	Marseille (FR)	Urban Development	Marseille Declaration
2010	Toledo (ES)	Urban Development	Toledo Declaration
2011	Gödöllő (HU)	Spatial Planning and Territorial Development	Territorial Agenda of the European Union 2020
2014	Athens (GR)	Cohesion Policy	Towards an EU urban agenda – future steps
2015	Riga (LV)	Territorial Cohesion and Urban Matters	Riga Declaration
2016	Amsterdam (NL)	Territorial Cohesion and Urban Matters	Amsterdam Pact

Source: González Medina & Fedeli, 2015, p. 7.

At the first meeting held in Potsdam (Germany) in 1999, the ministers responsible for spatial planning launched the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), which promoted a sustainable and balanced territorial development of the EU. This document set three main objectives: (1) economic and social cohesion; (2) sustainable development; and (3) balanced competitiveness of the European territory. Moreover, they proposed a new method supporting both analysis and coordination of the particular EU urban policies, as well as

provided a common framework for debates about urban issue on the European scale (Atkinson, 2001). Nevertheless, the area of territorial development and sustainable development were overlapping, because both policy institutions were dealing with the same problems and objectives. This challenge finds its solution during the further stages of the EU urban agenda development process by merging into the cohesion policy framework (González Medina & Fedeli, 2015, p. 8).

The European Council set the Lisbon Strategy 2000–2010, which defined the EU political context. This ten-year strategy aimed to promote the EU as “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth, with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Commission, 2007). The Gothenburg Strategy (2001) complemented this objective by environment and sustainable development dimensions. Both documents strengthened the discourse regarding the leading role of cities in the EU economic growth, social cohesion and sustainable development. Both strategies were supported by the first pilot initiative – URBACT I program (2002–2006). This program gathered 118 cities across Europe and allocated more than EUR 900 million from the EU funding for urban-related targets (Dühr et al., 2010, p. 287).

The Forth Stage: 2007–2013. This period was marked by a complete integration of urban dimension in the EU policies. In 2007, the Informal Meeting of Ministers responsible for Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig (Germany) caused a new impulse for the development of the EU urban policies (European Union, 2007). Consequently, both the Leipzig Charter and the Territorial Agenda of the EU were adopted the same year. This was a clear sign of the growing interconnections between the urban dimension and the territorial approach of the EU policies within the framework of cohesion policy (Olejnik, 2017, pp. 175–175).

The Europe 2020 Strategy (2010) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) only underlined the role of urban areas in the prospective development of the EU, as well as pointed out that both fields require a high level of coordination. However, the notion of territorial cohesion was not clearly defined, as well as shared competences between Member States and the EU. This new status enabled the European Commission to overcome its historic limit regarding the formal competences in the field of urban development by authorizing the EC to intervene in the urban development issues (European Commission, 2014). Simultaneously, the technical field of the territorial and urban development began to be linked to territorial cohesion. This position was approved by the Toledo Declaration (2010)

stating that the “urban development should be an integral part of the concept and wider context of territorial cohesion” (European Union, 2010). From the EU Structural Funds perspective this meant that urban policies would no longer be considered as Community Initiatives, but entirely integrated into national and regional Operational Programmes, mainly the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF). Additionally, majority of these changes was contextualized into the reflection process “Cities of Tomorrow” (2009) initiated by Johannes Hahn – the then Commissioner for Regional Policy. In 2011, as a result of this process, an expert report approved the existence of the “European model of urban development” (González Medina & Fedeli, 2015, p. 10).

In 2007, the EC launched the second round of URBACT (2007–2013) covering the whole EU, Norway, and Switzerland (European Commission, 2007). The main aim of URBACT II was the promotion of cooperation and knowledge exchange between European cities. The initiative consisted of 70 programs covering 2.2 million inhabitants (URBACT II, 2011). The total budget of the program was estimated at EUR 67.8 million, from which 78.6% or EUR 53.1 million constituted sources from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF; European Commission, 2007).

The Fifth Stage: 2014–2020. During this period the process of formalization of the EU urban agenda reached its peak. The present stage is characterized by a range of changes towards the formalization of the urban agenda both at EU and Member State level. First of all, the 1st CITIES Forum in 2014 demonstrated a strong need for the EU urban agenda for various stakeholders across the Europe. In 2014, the European Commission launched a public consultation to improve the understanding of the EU urban agenda. The European Commission pointed that the main objective of this consultation is to reach relevant stakeholders from different levels and to gather their opinions of the further directions of the EU urban agenda. In 2015, the results of this consultation were presented at the 2nd CITIES Forum, as well as summarized in the EC working document entitled “Results of the Public Consultation on the key Features of an EU Urban Agenda” (2015; González Medina & Fedeli, 2015, p. 11).

Presented in 2014, the Integrated Sustainable Urban Development (ISUD) approach shifts from being “optional” to being “mandatory” in order to access to the European Regional Development Funding. According to Art. 7 of ERDF Regulation, “at least 5% of the ERDF resources [...] shall be allocated to integrated actions for sustainable urban development where cities, sub-regional or local bodies [are] responsible for implementing sustainable urban strategies”. The new

rules and legislation regarding the next round of EU cohesion policy contained a more holistic approach and integrated sustainable urban strategies. Moreover, some Member States expressed their desire to launch their own national urban agendas within the frame of the new cohesion policy in accordance with the principles of the ISUD model (European Commission, 2014, pp. 1–4).

Following the URBACT I and II programs, URBACT III (2014–2020) aims to support the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy through the promotion of integrated urban development. Being the instrument of the cohesion policy, URBACT III is co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund, the 28 EU Member States, Switzerland, and Norway. The budget of the third round estimates EUR 96.3 million. The main objective of actual program is the improvement of city capacities to manage sustainable urban policies and practices in a participative and integrated way. The program is mainly delivered through a transnational exchange of knowledge between practitioners and decision-makers at a local level (URBACT, 2020). According to the URBACT III Citizen's Summary concluding activities of URBACT in 2018, 205 cities have launched their own Integrated Action plans; over 90% of these plans are already approved by the municipalities; by September, 50% of cities had secured funds for their implementation; and by October, 80% had started to implement these actions (URBACT, 2018, p. 1).

THE URBAN AGENDA FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

A special place in the EU urban policy-making is devoted to the Urban Agenda for the EU (the Pact of Amsterdam). This document was adopted on May 30, 2016, during the informal meeting of EU ministers responsible for urban development. The Dutch Presidency launched the Agenda as a political and strategic document mapping directions of the EU urban policy. Consultations regarding the draft of the Agenda began in the early 2016 and involved a broad range of multiple actors, including the European Commission, EU Member States, CEMR, EESC, EIB, CoR, EUKN, URBACT, Eurocities, and ESPON. The Agenda contains a number of important guidelines, i.e., operational frameworks, thematic priorities, objectives and actions (European Commission, 2019, p. 6).

The Pact of Amsterdam establishes a new model for multidimensional and multilevel cooperation of urban policy stakeholders aiming to strengthen the urban aspect in the EU policies. The Leipzig Charter (2007) and Toledo Declara-

tion (2010) constitute the main foundation of the Agenda. Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy performs the function of coordinative body of the Agenda. The main tasks of DG are the following: (1) to ensure effectiveness and transparency of actions; (2) to monitor progress; (3) to prepare informal guidelines for the further development of the Pact; (4) to share feedback concerning Action Plans for Partnerships; and (5) to make evaluation of thematic priorities (European Union, 2016, pp. 6–7).

The implementation mechanism of the Agenda is based on cooperation within 4 Partnerships of the following stakeholders: Member States, the European Commission DGs, local governments, institutions and experts. The main aim of Partnerships is a multidimensional and multilevel reinforcement of the European urban policy in the following three areas: (1) better exchange of knowledge; (2) better regulation; and (3) better funding. Each priority area is delivered within a chosen Partnership aiming to prepare and realize the Action Plan in two or three years (Olejnik, 2017, pp. 177–179).

The Urban Agenda for the EU highlights 14 thematic priorities within 4 Partnerships:

1. Amsterdam Partnerships (2016):
 - a. Air quality;
 - b. Housing;
 - c. Urban poverty;
 - d. Inclusion of migrants and refugees;
2. Bratislava Partnerships (2017):
 - a. Digital transition;
 - b. Urban mobility;
 - c. Circular economy;
 - d. Jobs and skills in the local economy;
3. Malta Partnerships (2018):
 - a. Public procurement;
 - b. Sustainable use of land;
 - c. Energy transition;
 - d. Climate adaptation;
4. Vienna Partnerships (2019):
 - a. Security in public spaces;
 - b. Culture/cultural heritage (European Commission, 2019, p. 8).

14 Partnerships gather together 23 Member States, 10 regions, 96 cities and/or metropolitan regions, the 17 European Commission DGs and about 33 institu-

tions, including European umbrella organizations, programs and networks, as well as private companies and civil society organizations. Totally, around 262 partners work together, facilitating the EU urban agenda through the regular dialogue and joined-up solutions. One of the most important characteristics of the Agenda is its capacity to connect policy actors who would otherwise not be linked. The cooperation and activities provided under this Agenda are funded through URBACT III and the Urban Innovative Actions (European Commission, 2019, p. 7).

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EU URBAN POLICY-MAKING

Over a long time, the process of the EU urban policy-making has been informal and “implicit” in its nature. It was the consequence of the fact that the European Union had no formal competences in the area of urban development and spatial planning in that time. In 1992, the European Commission proposed to introduce some changes in the Maastricht Treaty in order to delegate to the EU a range of related competences, but Member States rejected this initiative. As the result, the European urban agenda has been created in the form of intergovernmental dialogue. Thus, since 1999, ministers responsible for urban development set periodically informal meetings, i.e., Potsdam, 1999; Lille, 2000; Rotterdam, 2004; Bristol, 2005; Leipzig, 2007; Marseille, 2008; Toledo, 2010; Gödöllő, 2011; Athens, 2014; Riga, 2015; and Amsterdam, 2016 (European Commission, 2019).

A list of amendments was introduced in 2012, which, on the one hand, improved the visibility of urban dimension in the EU agenda and, on the other hand, facilitated the integration between sustainable development and territorial communities within the cohesion policy. First of all, the former DG REGIO became the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, which undoubtedly underlined the presence of urban dimension in the EU policy. As it was recommended in the Toledo Declaration (2010), the urban development had been gradually integrated into the “territorial cohesion” objective. Furthermore, according to the Lisbon Treaty (2007), the “territorial cohesion” became a shared competence between the European Union and Member States. Secondly, since 2012 the Urban Development Group (1999) and the Network of Territorial Cohesion Contact Points (2007) share the same working webpage. Both initiatives provide technical reports for the informal meetings of ministers responsible

for urban development and spatial development (González Medina & Fedeli, 2015, p. 4).

The informal approach of the European urban policy-making required a participation of a broad range of urban actors and stakeholders. Besides of ministers responsible, the following actors were involved in the EU urban agenda establishment: the European Commission, the URBAN Intergroup at the European Parliament, the Urban Development Group (UDG), the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the Committee of the Regions (CoR), and the European Investment Bank (EIB). This list was complemented by a number of interest groups, organizations and city networks (e.g., ICLEI, Eurocities, CEMR, etc.), as well as technical networks (URBACT, EUKN, ESPON, etc.). Moreover, URBACT and other exchange programmes helped to strengthen relationships between local governments and between local governments and EU institutions. Such exchange programs provided both cities and EU institutions with relevant knowledge, contacts, technical assistance and funding in order to overcome national and regional dependence (Parkinson, 2005, pp. 3–7).

Nowadays, as around three-fourth of the EU total population is living in cities and towns, the urban dimension became one of the most important issues of the EU agenda. González Medina & Fedeli (2015) argue that the most common feature of the latest EU urban policy-making process is its Europeanization. The authors define the Europeanization as “processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms [...] which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse [...]”. In practice, it means that the EU directly addresses urban issues in its strategic documents, which provides a strategic roadmap for all Member States.

In opposition to the early stages of the EU urban agenda creation, the European Commission pays a particular attention to the urban area and local policies. The urban Europeanization process is tightly connected to the ISUD approach, which is strongly promoted by the new Cohesion policy 2014–2020 through the European Structural and Investment Funds 2014–2020 (ESI Funds). Nowadays, the European Union provides Member States with the integrated financial instruments supporting urban development. Member States are encouraged to broadly use the financial tools facilitating sustainable urban development. Thus, a minimum of 5% of the European Regional Development Funds resources should be invested in the realization of ISUD Strategies aiming to ensure a long-

lasting improvement in the social, environmental and economic condition of cities (European Commission, 2019).

The actual process of Europeanization strongly facilitates the local empowerment and networking. At the same time, this process is strongly supported by the European Commission, which provides funding for the local initiatives, as well as promotes cooperation between Member State's cities and towns. González Medina & Fedeli (2015) distinguish three main dimensions of the current stage of the EU urban policy-making and its Europeanization. The first one is a top-down approach, which suggests that the implementation of the EU documents particularly concentrates on the domestic features and needs. The second, bottom-up dimension, points on the growing role of the local governments in the European policy-making. The third one, a horizontal approach, claims that the Europeanization can take place even without the direct involvement of EU institutions, however, the EU bodies can act as facilitators of the process by creating common platforms and networks for city cooperation.

CONCLUSION

The European urban agenda has been evolving through decades from being invisible to the top position within the EU policies. The research presents the evolution of the EU urban policy-making as five stages with a number of important milestones. At the first stage (1975–1988), the urban policy was not formalized, thus regions, but not cities, were gaining all the attention from EU policy-makers. The second stage activities (1989–1999) were marked by the first successful attempts to formally introduce the urban dimension into the EU policy-making and, in the result, the creation of the Urban Pilot Projects (1989–1994) and URBAN I Program (1994–1999). The third stage (2000–2006) of the EU policy-making was dominated by the informal meetings of ministers responsible, as well as the establishment of URBACT I (2002–2006). At the fourth stage (2007–2013), the EU urban policy-making was already formalized and put on a high level of the EU agenda; following URBACT I, the second round of this program was established for the period of 2007–2013. For the fifth stage (2014–2020), the European policy-makers presented the Integrated Sustainable Urban Development (ISUD) as a requirement to access the European Regional Development Funding; also, they continued URBACT initiative for the third round (2014–2020; URBACT, 2017).

Established in 2016, the Urban Agenda for the EU (the Pact of Amsterdam) created 14 Partnerships aiming to promote a new model of multidimensional and multilevel cooperation between urban policy stakeholders. The 14 Partnerships cover major urban policy issues, such as air quality, urban mobility, energy transition, security in public spaces, etc. The Agenda enables local communities to improve the exchange of knowledge, regulations and funding. Nowadays, the Agenda is bringing together 262 participants from 96 cities and 10 regions in 23 Member States.

The EU urban policy-making has passed the path from being the informal area of the EU agenda to the well-developed European policy based on a broad range of strategic documents. During the “informal” period, the EU urban policy-making was mainly based on meetings of ministers responsible for local issues and spatial planning. A number of declarations was adopted during such meeting, i.e., the Leipzig Charter (2007), the Toledo Declaration (2010), and the above-mentioned Pact of Amsterdam (2016). The informal nature of the EU urban agenda required a high level of cooperation among various stakeholders including the EC, EESC, CoR, ICLEI, Eurocities, URBACT, and the private sector. After the formalization of the EU urban policy, the Europeanization took place. The European Union, particularly the EC, pays special attention to the European urban issues by creating three generations of the URBACT program and integrating the urban dimension into the EU cohesion policy. The EU financially supports urban-related projects through the European Regional Development Funds and promotes sustainable development of European cities with the Integrated Sustainable Urban Development approach.

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JOINING THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION AND AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

UCZESTNICTWO W UNII GOSPODARCZEJ I WALUTOWEJ
A KONSTYTUCJA RP

*Szymon Pawłowski** 

— ABSTRACT —

The purpose of the article is to present a proposal to amend the Basic Law and to indicate its close connection with the nature of the political (system) decision. The amendment to the Basic Law may be extended or limited. Possible legal constructions were carried out in the article. This would determine the conditions of Poland's participation in the euro area, which are acceptable from the Polish constitution's point of view.

Keywords: constitution; European Union; monetary union; euro; European integration

— ABSTRAKT —

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie propozycji zmiany ustawy zasadniczej i wskazanie na jej ścisłe powiązanie z charakterem politycznej (ustrojowej) decyzji. Nowelizacja ustawy zasadniczej może bowiem być rozbudowana albo mieć charakter ograniczony. W artykule przeprowadzono możliwe konstrukcje prawne, które z kolei rozstrzygałyby o dopuszczalnych – z punktu widzenia polskiej konstytucji – warunkach uczestnictwa Polski w strefie euro.

Słowa kluczowe: konstytucja; Unia Europejska; unia walutowa; euro; integracja europejska

* University of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Institute of Political Science and Administration.

The main aim of this paper is a comparative and dogmatic analysis of constitutional models of integration clauses for the EMU which serves to verify hypothesis on the possibility of control of the integration process in the field of monetary integration. By using the method of dogmatic and comparative analysis it is possible to answer the question: what power would remain in the Polish constitutional institution after Poland's joining to the Euro zone by choosing different integration models. This analysis is of both cognitive and decisive character.

European Monetary Union is one of the most important common EU policies and the adoption of the euro would be an extremely important decision for Poland. An extensive body of literature on the subject of EMU and its extension confirms the importance of the issue in legal (Bałaban, 2002; Wójtowicz, 2006; Jaskiernia, 2009; Banaszak & Balicki, 2010; Czarny & Nowak-Far, 2010; Gronkiewicz-Walz, 2010; Jarosz-Żukowska & Żukowski, 2010; Kraś, 2011; Kustra, 2011; Zubik, 2011; Muszyński, 2013; Barcz & Kranz, 2013; Balicki, 2015; Kawalec & Pytlarczyk, 2016; Olszak & Porzycki, 2020; Orłowski & Skrzydło, 2020), political (Grosse, 2010; Orzechowska, 2010; Fiszer, 2010; Cichocki & Grosse, 2016; Grosse, 2018), and economic (Hölscher, 2014; Postek, Tchorek, & Tymoczko, 2015; Iwanicz-Drozdowska, 2016) area. In connection with the euro adoption being prepared, it is necessary to ensure the so-called legal convergence of the national law, including constitution, with EU primary law (cf. Art. 131 of the TFEU, former 109 of the TEC). Such a view is expressed by the European Central Bank and most of the doctrine. The literature argues that before Poland joins the euro area, it is necessary to amend primarily Art. 227 (1) and (6) of the Constitution (Pietrusiński, 2019; Pawłowski, 2015; Balczyk, 2014). Only the minority view presented in the doctrine is the argument that it is possible to adopt common currency without amending Art. 227 of the Polish Constitution as a result of "pro-Union" interpretation (see presentation of these views in Jarosz-Żukowska & Żukowski, 2010).

Neither the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, nor the Act on NBP directly provides that the central bank is independent of the government and other institutions (national and of the Union), so it is non-compliant with Art. 130 TFEU (see the ECB Convergence Report of 2018). The ECB Convergence Report of 2004 alleged (which was sustained later on) that provisions of the Act on NBP, and Article 227 of the Constitution provide for the National Bank of Poland's monetary policy powers and the issuing of money, and do not recognise the ECB's powers in this field (as regards the issuing of money, the ECB has

the power to issue banknotes only). The premises for relieving the President of NBP from office, as specified in the Act on NBP to which Art. 227 (7) of the Constitution refers, are incompatible with EU law, in particular with Art. 14.2. of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB. The European Commission took the view that Art. 198 of the Constitution was to also violate Art. 14.2. of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, which makes the President of NBP constitutionally accountable to the Tribunal of State, since Art. 14.2. of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB provides for a closed catalogue of premises for relieving governors of national central banks from office (violation of personal feature of independence; Commission Convergence Report of December 2006, p. 123). In the convergence reports, the European Central Bank and the Commission pointed to the need to amend Art. 203 of the Constitution, which defines too wide a scope of control of the Supreme Audit Office over NBP, namely in the aspect of purposefulness of actions taken by NBP in relation to the main purpose which is to maintain price stability (the institutional feature of independence may be violated, ECB Convergence Report of May 2004). The imperative to maintain confidentiality of information which NBP would obtain in the Eurosystem would involve the need to amend Art. 203 of the Constitution and restrict access of the Supreme Audit Office to the NBP's data.

In addition, ECB concludes that regulation provided by Art. 220 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland is too narrow. The prohibition prescribed therein is not identical to the prohibition of financing public institutions by the central bank under Art. 123 of the TFEU. However, it seems that the ECB does not require amendment of the Constitution in this respect since Art. 123 of the TFEU, and Regulation 3603/93 supplementing this prohibition, is applied directly in all Member States, including Poland.

Given the allegations raised, one should consider directions of amendments of the Polish Constitution in the process of preparations for joining the euro area. The issues which need to be resolved are, first, the nature of the amendment – whether it is to be heterogeneous or autonomic (Bainczyk, 2017); and second – the scope of the amendment. This paper is focused on changes of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, but it is obvious that for Poland to possibly adopt the euro, changes are also required in the statutory law, especially in the Act on the National Bank of Poland.

Neither the preamble nor provisions of the Polish Constitution mention the European Union, the European System of Central Banks or the European Central Bank by name. The Constitution merely provides for a standard which prescribes

the procedure of joining the European Union and accepting amendments of Treaty foundations of the EU consisting in the conferral of competencies to that international organisation – Art. 90 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland does not *expressis verbis* define material conditions for participation in the European Union, and even more so in the monetary union. Given that the constitution-maker has omitted these issues, such conditions have been defined by the Constitutional Tribunal (judgments Ref. No. K 18/04 and K 32/09). The constitutional court pointed to the obligation of the state bodies to control the integration process in such a way so as not to infringe upon the constitutional principle of state sovereignty and the principle of respecting (not conferring) the constitutional identity. Both principles are strictly interconnected. The Constitutional Tribunal put itself in the role of a body, also with regard to the constitutional bodies actively participating in the process of defining EU Treaty framework – the President of the Republic of Poland, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament – which ultimately defines and controls the integration process and affords protection against crossing the “boundaries and measures” which protect sovereignty. It should be noted that such “boundaries and measures” are the principles derived from Art. 8, Art. 90 and Art. 91 of the Constitution, defined in the case law of the constitutional court, named a “*normative anchor*” (Bainczyk, 2017). One of the most important “anchors” is the constitutional identity, defined as the scope of non-transferable constitutional matters (Granat, 2012). It should be noted that the constitution-maker perhaps should clearly define conditions for participation in the EU, thus providing the Constitutional Tribunal with a more precise audit template for reviewing constitutionality of the integration process, but limiting its scope to the interpretation and deriving new limiting standards from the existing wording of the Constitution.

Both the doctrine (e.g., Zubik, 2011) and the existing practice examined extension of constitutional foundations for membership in the EU by adding a Union chapter. The draft Act amending the Constitution submitted by the President of the Republic of Poland B. Komorowski and processed by the Sejm (Sejm print No. 3598/6th term of office) proposed a new chapter Xa “Membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union”. The draft also assumed amendment of Art. 227 of the Constitution. The amendment to Art. 227 was to come into effect on the day on which the euro would become legal currency in the Republic of Poland (Art. 3 of draft Act amending the Constitution). Relevant adjustments to Art. 203 and Art. 204 were proposed, with Art. 198 of the

Constitution left unchanged. The Presidential proposal is close to the regulation prescribed by the Art. 102 of the Constitution of Portugal (identification of the tasks of the central bank arising out of the national law and international agreements). It is also a limitation clause, which clearly defines the objective of NBP, which is still to maintain price stability, despite incorporation of the central bank in the Eurosystem. However, it is unclear why it is proposed in a constitutional provision that NBP is part of the ESCB, since the purpose of the amendment is to prepare Poland for joining the euro area. Before joining the euro area, NBP is part of the ESCB, so the amendment would not introduce anything new in normative terms in this field.

The President of the Republic of Poland A. Duda also considered amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and filed a motion to the Senate for the consent to hold a nationwide referendum (Senate print No. 933/9th term of office) with the following question: “Are you in favour of the constitutional regulation of the membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union and NATO, while respecting the principles of the sovereignty of the State and the supremacy of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland?”. Thus, he considered supplementing the Constitution with a provision that would constitute an integration and limitation clause. However, it is unclear if that provision was to open a new Union chapter in the Constitution or be incorporated in the existing chapters. It cannot be ruled out that such a provision, being a limitation clause, could have constituted regulations of chapter I – The Republic, like the Constitution of Finland, section 1: “Finland is a sovereign republic. The constitution of Finland is established in this constitutional act. The constitution shall guarantee the inviolability of human dignity and the freedom and rights of the individual and promote justice in society. [...] Finland is a Member State of the European Union” (1112/2011, entry into force 1.3.2012).

With introduction of a general Union integration and limitation clause in the Constitution, one might consider if general framework of participation in the monetary union should be defined there, and if “yes” – then where and how.

The amendment of the Constitution regarding participation in the monetary union could be placed in chapter I. Such an amendment would facilitate exercise of the right to hold a referendum approving amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, as referred to in Art. 235 (6) of the Constitution. The referendum would facilitate a decision by society on joining the monetary union in its current shape. It should be noted that at the level of Union Treaties, the monetary union is mentioned as an objective of the EU in Title I of the Treaty on

European Union. Placing the new provision in chapter I of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland would underline the importance of the decision to cease exercise of the monetary sovereignty by Poland. The new provision, for example Art. 9¹ of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which refers to Art. 3 (4) of the Treaty on European Union, might read as follows:

“The Republic of Poland is a member of the economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro”.

Another option would be to word a provision based on former Art. 88–2 of the French Constitution:

“On the basis of reciprocity and under conditions specified in the treaties on which the European Union is founded, the Republic of Poland becomes a member of the economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro”.

While the first proposal would be mostly heteronomous and integrational in its nature, the “French” regulation would be a limitation clause and an autonomous amendment. It could also be the model of constitutional control to check if the integration process in the monetary union falls within the framework defined by the Constitution. In such a case, the constitutional court could assess, for example by reviewing, as a result of a constitutional complaint being filed, normative acts of one of the ESCB parts (ECB or NBP), whether the shape of the monetary union violates the “conditions of union Treaties”. This way, the constitutional court could examine if the constitutional principle of conferred competencies is implemented in the monetary union. Constitutional determination that participation in the monetary union is possible only on the basis of reciprocity guarantees observance of the principle of sovereignty of state in the monetary area. It prevents abandoning the relation of equivalence among Member States of the monetary union. Therefore, doubts may arise as to whether this standard would require that the rotational method of voting in the Governing Council of the EBC, based on the principle that a certain state does not have a voting right every now and then, be first abandoned. Yet it would not stand in conflict with various methods of shaping a weighted voting, taking into account the capital contributed to the EBC.

Moving on to the analysis of methods of amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland which strictly refer to the position of the central bank, it should be mentioned that tri-directional solutions are possible. First, the constitutional regulation of the position of the central bank may be dropped. Then, the sole content of the Act amending the Constitution would be to delete Art. 227 and repeal the following phrases: “President of the National Bank of Poland”, “and

the purposes of monetary policy”, and “the National Bank of Poland” respectively in Art. 198 (1), Art. 203 (1) and Art. 204 (1) (1) of the Constitution. Such a solution is undesirable from the viewpoint of EU law, which requires guarantees for independence of the central bank in the legal act of the highest possible legal order. It is also defective from the viewpoint of the Polish constitutional order, which provides for protection of constitutional identity, which is composed of constitutional human rights, and thus the constitutional ownership right. The silence of the constitution-maker would not fulfil the requirement of integration in the monetary union, which assumes existence of a national central bank. In other words, if a constitutional regulation pertaining to the central bank is removed, integration that would assume existence of the ECB and liquidation of the NCB would be in line with the Constitution. The imperative to confer competencies of bodies of State authority in certain matters (Art. 90. (1) of Constitution) would not be an obstacle, since the basis for existence of a central bank would be solely by the act of law. As mentioned above, it seems incompatible with the imperative to protect the constitutional identity.

Another solution is a change that would only eliminate constitutional content which is incompatible with EU law. Selection of this solution would constitute resignation from the ability to co-shape the future development of EU law in the area of central banking or, more widely, monetary union.

Article 227 (1) of the Constitution, coming into effect on the day the euro is adopted, might read as follows:

“The National Bank of Poland is the central bank of the state which is an integral part of the Eurosystem. The National Bank of Poland performs the objectives and carries out the tasks of the Eurosystem in accordance with guidelines and instructions of the European Central Bank. The National Bank of Poland has the right to issue euro banknotes with the consent of the European Central Bank and has the sole right to issue euro coins with a prior consent of the European Central Bank which defines the size of issue” (Olszak & Porzycki, 2020).

This draft of the provision underlines acceptance of the existing legal status and is primarily intended to eliminate legal obstacles in joining the euro area. This regulation has no features of a limitation clause. The sole constitutional condition for participation of Poland in the monetary union is the continued existence of NBP. There is no mention of the internal structure of Polish central bank. Such a structure would have to result from subsequent paragraphs of Art. 227 of the Constitution. The proposal does not mention which objective goals NBP would be tasked to pursue. Definition of such goals would be transferred to

EU law (“tasks and objectives of Eurosystem”). In accordance with Article 282 of the TFEU: “The European Central Bank, together with the national central banks, shall constitute the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The European Central Bank, together with the national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro, which constitute the Eurosystem, shall conduct the monetary policy of the Union”.

Third, it is possible to shape provisions of the Polish constitution on the basis of German provisions, to facilitate legal convergence with EU law and implement a limitation clause in the area of central banking and control over monetary policy that would be in line with the Polish constitutional order. Such a proposal might take the form of the following regulation:

“The central bank of the State shall be the National Bank of Poland, which is an integral part of the Eurosystem. The National Bank of Poland performs its tasks within the European System of Central Banks and, along with the European Central Bank, has the right to issue money. The President of the National Bank of Poland participates in development and implementation of the monetary policy of the Union. Within the Eurosystem, the National Bank of Poland is responsible for the value of the euro currency”.

This provision determines specific premises for participation in the monetary union, while remaining compatible with EU law. First, after Poland joins the euro area, Poland must have a central bank called the National Bank of Poland. Second, the Polish central bank must be equipped with specific competences which it shall perform within the ESCB, with the ECB (the actual content cannot be hollowed out of the competencies). Third, the task of the President of NBP in the ESCB is determined in the Constitution. This regulation settles the nature of activities of Governors of NCBs in ECB bodies which has been disputed in the doctrine. The President of the NBP participates in the Governing Council and thus will be a member of a Union body, while continuing to be a member of a Polish authority. In addition, the EU order is constitutionally bound by a Polish constitutional limitation clause. Constitutional bodies which, along with other representative of Member States, develop future Treaty foundations for the monetary union must object to such changes that would eliminate NCB governors from creating EU monetary policy. Thus, the regulation is close to the French structure, which provides for the reciprocity of the competencies conferred and exercised. Given the change of the second and third sentence of Art. 227 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which are used by the Constitutional Tribunal to derive the principle of institutional and personal inde-

pendence of the central bank, the articles discussed above must be supplemented with the following provision: “The National Bank of Poland is independent” (see Art. 99 (2) of the Swiss Constitution: “The National Bank of Switzerland, as an independent central bank, implements monetary and currency policy, which serves the general interest of the state; it is managed in co-operation with and under supervision of the Federation”).

The following provision would be similar to the wording of the German constitutional provision which defines the Bundesbank position: “The central bank of the State shall be the National Bank of Poland. Its competencies in certain matters may be conferred within the European Union to the European Central Bank. Both the National Bank of Poland and the European Central Bank are independent and bound by the fundamental objective which is to guarantee price stability and commitment to implement this objective”.

The above leads to a conclusion that there is a constitutional dictate for Poland to participate in a monetary union solely if it is a stability community. The proposal also defines specific conditions for the shape of the ESCB. Further integration must not result in liquidation of the NBP. It is possible to (fully) confer only some competences of the NBP to a supranational body. In this way the norm of the Constitution defines the elements of constitutional identity and national identity, as referred to in Article 4 of the TFEU. In addition, the Polish constitution-maker refers to the primary Union legal system in such a way that it sets the independence of the ECB and the NBP as a condition of membership in the Eurosystem. It seems that within a social and economic system defined by the constitution (Art. 20 of the Constitution), independence of the central bank is its inherent element. In a situation where the integration programme “falls out” the constitutional track, the state bodies, including the Constitutional Tribunal, could order taking actions aimed at correcting the programme, modifying the Constitution or withdrawing from the monetary union. Given the fact that the EU’s primary law does not provide for a possibility of exiting the monetary union, the first step of national authorities would be to work out an exit path for this structure with EU partners (e.g., by way of a separate Protocol).

A major element would be to retain the right to provide the parliament with information about the activities of the central bank, also as a central bank of the Eurosystem, while preserving the rights to the confidentiality of information held by the central bank. It should be considered whether the following provision should be introduced to Art. 227 of the Constitution:

“The President of NBP submits to the Sejm annual statements on the activities of the National Central Bank, also within the Eurosystem”.

Following amendment of Art. 227 (6) of the Constitution, it will be necessary to modify Art. 204 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland as regards obligation of the Supreme Audit Office to present the Sejm with an analysis of assumptions for the monetary policy. The ECB recommends to adapt Art. 203 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland to provisions of Art. 130 of the Treaty and Art. 7 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB. A change consisting in restricting the Supreme Audit Office’s audit of the NBP activities only to their legality would constitute implementation of the imperative prescribed by Art. 131 of the TFEU.

In accordance with the ECB’s position, amendment of the Constitution related to ensuring legal convergence should come into effect on the day of euro adoption. Within the limits prescribed by the Treaties, the constitution-maker is responsible for the material content of constitutional provisions, the purpose of which is to ensure legal convergence.

In the present paper we examined and proved the link between the integration clause model and the admissibility of an assessment by the national institutions of the constitutionality of the integration process in the monetary area. In conclusion, given the need to modify the Constitution of the Republic of Poland before joining the euro area, the preferred solution is to adopt an autonomous limitation clause that would also support organisation of an approval referendum. For this reason, amendments to chapter I and Art. 227 of the Constitution should be recommended. Other modifications would be heteronomous in their nature. There is no need to modify Art. 220 of the Constitution, since, as the ECB explained, it is sufficient that it is co-applied with Art. 123 of the TFEU for the legal convergence to be achieved.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN VENEZUELA IN THE SECOND DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY

POLITYCZNE I SPOŁECZNE PROBLEMY W WENEZUELI
W DRUGIEJ DEKADZIE XXI WIEKU

*Justyna Łapaj-Kucharska** 

— ABSTRACT —

Venezuela, which is the country with the largest documented oil reserves in the world, has been plunged into a political, economic and social crisis for several years, struggling with recession and multi-digit inflation. In the second half of the second decade of the 21st century, the country's economic and political situation deteriorated. Over a million Venezuelans have already migrated from their country, where there is a lack of basic everyday products, including food, medicines and hygiene products. In relation to this state, part of a discussion is not only the political or economic crisis, but also the humanitarian one. Venezuela's internal problems also affect security throughout the Latin American region. International institutions and regional organizations are trying to undertake activities aimed at ending the dictatorial rule of President Nicolás Maduro and restoring the country's democracy and the rule of law.

— ABSTRAKT —

Wenezuela, która jest państwem posiadającym największe udokumentowane złoża ropy naftowej na świecie, już od kilku lat pogrążona jest w kryzysie politycznym, gospodarczym i społecznym, a także zmaga się z recesją oraz z wielocyfrową inflacją. W drugiej połowie drugiej dekady XXI wieku sytuacja gospodarcza i polityczna tego kraju uległa pogorszeniu. Już ponad milion Wenezuelczyków wyemigrowało z kraju, w którym brakuje podstawowych produktów codziennego użytku, w tym żywności, lekarstw czy środków higienicznych. W odniesieniu do tego państwa mówi się obecnie nie tylko o kryzysie politycznym i gospodarczym, ale także humanitarnym. Problemy wewnętrzne Wenezueli mają także wpływ na bezpieczeństwo w całym regionie latynoamerykańskim. Międzynarodowe instytucje i organizacje regionalne starają się podejmować działania, które mają na celu zakończenie dyktatorskich rządów prezydenta Nicolása Maduro oraz przywrócenie w kraju demokracji i praworządności.

* University of Silesia in Katowice, Faculty of Social Sciences.

Keywords: Venezuela; Hugo Chávez; Nicolás Maduro; economic crisis; humanitarian crisis; “socialism of the 21st century”; authoritarian rule

Słowa kluczowe: Wenezuela; Hugo Chávez; Nicolás Maduro; kryzys gospodarczy; kryzys humanitarny; „socjalizm XXI wieku”; rządy autorytarne

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 21st century, Venezuela was the world’s fifth largest exporter of oil and for many years it was the fourth economy in Latin America. The oil export rate amounted to 85.3% of total exports, which was the reason why this raw material became the dominant element of the states’ economy. Currently, from the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, the country that has the largest documented oil deposits in the world, where a liter of petrol has cost the equivalent of 2 cents over the years, is struggling with the economic, political and humanitarian crises. Some talk about the fall of this state, others predict the beginning of a civil war. Meanwhile, several decades ago, it was one of the richest countries in Latin America, enjoying prosperity and a relatively high rate of human development (HDI value in 2015 was 0.762, which placed Venezuela in a group of countries with a high level of development, together with Uruguay, Mexico, or Panama). Today, basic products such as food, medicines and hygiene products are missing. As a result, the Venezuelans began to leave the country *en masse*, looking for opportunities to improve their life situation in neighboring countries, such as Brazil and Colombia or further located, such as Argentina, Peru, Mexico, or Canada.

The aim of the article is to show the essence of the “socialism of the 21st century” – a concept implemented in Venezuela during the rule of Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and its consequences for the Venezuelan economy in the second decade of the 21st century. The characteristic features of the successor of the rule of Hugo Chávez – Nicolás Maduro – whose politics is described as authoritarian and dictatorial, were also presented. The author’s intention was to answer the question of which factors led to the economic collapse of the country with the world’s largest oil deposits. Attempts were also made to identify possible actions that would contribute to overcoming the current crisis and improving the economic and social situation in that country. The article analyzes the most important, in the author’s opinion, manifestations of the political, economic and social crises that make up the specificity of the internal situation in Venezuela in the second decade of the 21st century. The

assessment of the internal political and economic situation of Venezuela in the second half of the second decade of the 21st century was also made through the prism of the consequences that the current crisis may generate, both in terms of internal security of the country and the destabilization of the entire region, increasing the threats to international security of neighboring countries. The current internal situation of Venezuela – both the political and economic as well as social – is complex and multifaceted. The author's intention was not to present the titular issue in a comprehensive manner, but only to point out some selected manifestations of the dynamically changing internal situation in this country, which the author believes are important to understand the nature of the current crisis, its causes and consequences, as well as the possibilities of its solution.

THE GOVERNMENT OF HUGO CHÁVEZ AND THE CONCEPT OF BUILDING “SOCIALISM OF THE 21ST CENTURY”

The attempt to introduce the concept of “socialism of the 21st century” was undertaken at the end of the 20th century in Venezuela by the then presidential candidate of that country, Hugo Chávez¹. Since the victory of this charismatic politician in the presidential election in 1998, it was an official state doctrine, and his political group – the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) gained a dominant role on the Venezuelan political scene. The main goal of the political party of Chávez was to create a new state and society based on Bolivarian principles and models. The concept was based on four pillars (Spyra, 2009):

1. the struggle with such features of capitalism as: individualism, egoism, class privilege, and corruption;
2. participatory democracy, understood as a direct form of exercising power by people and public participation in decision-making processes;

¹ For the first time, the concept of “socialism of the 21st century” was presented by the German political scientist Heinz Dieterich, a lecturer at the Independent Metropolitan University in Mexico, in a publication under the same title, published in 1996. It is worth noting that Dieterich was an adviser to Hugo Chávez. They assumed that neither capitalism nor communism would solve basic social problems, such as: poverty, racism, hunger, lack of citizens' influence on the implementation of state policy. The “socialism of the 21st century” concept based on the abandonment of the free market economy for the economy based on the theory of value, direct democracy based on plebiscites and the state's role as a representative of the whole society would have been a healing of these problems (Gawrycki, 2008).

3. equality and freedom creating an equal society, without privileged or excluded;
4. co-operativism, as a change in the philosophy of the economic system, which should be based on state and collective ownership, and enterprises oriented not on profit but on meeting social needs.

Bolivarianism was, according to Chávez, a symbol of the progress and unity of the continent and an expression of independence (especially from the United States) and sovereignty. In order to ensure the integrity of the Latin American states, various integration groups were formed on the initiative of Caracas. They were to counterbalance the proposals for unification put forward by the government in Washington. An example is the creation of the ALBA economic agreement in 2006 at the initiative of Venezuela (Spanish: *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*). This grouping was supposed to be a counterbalance to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) proposed by the US. ALBA is focused on integration based not so much on the liberalization of markets as on a certain vision of social welfare and mutual economic assistance (Serbin & Serbin Pont, 2016).

The “socialism of the 21st century” program, widely criticized by the Western states, has had a tangible impact on all spheres of public and political life in Venezuela, both in terms of the internal and external policy of that country, as well as on the countries with close contact with Caracas.

Implementation of the concept of “socialism of the 21st century” was associated with increasing of the role of the state in the economy, introducing a planned economy instead of a market one, and state control over the resources of raw materials. Because Chávez assumed that the market economy would not solve basic social problems (as it leads to deepening inequalities in depriving the broad masses of society of ways out of poverty), the basis of his pro-social policy was the use of revenues from oil and gas extraction and export for infrastructure development, and education. Social programs for the poor and excluded groups was introduced on a large scale (Gallegos, 2016). At the same time, revenue redistribution was introduced to reduce social inequalities through wider access to education, health care and participatory democracy, ensuring the participation of the majority in the development of the country. An agrarian reform was also carried out (part of the regulations was intended to encourage people to return to the countryside and farming), as well as real estate reform, which gave land ownership to the citizens of the state who lived in makeshift homes in the suburbs of the largest cities (Anselmi, 2017).

The Chávez government, thanks to significant revenues from the export of crude oil, which prices on global markets remained high then, could successfully finance costly social programs. Among others, they invested in the construction and development of infrastructure, in increasing access to education and providing health care in the poorest areas of the country, which were previously not met with interest from the authorities. Practically from the beginning of this century until 2012, Venezuela (whose economic growth rate in 2012 amounted to 5.6%) was classified (along with Panama, Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Bolivia, as well as Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, and Paraguay) to the fast-paced developing Latin American economies (Gołowska-Bolek, 2017).

As a result of implementation of extensive social programs, the situation of ordinary citizens had actually begun to improve. This period was described in Venezuela as prosperity. Chávez introduced, among others, food subsidies, significantly increased spending on education and provided access to public services for society. This was reflected in the significant increase in many different development indicators (including the popular HDI – Human Development Index) in Venezuela. The infant mortality rate was reduced. The number of students at Venezuelan universities also increased. These effects assured the president of the praise and gratitude of the poor part of Venezuela, as well as the admiration of the leaders of parts of the other Latin American countries. Besides, the Venezuelan model was also adapted in nearby Bolivia by the first Indian leader of the country, Evo Morales. A manifestation of the strengthening position of Venezuela in Latin America was the fact that the Venezuelan integration initiative ALBA was eagerly joined by Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and several Caribbean countries (Ośrodek Analiz Politologicznych UW, 2017).

However, as noted, the achievement of impressive indicators of economic growth and social development was possible due to the favorable economic situation and high oil prices on global markets. This provided significant revenues to the budget of this 26-million country, which main wealth is oil. However, as some researchers argue, the “socialism of the 21st century” program was mainly based on buying social support through the distribution income from oil, from which Hugo Chávez drew beyond any institutional control. At the same time, the leader of this country tried to secure autocracy (including the referendum in which Chávez secured the right to run in elections as many times as he wanted) and the image of a charismatic savior and messiah, with unlimited power, who rules for the good of society (Stasiński, 2009). It is worth emphasizing, however, that the elections that took place during the time of Chávez government (1999–2013)

were always democratic. When this leader sought to introduce a new constitution, despite some difficulties, he also introduced it in a democratic way. Each time, he also allowed the election observation by independent international observers, including, among others, the Carter Center, which each time confirmed that the elections were held in a manner consistent with the principles of a democratic state of law. It is worth noting that the reason for the electoral and international successes of this populist politician (colonel, initiator of the military coup) was also the ability to shape his image in the Venezuelan and worldwide media, in a way that evokes associations with anti-globalization or alter-globalism.

THE TAKEOVER OF POWER BY NICOLÁS MADURO

Although the reforms and policies pursued by Hugo Chávez significantly improved the living situation of the poorest part of Venezuelan society, it was not a systemic alteration and could only be maintained in the short-term dimension (Gutiérrez, 2017).

In October 2012, Hugo Chávez won again the presidential election in this country with 55% of votes (*Hugo Chávez Celebrates...*, 2012). Nicolás Maduro, who was the chairman of the Venezuelan National Assembly, as well as one of the main figures in the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), took the post of vice-president (*Hugo Chávez Names...*, 2012).

Soon, however, Hugo Chávez despite the long-term treatment of cancer that he had been taking in Cuba for several years, died in March 2013. The authorities were taken over by – anointed by Chávez – ex-vice-president, Nicolás Maduro, who initially declared his desire to implement the policy of his predecessor. In a short time, however, it turned out that the continuation of the current assumptions and policy of “socialism of the 21st century” will not be possible due to the deteriorating state of the Venezuelan economy, which was the result of a significant drop in oil prices on world markets.

The price of crude oil in June 2014 was 105.5 USD per barrel, while in January 2015 only 47.5 per barrel USD. A year later it dropped even further, to 33.7 USD. These declines were the longest such series since the late 1980s, when oil prices dropped in five months from around 30 USD a barrel to 10 USD. This was caused by the deterioration of the condition of the Chinese economy – the country which is the second largest importer of crude oil in the world (*Cena ropy spadła poniżej 40 dolarów...*, 2015).

By comparison, in 1999 oil production in Venezuela amounted to 3,120,000 barrels per day, while in 2007–2,949,000 barrels (McDermott, 2008). From 1998 to 2008, the price of oil increased by 660%, which led to a significant increase in profits from this industry. The state's revenues from crude oil increased from 51% in 2000 to 56% in 2006, while oil exports increased from 77% (1997) to 89% in 2006 (Tanzer, 2009).

It is worth recalling that the years 2007–2008 were the beginning of the global economic crisis. Overall, the negative effects of the global crisis in Latin America were less severe than other recent crises of the neoliberal period. In Latin America the worst period of the crisis was the last quarter of 2008, after the major global credit crunch, and it extended through part of 2009, when world trade fell by 22%. Several countries in the region were able to recover by the middle of 2009, and for others, it was not until 2010 or later (Santarcangelo, Justo, & Cooney, 2016). According to the Central Bank, Venezuela's inflation rate reached 30.9 percent in 2008, an 11-year high. The rising price level was among the economic challenges facing President Hugo Chávez as the global financial crisis, and particularly falling oil prices, threatened to curtail growth.

At the same time, it should be noted that in the first and the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Sino-Venezuelan cooperation was strengthened in the area of sales and supplies of crude oil to China. In September 2008, Venezuela signed a series of bilateral energy cooperation agreements with China. By 2012, oil exports increased three times to one million barrels a day (Bull, 2008).

During the 14 years of Chávez's rule, however, he failed to diversify the Venezuelan economy, as a result of which other branches of industry almost completely did not develop, and their share in exports was negligible. Thus, when in 2014 oil prices in global markets fell sharply, Venezuela's economy, which was 96 percent based on export revenues from oil, was trapped. It should also be noted that in 2014 inflation was exceptionally high in Venezuela (68.5%) (Gołowska-Bolek, 2017).

The government headed by Maduro – a politician who does not have much political experience or skills in efficient economic management, and has much less public support than his predecessor – was no longer able to finance expensive social programs or pay for the import of consumer goods. The basic goods of everyday use, such as food, cleaning products and medicines, began to be scarce in the country.

At the same time, Maduro, who did not have such opportunities to strengthen his power as his predecessor, practically from the beginning of his presidency

began activities aimed at radicalization of the Venezuelan political scene. Representatives of the opposition were repressed and 430 of them were sent to prison on the basis of extraordinary judgments by military courts (Ośrodek Analiz Politologicznych UW, 2017).

Due to the deteriorating economic situation and the social situation of Venezuelans, support for the democratic opposition, which won the parliamentary election in December 2015, increased (obtaining for the first time in 16 years a majority in the parliament – 112 out of 167 seats) (Lafuente, 2015). This led to the escalation of the conflict between members of the opposition and the head of state. The opposition boycotted President's plans, and Maduro prevented the National Assembly from working. In this situation, Maduro decided to formally delegate the powers of the parliament to the Supreme Court, subordinate to him (which is also the last instance in judging the parliament's decisions), to be able to exercise the authority through the decrees introduced by this institution (Casey & Torres, 2017).

In response to the persistent social tensions, the head of the Venezuelan state decided to organize elections to the Constituent Assembly. He argued that the new constitution would ensure peace and allow the dialogue of a divided society. As the experts emphasized, it was feared that Maduro's goal was to introduce undemocratic political solutions, consolidate the indefinite power of the government and further marginalization of the opposition, but also divert attention from the growing economic and social problems of the country. Despite mass strikes and social protests (it is estimated that over 5 million Venezuelans went out onto the street, during the demonstrations there were bloody clashes with the police, in which over 100 people were killed) as well as criticism of international public opinion, in July 2017 the elections to the National Constituent Assembly in Venezuela took place². The National Constituent Assembly, made up solely of supporters of President Maduro, replaced the current parliament for an indefinite period³. The main task of the Constituent Assembly is to change the country's constitution and thoroughly rebuild the state.

According to independent observers, the results of the vote were falsified and the elections were not held in accordance with the principles of a demo-

² The authorities threatened to punish 5–10 years in prison for anyone who boycotts the elections and for trying to sabotage them.

³ In the election, out of 5,500 candidates to the 545-person Legislative Assembly (Constituent Assembly) there was not a single representative of the opposition. All were supporters of Maduro and his party – the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

cratic state of law. The criticism of their course was not only expressed by the opposition but also international organizations and institutions, such as: the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the European Union (EU), the USA and most of the region's countries, including Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru (*Wybory bez obserwatorów...*, 2017).

Meanwhile, on July 16, 2017, the opposition organized its own referendum, under the aegis of the National Assembly, in which the Venezuelans took a massive part and strongly opposed the dictatorial actions of the president, demanding his resignation and re-election while respecting democratic principles (Ośrodek Analiz Politologicznych UW, 2017).

In response to the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Ministry of Finance of the United States decided to impose on the president and several top state officials, including the brother of the former president, Adán Chávez, unprecedented sanctions: their financial assets subject to US jurisdiction have been frozen and they themselves have no entry to the US. US citizens are not allowed to maintain any business relationship with the Venezuelan president and his closest associates. Maduro, however, does not seem to care about the financial dimension of these sanctions, but rather uses the fact of imposing them in his criticism of the United States (*Socjaliści wygrali wybory regionalne...*, 2017). It is worth noting that Maduro also subordinated the state security apparatus and the army to strengthen his power. Although there was information in the media about the attempt to rebel part of the army (which on Venezuela's television was defined as the actions of terrorists dressed in uniforms), given the fact that the military and their families gained extensive privileges (including high salary and access to foodstuffs) one should expect that the army will remain loyal to Maduro at least for now (Ośrodek Analiz Politologicznych UW, 2017).

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN VENEZUELA IN THE SECOND DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Starting from 2014, when oil prices on global markets dropped, as well as the economic situation of one of the main importers of this oil from Venezuela, China, worsened, the country that derived 96% of its revenues from the sale of crude oil, had been facing serious economic problems, which in 2017 led to economic collapse.

Since 2014, the GDP of this country has decreased by 45% (the IMF predicts a further decline in GDP – for the fifth year in a row – in 2018 by 15%) and the inflation rate is the highest in the world and already amounts to over 13,000%⁴ (Biller, 2018). In 2017, inflation in this country was 7276%. For one US dollar, according to the official exchange rate, you have to pay 79,900 thousand bolivares (Exchange-Rates.org, 2019). On the black market, the rate is even higher and the dollar costs 800,000 bolivares.

With such a hyperinflation, the issuing bank cannot keep up with the printing of banknotes of increasingly higher denominations. The national currency – bolivar – practically completely lost its value. In June 2018, the currency will be denominated. Currently, according to journalist Maciej Okraszewski, when making slightly larger purchases, the sellers weigh the cash instead of counting it (*Prezydent na ropę*, 2018).

Due to the depreciation of the Venezuelan bolivar, local authorities print their own money. Caracas introduced currency called Caribe (which is equivalent to a thousand bolivars – 0.01 dollars at the official rate) (*Alcaldía de Caracas...*, 2018). In February 2018, the Maduro government carried out the world's first issue of the national cryptocurrency "Petro", earning 4.777 billion yuan (equivalent to approximately 735 million dollars) from its emission. Each "Petro" is the equivalent of one barrel of domestic oil reserves (raw material not yet purchased). One hundred million "petro" units are to be issued⁵. People will be able to pay taxes, fines and pay for public services in that cryptocurrency (Otis, 2018).

According to OPEC data, since 2014 oil production has also been reduced by almost a half. In 2018, oil production in Venezuela dropped to 1.59 million barrels per day, while in 2014 it was 2.93 million barrels. According to some

⁴ However, it should be emphasized that for three years the Central Bank of Venezuela has not published data on the budget, GDP, or inflation.

⁵ According to the weekly *Time*, the introduction of crypts in Venezuela in the form of "Petro" is the effect of "half-hidden" joint venture between representatives of the authorities and businessmen from Venezuela and Russia. The introduction of a cryptocurrency was intended to help Venezuela avoid US sanctions and combat the country's financial isolation, which is the result of US sanctions related to the ban on government financing in Caracas (including the ban on buying Venezuela bonds) (*Rosja pomogła Wenezueli wprowadzić kryptowalutę...*, 2018). The Venezuela authorities announced in September 2017 that they would replace the US dollar with other currencies in international transactions. Maduro also announced that the country wants to introduce a new international payment system using such currencies as yuan, yen, rupee, euros, and ruble (*Kryptowaluta petro...*, 2017; Słomski, 2018).

forecasts, oil production in 2018 may fall to 1.38 million barrels or even up to a million in Venezuela (Parraga & Guanipa, 2017).

Due to the deteriorating economic situation, basic consumer products such as food, medicines and hygiene products have been missing (even in hospitals). Shops with state-subsidized goods have been empty for many months, many factories have halted production and dismissed workers, and the state, because of a lack of financial resources, cannot import the products that society needs.

According to the BBC, a liter of milk on the black market costs even the equivalent of 3 thousand PLN, and a half-kilogram pack of coffee over 700 PLN. In the first quarter of 2018, prices increased by 897.2% (*Banki zamieniły się w zwykłe składy banknotów...*, 2018). According to the media, people have to work for 11 days to buy 1 kg of chicken (Abad Liñán, Galán, & Alameda, 2018). According to CEPAL, in 2016, more than 80% of households were below the poverty threshold, and nearly 87% of Venezuelans were starving. The infant mortality rate also increased significantly – from 11% to 30% within a few years (Ośrodek Analiz Politologicznych UW, 2017). The current situation has also caused a greater spread of infectious diseases. People are struggling not only with a lack of food and medicine, but also with access to water, electricity, or transport.

In such a situation, street protests have quickly begun. In four months (until mid-2017), during almost daily strikes, which were bloodily suppressed by the authorities, thousands of demonstrators were arrested, nearly 2,000 people were injured and about 130 lost their lives (Abad Liñán, Galán, & Alameda, 2018). In the demonstrations the public demanded: early elections, permission to allow humanitarian aid into the country that would allow them to obtain food and medicine, as well as respect for the opposition, parliament, and the release of prosecuted political activists.

Venezuelans began to emigrate from the country *en masse*. Exodus began in 2016 due to the deteriorating economic (which prevents normal functioning) and security situation in this country (connected with increase of the scale of crimes, theft and violence). Caracas is described in 2018 as one of the most dangerous places in the world. The number of homicides in this country in 1995–2017 increased fourfold.

It is estimated that over 1.5 million citizens fled to neighboring Brazil and Colombia. About a million people every few weeks cross the border with Brazil or Colombia to buy basic everyday products that are missing in the country or the ones they cannot afford due to high prices (Stasiński, 2018). Some people leave with the intention of staying longer or permanently. According to the UN,

each day the border is crossed by about 5,000 people who find shelter in cross-border refugee camps (Domoślawski, 2018). People flee from Venezuela not only to neighboring countries, but also to Argentina, Chile, Peru, and even Mexico, Panama, Costa Rica, the United States, Canada, or Spain. According to the data from the International Organization for Migration, over 1.6 million Venezuelans lived abroad in 2017. In comparison, in 2015 it was approx. 697.5 thousand, while in 2010–556.6 thousand of people (Abad Liñán, Galán, & Alameda, 2018).

The mass emigration of Venezuelans is an increasing problem for neighboring countries. Over 600,000 people stopped in such cities as Colombian Cucuta or Brazilian Boa Vista in Roraima (one of the poorest states in Brazil). The host countries try to give them support and help, but as the authorities of Colombia and Brazil claim, their ability to help due to such a large inflow of immigrants is limited. The growing problem is the fact that the number of people crossing the border illegally and without documents is increasing (Stasiński, 2018).

Regarding the opinion of emigrees staying in Colombia about the presidential elections held in Venezuela in May 2018, many declared their support for the pastor, Javier Bertucci, who was a running candidate. A large part of those people, however, claims that due to the loss of trust in politicians, they do not perceive anyone as a representative of their interests (Mesa, 2018a). Some compare the elections in Venezuela from May 20, 2018 to the plebiscite of December 15, 1957. Citizens who voted then to continue or discontinue the rule of Marcos Pérez Jiménez also could not count on their honest conduct, and their result was predetermined and in line with the expectations of the then dictatorship (Rodríguez⁶, 2018).

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN VENEZUELA AND MADURO APPLYING FOR ANOTHER TERM

Practically from the beginning of 2014, Venezuelans protested against the deteriorating economic situation, as well as the high level of crime and the increasingly authoritarian rule of President Maduro. The government described demonstrations as a putsch attempt, and Nicolás Maduro repeatedly accused the US government of fueling street protests and taking action to deprive him of his life (*Venezuela odpowiada...*, 2015).

⁶ Professor and researcher at the Observatory of Venezuela at the University of Rosario.

In ruined by economic crisis Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro announced his start in the presidential elections held on May 20, 2018. The main opponent of the current president was 56-year-old Henri Falcón – former military and former pro-government governor of the state of Lara (in 2000–2008), who joined the opposition and became head of the Progressive Avant-garde group⁷.

Less well-known activists of the Venezuelan political scene, such as Evangelical pastor Javier Bertucci and dissidents from the ruling camp like Reinaldo Quijada, Alejandro Ratti and Francisco Visconti, also reported their candidacy in the elections (*Estas son las propuestas de los candidatos presidenciales de Venezuela*, 2018).

The opposition, fearing election fraud, called for their boycott, claiming that participation in them, as well as the possible presence of foreign observers, would legitimize elections, which actually are just fiction.

Maduro, who calls himself the “son” of Chávez (*Venezuela’s President Maduro Wins Election...*, 2018), before the election counted on his supporters in the poorest constituencies, who despite the economic crisis are the faithful electorate of the PSUV. One of Maduro’s main electoral slogans was: “Your ballot paper will decide: votes or bullets, Venezuela-Fatherland or Venezuela-colony, peace or violence, independence or submission!” (Alonso, 2018). Maduro also assured that he is fighting with imperialist conspiracy that seeks to destroy socialism and take over Venezuelan oil (*Venezuela’s President Maduro Wins Election...*, 2018).

As predicted, the presidential election held in Venezuela on May 20, 2018 was won by the current head of the country. By means of this Maduro has guaranteed himself another 6 years of rule⁸. He won about 5.8 million votes (about 68% of votes), while his biggest opponent Henri Falcon only 1.8 million (about 22% of votes)⁹. The voter turnout was the lowest in the country’s history. Only 46.1% of citizens went to electoral polls („*Exodus Wenezuelczyków*”..., 2018), in compari-

⁷ Falcón argued that he knew how to get Venezuela out of the economic meltdown and the financial crisis. He could have a helping hand from the Wall Street economist Francisco Rodríguez. According to Rodríguez, the way to eliminate hyperinflation in Venezuela is “dollarization” (which would replace Venezuelan money – bolivar – by American dollar). As they believe, this would stop the Venezuelan government from over-spending money. Falcón promised that if he won the election, Venezuela could count on financial assistance and loans from international financial institutions, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund which more than once helped Latin American countries out of crisis (*Venezuela Presidential...*, 2018).

⁸ His second term began on January 1, 2019, and will last until 2025.

⁹ Javier Bertucci received only 950 thousand votes (Mesa, 2018b), and Reinaldo Quijada slightly more than 34 thousand votes (*Después de las cuestionadas elecciones...*, 2018).

son, in 2013 it was 80%. According to the opposition, however, the number was overstated, and in fact about 30% of voters voted (*Venezuela's President Maduro Wins Election...*, 2018).

As Henri Falcón stated, his chances of victory were reduced by the opposition itself, which called for a boycott of elections. Representatives of the opposition, in turn, accused Falcón of contributing to the legitimization of the election and breaking away from the solidarity of anti-government forces.

The results of the May presidential elections were not recognized by either the opposition or many actors of the international environment. The declaration of non-recognition of Venezuelan elections has been issued by Argentina, which is considering possible economic and financial measures as a sanction against the Maduro regime (in a way that does not affect Venezuelans). Also other countries like: Colombia, Mexico, Canada or Australia, did not recognize Venezuelan elections.

In the opinion of the European Union, these elections did not meet international standards and principles of a democratic state of law (including, e.g., political pluralism and transparency). The EU issued a statement calling on the Caracas authorities to release political prisoners and to respect the constitution.

The United States, which also considered the elections to be unlawful¹⁰, decided to impose further repressive measures on Venezuela. Earlier, Washington unsuccessfully appealed for the resignation of the organization of the election. As part of the new economic sanctions established by the Donald Trump administration, US companies and citizens were forbidden to help the Venezuelan government sell real estate and investment goods. The sanctions are aimed at blocking corrupt practices related to the sale of public property by corrupt Venezuelan officials in exchange for bribes (*“Exodus Wenezuelczyków”...*, 2018). The US Ministry of Finance, in turn, imposed sanctions on approximately 20 Venezuelan enterprises and several people, including the former director of the Venezuelan Financial Intelligence Service (*USA: przyspieszone wybory...*, 2018)¹¹.

It is worth noting that Washington has not sanctioned Venezuelan oil. According to the Latin Americanist and economist from the University of Warsaw, dr.

¹⁰ As announced on the election Sunday (May 20, 2018) on Twitter by the US Department of State spokeswoman Heather Nauert: “Venezuela’s so-called elections today are not legitimate. The United States stand with democratic nations around the world in support of the Venezuelan people and their sovereign right to elect their representatives through free and fair elections”.

¹¹ Washington imposed economic sanctions not only on Maduro and his co-workers, but also on PDVSA – the Venezuelan petrochemical giant (*Kryptowaluta petro...*, 2017).

Joanna Gocłowska-Bolek, only the introduction of sanctions by the United States for export, as well as the import of Venezuelan oil could lead the Maduro regime to a rapid fall (*Prezydent na ropę*, 2018).

A statement on the Venezuelan elections was also issued in May 2018 by the Lima Group¹² (Grupo de Lima, n.d.). The statement stated that the election was carried out in an undemocratic way and, therefore, it was decided to lower the level of diplomatic relations with Venezuela. Primarily, however, the assumptions of the Declaration concerned the ways of granting aid to Venezuelan refugees and supporting the countries in which their largest influx is observed (*Declaración del Grupo de Lima*, 2018).

Nicolás Maduro himself, during the ceremony of swearing-in the head of state, said that blaming him for the economic crisis in Venezuela was “stupid simplification”. At the same time, he invited citizens to dialogue and assured that he was the president of “all Venezuelans” (*Después de las cuestionadas elecciones...*, 2018).

When on January 10, 2019 Maduro began his second six-year term, the parliament controlled by the opposition in a special law annulled his oath and declared his power unlawful. A similar position was taken by a successive governments of the Americas and the international community. Maduro was called a dictator who usurped power, he was accused of falsifying the elections and bringing the country into bankruptcy.

Immediately after the swearing, mass protests against the rule of Nicolás Maduro broke out across the country. Once again, hundreds of thousands of people went out onto the street. As a result of the protests there were bloody riots, a series of arrests of opposition politicians and changes in the National Assembly, which is the legal parliament of Venezuela. It was headed by opposition politician Juan Guaidó (leader of the social party Voluntad Popular [Popular Will]), who in the climactic moment of growing tension in the country, with the support of the majority of parliamentarians and a large part of society, announced that he is taking over the power and becoming the temporary president of Venezuela until the next snap, democratic and free elections (*Quién es Juan Guaidó...*, 2019).

¹² The Lima Group was formed on August 8, 2017, in the capital of Peru. Its main goal was to find a solution to the Venezuelan crisis. The group includes more than a dozen Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Saint Lucia, as well as Canada and the USA.

A few minutes later, the President of the United States Donald Trump, expressed on Twitter his support for Guaidó: “The citizens of Venezuela have suffered for too long at the hands of the illegitimate Maduro regime. Today, I have officially recognized the President of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as the Interim President of Venezuela” (U.S. Department of State, 2019).

In response, Maduro immediately broke off diplomatic relations with the US, demanding that seventy-two North American diplomats leave the country, which triggered a symmetrical reaction of North American diplomacy. Meanwhile, Juan Guaidó, appearing as the president of the country, encouraged US diplomats to stay in Venezuela, ensuring that nothing bad could happen to them.

Many other countries in the world followed the USA, including Canada, most of Latin America and Europe (including Poland), Israel, and Australia. The international community, however, is not unanimous when it comes to expressing appreciation for the president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as the temporary president of Venezuela. Cuba, Bolivia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Russia, Turkey and Iran are still supporting Nicolás Maduro.

Controversies are also visible in the UN Security Council. It is hard to expect that Russia and China will agree to introduce sanctions against Venezuela. Although Guaidó was supported by the head of the European Council, Donald Tusk, who wrote on Twitter: “I hope that all of Europe will unite in support of democratic forces in #Venezuela. Unlike Maduro, the parliamentary assembly, including Juan Guaidó, have a democratic mandate from Venezuelan citizens”, the European Commission has not decided to adopt a common position in this matter.

The attitude of the army, which has so far unequivocally supported the current president, will be of key importance. Currently, however, more and more military officers are switching to the opposition party. Guaidó strives to create a split in the army’s faithful regime, promising an amnesty to all military men who will help take away the power of the current president.

What may ultimately determine the fate of the Maduro regime is US oil sanctions on Venezuela. Previous sanctions were of rather minor importance, although the US at some point reached for the argument of military intervention. However, Venezuelan oil still goes mainly to the USA. Loss of revenues from its exports will cause Maduro to lose any financial backing, which helps him to stay afloat.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The current economic problems that Venezuela is facing, to a large extent (apart from improper management of the country's financial resources and improper fiscal and monetary policy) result from a phenomenon called in economics a *Dutch disease*. It is connected with the economic recession caused by intensive exploitation of natural resources deposits, while neglecting the development of other industries. And yet, as much as 96% of Venezuelan budget income comes from the sale of crude oil. The excess of dependence of the economy on the sale of raw materials is also faced by several other Latin American countries, including Brazil.

As indicated in the article, the economic situation in Venezuela deteriorated in 2014 as a result of a drop in crude oil prices on global markets and as a result of the slowdown in economic development of the main importer of Venezuelan raw materials – China. The Latin American countries, including Venezuela, in order to protect themselves against problems resulting from the changing global market conditions in the future, should start implementing a new model of economic development. It should be based primarily on a modern and innovative economy. It would also be necessary to strengthen and invest in the development of other industries (the ones to which the price fluctuations on the world markets would have much smaller influence than that which takes place in the case of raw materials), increasing their competitiveness. The implementation of these assumptions is a long-term process, but it seems to be the only way to ensure the economic stability of Latin American countries in the future. According to the chairman of the finance committee of the Venezuelan parliament, Rafael Guzmán, only a new tax policy and discipline in the sphere of public finances could save this country from economic collapse (*Banki zamieniły się w zwykłe składki banknotów...*, 2018).

In working out a peaceful solution to the difficult political, economic and social situation in Venezuela, a big role could be played by such states as: Brazil, Colombia, or Cuba, which have their experience in mediation diplomacy. In addition, both Colombia and Brazil, due to the mass influx of Venezuelans to their countries, are already somewhat entangled in the internal situation of Venezuela and it is also in their interest to normalize the situation in that country. It is also worth remembering that in the face of the challenge of signing a Colombian government peace agreement with the FARC (i.e. the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), Caracas played a significant and positive role in

the negotiation process, not being indifferent to the situation in neighboring Colombia. It would also be good to start the talks on the normalization of the situation in Venezuela as part of regional Latin American integration structures, such as CELAC or UNASUR.

Considering the fact that Latin America experienced both periods of tension and conflict as well as economic and social crises (as in the 1980s, which were termed *la década perdida*, which was also accompanied by hyperinflation and economic problems in many Latin American countries), it is hoped that also this time, with the support of other Latin American countries, it will be possible to protect Venezuela from the specters of collapse or civil war. It should also be expressed that the lesson learned from this ordeal will change the economic model and fiscal policy to prevent such problems in the Latin American countries in the future.

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THE ROLE OF FOREIGN MEDIA AND DATA TRANSFER DEVICES IN CHANGING THE VIEWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S CITIZENS

ROLA ZAGRANICZNYCH MEDIÓW I ŚRODKÓW
PRZEKAZYWANIA DANYCH W ZMIENIANIU
ŚWIATOPOGLĄDU OBYWATELI KOREAŃSKIEJ REPUBLIKI
LUDOWO-DEMOKRATYCZNEJ

*Nicolas Levi** , *Kamil Weber*** 

— ABSTRACT —

North Korea is often seen as the most isolated country in the world. This isolation may be one of the key factors ensuring the rule of the Kim's family. For the last several years, however, the information barrier has been increasingly violated there. This article therefore describes how information is provided to the DPRK and examines whether this process can cause significant socio-political changes in North Korea.

Keywords: North Korea; transfer of information; pro-democracy activists; support for the regime

— ABSTRAKT —

Korea Północna często postrzegana jest jako najbardziej odizolowane państwo świata. Izolacja ta może być jednym z kluczowych czynników zapewniających trwanie tamtejszego reżimu rodziny Kimów. Od kilkunastu lat jednak bariera informacyjna zaczyna być tam coraz częściej naruszana. Artykuł ten opisuje zatem sposoby przekazywania informacji do KRLD oraz stanowi analizę tego, czy proces ten może spowodować w Korei Północnej znaczące zmiany społeczno-polityczne.

Słowa kluczowe: Korea Północna; przepływ informacji; aktywiści prodemokratyczni; poparcie władz

* Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures.

** Central Museum of Prisoners-of-War in Opole.

INTRODUCTION

The growing flow of information from the outside world to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)¹ several years ago prompted some analysts to think that this could cause significant changes and undermine the local political system. It is worth considering whether the consequences of this process may indeed be so far-reaching. This issue is not yet exhaustively shown in the scientific literature. Often, however, there are reports of news agencies that concern the transfer of information to North Korea. They show these events in a fragmented way, although the increasing number of such news confirms the scale of this phenomenon. In this case, it is necessary to take into account the activities of foreign media broadcasting signals to the DPRK's territory and the smuggling of memory media across the border with China. Another way to send information to a state controlled by Kim Jong-un² is sending the various types of leaflets by activists using balloons and drones. This form of action is exclusively delivered by refugees' NGO (Lankov, 2012, p. 226). These increasingly large-scale attempts to disseminate information about the real face of the DPRK regime should be contrasted with the efforts of the state authorities to keep citizens in isolation and disinformation. This should allow to answer questions about the potential consequences of the collision of these processes and their impact on the views of Koreans from the North, and thus – the durability of Kim Jong-un's power. It seems that despite the growing of this phenomenon and the emergence of votes of North Korean refugees about its significant impact on the stability of the regime, the effect will not be very significant in the near future. It is worth emphasizing that research on North Korean refugees is conducted on a group of people whose views often do not reflect the mood of majority of the North Korean society. This is due, among other things, to the fact that those who escape from DPRK are mostly uneducated women from the northern provinces of this country. The data provided by such research have, therefore, only informative meaning. It is therefore important to analyze the situation currently prevailing in North Korea, taking into account a wide range of factors affecting it.

¹ Also called: North Korea.

² The transcription of Korean names remains a challenging issue. This article generally follows the McCune-Reischauer system or the most popular forms. Korean names are written in different ways not only in Latin script languages, but also in the Korean language variants themselves. For example, Lee's transcript is written "I" (이) in South Korea and "Ri" (리) in North Korea.

Regarding the methodology, the article uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and source criticism to analyze the mentioned topic. The whole is done to develop important observations and draw conclusions.

This article supports the hypothesis and theoretical conclusion that information play a crucial role in the establishment and continuity of the DPRK dictatorial political system.

To fulfill these aims, the paper divides the discussed subject into three chapters. The first one consists of a short outline of the transfer of foreign information to the DPRK. The second topic tackles the behavior of the DPRK authorities toward the inflow of foreign information. The last chapter describes the potential influence of foreign information on the DPRK population.

THE TRANSFER OF FOREIGN INFORMATION TO THE DPRK

The North Korean audience is targeted by Public and Private western initiatives. The first category is dominated by Radio Free Asia and Voice of America which are state (US) sponsored projects. The second category gathers defector-based stations which lack funds and cannot develop themselves in spite of their broad knowledge of North Korea.

The sources of information sent to North Korea can be divided into two groups. The first are those related to entertainment – various types of media and memory cards containing mainly films and TV programs originally broadcast in South Korea and China. They are delivered, among others, by traders largely from North Korean provinces that border China. The second group is foreign media reporting on the real face of the outside world and the manipulations of North Korean authorities. Often, the delivery of these messages requires the involvement of other countries and non-governmental organizations operating in them (Lankov, 2012, pp. 26–27). In DPRK the most popular carrier of external information are smuggled DVDs. In the research of Nat Kretchun and Jane Kim from 2010, which were attended by North Korean refugees, 39 percent of them indicated DVDs as an important source of news in their homeland (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 10). However, these researches show that none of the surveyed refugees dared to watch them in a wider circle than family or trusted friends. An additional survey concluded that in 2009, the DVD penetration rate was around twenty percent (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 103). Watching a South Korean show still remains illegal and possession of

them is subjected to severe punishment. These absurd regulations are ignored by the population. Furthermore, owning a DVD player is authorized by the law (Lankov, 2014, pp. 16–17).

In 2012, representatives of such radio stations as: Radio Free North Korea, Open Radio for North Korea, and Radio Free Chosun, started cooperation in order to establish the Association of Broadcasters for North Korea. Their aim was to exert pressure on the DPRK's authorities to provide greater access to information for citizens of this country (Sedaghat, 2014).

South Korean radio stations often broadcast in the evenings and even late at night, when it is easier for the listeners to track the broadcast and tune in without risking being caught (Chun, 2008). The aforementioned research from 2010 showed, for example, that seventy-five percent of surveyed refugees listened to foreign radio between 11p^m and midnight. On the other hand, in the afternoon (from 1p^m to 6pm), only one in a hundred people listened to these programs (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 20). Listening to foreign stations is also hindered by the fact that radio and TV receivers must be tuned in such a way that they play only the North Korean radio stations (Ziccardi, 2013, p. 296). Earlier, receivers are also checked by and registered with the police (Sedaghat, 2014). In addition, controls are made at home every three months to verify that the receivers have not been tuned (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 73). The Central Agency for the Safety of Science and Communication Technology has an important role to oversee citizens. This office monitors the activity of TV, radio and Internet users, and the task of its employees is, among others, setting appropriate locks in the receivers (Demick, 2011, p. 223). Some North Koreans keep two radios at home. One to show the controllers and the other to listen (Higginbotham, 2014). The authorities, however, use an advanced radio jamming system (Colors, 2013). The effects of the inflow of external information are also counteracted by numerous national and local radio stations, strengthening support for leaders. There are even those that target their programs especially for soldiers guarding the border with the South (BBC, 2011).

Watching foreign television stations is also difficult in North Korea and is subject to various restrictions. Except several hotels and administrations in cities such as Pyongyang and Rason, there is no access to satellite television. This means that receiving external stations is only possible in areas near the borders with China and South Korea. As mentioned, it is illegal and theoretically receivers should not even have such a technical possibility. The signal usually reaches from fifty to seventy-five miles deep into the country. Chinese television Yanji TV is

the most popular at the border with China, while KBS is often watched in areas near South Korea. In comparison to the number of recipients of North Korean state television, the number of people watching foreign stations is relatively small (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 15). According to data from 2012, about one third of people who have a TV and live close to a border, had the opportunity to receive foreign broadcasts (Freedom House, 2016). In the research referred to the group of refugees, 38 percent of them said that state television has an important influence. While Chinese television was only indicated by 13 percent of surveyed and South Korean by five percent (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 10).

The third medium that could provide access to foreign information is the Internet. The number of computers exceeds 100,000 pieces and reached several times more people in North Korea (Lankov, 2014, p. 103). Among the surveyed refugees from North Korea, only 16 percent of them had such an opportunity. However, many offices, military units and schools have these devices (Lankov, 2014, p. 57). The fact of having a computer should be reported to the local branch of the Ministry of Public Security. Hard disks are thoroughly checked for the inclusion of anti-socialist material and content (Lankov, 2014, p. 72). As of 2012, there was only one Internet cafe in Pyongyang (Lee, 2012). In addition, one is discouraged to attend such places with a very high price of up to \$10 per hour, which is the average monthly wage (Ziccardi, 2013, p. 299). This means that the vast majority of citizens simply cannot afford to use these services. Moreover, computers in North Korea are connected to Chinese servers and subjected to strict data filtration (Ziccardi, 2013, p. 299). However, there is a limited group of people in DPRK who have access to a real, uncensored Internet – probably only a few dozen families closest to the leader (Lee, 2012). Lecturers and PhD students from the University of Science and Technology in Pyongyang also have access to the Internet, however their activity is closely monitored there³. They use the network mainly to find the necessary scientific information, and each e-mail must be approved by the university authorities before being sent (Talmadge, 2014). The Internet – under controlled conditions – is also available in some offices that cooperate with foreign companies.

The method of providing information, which is difficult to counteract for the North Korean authorities, is sending goods there, using special balloons. They fly up to 5,000 meters above sea level, so they are very difficult to shoot down (Sang-hun, 2016). Balloons with a cylindrical shape are filled with helium or

³ Also known as the Kim Chaek University of Technology.

hydrogen (Faiola, 2005). Their length is about 12 meters. The distance they reach depends on the strength of the wind and the type of construction (McDonald, 2011). As an effort aimed at pressing the North Korean regime, balloons also transport one-dollar coins, various types of digital storage media and leaflets to denounce the propaganda of the Kim Jong-un's regime (Sang-hun, 2016). The content of these pendrives include subversive media and information, or even copied Wikipedia pages. DVDs, in turn, contain popular television programs from South Korea. These one-dollar coins allow the purchase of rice on the black market (Farivar, 2014). These activities are co-financed by foreign church associations and international organizations fighting for Human Rights Conditions, such as the Defense Forum Foundation (Jung, 2014, p. 29).

Among the groups that deal with the transfer of balloons the following can be mentioned: Fighters for Free North Korea (FFNK), Campaign for Helping North Koreans in Direct Way (NKDW), North Korean Christian Association (NKCA), and North Korean People's Liberation Front (NKPLF) (북한 인민해방전선, Bukhan Inmin Haebangjeonseon) (Jung, 2014, p. 29). Many of the so-called 'balloon warriors' are former refugees from North Korea.

The founder of the Fighters for Free North Korea – Park Sang-hak⁴ – admitted that only until the beginning of 2014 his group dropped some 52 million leaflets to the DPRK's territory especially designed for the North Korean audience (Farivar, 2014). In the past, also books were sent, but due to the changes in technology, materials started to be scanned instead of being photocopied, which proved to be time and money consuming. The apparition of drones increases the vulnerability of the North Korean regime, which stocks data using SD cards and USB memories (Russon, 2016). At the end of 2015, across the border with China, activists sent 2,000 pendrives to North Korea, but it is still difficult to assess the impact of these launches (Shim, 2015). The website "flashdrivesforfreedom.org" indicates that activists reached around one million people through that kind of actions⁵. Unfortunately, it seems to be impossible to verify this data.

These efforts shall be continued but their impact can be limited as the border between South and North Korea is tightly controlled on both sides. This initiative would be more efficient being done from the Chinese border. However, in this case, requesting the approval of the Chinese authorities would be needed.

⁴ Park Sang-hak, before he fled to South Korea, was an official in the propaganda department of the Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist Youth League. He fled to South Korea in 1999.

⁵ This is a cumulated value till 2018. Retrieved from: <https://flashdrivesforfreedom.org>.

This issue was also deepened by the Google project, which tested the possibility of providing access to the Internet thanks to devices attached to balloons (Farivar, 2014).

However, a lot of people criticize such methods, believing that this only provokes the aggression of the regime from Pyongyang. Residents of South Korean villages are afraid that as a result of the actions of activists sending goods to the DPRK, they will be targeted by the authorities. The North Korean authorities regard these actions as a war act and in retaliation they threatened to use the artillery (Sang-hun, 2016), which was the case, for example, in October 2014 (The Guardian, 2015). A retaliatory action taken by DPRK was to send leaflets to the South, on which president Park Geun-hye was called a snake and a prostitute (Sang-hun, 2016). In January 2016, balloons were sent to South Korea, which could transport up to one million prospects.

Some commentators claim that sending balloons has little chance of success. In their opinion, it is hard to know where it would fly, because even when the wind blows north it is possible that the balloons fall into the sea or that most of them end up in the hilly province of Gangwon (Jung, 2014, p. 30). Andrei Lankov – professor at the South Korean Kookmin University – also expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of the impact of leaflets on the situation in North Korea, because in his opinion, it is difficult for a brochure to be able to reverse the prolonged influence of propaganda. However, there is no reliable information on how many Koreans from the North read such leaflets and what is the effect of this (Sang-hun, 2016).

THE BEHAVIOR OF THE DPRK AUTHORITIES TOWARD THE INFLOW OF FOREIGN INFORMATION

North Korean authorities have been trying to respond to the effects of providing information from abroad for years. The law represses the use of smuggled devices and data carriers, as well as access to external broadcasts or the dissemination of rumors that destroy the social order (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 70). Receiving foreign radio or TV stations and having illegal publications is treated as a crime against the state and may be punishable by heavy works, imprisonment, or even death (Baek, 2016). The amended Penal Code of 2004 set the punishment of staying in a labor camp or correctional institution for importing illegal photographs, CDs or VHS tapes containing foreign music, films and pornographic materials.

Article 195 of the Penal Code forbade listening to South Korean broadcasts and collecting and disseminating printed materials from the South and spreading the information heard. Article 222 stated that the dissemination of false messages causing distrust of the state or disturbing the social order is punishable by two years of forced labor. The punishment for tracking the South Korean media was the imprisonment of two years in a re-educational labor camp for up to five years in a prison camp. In reality, however, it often depended on the social status of the accused and his ability to pay a bribe (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 71).

In 2007, the Penal Code was changed. New regulations were supposed to additionally increase control over the society and tighten punishments for some offenses related to obtaining information from abroad. For example, since then illegal cooperation with someone living in another country was to be punished with a stay in a labor camp for three to five years. In addition, there is the lack of precision in such terms as: “particularly serious circumstances” or “very serious matter”, that may lead to arbitrary treatment of defendants and condemning them to harsh sentences even for minor offenses (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 72).

POTENTIAL INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN INFORMATION ON THE DPRK POPULATION

It is also worth considering how much the desire to access foreign information is caused by a real desire to learn the truth about the policy of North Korean authorities and the readiness of citizens to change their views. As pointed out by N. Kretchun and J. Kim, some recipients of the external media are not looking for information to convince themselves of the manipulation of the regime, but of mere curiosity or entertainment. In addition, due to the isolation of North Korea from the foreign media, it is often difficult to comment on political events in this country. For this reason, national media are actually the only ones able to relate to current social and political situations (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 13). One cannot assume that information from abroad will have an immediate effect and change the North Korean people’s beliefs inculcated in them for decades. In any case, North Koreans do not necessarily believe everything they see. Andrei Lankov noticed that in the 1970^s and 1980^s the citizens of the European communist bloc states, thanks to – among others – foreign radio programs, learned about life in Western countries, which deprived the state authorities of their credibility and raised the curiosity of the outside world (Lankov, 2009, p. 4). Due to the

conditions at the time, the influence of, e.g., Radio Free Europe in Poland during the communist dictatorship, was different. The vast majority of Polish society in fact distanced themselves from the theses proclaimed by the state authorities. The propaganda used in DPRK is in turn based on the real painful historical experiences of the Korean people and the stimulation of nationalist sentiments. It is therefore difficult for foreign messages to be absorbed there with the same ease as the aforementioned content transmitted to Poles in the 1980s. As in Poland, the inflow of foreign information led to linguistic changes through the utilization of foreign words. Young North Koreans started to use South Korean slang (Baek, 2016, p. 187), just as Poles in the 1970s used American words.

According to a research conducted by N. Kretchun and J. Kim, foreign media seem to be credible to Koreans from the North. Despite this, it does not affect the attitude of citizens towards their authorities too much (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 33). Access to foreign information sources, however, affects the more favorable perception of the United States and South Korea (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 24). It should be remembered that the citizens of North Korea do not have the opportunity to express their views, let alone engage in activities that could cause significant changes in the country (Kretchun & Kim, 2012, p. 31). It is also worth taking into account that when examining the attitudes of refugees, we often deal with people who believed in foreign messages and on this basis decided to escape from their homeland. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions from such results in the context of the entire population of the DPRK. For example, the individual character traits of these people, or the region of residence, where it is easier to access news from abroad, could be important.

CONCLUSION

The inflow of foreign information to North Korea is a process that will be very difficult to slow down in spite of the efforts of the DPRK relevant authorities. On the basis of the data provided in this article, the regime from Pyongyang not only strengthens and extends methods of control and isolation of citizens, but also introduces changes to the law. However, by applying pressure to the authorities in South Korea, the DPRK government tries to influence the actions of people undertaking initiatives outside the borders of the DPRK. Yet, we can expect that despite threats, smuggling of goods and the efforts of foreign activists and the media will be continued. As a result, knowledge about living conditions in other

countries will spread. For many years, in North Korea there was a situation in which – contrary to the beliefs of many people in the Western world – citizens, due to isolation and propaganda, were indeed devoted to national leaders and ideas. Through the flow of information, this belief will most likely be subject to gradual disappearance. This may be the reason for the growing discord between the declared views and the theses proclaimed by the media, and the real feelings of the ever-wider circles of society. It does not seem, however, that the current time should be groundbreaking. Regarding leaflets sent to North Korea, the influence of such actions is still limited as the South Korean government is reluctant. We consider that this initiative would be much more efficient being supervised from the Chinese border. However, it would need the approval of Chinese authorities, which would rather cooperate with North Korean authorities.

Furthermore, as there are regular repression campaigns, there is also a lack of trust between people, which would enable unity and undertaking joint actions aimed at changing the government. However, the standard of living is not as tragic as in the second half of the 1990s. It is also not easy to quickly destroy the myth built in the minds of Koreans from the North for seven decades. Due to the centralization of power, there are also no educated mechanisms or even a tradition of bottom-up political activity. People from the top of power are often beneficiaries of the regime. It is difficult to expect both rapid changes from the bottom-up as well as those inspired by the political elite. As a result, it helps to maintain the *status quo*, which may after all become more and more vulnerable in the future. In the case of North Korea, the main firewall consists of the Chinese authorities.

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SPECIFICS OF THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC STATE

SPECYFIKA TZW. PAŃSTWA ISLAMSKIEGO

*Kinga Smoleń** 

— ABSTRACT —

The aim of this paper is to analyze the specific character of the so-called Islamic State. For the purposes of the study it is based on two assumptions. Firstly, the rise of the so-called Islamic State was determined by a number of regional and international conditions, in particular the destabilization of the Middle Eastern order, the events of the Arab Spring, operations of the United States in the region, globalization processes, and technological development. Secondly, the specific nature of the so-called Islamic State, reflected in the use of violence and intimidation, noncompliance with the principles of international law, and challenging the international order exclude the possibility of the entity in question being considered as a person of international law. To begin, with view to attain the research objective stated above and under consideration of the research hypotheses adopted herein, this paper examines the root causes behind the rise of the so-called Islamic State at the regional and international level. Subsequently, it defines the specific nature

— ABSTRAKT —

Celem poznawczym artykułu jest analiza specyfiki tzw. Państwa Islamskiego. Dla potrzeb podjętego problemu przyjęto dwa założenia. Po pierwsze, na powstanie tzw. Państwa Islamskiego wpłynął szereg uwarunkowań o charakterze regionalnym i międzynarodowym, m.in.: destabilizacja porządku na Bliskim Wschodzie na skutek wydarzeń Arabskiej Wiosny Ludów, działania Stanów Zjednoczonych w regionie, procesy globalizacji i rozwój technologii. Po drugie, specyfika tzw. Państwa Islamskiego – określana m.in. przez: stosowanie przemocy, zastraszanie ludności, nieprzestrzeganie zasad prawa międzynarodowego oraz kontestowanie porządku międzynarodowego – nie pozwala uznać go za podmiot prawa międzynarodowego. W ramach artykułu wskazane zostaną, po pierwsze, najważniejsze uwarunkowania powstania tzw. Państwa Islamskiego na poziomie regionalnym i międzynarodowym. Po drugie, określona zostanie specyfika badanego podmiotu z uwzględnieniem zasięgu przestrzennego,

* Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Faculty of Political Science and Journalism.

of the entity in question, taking into account its territory, internal structure, principles of operation, and personality.

struktury wewnętrznej i zasad funkcjonowania oraz podmiotowości.

Keywords: so-called Islamic State; terrorist organization; Middle East; state; quasi-state

Słowa kluczowe: tzw. Państwo Islamskie; organizacja terrorystyczna; Bliski Wschód; państwo; quasi-państwo

The so-called Islamic State declared its establishment in June 2014, thus confirming the significance of the late Westphalian international relations. These are characterized by pluralism and hybridity of subjective and objective scope as well as an increasing complexity (Pietraś, 2015). The specific nature of the so-called Islamic State regarded as a new participant of international relations is subject to several factors. Firstly, its legal personality is unregulated. Secondly, its structure and functioning are based on violence and terror. Thirdly, its territory is merely declared and not confirmed by any international treaties. Due to these factors and because it does not comply with the principles of international law but rather clearly defies the international order, the so-called Islamic State cannot be considered a state. It should be noted that international relations scholars are not unanimous in the classification of the entity in question. There are two major approaches described in the literature, whereby the so-called Islamic State is considered either as a terrorist organization or as a quasi-state.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the specific character of the so-called Islamic State. The analysis serves to summarize the existing research, as well as to organize the knowledge about the new entity in the international system. For the purposes of the study, it is based on two assumptions. Firstly, the rise of the so-called Islamic State was determined by a number of regional and international conditions, in particular the destabilization of the Middle Eastern order, the events of the Arab Spring, operations of the United States in the region, globalization processes, and technological development. Secondly, the specific nature of the so-called Islamic State, reflected in the use of violence and intimidation, noncompliance with the principles of international law, and challenging the international order exclude the possibility of the entity in question being considered as a person of international law.

The following research methods and techniques were used in the publication. Factor analysis was used to examine the regional and international determinants of the emergence of the so-called Islamic State. The analysis of statistical data was

used to determine the extent of the area occupied by the so-called Islamic State, as well as its military and financial resources. The analysis of the state of literature and research was used to verify and evaluate studies on the functioning of the so-called Islamic State, and also helped to define the level and state of research of the analyzed phenomenon.

To begin, with view to attain the research objective stated above and under consideration of the research hypotheses adopted herein, this paper examines the root causes behind the rise of the so-called Islamic State at the regional and international level. Subsequently, it defines the specific nature of the entity in question, taking into account its territory, internal structure, principles of operation, and personality. The analysis covers the period 2014–2018, in which the so-called Islamic State occupied certain areas. Since the statehood of the Islamic State is disputed, it shall be referred to as the so-called Islamic State.

Among the popular science studies, a significant contribution to the study of a new participant in the international system, which is the so-called Islamic State, can be found in the following monographs: A.B. Atwan, *Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate*, London 2015; P. Cockburn, *Państwo Islamskie [The Jihadis Return]*, Warszawa 2015; B. Hall, *ISIS Państwo Islamskie. Brutalne początki armii terrorystów [Inside ISIS: The Brutal Rise of a Terrorist Army]*, Warszawa 2015; M. Weiss, & H. Hassan, *Wewnątrz armii terroru*, Warszawa 2015. Articles in scientific journals should also be considered valuable, among others: D. Holbrook, *Al-Qaeda and the Rise of ISIS*, „Survival. Global Politics and Strategy” 2015, vol. 57; J. Dobbins, & S.G. Jones, *The End of a Caliphate*, „Survival. Global Politics and Strategy” 2017, vol. 59; H. Brands, & P. Feaver, *Was the Rise of ISIS Inevitable?*, „Survival. Global Politics and Strategy” 2017, vol. 59. Among the Polish studies, attention should be paid to the Amicus Europae Foundation study entitled *Wojna z Kalifatem* edited by I. Bil, J. Gajda, & T. Otłowski, published in 2015 in Warsaw, as well as articles, among others: S. Wojciechowski, *Fenomen „Państwa Islamskiego” i jego źródła*, „Przegląd Strategiczny” 2016, vol. 9, and K. Wojtasik, *Życie codzienne na terenach tzw. Państwa Islamskiego w przekazie jego oficjalnych mediów*, „Media i Społeczeństwo” 2016, vol. 6. From 2018, the so-called Islamic State is analyzed in an increasing number of Polish-language scientific studies: B. Bolechów, *Słowa w cieniu mieczy: „Dabiq” i narracja Państwa Islamskiego*, Wrocław 2020; M. Dziekan, K. Zdulski, & R. Bania, *Arabska wiosna i świat arabski u progu XXI wieku*, Łódź 2020; M. El Ghamari, *Cool Jihad*, Warszawa 2018; A. Graban, & M. Jaroszyńska, *Działalność propagandowo-informacyjna Daesh*, Warszawa 2018; A. Wejkszner, *Samotne wilki kalifatu? Państwo Islamskie*

i indywidualny terroryzm dżihadystyczny w Europie Zachodniej, Warszawa 2018. The studies mentioned above were used in the article.

1. DETERMINANTS OF THE RISE OF THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC STATE

The so-called Islamic State came into existence owing to various regional and international determinants (Brands & Feaver, 2017, pp. 7–54; Warrick, 2017). Among the regional factors, it is primarily the Arab Spring that was of the greatest significance (Ilkowski, 2011), whereas the international factors include the actions of the United States in the Middle East, globalization processes, and technological development.

Conditions at the regional level

The underlying cause of the events of the Arab Spring were high food prices. According to World Bank data, they increased by 15 percent (Ilkowski, 2011) from November 2010 to January 2011. The event which directly sparked the radicalization of social unrest in the Middle East was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor. Initially, this tragedy gave rise to a wave of nationwide protests, as a result of which President Zine Ben Ali was forced to resign (Kaczmarek, 2014). This led very quickly to social tensions in other states of the region, i.e., Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. Citizens organized street protests by means of modern tools of communication, including mobile phones and social networking sites.

A political analysis of the Arab Spring events should take into consideration the diverse nature of its effects (Smoleń, 2020). A part of them further deepen the instability in the Middle East (Dziekan, Zdulski, & Bania, 2020; Ożarowski & Grabowski, 2017) and as such must be deemed explicitly negative. These consequences include: the dysfunctionality of some countries, in particular Syria, Iraq, and Libya (Gil, 2015); local problems which remain unsolved; uncontrolled mass migration and thus the issue of refugees; increasing Islamization of social life; as well as radicalization of groups with an Islamic background. At the same time, the influence of liberal-democratic, leftist and nationalist movements declined (Dołgow, 2014).

The Arab Spring proved most tragic for Libya and Syria. In the case of the former, the events contributed to a government change. Those who fought the

regime of Muammar Gaddafi received support from a coalition of Western countries. Before long, the conflict evolved into a regular civil war, as a consequence of which the situation developed into a dual-power arrangement. Since 2011, the capital is ruled by the National Transitional Council, which was established with the aid of the European Union and the United Nations. The parliament, in turn, is located in Tobruk and remains under the control of the army. While the conflict persisted, the so-called Islamic State began its operation in Libya.

Syria, next to Libya, is recognized as one of the most dysfunctional countries of the international system as a result of the events of the Arab Spring (*Fragile State Index*, 2015). It has been categorized as one of states labeled *High Alert* in the Fragile State Index. Based on an analysis of trends over the years 2006–2015, Syria ranked second as to increasing dysfunctionality. One of the relevant factors which drove Syrians to the streets and made them demand a change of the existing authorities (Ilkowski, 2014) was the drought they were experiencing over the years 2006–2010. As its effects were not addressed by the government, nearly 1.5 million inhabitants of villages migrated into cities. This process permanently changed the socio-economic structure of the country (Sawiński, 2014). At the beginning of 2012, anti-government demonstrations turned into an armed resistance movement, leading to the death of 7,000 people (Olszanecka, 2012). The government forces used increasingly violent methods to quell the opposition, and as a result social unrest evolved into a bloody civil war.

Although the international community has taken several peace initiatives, a permanent solution to end the conflict in Syria has not been found. The two main factors which contribute to its complexity are ethnic and religious divisions within Syria which preclude any common coalition from being created (Michalik, 2014)¹, as well as external entities involved in the conflict, whose interests and political ambitions are mutually exclusive, thus diminishing the possibility of a single coherent strategy being developed (Rojek, 2014)². Deep

¹ A representative of the Alevi Islamic community (constituting 10 percent of the Syrian population), President Bashar Al-Assad has the support of Christians and the Druze, the Baath Party and the government security forces. The opposition comprises the Sunni population, i.e., the 70 percent of the society. The symmetric division among the followers of various denominations of Islam has naturally become a sphere for the expansion of the Wahhabis, i.e., Muslim fundamentalists from Saudi Arabia. The internal situation in the country is furthermore complicated by the presence of both Sunnis and Kurds.

² The Syrian authorities have the support of Lebanon, Iran, Russia, and China, as well as Hezbollah as a non-state actor, whereas the opposition is supported by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Republic of Turkey, the United States, and the European Union.

ethnic and religious divisions and dysfunctional state structures enabled fighters of the so-called Islamic State to occupy a part of Syrian territory.

Conditions on the international level

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US administration labeled Iraq as a part of the group of countries supporting international terrorism dubbed the axis of evil on the basis of the reports whereby Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction. As a result of this decision, the United Kingdom and the United States attacked Iraq in March 2003 (Kubiak, 2005). The fundament of US foreign policy was the idea of the so-called conservative internationalism, reflected in unilateral activities, various types of political and military instruments, as well as in a moral interpretation of actions taken (Jarczewska-Romaniuk, 2005). Although the regime of Saddam Hussein was overthrown in April 2003 and he himself was captured eight months later, the war in Iraq was not over. Patrols of the coalition forces were regularly attacked by armed rebel groups. Despite the first free elections to the Parliament in 2005 and the establishment of the Government, the situation has not improved (*Iraq – Conflict...*, 2012).

2006 saw a deterioration in the Sunni-Shiite relations in Iraq. In August 2010, the US army withdrew from the Iraqi territory, with 35 to 50 thousand soldiers remaining until December 2011 for the purpose of supporting the Iraqi government and security forces (Bocheńska, 2011). The final removal of American troops from the territory destabilized country even further. The part of the population which was excluded from social life after the US soldiers had been deployed now turned to even more radical steps. These were primarily military and civilian groups of Hussein's Sunni allies. It is the marginalization of that group that led directly to the creation of the so-called Islamic State (Hodali & Metzner, 2014).

As a result, a part of former allies and distant associates of the toppled dictator began to form a united front against the US army. Under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, "al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI) came into being. Upon his assassination in 2006, local leaders formed an alliance between al-Qaeda in Iraq and another terrorist structure called "Mujahideen Shura Council", ultimately leading to the creation of a new organization: "Islamic State in Iraq" (ISI) (Hodali & Metzner, 2014). In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took command of this organization, after the tragic death of its former leader, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (Cockburn, 2015). By sending fighters into war-torn Syria, al-Baghdadi contributed to

the establishment of the terrorist al-Nusra Front with bases in Raqqa, Idlib, Deir ez-Zor, and Aleppo.

In April 2013, al-Baghdadi decided to combine the “Islamic State in Iraq” and the al-Nusra front into one organization named “Islamic State of Iraq and Levant”. The objective of the new entity was to centralize the terrorist groups operating on the territories of Iraq and Syria (Cockburn, 2015). The merge never happened as the leader of the al-Nusra Front, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, opposed it. This is interpreted as a sign of struggle for supremacy and leadership among radical Islamic terrorist organizations. Al-Julani pursued to introduce the al-Nusra front into al-Qaeda structures. Thanks to his efforts, the Front received the status of the official representative of al-Qaeda in Syria. At the same time, the leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, ordered all Salafi organizations that operate in Syria to acknowledge the al-Nusra Front as their superior. In response, al-Baghdadi detached itself completely from al-Qaeda and started to compete with it for influence on the border of Iraq and Syria (Cockburn, 2015). Regardless of this failure, on June 29, 2014, al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of a caliphate under the name of the “Islamic State”, led by himself. The caliphate must be regarded as a self-proclaimed state because it has not been acknowledged by most fundamentalist organizations, whereas its existence is disputed by leaders of Muslim countries and numerous preachers (Cockburn, 2015).

It should be stressed that the escalation of tensions and social unrest comprising the Arab Spring and leading to the creation of the so-called Islamic State were only possible owing to globalization and dynamic technological development. The essence of globalization processes has become the topic of many debates and consequently various dimensions of this phenomenon are emphasized. It is most frequently identified with system determinants which exhibit novel characteristics that affect the parameters of the international order. The essence of the new quality of social life and the functioning of the transnational space is well defined by the mechanism of the “time–space compression”, whereby, as explained by the British geographer David Harvey, the compression of time and space experienced nowadays manifests itself in shorter time and smaller space (Harvey, 1989).

The phenomenon described above is contingent upon the dynamics of the technological development. As a result of this mechanism, social phenomena and processes undergo *deterritorialization*, and thus a transnational social space is being formed and functioning. The notion of *deterritorialization* regarded as a factor behind a quality change in the international environment should mean

that the globalization processes lead to the establishment of interaction and ties not from a distance, “across” the territory, but rather at no distance, relatively detached from a particular location (Scholte, 1996). The crux of the matter lies in the low importance of geographical distance and space in its traditional meaning. The local and the global issues are mutually conditioning. The awareness of the world as a whole, as a “single community” or “one place”, is gradually increasing.

The technological factor plays a key role in isolating the transnational space where a wide variety of social interactions could occur, regardless of national borders (Rosenau & Singh, 2002; Mueller, 2010; Kremer & Müller, 2014). The first modern information revolution, initiated in the middle of the nineteenth century, focused above all on different communication methods, and it allowed people to utilize the telegraph, the telephone, and the radio. The second information revolution led to the spread of TV, satellites and early generations of computers. These inventions revolutionized the way people communicate and, what is relevant in the context of the evolution of the transnational space, they have changed the importance of distance, time, and location. However, the structure of the international system remained unchanged (Surmacz, 2015). The dynamic development of technology reflected in unprecedented technological innovativeness induces substantial changes in the organization and functioning of social life, such as reorganization of the world economy, evolution of political processes, or new methods of communication and transport (Kellner, 1998). The trends presented above are apparent in the events of the Arab Spring and the emergence of the so-called Islamic State.


2. ESSENCE OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC STATE

The specific character of the so-called Islamic State (Wasiuta, Wasiuta, & Mazur, 2018) should be analyzed in several dimensions. Firstly, this concerns the spatial range, i.e., the area that is under the control of the examined entity. Secondly, its internal structure and rules of functioning. Thirdly, its unregulated personality³.

³ This publication attempts at the classification of the so-called Islamic State as a new participant of international relations, whereas the issue of its irregular personality is the subject of another section.

Specifics of the spatial range

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the founder of the so-called Islamic State (Chrońnicki, 2015/2016), aimed at gaining control over an extensive area, stretching from Aleppo to Mosul (Cockburn, 2015). In spring of 2014, al-Baghdadi managed to dominate the eastern part of Syria exploiting the failure of the government, with Raqqa as the “capital” of the occupied territory (Kucharczyk, 2015). Upon securing his position in Syria, al-Baghdadi went on to conquer Iraq, governed by a relatively weak Shiite administration in a constant conflict with the Sunnis.




Map 1. Territory of the So-called Islamic State in December 2014

Source: Tanter, 2014, p. 2.

By September 2014, the jihadists captured Mosul, inhabited by over one million people, and almost the entire western Iraq (Kucharczyk, 2015). By the end of 2014, a significant part of western Iraq and almost all eastern Syria was under the control of the so-called Islamic State. In this period, it also commanded strong

forces in the central part of the country, almost entirely driving out Kurdish troops and forcing them to heroically defend the city of Kobane. According to the information of the Institute for the Study of War, the jihadists occupied nearly 200,000 km² in January 2015 (Atwan, 2015). This area was inhabited by approximately ten million people (Dobbins & Jones, 2017). The so-called Islamic State held 19 percent of the Iraqi territory and 14 percent of Syria (Dobbins & Jones, 2017). From the beginning of 2015, the so-called Islamic State clearly began to lose initiative. The only major jihadist offensive at the time was capturing Palmyra in May, a town controlled by the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The fighters also managed to gain access to oil and gas fields in the central regions of Syria (Kucharczyk, 2015).



Map 2. Territory Lost by the So-called Islamic State between January 2015 and October 2016

Source: *Islamic State Caliphate Shrinks by 16 Percent in 2016...* (2016).

In the remaining months of 2015, the jihadists lost only the already established strategic points of their territory. In March, they were expelled from the city of Tikrit (*Iraqi Forces Recapture...*, 2015), whereas in October from Baiji (*Iraqi Forces and Militia...*, 2015). In the following year, Salafi radicals lost control over Ramadi in February (*Iraq Says...*, 2016), Rutba in May (*Iraqi Forces Retake...*, 2016), and Fallujah in June (Cockburn, 2016). October 2016 saw a large-scale

operation of Iraqi troops. Their aim was to recapture Mosul, which was the last major urban center controlled by the so-called Islamic State. Both Sunni and Shiite militia as well as the Kurdish peshmerga fighters participated in it. The international coalition under the leadership of the United States rendered air support throughout the operation. As a result of these activities, the eastern part of Mosul was freed in January 2017. A few months later, on July 9, the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced that the city was liberated from the jihadist occupation.

According to Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Centre, the so-called Islamic State lost 23 percent of the area occupied by its fighters since the beginning of 2016 (*Raport...*, 2017). This means that the territory of 78,000 km² shrank to an area of slightly above 60,000 km² (*Raport...*, 2017). In comparison to 2014, the losses of terrorists amounted to 90 percent in 2018. However, the fact that the so-called Islamic State lost control over the vast majority of the occupied area does not mean that it has been completely overcome and is not a threat anymore. The report of the United Nations shows that there may still remain 20 to 30 thousands of Islamic State members on the territory of Syria and Iraq (*State*, 2019). They occupy mainly parts of the desert and not any major urban centers.

Outside the territory of Syria and Iraq, the largest activity of the so-called Islamic State was observed in Libya. After Muammar Qaddafi was shot, the state was in fact split between two competing government administrations. Given such internal instability, particularly in the south of Libya, many jihadists who earlier fought in the northern Mali moved to Libya (Czerep, 2015). Members of the local terrorist organizations, particularly the Battar Brigade, declared the establishment of the Barqa (Derna) provincial division of the Islamic State in October 2014 (Czerep, 2015). Subsequent *wilayat*, i.e., caliphate provinces, were created in Tripoli and Fezzan. In 2018, there were 3 to 4 thousand jihadists active in Libya. Outside the territory of Libya, the provinces subordinate to the so-called Islamic State appeared in Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan. The organization aimed at controlling these provinces in terms of infrastructure and facilities. Firstly, a significant number of the recruits came in particular from North Africa. Secondly, dependent areas, especially Derna, were the transit point for terrorists from Sudan, Syria and other areas (Czerep, 2015).

The actions of the international anti-terrorist coalition prompted the process of decentralization and division of the so-called Islamic State, and so Africa became a strategic region for the jihadists, particularly for Sahel Islamist groups. They decided to unite under the name of the *Islamic State in the Greater Sahara*

(ISGS) and took fight with anti-terrorist units from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The experts stress that it is these countries that are particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Islamist terrorism also poses a serious threat in Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (De Maeyer, 2018).

According to the authorities of the autonomous Kurdistan, at the end of 2019 the process of rebuilding the structures of the so-called Islamic State was about to end. The terrorists are now expected to be in the Hamrin Mountains in northeastern Iraq. The Kurds estimate that the number of jihadists is around 10,000, of which four to five thousand are to be in Iraq. After the reorganization, Daesh's goal is not to control a compact territory, but to operate underground and carry out attacks similar to Al-Qaeda (BBC..., 2019). The above reports can be considered credible due to the increasing number of terrorist attacks in Iraq. Attacks are also taking place in Afghanistan and Syria. The organization's revival is favored by social protests against the center of power in Iraq, as well as by the presence of Turkish troops in the north of Syria, and thus the weakening of the Kurds who have carried out very effective operations against the so-called Islamic State (Jendroszczyk, 2020).

SPECIFICS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC STATE

Another factor important for the analysis of the specific character of the so-called Islamic State is its internal structure. It was supposed to pursue two objectives. Firstly, to demonstrate the power of the so-called Islamic State and thus prevent any rebellion among the occupied population. Secondly, to provide for the basic social needs of the local community and give this radical organization an impression of statehood. It should be noted that these objectives were successfully achieved for the entire period the fighters of the so-called Islamic State were occupying the parts of Syrian and Iraqi territories.

At the core of the internal structure of the so-called Islamic State is its historical background and strict interpretation of rules of the Qur'an. Since its very beginning, regardless of the probable reorganization it has recently undergone, the so-called Islamic State has been managed by the self-proclaimed caliph. Until the decentralization and the division of the so-called Islamic State, the caliph was advised by the Shura Council, an authority consisting of a dozen members selected by the caliph himself. The members of the Shura Council supervised the administration and the military, whereas the Sharia Council was responsible

for the religion and the judiciary on the territory, as well as for overseeing the religious police (al-Hisbah). Its official competences also included the election of the caliph. The remaining relevant bodies constituting the internal structure of the so-called Islamic State are the following: the Military Council/War Office, Security and Intelligence Council, Education Council, Economic Council, Province Council, Islamic Council for Services, Ministry of Martyrs, Islamic State Institution for Public Information (Atwan, 2015). The members of these bodies were to control the compliance with the Quranic principles in their subordinate areas.

An analysis of the internal structure of the so-called Islamic State should take into account the fact that coercive measures, in particular the religious police (al-Hisbah), played a very important role in the organization right next to its administration. The propaganda messages spread by the fighters show that al-Hisbah was responsible for the safety and the protection of the local population and its possessions (Wojtasik, 2016). In practice, however, the main task of the police was to ensure that the local communities observe Muslim principles and values. Should there be any suspicion that a person browsed websites or possessed any materials related with Western values, officers could apprehend such a person and search their homes and equipment (phones, computers). If such materials were to be found, household members were subjected to severe corporal punishment, including flagellation (Hall, 2015).

As the control of the so-called Islamic State over the occupied territories was highly unstable, it required ongoing reinforcement. Numerous local clan militias proved crucial as they were put into service to the caliph by the elders of larger Sunni clans (Otłowski, 2015). The total number of members of these formations on the areas occupied by the so-called Islamic State was estimated at about 30 thousand people. Their role was in a way complimentary to the coercive apparatus of the Sunni organization. Clan militias performed law-enforcement and police tasks. They were to preserve the Islamic social order and secure the provision of basic public services, as well as to participate in local riot control operations. Clan militias were regularly supported by the army of the so-called Islamic State (Otłowski, 2015). Given the intensity and scale of the activities of the religious police and clan militias, as well as their almost unlimited power, it may be concluded that the area occupied by the so-called Islamic State was governed by principles typical of a police state (Wojtasik, 2016).

The internal structure of the entity in question also comprises its media system⁴. Its specific nature is subject to two factors: a considerable scale in comparison with other terrorist organizations, and efficiency in performing its information and propaganda, as well as recruitment functions. The major actors were and probably still are the following institutions: Al-Hayat Media Center founded in 2014, As-Sahab, Al-Furāt Media Foundation, Al-Malahem Media, Ajnad Media, and Asedaa Foundation (Wojtasik, 2016). These are specialized units consisting of high-level experts in the field of IT, graphic design, advertising and many others. Until the Islamic terrorists were ousted from Syria and Iraq, there were smaller agencies at the regional level which documented actions of jihadists in individual provinces of the so-called Islamic State. In April 2016, the media organization structure welcomed a group of hackers called the United Cyber Caliphate. The main means of communication and information for the jihadists now are probably Amaq News Agency and Halummu Website.

By means of media tools, the so-called Islamic State was able to develop a large recruitment capacity, which called for a strictly hierarchical and well-organized army. It was deemed one of the strongest, most effective and best motivated Islamic paramilitary structures in the region of Levant by a part of analysts. The actual size of the army of the so-called Islamic State is not known. According to the most commonly cited estimates, it amounted to 20 to 50 thousand fighters at the time of the jihadi offensive (Wojciechowski, 2016), yet some reports claim that this number could be even 200 thousand, taking into account not only the regular fighters (who would indeed give a total of up to 50 thousand people), but also tribe and clan forces and special formations such as religious police. From the 200 thousand fighters, only about 15 to 25 thousand were actually trained and experienced or provided with military *know-how* (Otlowski, 2015).

In terms of organization, the army of the so-called Islamic State comprised different kinds of formations, such as infantry, marksmen, reconnaissance, quartermasters and others (Wojciechowski, 2016). Among the armed formations of the organization, a special position was held by Amni. This structure was responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. It was also assigned such tasks as kidnapping, assassination and other acts of terror. Amni was directly

⁴ For the purposes of this publication, the use of the media by members of the so-called Islamic State will be subject to a thorough analysis in section titled "Specifics of the Functioning of the So-called Islamic State".

subject to the caliph (Wojciechowski, 2016). In view of the specific nature of the abovementioned tasks, it can be assumed that Amni still exists, perhaps under a different name, regardless of the reorganization of the so-called Islamic State. According to unconfirmed reports, Amni was supposedly a major force not only due to disciplined and well-trained fighters, but also due to chemical weapons in quantities difficult to estimate (Wojciechowski, 2016).

The structure of the so-called Islamic State demonstrates a relatively high capacity as to its political, military, social, financial and logistical organization (Wojciechowski, 2016). Since these are the matters regulated by the state, the government of the so-called Islamic State confirms the efficiency of its power.

SPECIFICS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC STATE

The specific character of the so-called Islamic State as to its functioning is determined by several elements. First, brutal and violent actions aimed at continuous intimidation of the population and financial profit. Secondly, propaganda and manipulation of the media and the Internet for the purpose of ideological penetration. Thirdly, operational flexibility. Fourthly, continuous expansion of influence zone, characteristic for the first months of self-proclaimed caliphate. Fifthly, networking with other radical organizations.

The fighters of the so-called Islamic State combine physical strength with brutality never seen before in terrorist organizations, observed not only in their military actions, but also in the form of terrorist attacks and other acts of terrorism aimed at representatives of other faiths or other forms of Islam, as well as members of various ethnic and political groups (Desbois & Nastasie, 2019). An example of this type of action was when they burned alive a Jordanian pilot trapped in a cage in 2015 or beheaded 21 Coptic Christians. To a great extent, these practices resemble medieval executions (Wojciechowski, 2016). They confirm how ruthless and unscrupulous the jihadists are. It should be noted that numerous spectacular and bloody executions were published in the media or on the Internet prior to the neutralization of the majority of their forces on the territory of Syria and Iraq. This measure was intended to demonstrate the strength and power of the so-called Islamic State on the one hand and to indicate the radicalism of the fighters on the other hand, and thus raise fear, primarily among the citizens of Western countries and infidels (Atwan, 2015).

On the basis of these considerations it can be concluded that the so-called infidels and representatives of the Western civilization are the two main enemies targeted by the members and supporters of the entity examined. Since the proclamation of the so-called Islamic State, the jihadists have led or inspired over 30 terrorist attacks, predominantly against the Christians and followers of other non-Muslim religions. Many of them happened in the Western countries (Wejkszner, 2018). Over 650 people were killed altogether (IISS Strategic Comments, 2016). The most spectacular attacks were carried out in November 2015 in Paris (130 fatalities) (Castillo et al., 2015), in March 2016 in Brussels (32 fatalities) (*Polskie MSZ...*, 2016), and in May 2017 in Manchester (23 fatalities) (*Manchester...*, 2017).

Apart from those organized acts, attention should be called to single-handed terrorist attacks carried out by individual people inspired by the ideology of the so-called Islamic State. They are not members of the organization itself or are loosely affiliated with it. On the one hand, this specific relation between the so-called lone wolves and the jihadists is the reason why it is so difficult to locate them. The chances to thwart a bombing plot are therefore severely reduced. On the other hand, this confirms the efficiency of terrorist propaganda. Currently, it is the activity of those lone wolves that poses one of the major threats to the security of the Western European countries, as the jihadists operating within the structures of the so-called Islamic State have been weakened by the international anti-terrorist coalition and now concentrate their activities in the Middle East and Africa.

For the members of the so-called Islamic State, violence and terror generated financial profit at the time when they occupied territories of Syria and Iraq. According to the law of *zakat*, one of the five pillars of Islam, Muslims are required to donate up to 2.5% of their wealth on an annual basis (Godlewski, 2015). However, the tax charged must not be greater than that percentage, which is a major restriction for the jihadists. A high tax, or in fact a forced tribute, in the amount of 10 percent of total revenue was therefore imposed on infidels (*„Państwo Islamskie”...*, 2015). In addition, they were forced to pay protection money to the fighters in return for a questionable promise of security. Should they fail to observe this order, they were subjected to severe punishment, including death. Only in 2014 did the Salafi terrorists extort 360 million dollars from the occupied civilian population (*„Państwo Islamskie”...*, 2015). Aside from the charges described above, residents of areas occupied by the so-called Islamic State had to bear extra costs of pharmaceutical drugs (10 to 35 percent tax),

bank cash withdrawals (5 percent), or education (22 to 65 dollars) („*Państwo Islamskie*”..., 2015). A high road toll of 200 to 1000 dollars was collected from drivers on the Iraqi roads („*Państwo Islamskie*”..., 2015).

The organization also gained certain financial benefit from human and organ trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and blackmailing the occupied population. According to the Thomson Reuters Accelus report, 12 percent of total revenue of the so-called Islamic State in 2014 was derived from extortion, whereas 4 percent came from abductions and robberies („*Państwo Islamskie*”..., 2015). Another source of income of the jihadists is mass theft and looting. Upon capturing Mosul in June 2014, they stole near half a billion dollars in cash from the local banks (Godlewski, 2015). It is estimated that the members of the so-called Islamic State could have obtained up to 12 million dollars per day from the criminal activity in Mosul alone. Mass looting occurred not only in private homes, but also numerous monuments, including churches and archaeological artifacts. Some of the artifacts, situated on the territory of Syria, dated eight thousand years back and were sold for nearly 40 million dollars to collectors on the black market (Godlewski, 2015). A part of the revenue came from donors. It is estimated that approximately 20 million dollars were transferred to the account of that organization as humanitarian aid”, primarily from Qatar and Kuwait (Godlewski, 2015). It is possible that such contributions from the so-called devotees still flow in.

The financial independence of the so-called Islamic State was possible thanks to sale of crude oil and natural gas obtained from deposits in Syria and northern provinces of Iraq. The profits from raw materials and energy sources quickly got to the top of the financial pyramid of the organization (Godlewski, 2015). According to *Financial Times*, the jihadists earned approximately 1.5 million dollars per day and 540 million dollars on a yearly basis only by selling petroleum („*Państwo Islamskie*”..., 2015), whereas the Reuters agency estimated their income at a significantly greater amount of 730 million to nearly 1.5 billion dollars („*Państwo Islamskie*”..., 2015).

These considerations lead to the conclusion that no terrorist structure in the past had such possibilities of obtaining financial means or so large financial resources at its disposal as the so-called Islamic State. In 2015, the revenue of this entity was estimated at 2.4 billion dollars (Wojciechowski, 2016). In comparison, the funds of other terrorist organizations were estimated as follows: al-Qaeda with 15 to 50 million dollars, Hamas with 70 million dollars, Hezbollah 200 to 500 million dollars (Wojciechowski, 2016). Such budget largely determined the

specific structure and principles of the functioning of the so-called Islamic State as well as defined the scale and efficiency of its operations.

An analysis of the propaganda of the so-called Islamic State must cover the specific functioning of the jihadi media system (Graban & Jaroszyńska, 2018). One of its major functions and objectives was to provide information and propaganda about the so-called Islamic State (Bolechów, 2020). The image that was created presented a stable state with a (relatively, given the conditions of the Middle East) well-developed social welfare system, compliant with the sharia law. Its second function was tactical and operational, and namely to recruit new members (Kmieciak, 2016). A particularly effective instrument for this purpose was the Internet (Kubiński, 2018; El Ghamari, 2018), where short videos were posted, picturing the jihadist offensive and mass executions of “infidels”. In the “Dabiq”, “Rome” and “Dar Al-Islam” online magazines (in English and French), the jihadists explained and justified the fight with infidels referring to a very radical interpretation of the Qur’an. The so-called Islamic State is still using the Internet to recruit new members, yet the online actions of the terrorists have been limited to social networking sites, especially Facebook and Twitter. In a wider sense, the Internet constitutes an educational platform for the jihadists, used for posting a variety of training materials and instructions, for example, how to construct explosives. It is also a tool for obtaining financial profits. Users post links to websites where anyone can design a T-shirt with the Daesh⁵ logo or order a flag and other gadgets through Facebook and Twitter groups (Kmieciak, 2016).

The offensive actions of the so-called Islamic State were particularly spectacular in the first dozen months after the self-proclaimed caliphate was established. It was possible thanks to the simultaneous use of psychological warfare (brutal media campaigns, propaganda in the social media, etc.) and tactical action based on the operational flexibility of troops (Otłowski, 2015). In terms of military actions, the so-called Islamic State focused on blitzkrieg-style of operations, attacking the enemy by deploying a mobile unit, such as a company or a battalion (Weiss & Hassan, 2015). The aim of such an impact was to quickly capture

⁵ Term ‘Daesh’ (or Da’ish) has been used as a way of challenging the legitimacy of the group due to the negative connotations of the word. ‘Daesh’ is essentially an Arabic acronym formed from the initial letters of the group’s previous name in Arabic – “al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham”. Although it does not mean anything as a word in Arabic, it sounds unpleasant and the group’s supporters object to its use. ‘Daesh’ also sounds similar to an Arabic verb that means to tread underfoot, trample down, or crush something (Irshaid, 2015).

a minor object (a village, town, city district, building, etc.) in order to secure and uphold it, and then resume its socio-economic functions and tasks. In the case of larger objects (e.g., a big city), the jihadists would lead a surprise attack and inflict greatest damage possible (also by taking extreme terrorist measures) and then disengage and return to their initial positions.

As a result of this strategy, the communities which chose to remain in the areas attacked by terrorists were generally characterized by religious homogeneity and willing to comply with the rules imposed by the so-called Islamic State. Should the local population resist and refuse escape, the jihadists would launch another, more fierce attack on them as a kind of “punishment” for their defiant behavior (Otlowski, 2015). When the target of an attack was a reinforced object, such as a military base or a fortified building, the jihadists would combine *purely* terrorist actions (suicidal attacks) with standard military operations. The attack was started by suicide bombers driving gun-equipped pick-up trucks (SVBIED) filled with explosives. The next to attack were suicide fighters with individual loads, equipped with explosive belts. Subsequently, the regular assault groups were tasked with capturing the entire object and overcoming any remaining resistance (Otlowski, 2015).

It should be emphasized that the tactics of the so-called Islamic State was based on the high mobility of its units, possible through the use of a fleet of technicals, i.e., civilian pick-up vehicles, SUVs, trucks modified for military purposes, and machinery of purely military use. Within the units, companies and battalions acted independently of the armed formations equipped with tanks and armored infantry vehicles. The above-mentioned units were often deployed on these sections of the front where it was necessary to reinforce armored units (Otlowski, 2015).

The development of a specific flexibility in terms of military operations of the so-called Islamic State directly affected the dynamics of spreading its sphere of influence, especially in the early phase of its existence. For this purpose, members of the organization developed a strategy for opening new battlefronts, which entails, among others, taking action in new countries or regions, including terrorist attacks and training. This strategy was formulated by al-Qaeda and then extended and improved by the so-called Islamic State. In the past years, it was implemented in the following countries and regions: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chad, Cameroon, Somalia, Nigeria, Niger, Yemen, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Palestine, as well as Western Europe, the Caucasus, and the Balkans (Wojciechowski, 2016).

Given the fact that the jihadists have limited possibilities of occupying extensive areas, it may be assumed that one of the main instruments of spreading their sphere of influence is ideological penetration. International relations research indicates that such countries as Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and region of Mount Sinai in the Sinai Peninsula may be particularly vulnerable to the ideology of the so-called Islamic State (Cirlig, 2015). The specific character of the functioning of the so-called Islamic State should be examined for its links to other terrorist organizations. This factor significantly strengthens the entity, and at the same time fighting it becomes more complex. The most significant radical groups which have established cooperation with the members of the so-called Islamic State include: Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and Tunisia, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis in Egypt, as well as Tehrik-i-Taliban from Pakistan (Henzel, 2014). Thus, an international terrorist network has been established.

SPECIFICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC STATE

The personality of the so-called Islamic State as a legal entity is not clear. Due to its common name used customarily in mass communication, the notion of it being an actual state is constantly reinforced in the public mind. There has not been a single approach in the literature which would clearly indicate of the legal personality of this new participant of international relations. From the two dominant approaches, the first classifies the so-called Islamic State as a quasi-state, whereas the second one labels it as a terrorist organization.

One option that should be explicitly rejected is that the so-called Islamic State is an actual state. According to a classic definition of statehood based on a state's structural elements, the German lawyer Georg Jellinek indicates that a state possesses the following qualifications: a defined territory, a government, and a permanent population (Szmulik & Żmigrodzki, 2002). Other frequently indicated attributes are the capacity for establishing and maintaining external relations with other countries as well as international recognition. A basic condition for the existence of a state is possessing its own territory, i.e., an area of land and space over which the sovereign state has effective control. On its territory, the government "exercises its own prerogatives considered fully and jointly in respect of individuals, objects and events" (Szmulik & Żmigrodzki, 2002). As to

the population criterion determining the statehood of an entity, it is not national and tribal ties that define a citizen of a state, but rather being its resident for an appropriately long time and recognizing the public authority which exercises control over a given territory (Szmulik & Żmigrodzki, 2002).

The so-called Islamic State has never had a territory whose borders would be confirmed by international treaties. It has only held control over selected provinces of Syria and Iraq which it seized and then occupied. It should be therefore stated that the territory of the entity in question was of a merely declaratory nature. As to the state government, the so-called Islamic State was highly efficient in managing the local provinces. It appointed a political elite and established state structures, including courts, army, police, media, education system, etc. These elements confirm its actual public power within the territory it controlled. In January 2015, i.e., during the offensive of the so-called Islamic State, the areas it occupied were inhabited by nearly 10 million people. Taking into account that the population adhered to the obligations imposed on it by the jihadists, including the payment of taxes and observance of the sharia law principles, it can be concluded that it was indeed under the jurisdiction of the so-called Islamic State. However, it must be clearly stated that it was forced by the occupant to do so by means of intimidation and terror. It is therefore appropriate to exclude the possibility of the local population voluntarily acknowledging the authority of the so-called Islamic State, whereas it was recognized by members of its army. Thus, the entity in question indeed has its citizens.

While such attributes as a government and a population may substantiate the statehood of the so-called Islamic State, two others preclude it. These are namely the capacity for establishing and maintaining relations with other entities and international recognition. The first, along with the ability to enter international agreements, to be a member of international organizations, to participate in international economic trade, to extend claims against other states and participants of international relations and to pursue them seeking an amicable resolution, as well as respect for the rules of international law and the agreements concluded, responsibility for its own actions and for actions of its officials, are the conditions necessary for a participant of international relations to be regarded as a person of international law and to acquire international legal capacity. The so-called Islamic State does not meet any of them (Kondrakiewicz, 2006).

The statehood of the so-called Islamic State is also excluded on the basis of theories regarding a state's international recognition. Pursuant to the constitutive theory of state, a state must enjoy recognition of other states in order to acquire

international legal personality. The declaratory theory, in turn, implies that an entity becomes a state at the moment it comes into existence, whereas its recognition by other states merely confirms the status quo, establishes its international status and extends its scope of powers. Given that the effects of recognition in respect of international law occur if a state meets the criteria of international law, the so-called Islamic State may not be considered a state in accordance with this theory (Antonowicz, 2015).

As the so-called State Islamic does exhibit certain attributes characteristic of a state, according to a part of the literature sources, this entity is rather associated with the notion of a quasi-state due to the following reasons. Firstly, it exercises effective control over the occupied area. Secondly, it has existed for more than two years. Thirdly, it performs the main functions of a state to a limited extent, which was to ensure a limited public support, relative internal stability, financial autonomy, and limited participation in the international trade for the so-called Islamic State until it was decentralized and its organizational structures dismantled (Gil, 2015).

From the elements presented above, two are debatable. One may agree with the claim that the so-called State Islamic exercised effective control over the occupied area, but only to the extent whereby its center of authority effectively managed the occupied provinces of Syria and Iraq. In 2018, the jihadists lost control over nearly all occupied centers, which rendered their power over them relative. Public support for the so-called Islamic State was also limited as it was forced upon the local population through the use of violence and intimidation. The entity aspiring for the category of a quasi-state should meet one more condition, and namely to actually endeavor to receive international recognition. In the case of the so-called Islamic State, this was never the case. In June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of the self-proclaimed caliphate and its declarative territory, expecting the international community to accept the new status quo.

On the basis of these considerations, the Author of the article ascertains that only certain elements characteristic for a quasi-state are applicable in respect of the so-called Islamic State, as the remaining features are only relative. It is therefore not possible to clearly label the entity in question as a quasi-state, neither are there any grounds for classifying it as a state. Given its use of violence, political motivations and objectives, as well as long-term psychological effects, it can be assumed that the so-called Islamic State is a terrorist organization (Nizioł-Celewicz, 2006). This analysis shows, however, that it exhibits characteristics

attributable not only to a terrorist organization, but also to a criminal group, state, terrorist network and an armed formation. The so-called Islamic State – according to the Author – exceeds the classic understanding of a terrorist organization. It is in fact a hybrid terrorist structure and constitutes the most complex part of the so-called inverted terrorist pyramid (Wojciechowski, 2016).

In summary, this study confirms accepted assumption that the arrival of the so-called Islamic State as a new participant of international relations was determined by regional and international conditions, in particular the events of the Arab Spring, operations of the United States in the Middle East, globalization processes, and dynamic technological development. On the basis of the considerations presented above it may be stated that it is the specific nature of the functioning of the so-called Islamic State, defined primarily by the extensive use of violence and intimidation as well as reluctance to establish and maintain relations with other states and noncompliance with the principles of international law and challenging the international order that exclude the possibility of the entity in question being considered as a person of international law. The personality of the so-called Islamic State – according to the Author – is very specific and not yet clearly defined. Over the years 2014–2017, it was a highly complex hybrid terrorist structure characterized by elements typical of a classic terrorist organization, terrorist network, criminal group, armed formation, and a state. No other terrorist structure in the history of international relations has ever had such a significant *hard power* reflected in military equipment or zealous fighters. Neither has any other terrorist structure ever applied *soft power* instruments to such an extent, especially in respect of propaganda on the Internet and in other media.

SUMMARY

Due to the specific nature of the functioning of the so-called Islamic State, defined above all by the extensive use of violence and intimidation as well as reluctance to establish and maintain relations with other states and noncompliance with the principles of international law and challenging the international order, the possibility to consider the entity in question as a person of international law must be excluded. The personality of the so-called Islamic State is very specific. Over the years 2014–2017, it was a highly complex hybrid terrorist structure characterized by elements typical of a classic terrorist organization, terrorist network, criminal group, armed formation, and a state.

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SECURITY STUDIES



ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS AMONGST YOUTH IN TIMES OF CLIMATE CRISIS

ŚWIADOMOŚĆ EKOLOGICZNA MŁODZIEŻY
W DOBIE KRYZYSU KLIMATYCZNEGO

*Izabela Kapsa** , *Wojciech Trempała*** 

— ABSTRACT —

This article deals with the important issue of environmental awareness amongst youth in times of climate crisis. Environmental awareness has been measured basing on the currently dominant division into anthropocentrism and biocentrism, the main two positions on the place of man in nature, the value of nature, including its moral significance and the assessment of human impact on environmental safety. The results come from surveys conducted in 2018 and 2019 in Poland (in the city of Bydgoszcz) on high school students (approximately 18 years old). The research presents young people's opinions on environmental protection, the role of man in relation to nature (identified as biocentric or anthropocentric), and the threats associated with the climate crisis. We also analyse how environmental awareness is influenced by the content of media messages. Our results show that the surveyed students declare biocentric/anti-anthropocentric beliefs more often than anthropocentrism, and this tendency

— ABSTRAKT —

Artykuł podejmuje ważny problem świadomości ekologicznej młodzieży w dobie kryzysu klimatycznego. Zawiera analizę wyników badań empirycznych przeprowadzonych w 2018 i 2019 roku w Polsce (miasto: Bydgoszcz), w wyniku których poglądy młodych na temat kryzysu klimatycznego, postrzegania ochrony środowiska i kategorii człowieka w relacji z naturą dostarczyły danych pozwalających na ulokowanie ich na skali biocentrycznej lub antropocentrycznej. Ponadto zaprezentowane są informacje dotyczące postrzegania przez młodych ludzi kryzysu klimatycznego w kategorii zagrożenia współczesnego świata. W tym celu zaprezentowano statystyki opisowe i badanie związku między zmiennymi, które ponadto służą odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy stan świadomości ekologicznej zmienia się pod wpływem treści komunikatów medialnych. Jak wynika z przeprowadzonych przez autorów badań, na poziomie deklaracji badani maturzyści przejawiają predyspozycję do silniejszej akcepta-

* Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, Faculty of Political Science and Administration.

** Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, Faculty of Political Science and Administration.

was reinforced by the growing presence of discussions surrounding climate change and related threats in public discourse.

Keywords: climate crisis; ecological threats; environmental awareness of young people; environmental protection; youth's perception of the climate crisis as a threat

cji przekonań biocentrycznych/antyantropocentrycznych niż antropocentryzmu i tendencja ta wzmacnia się wraz z nasilaniem się dyskursu publicznego na temat zmian klimatu i zagrożeń związanych z kryzysem środowiskowym.

Słowa kluczowe: kryzys klimatyczny; zagrożenia ekologiczne; świadomość ekologiczna młodzieży; ochrona środowiska; postrzeganie przez młodych ludzi kryzysu klimatycznego jako zagrożenia

INTRODUCTION

Although the general public has been aware of various environmental threats for years, awareness of the climate crisis has only begun growing recently. Interestingly, young people in previous decades were known for having the strongest pro-environmental opinions and attitudes. The results of surveys conducted in Poland and all over the world indicate that youth, young adults, urban dwellers, women and those with a university degree have a higher environmental awareness than other groups (e.g.: Dunlap & Catton, 1979; McMillan et al., 1997; Dunlap et al., 2000; Burger, 2005; Aminrad, Zakaria, & Hadi, 2011). Nowadays, we may observe that young age is not currently the principle demographic in regard to environmental awareness. In the report of the Polish Ministry of Environment (entitled *Adaptation to Climate Change*, see: *Badania świadomości ekologicznej*, 2018), the question – “Have you personally done anything over the last six months to limit the effects of extreme weather events?” – was given a positive answer by respondents aged 25–34 years (12.6%) and 45–59 years (11.6%), while for the youngest (15–24) this was only 7.4%, the lowest rate among all age groups. Yet, as their attitude seems to be changing with the growing prevalence of media reports on climate strikes or Greta Thunberg’s actions, as well as numerous comments linking COVID-19 pandemic with human neglect of nature, it may be expected that for new generations the problem of environmental protection may eventually become very important or even crucial to be solved. We see some similarity in this matter to the environmental and pacifist revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. This similarity is not so much about just taking action because the way of communication and mobilization basing on new technologies has changed a lot, but we notice that similar to the end of the 20th century, the way of thinking about the need to protect the environment is changing in general

because media (also electronic) are tackling this issue. This is why one of the aims of this paper is to investigate the relationship between content published in the media and the state of ecological awareness of young people. The open question is whether the access to the information regarding the environmental issues in the era of information society is sufficient to shape ecological attitudes. However, it is necessary to raise this topic especially when neither the education system nor domestic habits promote environmental attitudes sufficiently.

It is worth emphasizing that the report by the United Nations Secretary General U Thant (1969), following the first conference organized under the aegis of the UN in Stockholm (1972) and the publication of the reports to the Club of Rome (1972 and 1974), sparked great interest in the issue of the environmental crisis in the world of politics, science, media and, consequently, among ordinary people around the world. This also applied to communist Poland, whose authorities reacted especially enthusiastically to U Thant's report. According to Tadeusz Burger (2005, p. 24), "the authorities of the People's Republic of Poland relatively quickly recognized that the state of the environment is a very fashionable problem, which would allow to show that a communist state, representing the best of all political systems, boldly responds to the challenges of the modern world. To Polish decision-makers, the environmental issue also seemed far less risky than, for example, human rights or the free flow of information or freedom of speech". National empirical research on environmental awareness in Poland shows a shift towards pro-environmental attitudes from the youth in reports from the 1980s to the middle-aged respondents in the 21st century (Gliński, 1988; Burger, 1992; Burger & Sadowski, 1994; Burger, 1997; Burger, 2000; Fudali, 2002; Burger, 2005; Bołtromiuk, 2009). This indicates a "cohort effect" and the existence of a "generation of ecological breakthrough" in Polish society. The intensified media focus on the climate crisis and the emergence of new social green movements indicate that the current generation of youth may become the generation of "the climate breakthrough" or the group which directly experiences the effects of "the environmental crisis" as defined at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s.

The main aim of this article is to present the results of research on environmental awareness amongst youth at a time when the climate crisis has become an important element of public debate. The results come from the original survey aimed at identifying young people's view on ecological issues. Based on the fact that the survey was conducted twice (in 2018 and 2019), we performed a comparative analysis between these two years. In addition, we analysed the relationship between environmental awareness, expressed in one of two cat-

egories – anthropocentric or biocentric, and the perception of climate crisis as a threat. In our opinion, knowledge of environmental threats may serve as the basis for building attitudes and behaviours among young people that could help prevent further degradation of the environment.

METHODS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The results of the empirical research presented in this article come from the project: “Attitudes of secondary school graduates in Bydgoszcz”, carried out by an interdisciplinary team of pedagogues, political scientists and sociologists from the Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz. Its main objective was the diagnosis of a wide longitudinal spectrum of environmental awareness in the generation entering early adulthood. An original questionnaire was constructed to measure life orientation, social and civic participation, political knowledge and preferences, social distance towards selected groups, attitudes towards education and school, system of values, perception of a hierarchy of threats or ecological beliefs. The theoretical validity of the positions of the questionnaire was assessed by three independent experts in environmental ethics. The reliability of the overall scale A versus B was estimated using Cronbach’s alpha (2018: $\alpha = 0.88$; 2019: $\alpha = 0.87$). Due to the fact that the survey was carried out at secondary schools, the questionnaire was also checked for content and accessibility by teachers as well as by methodologists from the Municipal Teacher Education Centre in the city of Bydgoszcz where the measurements were conducted.

The results presented in the article come from two surveys. The first one was conducted in the school year 2017/2018 (in short: 2018) with 262 ~18 year old students in their final year of high school (about 10% of all final year students in the schools covered by the survey), while in 2018/2019 (in short 2019) it was conducted on 392 students (approx. 15%). The selected method of quota sampling in both editions of the survey reflected the actual proportions in terms of school type and gender in the surveyed schools. It means that if in 2018 the proportion between the number of students in general and vocational education schools were 58%:42%, in our survey the similar number of students from each type of school took part (55%:45%). In 2019, we obtained an exact reflection of this proportion – it was 56%:44%. We also considered the profile of education, keeping the numbers reflecting humanities and science students. Regarding to gender, in both editions it was roughly half and half, what we also achieved in

our survey. The survey was conducted in Bydgoszcz (Poland), a city of about 350,000 inhabitants.

The two editions of the questionnaire differed slightly in the number of questions and possible answers. In the 2018 survey, the students were asked to respond to 40 statements, compared to 33 in 2019. Our comparative analysis concerned the same 19 statements included in both surveys. The respondents determined the level of compliance with the statements given in the table using a scale based on Rensis Likert's model (I strongly agree, I agree, etc.). In the question on threats related to safety, respondents could indicate answers on their own (in an open-ended question). The results presented in the article are based on the statistical analysis, mainly descriptive statistics.

In our study, the notion of "environmental awareness" is based on the definition of Andrzej Papuziński (2006) who describes it as: "a part of social awareness referring to information and beliefs regarding the natural environment and the perception of the relationship between the condition of the environment and the conditions and quality of human life, especially in the matter of ecological threats".

Therefore, we focus primarily on the perception of the condition of the environment, human relations with nature, as well as knowledge about ecological threats. Our scale of ecological awareness was based on the currently dominant division in environmental ethics into anthropocentrism and biocentrism (Table 1), the main two positions on the place of man in nature, the value of nature including its moral significance, and the assessment of human impact on environmental safety (Ciążęła, 2009; Ganowicz-Bączczyk, 2009; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2001). The anthropocentric position is well embedded within the humanistic philosophical tradition, while the biocentric position, where the human species is not perceived as superior to other living beings, is sometimes referred to as yet another example of a human point of view, and so it is more accurate to describe the opposition to anthropocentrism as anti-anthropocentrism (Skolimowski, 1984). Therefore, in order to maintain methodological accuracy in this study, the notion of "biocentrism" was supplemented with "anti-anthropocentrism".

The results of the analysis were based on descriptive statistics and focused on the following research questions contained in the study:

- 1) What is the environmental awareness of the surveyed youth?
- 2) Do the studied youth manifest anthropocentric or biocentric orientation in their perception of nature?

Table 1. Images of Nature in Human Attitudes by Anthropocentric and Biocentric/
Anthropocentric Positions

Extreme Anthropocentrism	Biocentrism/Anti-anthropocentrism
1) Only man creates the value of the world around him. 2) Only man knows and has knowledge of the world. 3) Only human beings have an intrinsic value in and of themselves. 4) Man is the measure of all things. 5) Man has an unlimited right to use natural resources and living space, because nature was created or evolved for him.	1) Not only human beings, but also non-human beings have an inner value. 2) Not only man, but also non-human beings realize their own vital values and know how to live according to their own nature. 3) Every living creature is a measure of those aspects of the environment with which it interacts in order to live. 4) The biosphere should not be exploited and managed solely for human interests.

Source: authors' own elaboration based on Z. Piątek, 1998, p. 11–12.

- 3) Is the awareness of threats resulting from the climate crisis connected with anthropocentric or biocentric orientation?
- 4) Where are ecological threats located in the spectrum of threats to the modern world in young people's minds?
- 5) Does the media influence the perception of ecological threats?

RESULTS

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics regarding young people's perception of nature, manifested in either anthropocentric or biocentric orientation. The intensity of anthropocentric or biocentric attitudes is presented in Table 3. The tables show that environmental awareness among young people is dominated by the predominance of biocentric/anti-anthropocentric orientation over anthropocentrism. Moreover, in 2019, significantly more respondents (52.87%) fell within the categories of moderate and extreme biocentrism compared to 2018 (34.47%). Overall, the surveyed youth expressed the conviction that man occupies the highest position in the hierarchy of beings and is the most exceptional of all living beings on Earth. Nevertheless, these beliefs cannot justify, according to the respondents, an abuse of the privileged and dominant position of the human species in relation to nature. Nor did they have a strong belief that new technologies, progress and science are the remedy for the environmental crisis. Moreover, the

respondents were much more inclined to perceive the value of nature in autotelic rather than instrumental terms.

Table 2. Scale: Anthropocentrism vs. Biocentrism

Anthropocentric statements	Year	SA*	A	NO	D	SD	Median
In the hierarchy of beings, human occupies the highest place among all living beings inhabiting the Earth.	2018	51.26	25.63	15.2	5.04	2.94	1
	2019	45.2	30.64	11.68	7.01	5.19	2
Thanks to science, human will be able to fully control nature, and thus ensure the safety of life on Earth.	2018	18.48	23.94	30.67	20.16	6.72	3
	2019	11.2	28.64	22.13	25.78	12.24	3
For the sake of economic development, the natural environment should be transformed as much as possible.	2018	7.17	11.39	26.16	26.58	28.69	4
	2019	5.20	9.89	19.01	29.42	36.45	4
Man, due to his abilities and skills, is the most unique species inhabiting the Earth.	2018	32.35	24.36	25.21	12.18	5.88	2
	2019	33.16	25.58	16.97	13.83	10.44	2
Man has no moral obligations towards nature.	2018	5.51	6.35	21.61	31.78	34.74	4
	2019	3.12	4.68	15.36	23.43	53.38	5
Man, because of his superiority to other living beings, has the full right to rule over nature.	2018	7.26	10.68	27.7	25.64	28.63	4
	2019	6.8	8.64	17.01	26.7	40.83	4
The development of modern technologies is safe, because in the near future it will allow people to fully control the laws of nature.	2018	8.93	12.76	40.85	24.68	12.76	3
	2019	4.94	12.76	25.26	35.15	21.87	4
Increasing the material well-being of humanity is much more important than nature's well-being.	2018	6.83	10.25	34.61	27.77	20.51	3
	2019	1.82	7.81	24.74	32.03	33.6	4
Nature is of value only in so far as it is a source of benefit for human life.	2018	5.95	11.06	37.44	26.81	18.72	3
	2019	2.88	4.97	21.46	30.36	40.31	4
The meaning of all life on Earth should be determined by man.	2018	6.81	17.02	34.46	25.11	16.59	3
	2019	3.9	10.67	25.26	25.52	34.63	4
The extraction of natural resources should not be restricted in the name of environmental protection.	2018	10.72	16.73	39.48	21.46	11.58	3
	2019	4.97	9.68	23.56	26.96	34.81	4
Plants and animals do not have their own rights. Only human beings have rights.	2018	6.46	6.89	36.2	14.65	35.77	4
	2019	6.02	5.49	17.27	26.96	44.24	4

Biocentric statements	Year	SD	D	NO	A	SA	Median
Plants and animals, like humans, have their rights.	2018	3.78	6.72	13.86	29.83	45.8	4
	2019	3.64	4.95	11.45	32.29	47.65	4
Nature has value through the very fact of its existence.	2018	2.54	1.69	20.33	33.9	41.52	4
	2019	0.78	1.83	10.99	27.75	58.63	5
The natural world does not exist solely because of human needs.	2018	2.54	5.93	19.91	32.2	39.4	4
	2019	2.88	5.23	14.66	19.37	57.85	5
The development of new technologies is dangerous, as it will soon lead to the extinction of many species of plants and animals.	2018	8.05	15.68	26.69	27.12	22.45	3
	2019	7.55	15.62	19.27	31.25	26.3	4
The meaning of all life on Earth is equally determined by the existence of man, animals, and plants.	2018	2.55	5.95	28.08	24.68	38.72	4
	2019	3.91	7.31	22.45	33.94	32.37	4
Human conduct should take into account the interests of animals and plants.	2018	4.29	6.43	27.89	27.89	33.47	4
	2019	3.91	2.87	13.31	32.9	46.99	4
The abilities and skills possessed by humans do not make them a better species than other living beings (other animal or plant species).	2018	9.44	18.02	30.9	22.31	18.45	3
	2019	8.09	16.45	26.89	22.19	26.37	3
Average score for all statements	Mean	Min	Max	Me- dian	Cronbach's alpha		
2018	64.2	25	89	64	0.88		
2019	70.14	34	95	71	0.87		

In addition, the 2019 survey included the issue of climate change. Less than 55% of respondents believed that climate change is the most serious problem in the modern world (24.07% did not agree with this statement, and 21.2% had no opinion). A willingness to pay high taxes to halt climate change was made by 35.43% of respondents (38.05% rejected this claim and 26.51% had no opinion). As many as 62% of respondents believed that Poland should resign from coal in favor of renewable energy sources (only 16% were against, and 22.04% had no opinion). Interestingly, the ruling party at that time in Poland declared a different position (see: *Expose Morawieckiego...*, 2017). However, only 12.08% of respondents did not eat meat for moral reasons (12.33% had no opinion, and 75.6% had a different opinion; however, we do not know whether these two groups included

those who did not eat meat for reasons other than morality). Only 12.83% of respondents believed that climate change is a lie used by international elites to multiply their own profits at the expense of ordinary people (although as much as 30% had no opinion on this issue).

Attitudes to climate change (recognizing climate change as the most serious problem in the modern world) were not related to the position on the scale of anthropocentric attitudes vs. anti-anthropocentric/biocentric attitudes ($r_s = 0,222$; $p < 0,001$; the scale is presented in Table 3). However, those who were willing to pay higher taxes to halt climate change showed stronger degrees of anti-anthropocentric/biocentric attitudes than those who were not ($r_s = 0,357$; $p < 0,001$). The participants who declared that Poland should give up coal-fired power generation in favor of renewable energy sources also showed stronger anti-anthropocentric/biocentric attitudes than people who did not agree with that statement ($r_s = 0,301$; $p < 0,001$). The same applies to the conviction that climate change is *not* a lie used by international elites to multiply their own profits at the expense of ordinary people; the greater the conviction, the stronger the tendency to support anti-anthropocentric/biocentric orientation ($r_s = 0,385$; $p < 0,001$). However, there was no statistically significant correlation between not eating meat for moral reasons and the respondents position on the scale of anthropocentric vs. anti-anthropocentric/biocentric attitudes ($r_s = 0,073$; $p > 0,01$).

Further information on the perception of the climate crisis as an important problem of the contemporary world was provided by an open-ended question where we asked the respondents to indicate the three largest safety threats in the world (ranked from the largest to the smallest). It is worth noting that Polish government survey (e.g., survey of environmental awareness available) have so far showed a low position of environmental threats, i.e., 12th place in 2014 (with only 8% of respondents indicating environmental protection as an important problem to be solved by Poland), followed by 7th place in 2018 (based on 18% of respondents). This survey is a cyclical study of Poles' awareness and ecological behavior, taking into account such problems as the biggest challenges for Poland in the context of the environment, natural environment and its protection, air quality, waste management, climate change, individual actions and behaviors supporting environmental protection. However, our study shows a very distinct difference between the indications of the respondents in 2018 and 2019. The respondents in 2019 indicated a much larger number – more indications for

Table 3. The Intensity of Environmental Beliefs Measured on the Anthropocentric–Biocentric/Anti-anthropocentric Scale and the Perception of Environmental Threats

Orientation	Average degree of intensity of beliefs on a scale A-AA/B		Percentage of indications of ecological threats among the three main threats to security in the modern world in the entire population of respondents		Percentage of the indication of ecological threats in relation to the group size of each orientation	
	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019
Extreme anthropocentrism	3.36%	0.26%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Moderate anthropocentrism	3.36%	1.3%	0%	2.32%	0%	20%
Ambivalent with a tendency towards anthropocentrism	17.22%	13.54%	7.3%	9.3%	2.89%	7.4%
Ambivalence/Indifference	8.82%	3.64%	3.63%	1.55%	2.89%	4.76%
Ambivalent with a tendency towards biocentrism/anti-anthropocentrism	32.77%	28.38%	45.45%	27.13%	9.68%	10.51%
Moderate biocentrism/anti-anthropocentrism	27.73%	36.20%	34.55%	37.98%	8.67%	11.5%
Extreme biocentrism/anti-anthropocentrism	6.74%	16.67%	9.07%	21.70%	9.25%	33.33%

particular categories as well as more new categories in the area of environmental protection than in the previous year.

The threats indicated in the survey in 2018 included the following categories: **1st place** – global warming (1 indication), smog (1) and natural disaster (1); **2nd place** – environmental pollution (11), natural disasters (7), waste (2), smog (2), ozone depletion (1), global warming (2), consumption of raw materials (2); **3rd place** – natural disasters (11), pollution (7), global warming (2), depletion of natural resources (2), disrespect for nature (1), smog (1), CO₂ emissions (1). In total, in 2018, threats mentioned in 1st place included 3 environmental categories, compared to 27 in 2nd place, and 25 in 3rd place.

Among the threats indicated in the survey in 2019, **1st place** included global warming (8), climate change (8), natural disasters (8), environmental pollution

(5), depletion of natural resources (1); **2nd place** included environmental pollution (22), environmental disasters (12), climate change (6), global warming (4), natural disasters (3), smog (1), ozone depletion (2), depletion of resources (1); and **3rd place**: pollution (18), climate change (13), natural disasters (11), depletion of natural resources (3), global warming (2), and smog (1).

In total, in 2019 as many as 30 environmental threats were indicated in 1st place (10 times more than in the previous year), 51 in 2nd place (almost twice as many as in 2018), and 48 threats in 3rd place (also almost twice as many as in 2018). Interestingly, when asked to indicate the 3 most important values in life, in 2018 the respondents did not indicate any values related to nature at all, and in 2019 one person indicated the beauty of the world and nature in 3rd place. It is worth noticing that the respondents with a biocentric worldview more frequently pointed out ecological threats among the most important threats to security in the modern world. In 2018, as much as 89% and in 2019 over 86% of such indications came from people whose biocentric/anti-anthropocentric beliefs domineered over their anthropocentric opinions. This does not mean, however, that biocentric/anti-anthropocentric beliefs were always, or even significantly, correlated with an awareness of environmental problems – these were relatively rarely mentioned by young people in our study. In 2018, among respondents with a biocentric/anti-anthropocentric orientation, approximately one in ten of all indications concerned environmental threats. Among those with an anthropocentric orientation as well as ambivalent people, they were almost non-existent. The situation was slightly different in 2019. Among the representatives of extreme biocentrism/anthropocentrism, one in three threats mentioned was related to environmental issues (33.3%). In ambivalent people with a predominance of biocentric/anti-anthropocentric beliefs and moderately biocentric/anti-anthropocentric respondents, environmental threats still accounted for about 10% of all declarations. The results of respondents with an ambivalent orientation, albeit with a tendency towards anthropocentric attitudes, were also similar in this case and higher by almost 5% in comparison to the previous edition. It is also interesting that environmental threats constituted 20% of all threats listed by respondents in the moderate anthropocentric range. However, it is difficult to form unambiguous conclusions in this respect due to the small size of this group compared to the entire population.

The visible increase in the indications of environmental threats may have been related to several important events covered extensively by the press (including electronic media). In 2018, the city of Bydgoszcz – where the research was

conducted – launched numerous initiatives to counteract smog and the public was extensively informed on the exposure to pollution from Zachem, a local chemical plant. These were both the activities of public services, e.g., the municipal police, as well as grassroots initiatives of the residents. Similar initiatives were also being undertaken in other cities at that time (e.g., “Smog Stop”, 2018). It was also the year when Poland hosted the highly publicized UN Climate Summit – an international forum devoted to global climate policy (United Nations Climate Change Conference, 2018), followed by numerous youth protests (climate strikes, e.g., Protests of the Youth Strike for Climate in entire Poland, 18 September 2019, see: *Protesty Młodzieżowego...*, 2019).

We notice that the relationship between the content of the media coverage and the views of society concerns many areas, including environmental protection. Happer and Philo’s research (2013, p. 333) shows that the media play a facilitating role in the easing through of policy action by repetition and reinforcement of media messages, and the absence of proposed alternatives – and also a possible role in shaping behavior, especially where these are linked to other types of structural support. We wrote about this when the dominant topics in the media influenced the growth of social distance towards immigrants (Kapsa, Kaszkur, & Trempała, 2017, pp. 222–247). We referred to the results of Artur Lipiński’s analysis (2013, p. 22), who noted that news about immigrants is particularly frequent during spectacular dramatic events, and the way in which immigrants are presented is based on the “us vs. them” mentality, combined with the positive evaluation of “us” and the negative evaluation of “them”. A consequence is the tendency to put national interests above the value of the integration of states, while the curiosity of another, characteristic of a democratic personality, seems to increasingly give way to authoritarian fears of foreign and xenophobic aggression.

The Internet plays an important role as a platform for social communications and user generated content but it also increases the availability of existing content rather than adding new content and new content formats (van der Wurff, 2008, pp. 68–85). So we can agree that apart from the topics initialized by the users on the Internet there are published also the issues that the traditional media are taking up. The surveyed young people seemed to have been highly influenced by the content present on the Internet, with 91% of respondents in 2018 indicating the Internet as the main source of information (with such high rate of indications, in 2019, we abandoned this question). The Internet is used by them for watching videos on YouTube, participation in social platforms, and browsing various content on portals, and it may be assumed that these were the channels

of communication that influenced the world view of young people and their sensitivity to various problems (certainly also to the environment). Between 2018 and 2019, the climate crisis was certainly one of the topics that was “trending” on the Web (an example of this popularity was the environmental challenge on Facebook – #ShowYourStripes – a Facebook ecological campaign which, with the help of “stripes”, showed the changes in average annual temperature in the participants place of residence).

If we compare those conclusion with surveys conducted two decades ago, for example, in Hong Kong (Chan, 1996) or in Oslo (Strandbu & Skogen, 2000), we see some differences. At that time the attention was paid, in the first case, to the television and school as major sources of environmental information, and in the second one – to the cultural capital. Also such researchers as Fien et al. (2002) focused on the educational reform and the efforts to encourage teachers and others who have influence over young people to develop their own knowledge and skills to be able to teach environmental education effectively. Our survey results indicate that today the most important factor in influencing youth is Internet content. It does not mean that the previous elements are not relevant but the role of school and the social environment should be consistent with the network environment.

CONCLUSIONS

Our analysis of empirical data concerning the environmental awareness of young people showed the predominance of biocentric/anti-anthropocentric over anthropocentric views in the studied population of final year high school students from Bydgoszcz, Poland. In addition, the 2019 survey showed an increase in responses within the ranges of moderate and extreme biocentrism compared to 2018. This difference is also visible between the indications of respondents regarding the three biggest threats in the world today; both in quantitative and qualitative terms, respondents in 2019 indicated more environmental categories than the year before. This highly significant difference between the two editions of the survey may be attributed to several important events, extensively reported by the media at the time. Although understanding the exact relationship between the content of communications published in the media and the state of environmental awareness of young people would require a broad analysis of the content of media messages, it should be noted the world view of young

people and their sensitivity to problems seem to depend highly on the content of modern communication channels (mainly the Internet).

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TOWARDS A REDEFINITION OF ISLAMIC SUICIDE TERRORIST'S MOTIVATION: AN "ALTRUISTIC" TERRORIST MODEL

ZMIERZAJĄC KU REDEFINICJI MOTYWACJI ISLAMSKICH
TERRORYSTÓW SAMOBÓJCÓW:
MODEL „ALTRUISTYCZNEGO” TERRORYSTY

Zbigniew Małysz* 

— ABSTRACT —

The article aims at a redefinition of Islamic suicide terrorist's motivation. It describes the basic determinants and conceptualizations of terrorism and discusses major theories and explanations of that phenomenon from an individualistic and sociocultural perspective. Due to the fact that suicide terrorism is a very distinct and narrow subcategory of terrorism, the paper addresses the questions of *Why it is unique?* and in *What ways it is distinct from ("normal") terrorism in general?* Given the absence of convincing psychological, sociological and educational evidence that terrorists (and especially suicide terrorists) differ in any particular way from the normal population, the author has developed and proposed an "altruistic" suicide-terrorist model.

The proposed model treats suicide terrorism as a process of continuous communication/

— ABSTRAKT —

Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu zdefiniowanie motywacji islamskich terrorystów samobójców. Opisuje on podstawowe determinanty i koncepcje terroryzmu oraz omawia główne teorie i wyjaśnienia tego zjawiska z perspektywy indywidualistycznej i społeczno-kulturowej. Z uwagi na fakt, że terroryzm samobójczy jest bardzo odrębną i wąską subkategorią terroryzmu, w artykule podjęto próbę odpowiedzi na następujące pytania: *Dlaczego jest on wyjątkowy?* i *W jaki sposób różni się od („zwykłego”) terroryzmu?* Biorąc pod uwagę brak przekonujących dowodów psychologicznych, socjologicznych i edukacyjnych na to, że terroryści (a zwłaszcza terroryści samobójcy) różnią się w jakikolwiek sposób od normalnej populacji, autor opracował i zaproponował model „altruistycznego” terrorysty samobójcy.

* The Maria Grzegorzewska Pedagogical University in Warsaw, Institute of Pedagogy.

education between the terrorist and his/her reference group in which psychosocial bonds are developed between the individual and the terrorist organization. The process is determined by: (1) an erroneous understanding of jihad, (2) the existence of conducive external conditions, such as frustration underpinned by poor living standards and a sectarian mentality negating the outside world and its values, and (3) a high level of altruism (and in particular reciprocal altruism) in would-be suicide bombers.

Keywords: suicide terrorist model (redefinition); (reciprocal) altruism; Islam; group processes; reference group; education

Proponowany model traktuje terroryzm samobójczy jako proces ciągłej komunikacji między terrorystą a jego/jej grupą odniesienia, w którym rozwijane są więzi psychospołeczne między jednostką a organizacją terrorystyczną. Proces ten determinowany jest przez: (1) błędne zrozumienie dżihadu, (2) istnienie sprzyjających warunków zewnętrznych, takich jak frustracja spowodowana złym poziomem życia i mentalności sekciarskiej negującej świat zewnętrzny i jego wartości, oraz (3) wysoki poziom altruizmu (a zwłaszcza altruizmu odwzajemnionego) u potencjalnych zamachowców samobójców.

Słowa kluczowe: model terrorysty-samobójcy (redefinicja); altruizm (odwzajemniony); islam; procesy grupowe; grupa odniesienia; edukacja

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has become a multidimensional activity with widespread and numerous actors or creators of terror/violence. When discussing terrorism and its *modus operandi*, it should be borne in mind that it typically represents an activity of long duration which needs careful and secretive planning, preparation, and execution, akin to special military forces and services. The main perpetrators of terror worldwide are terrorist organizations (e.g., Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, Boko Haram, Al-Fatah, Hamas, Irish Republican Army, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, etc.), which strike to achieve some more or less precisely defined, predominantly political, but also economic, military, and even religious, goals. The second category of terrorists consists of “*lone wolves*” motivated by an individual understanding of social justice or ideology. The third and most interesting category of terrorists are organizations and “*semi-lone wolves*” enticed, trained and equipped covertly by states or their intelligence agencies (as in the Ukrainian crisis). The most distinct (narrowest) and academically interesting subcategory of the above three types of actors are suicide terrorists, who are the subject matter of the presented paper.

BASIC DETERMINANTS AND CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF TERROR AND TERRORISM

The key to understanding terrorism is an understanding of the basic determinants of human aggression, violence, and their human dimensions. Terrorism may be defined as the use of terror (extreme physical aggression/violence towards certain social groups) to achieve political, economic, or military goals. However, this definition is very narrow and does not cover some important pre-terror conditions.

In the process of defining terrorism one should be aware of at least four important issues characterizing modern-day terrorism:

- 1) **Diversity and a lack of focus:** In different geographic regions and at different times, different acts may be deemed “*terrorist*”; it is almost impossible to formulate a general definition of “*terrorism*” due to the fact that every terrorist has his/her own specific goals and set of beliefs.
- 2) **Point of view:** Acts which may be deemed “*terrorist*” by one population may be perceived as heroism, guerilla warfare, or freedom fighting by another. There is also a strong tendency to romanticize “*«unheroic» terrorist acts*” committed by important political and social or (in extreme circumstances) military figures struggling against the “*barbaric others*” attacking women and children.
- 3) **Escalation of attacks:** Each new terrorist attack is supposed to be larger, louder, and more powerful than the previous one as terrorists need to shock public opinion and want their actions to attract increasing attention from society and the mass-media (which gives rise to the problem of the domestication of terrorism).
- 4) **Diversity of motivations of terrorist organizations and lone wolves:** David C. Rapoport has developed his famous concept of four waves of terrorism (Rapoport, 2004): the first one is anarchistic (“*pro-democratic*”), the second one is anticolonial, the third one represents “*New Left*” terrorism, and the fourth one is Islamic (“*jihadist*”) [this proposition is favored by researchers and taught around the world – Z.M.]. Due to rapid political changes around the world and emerging unconventional ways of engaging in political conflicts (e.g., hybrid warfare), **it has been proposed that a fifth wave, namely, state terrorism, should be added:** In today’s multipolar world of “*liquid modernity*” (see: Bauman, 2000), in the wake of the Cold War threat of atomic annihilation, the use of force by one state against

others without starting a war is a very cost-effective solution to resolve “*unsolvable*” problems (see: the Ukrainian crisis and “*little green men*”, Latin America in the 1980s, etc.). One should be aware that this wave differs in many ways from the four preceding ones. Such terrorist attacks are well coordinated and planned and carried out by well-equipped and trained special forces acting against military and political personnel on foreign ground without declaring war. Typically, the assailants will not directly attack civilian population and their actions are based on good or very good intelligence (compare: Karolczak, 2010).

In light of the above problems, this paper defines terrorism as a goal-oriented use of violence (terror) in the form of guerrilla warfare (hit-and-run tactics) by individuals, groups, organizations, or states against their “*enemies*” including civilians, military and institutional personnel, as well as critical civilian and/or military infrastructure without pre-existing and legalized state/declaration of war. This activity is designed to force the policy-makers and society to perform or discontinue certain actions, to obtain mass obedience (by manipulation of the perception of enemies), or to acquire political power without declaring war.

ORIGINS OF TERRORISM

Past and present research divides theories of terrorism into two groups: individualistic or human-oriented and sociocultural; the latter are focused on interactions between social and cultural factors, certain combinations of which may potentially incite terrorism in some groups and societies.

The main individualistic theories involve the following underlying causes, motives, or explanations of terrorism (cited after: Bolechów, 2010):

- **developmental psychopathology or disturbances in psychophysiological functions**; mostly avitaminosis, negative character traits, and psychopathy – relevant research findings concern: congenital conditions and avitaminosis (Lombroso, 1870), vestibular defects of the inner ear (Hubbard, 1983), “*normality*” of terrorists (Crenshaw, 1981), absence of a specific psychopathology in terrorists (McCauley & Segal, 1987; Ferracuti, 1982), antisocial personality disorder (Cooper, 1977, 1978; Taylor, 1988), narcissistic psychopathy (Hamden, 2002), altruistic suicide (Durkheim, 1897,

- 2011), and psychopathology resulting from participation in a terrorist organization (Taylor, 1988),
- **model of rational choice based on game theory** – based on the equation: participation in a terrorist organization = personal profit + group profit – costs (Gupta, 2005), game theory as a useful tool in terrorism research (Sandler & Arce, 2003), the problem of a “*monolithic*” view of terrorism (Crelinsten, 1988), the relative nature of terrorist rationality (Ganor, 2005), the proposition that terrorists think rationally but believe irrationally (Goertzel, 2002),
 - **terrorist personality or mentality (types)** – this construct has been discussed in, e.g., Horgan (2003), Reid (2002), Laqueur (2001), and Fetscher & Rohrmoser (1981): a) **extraverted type** vs. b) **neurotically-hostile type**,
 - **need for strong stimulation (temperamental sensation seeking)** – Levine (1999), Crenshaw (1986): a) **individualistic** vs. b) **group**,
 - “*authoritarian extremist personality*” – Ferracuti & Bruno (1981),
 - **low socioeconomic status** – partly falsified by Sageman (2004),
 - **social influence and tendency to increase socioeconomic status** – Sageman (2004), Post, Sprinzak, & Denny (2003),
 - **psychodynamics and its influence on human life** – involving hostility between sons and fathers based on the Freudian Oedipal complex (Feuer, 1969), projective identification (Perlman, 2002), narcissism (Rothman & Lichter, 1982), narcissistic disappointment and rage (Pearlstein, 1991), identity and its crisis (Taylor & Louis, 2004), the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Bandura, 1973; Berkowitz, 1989), and the relative deprivation hypothesis (Gurr, 1970); also see contributions by Kohut (1971), Crayton (1983), Morf (1970), Volkan (1997), Robins & Post (1997), Böllinger (1981), Moghaddam (2006), Gallimore (2002).

From the sociocultural perspective, the most significant explanations involve (cited after: Bolechów, 2010):

- **social learning theory** – Bandura (1973, 1986), Oots & Wiegele (1986),
- **social marginalization of the reference group (its culture and members)** – Ardila (2002),
- **cultural “*pro-terrorist*” determinants (on a continuum between individualism and/vs. collectivism)** – Staub (2004), Weinberg & Eubank (1994), Lawal (2002), Moghaddam (2006),
- **cultural context and group identity** – Caracci (2002),

- **radical social changes and reactions to their emergence** – Waldmann (2005),
- **intergroup conflict** – Sherif (1966), Volkan (1988, 1992), Olweean (2002), Kressel (2002), Brewer (1999), Gaylin (2003), Post (2007), Staub (2004), Girard (2004), Lerner (1980),
- **radical social changes** – Stevens (2002), Stern (2003), Münkler (2004), Selengut (2003), Tajfel & Turner (1986), Moghaddam & Harré (1996), Vygotsky (1978),
- **memetics/memplexes of terror and terrorism** – Dawkins (1976),
- **initial conditions and detonators (radicalization and escalation)** – Hacker (1983), Shaw (1986), Borum (2003), Sprinzak (1998), Moghaddam (2005), Drummond (2002),
- **processes** – Horgan (2005, 2014), Bolechów (2002, 2010).

UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

Taking into consideration the above-mentioned theories concerning terrorism and its influence on normal human life, the widespread occurrence of suicide attacks is quite surprising. **Indeed, suicide terrorism is very special in at least six respects:**

1. It is a relatively new kind of terrorism originating from Lebanon (from the 1980s);
2. A relatively small number of people (“actors”) participate in suicide attacks (currently the numbers of such attacks are growing and they are increasingly better prepared);
3. Suicide attacks are performed almost exclusively by Muslims;
4. Such attacks are very spectacular and attract the attention of the mass media;
5. In the public mind they are associated with the religious sphere;
6. Such activity is logical within the European sociocultural framework (see: Horgan, 2008, 2014; Bolechów, 2010; Zimny, 2006, 2017).

For a long time, suicide attacks have been explained through (see: Bolechów 2010; Zimny, 2006, 2017):

- **religious fundamentalism,**
- **modeling behavior,**
- **desperation of suicide terrorists and their social surroundings,**

- the perception of self as a group or individual **“oppressed by others and selected to carry out an important mission”**,
- Émile Durkheim’s theory of suicide, including the following motivations: selfish (linked to trauma or disease), fatalistic (brought about by peer pressure), altruistic (associated with integration with one’s group, where suicide is perceived as superior to attacking others), and anomic (resulting from an absence, confusion, conflict in the norms of a society or lack of strong social ties to other people),
- cultural violence (redefined meaning of violence with aggression and violence towards others being a source of pride),
- ideology,
- personal and family benefits (prestige),
- ethos of martyrdom,
- effectiveness of the strategy.

The theories given above are very popular and widely believed to be useful for predicting and explaining terrorist attacks around the world. But from the psychological/psycho-pedagogical perspective they do not explain satisfactorily the following issues concerning suicide terrorism:

- 1) Why is there **“only a handful of men involved in terrorist activity”** amongst millions of people? (Bolechów, 2010, p. 98).
- 2) Why are there so few terrorists who are capable of a suicide attack?
- 3) What explains the fact that among the legions of terrorists, **“only a handful of Muslims are carrying out suicide attacks”**?

REDEFINITION OF ISLAMIC SUICIDE TERRORIST MOTIVATION

Prior to embarking on an effort to redefine Islamic suicide terrorist motivation, one should specify the prerequisites of redefinition:

1. **Humans are raised by and emotionally invested in the reference groups to which they belong**, such as a clan, tribe, community, nation, or even an imaginary entity; therefore, they act, feel, and think accordingly (see: Bolechów, 2010, p. 75; Giddens, 2004; Sztompka, 2002).
2. **Transmission of values and “humanity” takes place in society within the culture of the group or community** (see: White, 1977; Hurrelmann, 1989; Erikson, 1950, 1968; Erikson & Erikson, 1997; Cooley, 1902; Mead,

1934; Harris, 1998; Ochs, 1988; Schieffelin, 1990; Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskirty, 1998).

3. **Humans always act (more or less consciously and intentionally) in such a way as to defend their reference group**, e.g., family, friends, tribe, caste, class, nation, etc. (see: Aronson, 2011; Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2010; Aronson et al., 2015; Austin & Worchel, 1979; Bales, 1950; Doise & Palmonari, 1984; Sorokin, 1925; Parsons, 1964; Merton, 1968[1949]; Turner, 1994).

As stated above, there is no significant psychological or socio-educational evidence that terrorists (or suicide terrorists) differ in any particular way from the normal population. Previous theories and models endeavored to explain and predict terrorism through different individual and sociocultural conditions, but they failed to give a clear answer to the question as to: *What distinguishes suicide terrorists from the normal population?* – and: *Why?* There are still no convincing theoretical or empirical findings identifying the values and conditions creating terrorists, and in particular – suicide terrorists.

To fill in the aforementioned research gap, the author has developed and proposed an “*altruistic*” terrorist model, according to which suicide terrorism is determined by:

1. **An erroneous understanding of jihad** (in the case of Islamic terrorists),
2. **The existence of conducive external conditions**, such as frustration underpinned by poor living standards and a sectarian mentality negating the outside world and its values,
3. **A high level of altruism, and especially reciprocal altruism, in (would-be) suicide bombers.**

These three preconditions may enable the initiation of group processes developing psychosocial bonds between an individual and his/her reference group (in this case, a terrorist organization) which finally lead to a suicide attack carried out as an act of perceived defense of the reference group (the suicide bomber intends to increase the chances of survival of that group) (Sic!).

1) ERRONEOUS UNDERSTANDING OF JIHAD

The explanation of the first point is strictly sociocultural. Briefly, it should be noted that Islam is a very peaceful religion and calls for continuous improvement through efforts to please Allah, collectively known as *jihad* (Aktan, 2007, p. 43).

The Qur'an mentions four types of ideal people to be emulated (Women 4:69): the prophets, the affirmers of truth (*siddiq*), the martyrs (*shahid*, also translated

as “*witnesses*”), and the righteous (*salih*) (Yüceoğlu, 2007, p. 105). Martyrdom is imbued with spirituality, but the key issue is the individual's intention (Yüceoğlu, 2007, p. 106). There are three kinds of martyrdom: *perfect, of this world, and of the afterworld*. **A perfect martyr should profess Islam, possess full mental faculties (be a sane adult) and be ritually clean; furthermore, death must occur for a just cause rather than as a punishment, retaliation for a sinful deed (outside the scope of blood money), or by accident; also injured individuals evacuated from the battlefield are excluded (Yüceoğlu, 2007).**

According to Islam law, military actions undertaken by fighters should be triggered by a state of war, directed against enemy militants, and dependent on a prior damage done by the enemy (Güneş, 2007). **In the case of death in combat with infidels, participation in jihad entails very attractive gratification for men in the form of the houris. On the other hand, jihadi fighters killed in battle by a woman are said to be barred from salvation (Sic!).**

Finally, it should be borne in mind that Islamic law allows the possibility of different, competing interpretations of faith by imams and the imposition of fatwas (in the Roman Catholic Church there is only one interpretation of faith, ultimately decided by the Pope; in other Christian denominations the divisions are not as common and profound, and the proponents of different interpretations are able to coexist peacefully; finally, in Christianity there exists a strong ecumenical tendency not present in Islamic denominations). Moreover, a considerable body of research also indicates that this situation has enabled the growing importance of Islamic extremist and fundamentalist movements (Zimny, 2006, 2017), and especially Wahhabism, which seems to completely repudiate a non-Islamic way of life (DeLong-Bas, 2004).

2) THE EXISTENCE OF CONDUCTIVE EXTERNAL CONDITIONS

As it was mentioned above, frustration with one's living conditions is a very useful tool in explaining the recent alarming surge of suicide attacks. The classical sociological J-curve model developed by James C. Davies (1962) is extremely helpful in understanding this issue. According to this model, throughout history each community, tribe, nation, society, etc. pursues welfare striving to attain better living and working conditions. This process leads to the emergence of increasing needs (including material goods) which need to be satisfied. **Following a relatively long calm period without civil or military unrest accompanied by a gradual improvement in living conditions, a society controlled by an authoritarian ruler/democratic community (e.g., comparing the rule**

of Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti in Iraq, Mu'ammarr al-Kaddafi in Libya, Muhammad Husni as-Sajjid Mubarak in Egypt, Hafez al-Assad and Bashar Hafez al-Assad in Syria with the situation after their fall; western lone wolves and would-be lone wolves who live in a relatively safe environment and enjoy broad privileges of the Western world compared to the traditional Muslim societies of the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East) is **more likely to engage in a revolution if faced with even a short period of economic deterioration and hardship** (e.g., the Second Gulf War, the Islamic Revolution in Egypt or the ongoing war in Syria; the socioeconomic crisis in the West and a lack of assimilation of Muslim communities therefore).

Davies concluded that (1962, p. 5): *“Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. People then subjectively fear the ground gained with great effort will be quite lost; their mood becomes revolutionary”*. This idea is aptly presented in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1. Need for Satisfaction and Revolutions by James C. Davies
(Davies' J-curve model)

Source: Davies, 1962, p. 6.

Given the continuum shown in Figure 1 and the conditions in which members of terrorist organizations and lone wolves live, think, feel, and act, they could be treated as members of a sect. A sect is a relatively small group of

people connected by some ideology, having one or more leaders, gathering more or less regularly, discussing their beliefs and problems, and mostly seeing the outside world as a threat (Stark & Bainbridge, 1979, 1985; Barker, 1990; Wilson & Cresswell, 1999). Furthermore in terrorist organizations or sects, ***“Members need to be integrated, share layers of habitus, hold similar ideas, goals and morals and be committed do the dyad, triad and larger configurations.”*** [bolded by Z.M.]. *Hence feelings of commonality and collective purpose need to exist on which to build solidarity in order to achieve group goals. These shared feelings are often created within informal groups through gossip and the mutual identification of group charisma and de-identification with the ‘Other’. Secrecy and trust, the intersection between group charisma and stigmatization and minorities of the best and worst are integral to group cohesion, recruitment and retention processes”* (Vertigans, 2011, p. 110). One of the most influential researchers of terrorism, John Horgan, claims that potential terrorists and those acting as members of an organization [sect – Z.M.] are characterized by: ***obedience to authority, dehumanization of their enemies/victims, justification of terrorist actions, routinization of their actions, deindividuation of victims, and, ultimately readiness to change their normal life habitus*** (see: Horgan, 2008, pp. 140–151).

Finally, it should also be noted that sect members are brainwashed (the highest level of socialization) at the time of their recruitment. Even more importantly, the process of brainwashing continues during periodic meetings and conversations with other sect members (strong socialization function of the group and propaganda). The sect leaders attempt to create a strong belief in their followers that only their teachings are good, acceptable, and trustworthy, while anything else is untruthful, hostile, and disfavored by the God (deity, prophet, sect leader, etc.). As a result, after conversion and confirmation, sect members are very strict in the way they think and act, and behave in a hostile manner to the infidels (the problem of neophytes). The leaders have a tendency to make oversimplifications in conceptualizing the complex world, causing increased radicalization (see: Barker, 1990; Brown, 2001; Cialdini, 2007; Ellul, 1965; Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956; Hassan, 1988; Hoffer, 1981; Meerloo, 1956; Singer & Lalich, 2003; Storr, 1997; Taylor, 2004; Thouless, 1953).

In general, sect members interact with the outside world in three main ways (see: Barker, 1990; Clarke, 2006; Saliba, 2003; Toch, 1965; Wilson, 1961, 1990):

1. **Evolutionary** – the sect sends preachers to the outside world to peacefully teach outsiders about *“the Truth”*.

2. **Revolutionary** – the sect acts as a military or guerrilla force and aggressively fights others to obtain vital resources.
3. **Complete avoidance of contact due to indifference, disregard, or hostility towards others** – this is the most peaceful way of communication with the main goal being ignorance or defiance of the roles, values, lifestyles, and influence of others/(surrounding) the World.

3) HIGH LEVEL OF RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM

Within the presented framework, the last but not least distinctive feature of suicide terrorism is a very high level of reciprocal altruism. To better understand the significance of this claim, it should be noted that “[...] *sociobiology teaches us that the moral prejudice is bound up with the evolution of altruism. Biologists use the term ‘altruism’ for any behavior that promotes the reproductive success of another at one’s own expense [...]*” (Smith, 2011, p. 204). This means that from the sociobiological perspective altruism is understood as a pattern of behavior in which the individual feels and acts to increase the chances of survival and reproduction of other people, even if unrelated (see: Axelrod, 1984; Batson, 1991, 2011; Dawkins, 1976; Kropotkin, 1902; Oord, 2004, 2007, 2010; Oliner & Oliner, 1995; Wright, 1995). According to cultural anthropology and ethnography, people typically live and operate within their reference cultures, in which they were raised and educated, and with which they are familiar (see: Agar, 1996; Fetterman, 2009; Geertz, 1973; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Kottak, 2013; Marcus & Fischer, 1986; Stocking, 1968; Tylor, 1871, 1881; Van Maanen, 1988). This suggests that individuals may be altruistic primarily towards other members of their culture or reference group.

In his seminal work *The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior: I and II*, William Hamilton (1964) demonstrated, in the context of evolutionary Darwinism, that the proliferation of donor genes may be achieved through the support of family (reference group members) by begetting, educating and ensuring the safety of offspring (providing a living space for one’s relatives), which is known as kin altruism. By analogy, this means that people who are not able to have or nurture and educate their own offspring may achieve genetic success *via* support given to their more or less broadly defined family (Sic!).

That understanding was extended by Robert Trivers in his widely discussed article *The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism* (1971), in which he elaborated on altruism towards nonrelatives. Examining the role of that phenomenon in different species, including primates, cleaning fish and shrimps, birds, and human

societies, Trivers argued that the rule of reciprocity is omnipresent. According to him, human altruistic attitudes and behaviors toward nonrelatives are linked to genetic proliferation of alleles and are quite common in nature due to their adaptive role – they help to achieve collective safety by means of a relatively small expenditure of effort. Trivers also explained the role of friendship, dislike, moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, trust, suspicion, trustworthiness, some aspects of guilt, dishonesty, and hypocrisy as psychological adaptations helping to regulate the human altruistic system. His model shows that natural selection works against the cheater (non-reciprocator), who is not likely to receive support from others when in danger. It also indicates that the crucial question while examining reciprocal altruism is the problem of revenge (*Will I be repaid in kind?*). Furthermore, reciprocal altruism may be preferred by cultural systems due to the fact that trust and reciprocity are critical in the process of building social bonds (see: Sztompka, 1999).

Richard D. Alexander (1987) explored in greater detail the relationship between altruists and their reference groups, formulating the concept of “*indirect reciprocity*”. According to him, generous altruists can greatly boost their personal reputation and that of their families, which ultimately is likely to improve their socioeconomic status (cited after: Smith, 2011, p. 206). In some countries and cultures (e.g., Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq) people following the social rule of reciprocity may be able to achieve greater benefits for themselves and their families by committing an “*altruistic*” suicide attack aimed at the oppressive world surrounding them than by staying alive. Social actors who know that their community abides by the social rule of reciprocity are more likely to work for the good of their community because in the long term they simply work for themselves (for the family who carries their genes). If a man or woman dies in a suicide attack, their children, brothers, and sisters are more likely to survive the struggle for limited natural resources¹.


¹ We also should remember that in the Islamic world fertility rates are high and due to this fact the gene copies of suicide bomber (carried by their children, parents, brothers and sisters, cousins, etc.) may survive and spread. For instance, a suicide bomber (100% genes) may have 3 children (50% common genes – in total 150%), two parents (50% common genes – in total 100%), two brothers and three sisters (25% common genes – in total 125%), which amounts to 375% copies of genes in the family versus 100% of genes in the suicide bomber. Ultimately 375% of the suicide bomber's genes copies remain alive (relatively safe and well protected by the bomber's reference group or a democratic political system). Thus, in terms of gene proliferation the suicide bomber always wins (Sic!).

In summary, suicide bombers appear to act for the perceived greater good of their generalized reference groups (Sic!). They feel special bonds towards their fellow countrymen or fellow believers. The three factors affecting this process to the greatest extent are: an erroneous understanding of jihad in the religious sphere, conducive external conditions in the sociocultural sphere, and a high level of reciprocal altruism in would-be suicide terrorists. When combined together, these ingredients form a very explosive mixture. Importantly, the bonds between ‘suicidists’ and their reference groups do not have to be physical – what is sufficient is a platform for the exchange of ideas (e.g., the Internet) and a specific motivation. Furthermore, actual contact with the reference group is not always necessary; the prerequisite is for the prospective suicide bomber to experience a sense of belonging to it (or growing alienation in the culture of the country of residence and misunderstanding of its values).

AN “ALTRUISTIC” TERRORIST MODEL

A better understanding of the motivation of suicide terrorists would be useful in preventing terrorist attacks. Previous models and theories were concentrated on identifying abnormalities distinguishing such terrorists from the general population, but empirical data show that such an approach has not helped combat global terrorism. Numerous efforts have been undertaken to analyze suicide terrorists (or terrorists in general) in terms of normality and collective actions initiated against more or less clearly specified enemies, but the above-mentioned perspectives also have their limitations (especially as regards lone-wolf motivation). Thus, the present author has developed a novel model in the hope of overcoming these shortcomings.

The interpretation of suicide terrorism proposed herein is dynamic action oriented towards a “*total victory*” (or, from another perspective: “*total annihilation*”). Indeed, the suicide quest is interpreted as a dynamic process between a would-be suicide terrorist and his/her reference group. Due to its processual nature, the presented model consists of phases of intensive activity (preparation of an attack) followed by relative quiescence (reconnaissance and prayers preceding the attack), as shown below in Model 1.



TOLERANCE
Function: Elimination of a sense of danger felt by the individual.
Statement: <i>We are not dangerous. We can live side by side.</i>
Place: Mosque, the Internet, publications.
Intention: <i>Come to us.</i>
Effect: Domestication of "difference".




ACCEPTANCE
Function: Domestication of the organization, its values and methods of operation.
Statement: <i>What we do is good.</i> – An attempt to interest the individual in action.
Place: Mosque, market, hospitals, schools.
Intention: <i>See [How good We are...]</i>
Effect: First stages of value internalization.



AFFINITY
Function: Joining the organization.
Statement: <i>I like You. I will join You.</i> – The first actions and speeches on the group forum.
Place: Mosque, private houses, the Internet.
Intention: <i>I would like to be like You.</i>
Effect: Joining the structures (to increase the quantity and quality of the group's activities).



FRIENDSHIP
Function: Participation in the organization.
Statement: <i>I am an integral part of the group. Your enemies are my enemies.</i>
Place: Everywhere.
Intention: <i>Participation in the organization.</i>
Effect: Reinforcement of behaviors (conditioning, modeling, indoctrination).



PERFECT FRIENDSHIP
Function: Full participation in the organization (quantitative and qualitative increase in social influence and action).
Statement: <i>I am an integral part of the group. I trust You completely and I will defend You at all costs.</i>
Place: Everywhere.
Intention: <i>Willingness to sacrifice in the name of the values of the reference group.</i>
Effect: Full scale reinforcement of behaviors (conditioning, modeling, indoctrination).



SUICIDE ATTACK TO DEFEND THE REFERENCE GROUP
Function: Altruistic self-destruction (<i>I'm saving you from harm, fulfilling the will of merciful Allah</i>)
Statement: <i>You are under attack by someone or something.</i>
Place: Gatherings and safe grounds of infidels.
Intention: <i>I will destroy the enemies (infidels) so that You may live and so that I will be able "to live forever in You" and watch over You.</i>
Effect: Separation from the group and "sudden silence" (final preparations) ended with a suicide strike.

Model 1. An "Altruistic" Terrorist Model (*"It takes only one step to move from love to hate"*)

Based on psychosocial communication levels between the Individual and his/her reference group/organization.

Source: Author's own work. Note: Due to processual nature of human life and basic conditions of this model it is impossible that every man who will start modeling his/her behavior according to this model will end as a suicide bomber – furthermore *drop-outs* are normal part in the process of communication between individual and his/her reference group/organization.

CONCLUSIONS

Suicide terrorism is a very interesting and broad subject of research. To date, numerous studies have endeavored to explain the determinants of this phenomenon and ways to prevent it. As the existing methods reviewed in this paper have ultimately failed to provide a successful explanation of suicide terrorism and its dynamic nature, an altruistic suicide terrorist model has been proposed. **The main advantage of the developed model is a new perspective on understanding (would-be suicide) terrorist motivation in members of terrorist organizations; on the other hand, the model may be less useful in addressing the problem of Islamic lone-wolf suicide motivation. As a result, an empirical evaluation of the model is required.**

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INTERNAL MIGRATIONS FROM CRIMEA AND DONBASS AFTER 2014 AS CONFLICT-TRIGGERING FACTORS IN THE REGIONS OF UKRAINE

WEWNĘTRZNE MIGRACJE Z KRYMU I DONBASU PO 2014
ROKU ORAZ ICH WPŁYW NA POTENCJAŁ KONFLIKTOGENNY
W REGIONACH UKRAINY

*Oksana Voytyuk** 

— ABSTRACT —

The annexation of the Crimea and the war in Donbass resulted in intense migration flows from these areas to the non-conflict areas of Ukraine. Internally displaced persons (IPDs) in the initial phase of the conflict were mainly received by the neighbour regions bordering with the area affected by the conflict. The endless war in Donbass significantly affected the deterioration of the economic situation in Ukraine, which also influenced the attitude towards IDPs. The social attitude towards IDPs from Donbass was initially positive, but gradually changed into negative one, mainly in the eastern Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine. In the west of the country, the attitude was more positive. The main factor that could reduce the degree of tension in the society between IDPs and the receiving communities is the end of the war in Donbass, but as the situa-

— ABSTRAKT —

Aneksja Krymu i wojna w Donbasie spowodowały intensywne migracje wewnętrzne z tych obszarów do regionów nie objętych konfliktem. Osoby wewnętrznie przemieszczone (OWP) w początkowej fazie konfliktu głównie przemieszczały się w sąsiednie regiony graniczące z obszarem dotkniętym konfliktem. Niekończąca się wojna w Donbasie znacząco wpłynęła na pogorszenie się sytuacji gospodarczej na Ukrainie, co również wpłynęło na stosunek do osób wewnętrznie przesiedlonych. Społeczne podejście do OWP z Donbasu było początkowo pozytywne, ale stopniowo zmieniło się w negatywne, głównie we wschodnich, rosyjskojęzycznych regionach Ukrainy. Na zachodzie kraju postawa była bardziej pozytywna. Głównym czynnikiem, który może zmniejszyć stopień napięć w społeczeństwie między osobami wewnętrznie przesiedlonymi

* University in Białystok, Institute of History and Political Sciences.

tion of the conflict indicates, it cannot be finished quickly.

a społecznościami przyjmującymi, jest koniec wojny w Donbasie, ale jak pokazuje sytuacja, nie można liczyć na szybkie zakończenie konfliktu.

Keywords: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); internal migration; Donbass; Ukraine

Słowa kluczowe: osoby wewnętrznie przesiedlone (OWP); migracja wewnętrzna; Donbas; Ukraina

INTRODUCTION

The annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass contributed to the emergence of the phenomenon of internal migrations and to the appearance of internal refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). Unlike refugees, the IDPs are legally protected by the government of Ukraine. In 2014, the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted the law *On Guaranteeing the Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons*, according to which the IDP was “a citizen of Ukraine, a foreigner or stateless person, residing legally on the territory of Ukraine and entitled to permanent residence in Ukraine, who had been forced to leave the place of residence in order to avoid the negative effects of armed conflict, temporary occupation, ubiquitous acts of violence, violation of human rights and natural or man-made disasters” (Law of Ukraine, 2015).

As warfare developed in the east of Ukraine there were several waves of migration, both internal and external (Voytyuk, 2018a, pp. 359–362). In addition, the annexation of Crimea also favoured the development of the intensity of this phenomenon.

Migrations from the occupied territories caused a number of problems in regions that were not affected by the conflict. The most common problems were:

- different attitudes towards the IDPs from Crimea and Donbass,
- tensions between the IDPs and host communities,
- increase of conflict-triggering potential in regions of Ukraine,
- adaptation problems.

Before analysing the problem of internal migration, a few words need to be said about the specificity of Donbass and Crimea. The history of Crimea was long and dramatic, because the fate of many nations intersected there (From the Cimmerians, 2010). In various historical periods the peninsula was a part of the Golden Horde, an independent state (Crimean Khanate, 1449–1783), in vassal dependence on the Ottoman Empire (after the death of Haji Girei and until

the annexation in 1783), part of the Russian Empire (from 1783), later Soviet Russia, and in 1954, the peninsula became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Vozgrin, 2013, vols. 1–4). In 1991, after the collapse of the USSR, the Crimean peninsula was included into the independent Ukrainian state, and its status was not regulated during the first years of Ukraine's independence.

In March 2014, Crimea was unlawfully annexed by the Russian Federation. Despite the fact that the peninsula *de facto* was considered Ukrainian since 1954, the influence of Kyiv was negligible, and the Russian influence was never eradicated and only increased in the last years before the annexation (Zadorozhnyi, 2015).

In the interwar period, the Crimean Tatars were the largest ethnic group in Crimea. After the Second World War and the deportation of the Crimean Tatars to Central Asia, their place was taken mainly by Russians, and to a lesser extent Ukrainians (Vozgrin, 2013, Vol. 4). Most of the peninsula's population used to be mainly Russian-speaking, and in political, socio-cultural preferences, they were more inclined to Russian than Ukrainian, except for the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians.

The history of Donbass is slightly different from the history of Crimea, because in the interwar period Ukrainians dominated in this region (Voytyuk, 2018a, pp. 125–138). The ethnic structure in Donbass as well as in the Crimea began to change after the Second World War. The processes of industrialization of Donbass were strengthened by the Russification policy, which significantly increased the number of Russians in the ethnic structure of the region. Donbass began to lose Ukrainianness in favor of Russianness. Since then, this region has always held a pro-Russian position in political preferences and in the cultural and social aspect. Russian culture, language and traditions were closer to the citizens of the region than Ukrainian values (Voytyuk, 2018).

Linguistic, religious and cultural differences have divided the inhabitants of the east and the west of Ukraine since the proclamation of independence in August 1991. The western part of the state can certainly be said to be the core of Ukrainianness – here the Ukrainian language has always prevailed, the west is very diverse in religious terms (Orthodox, Greek, Roman Catholic, Protestants). On the east and in the Crimea the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church was strong. The Crimean Tatars after returning to the Crimea in 1991 began the revival of Islam.

Inhabitants of the east and the west of Ukraine also differ in terms of political preferences – the east Ukraine and Crimea (except for the Crimean Tatars) have always supported pro-Russian forces, while the west – pro-European and

nationalist forces. No less important are economic differences – eastern Ukraine has always been the centre of industry, Crimea – a strategic place, while the west was dominated by the service and agricultural sectors (Putintsev & Pashchenko, 2015).

According to statistical figures, at the beginning of 2018 there were 1 493 529 057 IDPs. Considering the data included in Table 1, the biggest number of IDPs was received by the regions in the direct vicinity of the occupied Crimea and ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation Zone) area – the Donetsk Oblast (588 100), the Kharkiv Oblast (191 700), Zaporizhia Oblast (102 500), the Dnipropetrovsk District (73 800), and Kyiv (153 400). The lowest IDP number arrived in the Chernivtsi Oblast (3000), the Ternopil Oblast (2700), and the Volyn Oblast (3800). It was the Lviv Oblast that received the biggest IDP number of all Western Ukraine districts (10 400), and Lviv itself was a shelter to about 8000 people. The fact the people concentrated in the areas of direct vicinity to ATO zone and Crimea could be explained by people's expectations of war to be soon ended and Crimea de-occupied. The unfavorable attitudes towards western regions in the initial stage of the conflict could be explained by numerous stereotypes and convictions of nationalist and hostile societies.

Table 1. The Number of IDPs in 2015–2018 from Occupied Territories

Oblast/Date:	25.09.2015	04.02.2016	03.08.2017	01.02.2018
Volyn Oblast	3800	4033	2824	2906
Lviv Oblast	10400	11337	12050	12013
Zakarpattia Oblast	3300	3462	3467	3599
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	3900	4116	3397	3493
Chernivtsi Oblast	3000	3149	2263	2500
Ternopil Oblast	2700	2722	2499	2189
Rivne Oblast	3100	3204	3256	3219
Khmelnyskyi Oblast	7100	6793	6584	6988
Vinnysia Oblast	12400	13251	14819	14902
Zhytomyr Oblast	9800	10496	7270	7248
Kyiv	153400	127026	153999	159412
Kyiv Oblast	b/d	48318	59926	62042
Cherkasy Oblast	14000	48318	12964	12643
Kirovohrad Oblast	10600	12268	7801	6854

Oblast/Date:	25.09.2015	04.02.2016	03.08.2017	01.02.2018
Odessa Oblast	31800	35703	38095	39873
Mykolaiv Oblast	8500	8612	8255	8350
Kherson Oblast	12900	14226	13441	13760
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	73800	76457	73576	73630
Zaporizhia Oblast	102500	118878	54564	54174
Poltava Oblast	29300	30684	27502	25903
Sumy Oblast	14900	15283	14299	11102
Kharkiv Oblast	191700	212557	160616	122396
Luhansk Oblast	223100	251231	299134	294529
Donetsk Oblast	558100	676553	529130	540804
Chernihiv Oblast	9500	10011	8614	8528
Totally:	1 493 600	1 748 688	1 520 345	1 493 057

Source: author's own study based on infographics in *Slovo i dilo* (2017).

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The purpose of this article is to present the analysis of the reasons forcing people to flee from the occupied territories and the territories affected by the conflict, relations between IDPs and the receiving communities in different parts of the state. In the context of the analysis of the phenomenon of internal migration, the question should be answered whether the reasons for leaving Donbass and the Crimea are similar or not? Is Ukrainian society really divided into east and west? Is there a chance that the war in Donbass and the annexation of Crimea will eliminate social divisions, if any?

The article was written following the analysis of the figures and reports of sociology institutes, non-governmental and international organizations (Report, 2019; OSCE, 2017; IEF, 2019). The main attention was concentrated on the following reports: *Assessment of Psychological, Socio-Economic Adaptation and Integration of IDP Women in New Communities (Vinnytsya, Lviv and Kyiv oblast')*. The document provides an assessment of the various problems faced by IDP women. It analyses how women adapt to new living conditions. What are the opportunities for the interaction between IDPs, local authorities and host communities (OSCE, 2017). In the report *IDPs and Host Communities: Lessons for Effective Community Adaptation and Integration*, the following aspects were

analysed: international experience in public policy making regarding IDPs and the approaches to assessing their integration and adaptation. The functions and opportunities of state authorities, local authorities, private and public sectors, rural communities in these processes in Ukraine were considered. The manifestations and factors of social exclusion among IDPs have been identified. The correlation of different forms of social capital of IDPs in Ukraine was analysed and the determinants of their successful local integration were substantiated. The expectations of the representatives of host communities regarding the IDPs were established, the value differences of IDPs and the representatives of the host communities were analysed on this basis. The set of practical recommendations on the expedient directions of the state policy on adaptation and integration of IDPs in Ukraine was offered (IEF, 2019). The report *Analysis of the Dynamics of Conflicts between the IPDs and Host Communities 2014–2016* was a significant source while writing the article. It is based on a survey of over 117 regional experts, NGO leaders, as for their opinion on IDPs in host communities. It was also analysed how the issues related to IDPs as well as the attitude of the local population to the IDPs were presented in the media (Stabilization Support Services, 2017). Report *The Attitude of the Population of Ukraine to IDPs from Donbass and Crimea: Results of the Public Opinion Polls 2015–2018* presents the dynamics of changes in population attitudes towards IDPs and assesses the subjective integration potential for IDPs in host communities. Questions about the attitude of the population to IDPs, in particular, the willingness of the local population to interact with displaced persons at the private, professional and public levels, were asked to respondents in 2015–2018 in all regions of Ukraine except the Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Each year, 1800 respondents over the age of 18 were interviewed (UNCHR, 2019). In the *Report on the Results of Analysis of the Problems of IDP in the United Territorial Communities* the key issues of IDPs in host communities were summarized. Prospects of integration of IDPs into integrated territorial communities are the possibilities of taking into account the policy of decentralization when developing a strategic plan for IDPs' integration. The achievements and problems of the integrated territorial communities in integrating IDPs were analysed, the ability to implement and promote the social protection policies of IDPs were considered (Radnyk, 2017–2018). The research was conducted in the following regions of Ukraine: the Vinnytsia Oblast, the Zaporizhia Oblast, the Poltava Oblast, the Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, the Donetsk Oblast, the Luhansk Oblast, the Kherson Oblast, the Lviv Oblast, the Kyiv Oblast, and in Lviv. The

reports show that during the adaptation of internally displaced persons in places of new residence, the main attention is focused on economic, psychological, sociological, demographic, anthropological and medical aspects. In this context, medical science focuses on the quality of the health of IDPs, on the frequency of various diseases, including epidemics. Psychological sciences consider the psychological conditions of internally displaced persons, including stress and their behavioural consequences. For sociology and anthropology, the interactions of internally displaced persons with the new cultural environment and the possibility of transforming the identity of internally displaced persons are the major problems. Economics is relatively more interested in the costs and working potential, qualifications of internally displaced persons, as well as their experience/abilities (Putintsev & Pashchenko, 2015).

The monograph by S. Kulchyts'kyy and L. Yakubova, *Three Hundred Years of Loneliness: Ukrainian Donbass in Search of Meaning and Homeland* (2016), was a useful publication helping to understand the reasons between IDPs and hosting communities. The monograph presents the circumstances of the colonization of the Donetsk region and the Luhansk region, and analyzes the participation of individual ethnic groups in the economic development of the region, the processes of ethno-cultural interaction and the contradictions they generated (Kulchyts'kyy & Yakubova, 2016). The important inspiration while writing the article was also the research of Illiya Kononov, where not only he analyses the relations between the center and the provinces, but also between two regional poles, namely Donbass and Galychyna, that produce different perspectives on social development (Kononov, Khobta, & Shchudlo, 2008; Kononov, 2019).

Different problems that concern the history of Crimea were introduced in monographs by V. Vozgrin, *The History of Crimean Tatars: Essays on the Ethnic History of the Indigenous Population of Crimea* (2013), by O. Zadorozhnyi, *Annexation of Crimea Is an International Crime* (2015), and by O. Voytyuk, *Tatarzy Krymscy. Sytuacja narodu w warunkach zmieniających się państwowości* [Crimean Tatars: The Situation of the Nation in the Conditions of Changing Statehood] (2018). Among the research problems were the relations between some ethnic groups, deportation of 1944, the annexation the peninsula in 1783 and in 2014, fight for human rights. Monographs helped to understand the history of Crimea and Donbass before 2014, and to find differences among Ukrainian regions and understand them.

In the context of internal migrations from Donbass and the Crimea, two theoretical approaches can be distinguished – socio-cultural and economic.

In this context, the IDPs adaptation to new realities is very important. From the point of view of the socio-cultural approach, adaptation is overcoming the shock of changing the ordinary cultural environment and the need to adapt to another culture, including finding the way of successful coexistence between internally displaced persons with those of surrounding groups. The essence of the economic approach is that “Resources can be defined as the means by which people meet needs, pursue goals and meet requirements”. In the context of the IDPs, there are factors that facilitate or limit the access to resources (Putintsev & Pashchenko, 2015).

Basically, the following dimensions of IDP’s adaptation can be distinguished:

- as part of the socio-cultural approach, this is to overcome psychological stress caused by moving to a new place of residence;
- as part of the economic approach, adaptation consists in obtaining information on the availability and location of the new place of residence of the resources needed to maintain “livelihoods” (housing, food, income sources (taxes, business income, social payments), healthcare, education, transport and communication, etc.) (Putintsev & Pashchenko, 2015).

The theory proposed by J.T. Gullahorn and J.E. Gullahorn can be used to evaluate IDP adaptation strategies. It is based on the hypothesis that the adaptation follows a certain U-shaped curve, the individual parts of which reveal the stages of this process:

- the first stage, characterized by optimistic expectations and hopes for the future;
- the second stage is characterized by an increase in the negative impact of the environment on the person, which causes a state of depression and frustration;
- the third stage is characterized by the maximum manifestation of symptoms of helplessness and the appearance of psychosomatic disorders;
- the fourth stage is accompanied by the appearance of optimism, a sense of satisfaction and integration in new conditions;
- the fifth stage ends with the complete adjustment of the unit.

According to reports, some IDPs are unable (or reluctant) to fully adapt to the new environment and return to their previous place of residence after the relative normalization of the situation. There, they encounter the new problems of readaptation, which again repeat the U-curve (Gullahorn & Gullahorn, 1963, pp. 33–47).

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS FROM THE CRIMEA

The events that took place on February 26, 2014 were a breakthrough moment in the history of Crimea that commenced a creeping occupation of the peninsula. Masked soldiers in unmarked green army uniforms, carrying modern Russian military weapons and equipment (also called “Little Green Men”), appeared in the streets of Crimean towns, and the chaos they brought, as well as increasing ethnic and religious discrimination contributed to direct danger experienced by certain social groups. The first migrations from the Crimea began.

Initially, the reasons to leave Crimea were based on ideological terms: strong pro-Ukraine stance, the unwillingness to accept new conditions imposed by the occupants; then – unbearable life conditions to pro-Ukrainian population regardless ethnic affiliation (bad atmosphere, no perspectives, demonstration of negative attitudes, businesses being endangered, persecution, denouncing people to the authorities, aggression, physical violence, abduction, arrest, searching with no relevant reason, intimidation). The clergymen, the Crimean Tatars, Crimean Ukrainians and other ethnic groups started to leave the peninsula. Economic factors were not significant in this situation.

Lviv and Kyiv were the first cities ready to receive IDPs from Crimea. Kyiv provided shelter to a nationally diverse group of people, since not only the Crimean Tatars came here, so did Crimean Ukrainians and other ethnic groups that did not feel safe after the annexation of Crimea. The group of IDPs chose Kyiv, as they wanted to be close to the state structures that were created in order to solve IDP problems (Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories). IDPs expected to receive faster state’s help in Kyiv in solving their problems.


However, it was Lviv that received the biggest IDP number in March-April 2014. The Crimean Tatars were invited to Lviv by the oblast administration and the mayor of Lviv, Andrii Sadovyi. The inhabitants of Lviv treated the Crimean Tatars with understanding and they were willing to help them (Radio Svoboda, 2014).

The Crimean Tatars were distinguished, being compared to the IDPs from Donbass, by the following factors:

- They actively used survival strategies they had acquired during the deportations and exile in 1944–1989;
- When they moved to Lviv from other regions of Ukraine, they were not afraid to establish active interactions with the state, the NGOs and the voluntaries. They were frequently the initiators of voluntary organizations themselves;

- They managed to solve their job problems independently, by settling their own businesses (ethnic cuisine, handicraft, NGOs);
- They created ethnic-cultural associations;
- They supported one another, helping people arriving from the Crimea later.

As the statistical data prove, there is a big difference in the approach to the Crimean Tatars and the IDPs from Donbass in the Ukrainian society. Perception of the Crimean Tatars and attitude towards this group within the Ukrainian society is different from opinions on the IDPs from Donbass. The influence of mass media on public opinion in this context seems to be critical (Graph 1).



Graph 1. On Which Sources of Information Is Your Opinion on IDPs Formed?

Source: author's own translation on the base of *Attitude*, 2016, p. 10.

According to the statistical data, 65 per cent of the Ukrainians formed their opinion on IDPs following the media information, 49 per cent formed the opinion according to their friends' information, 13 per cent received the information from social media, 13 per cent used their own experience. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees reports that the Crimean Tatars are more liked in the west of Ukraine – 11 per cent, in the center – 9 per cent, and in the capital – 12 per cent. The level of confidence to the Crimean Tatars is higher, as this nation explicitly declared their standpoint related to Crimea annexation and the policy of the Russian Federation.

Positive attitude of the society in Western Ukraine towards the Crimean Tatars results from the similar past experience among people living in the

western regions of Ukraine, particularly the deportations among the present inhabitants of Western Ukraine from eastern Poland. The dramatic experience they shared became the grounds for positive feelings, support and understanding the problems experienced by the Crimean Tatar people. The Crimean Tatars' reasons for choosing western Ukraine and Lviv include such factors as friendly and religious people living here, helpful while looking for a job and accommodation. Their attitude towards poor competence of the Ukrainian language among the newcomers is full of understanding. In fact, the Crimean Tatars are willing to study Ukrainian language and use it in their everyday life along with Crimean Tatar language. Local population's positive approach to the Crimean Tatars results from their pro-Ukrainian stance (Mikheyeva & Sereda, 2015, pp. 9–49).

There were several stages in the Crimean emigration during the short period after the annexation of the peninsula. There was the main reason of emigration in each stage but the reasons appearing earlier also need to be considered. However, the main reason to leave the Crimea just after Russian annexation was the one of the ideological nature. The first group to leave the Crimea were military men and women who had made the oath of allegiance to Ukraine and Ukrainian people; they were followed by the government administration, journalists, patriotic activists and the clergy who did not accept the annexation. Most of them left the peninsula in fear of their and their families' security. Considering the clergy, these who left were the representatives of the religious factions that were illegal in Russia and the representatives of other religious minorities – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, protestants, Greek Catholic. The first stage of emigration covered the period from March to the summer of 2014. In the summer, when it turned out there would be no war, the migration movement stopped. Some people returned to the peninsula, yet the majority sold their property in the Crimea and decided to stay in the continent.

Since the very beginning of the Crimea occupation the forced emigration based on discrimination has continued. It is mainly related to the Crimean Tatars (the Mejlis members) and these Ukrainians who did not leave the Crimea at the beginning of the occupation for various reasons. These groups are treated in a way making them leave the peninsula (their houses being searched, persecution, harassment, criminal proceedings).

The second stage of emigration from the Crimea began in the autumn of 2014, being mainly motivated economically. In September and October 2014, young educated and professionally active people began leaving the Crimea. Their

political preferences were diverse yet Ukrainian patriotic attitudes formed a critical factor of their decisions. They initially believed it was possible to co-exist with the new authorities; however, it turned out to be impossible. There are no accurate data concerning the number of people who moved to the continent, as unlike during the first emigration stage in the spring, they did not officially register. The estimated data proved the smaller number of newcomers during the second emigration stage – they accounted for 30 per cent emigrants of the first stage (Drozd, 2014). The migrations slightly ceased in the winter of 2014/2015 due to the fear of homelessness, lack of jobs and money.

Educational migration (the third stage) intensified in the summer of 2015, when young people decided to travel to Ukraine in order to gain access to higher education. According to Emine Dzheparova, the First Deputy Minister of Information Policy, “Ukrainian education for Crimeans is a guarantee for return of the Crimea to Ukraine” (Uryadovyi kurier, 2016). For the Crimean youth there are two possibilities to enrol at Ukrainian Higher Educational Institutions:

- Considering the results of final state examination. The documents can be submitted to all Ukrainian higher educational institutions on a par with other Ukrainian citizens;
- Following the simplified procedure not considering the results of final state examination (there are students in the Crimea who did not have the possibility to take this exam). Students are obliged to pass such subjects as Ukrainian language, history and literature in Educational Centers “Crimea – Ukraine” (Lvivska gazeta, 2016)¹.

When it was realized that improving situation in the Crimea was nothing more than illusion, the fourth stage of emigration began, the stage of a business nature. Small and medium-sized businesses in the Crimea were based on tourism and travel-related services, like catering, tourist guide services, rentals for tourists, etc. Russian government strictly limited businesses in seaside regions, partly destroying infrastructure in coastal areas. Moreover, the Crimea annexation resulted in the considerable loss in the number of tourists, which made the hotels and pensions unprofitable and cost-consuming. Furthermore, conditions to run business became highly unfavorable, which resulted in moving a part of

¹ In July 2016 the educational centers “Crimea-Ukraine” were opened in 12 Ukrainian higher educational institutions. Their purpose is to test the Crimean youth and help them enrol at Ukrainian higher educational institutions. The centers were established in Lviv, Kyiv, Kherson, Dnipro, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv. The centers are also obliged to help the youth to apply for the Ukrainian passport.

businesses in the coastal regions of Ukraine, such as Odessa Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast, or Kherson Oblast.

Conscription emigration was the fifth stage of emigration. It was related to compulsory military service in Ukraine, compulsory military conscription. There are concerns that people who achieved military age could be dispatched to eastern Ukraine in order to support the rebel forces in Donetsk and Lugansk (Hromadske Radio, 2014). Certain part of people in the Crimea arrived in Ukraine where they joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS FROM DONBASS


Internally Displaced Persons from Donbass are in a slightly worse situation than the Crimean Tatars. There were a lot of reasons contributing to this condition. As it was mentioned above, during the first migration stage it was a patriotic attitude and a pro-Ukrainian standpoint that made the Crimean Tatars leave the Crimea, whereas in Donbass these were the rich who fled as the first group, hoping to save their ships. Most of them did not stay in Ukraine and using various excuses decided to move to Europe, Russia, or Belarus. Later, the main reason to leave Donbass was the hostilities, making IDPs lose their property and endangering their life and health. People residing in other regions of Ukraine perceived IDPs from Donbass to be the ones supporting separatism. According to UNHCR Report, the positive attitude to IDPs from Donbass in the east of Ukraine reached 7 per cent, while in central Ukraine, western Ukraine and Kyiv it did not exceed 4 per cent (Attitude, 2016, p. 12).

Considerable part of IDPs from Crimea is formed by families with children. Unfortunately, there was no access to more precise data to present it in a chart. In the media, the image of IDPs from Donbass is unfavorable, being formed by the security services that focus on the negative phenomena and deeds within this group (e.g., the increase in crime in different regions is associated with IDPs) (Panchenko, 2017).

The statistical data prove that the retired constitute the biggest group among IDPs – 52.5 per cent, while the group of professionally active IDPs constitutes only 28 per cent, children – 15.5 per cent, the disabled – 4 per cent (Graph 2). Most of these people need social security support, such as benefits or pensions.

The Ukrainian government suspends pensions to the people who moved to non-government controlled areas and stayed there more than two months,

until they return to government-controlled areas. The number of these people approximately reaches as many as 500,000 (Interfax UA, 2017).



Graph 2. IDPs Age Structure, Including the Disabled Per Cent

Source: UAIN, 2018.

Occupation of Donbass and the Crimea resulted in negative attitudes to one another within the societies of these regions, including the noticeable differences. In the Crimea, it is mainly ethnic hostility between the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians on one side and the Russians and pro-Russian citizens on the other. Then – the differences related to religion need to be mentioned, Muslim versus Orthodox Christian. The third place is occupied by the supporters and the opponents of “the Russian World”. In Donbass the circumstances are different – it is the ideology that matters: Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR or DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR or LNR) supporters and opponents; ethnic and religious issues do not matter much.

Migration processes concerning leaving from the occupied Crimea and Donbass were also different. As it was mentioned before, the biggest migrant wave from the Crimea was observed just after it was annexed, during the first several months. The nature of the first wave was clearly ideological. The process of leaving Donbass was so intense that people just waited for the situation to improve, no matter what direction it could have chosen. Part of the inhabitants looked forward to being incorporated by Russia, like the Crimea was. However, the situation turned out to be different – it became obvious that the Russian Fed-

eration was not interested in the annexation of Donbass. When the situation had become envenomed, people began fleeing from the occupied territories. Apart from ideological issues, people delayed moving from Donbass due to various reasons, such as the unwillingness to abandon their jobs, fears and stereotypes, mistrust, problems related to employment and accommodation in a new place.

The direction also was a significant matter. The Crimean Tatars opted for Lviv and Kyiv due to patriotic reasons, not considering employment and accommodation factors to be really critical. In particular situations, they considered their relatives residing in certain areas to be a favorable factor, it did not play the decisive role to them, though. The IDPs from Donbass, by contrast, regarded the fact their relatives stayed out of Donbass as a decisive factor. The other important element was employment. The patriotic reasons were not considered to be the ones of great importance (Petryk, 2018).


The Crimean Tatars and their families tended to emigrate on their own, their received the assistance having arrived in a particular place. The IDPs leaving Donbass could be divided into two groups: the IDPs whose departure was organized – these were mainly the employees of large enterprises, the members of religious communities or the IDPs leaving on their own (the families). The first IDP group was in a slightly more favorable situation, as they were given the basic assistance (temporary accommodation, sometimes employment); the other group often left Donbass during the shelling of the area. Having fled from the occupied territory, people were often forced to rely on themselves.

CONFLICT-TRIGGERING POTENTIAL IN PARTICULAR REGIONS

In January 2017, the conflict dynamics between the IDPs and the representatives of receiving communities, the demobilized individuals from ATO zone and the families of dead soldiers in ATO zone was examined. It was proved that the level of confrontational tendencies in the communities receiving the IDPs was increasing (Graph 3).

There are numerous factors affecting the increase in conflict-triggering attitudes in the Ukrainian society – from myths and stereotypes present in certain regions to religious, political and linguistic issues. The increase in negative attitudes toward the IDPs is also the result of a difficult economic situation in Ukraine, reduced financial rewards, unemployment, low standard of living. Moreover, it is the media that frequently form unfavorable attitudes toward

the IDPs in the receiving regions, accusing them of illegal activities or abusing humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the media often contribute to forming IDPs' image as criminal elements.



Graph 3. The Degree of Confrontation Tendencies in the Societies Receiving IDPs, 2014–2016

Source: own translation based on: Stabilization Support Services, 2017, p. 4.

A conflict-triggering potential in the Ukrainian society is going to increase; it will result from the additional assistance from the state, the charity organizations, the NGOs in the context of the decline in financial conditions and the increase in unemployment figures. Particularly negative attitudes toward IDPs are observed in regions along the demarcation line in Luhansk Oblast, Donetsk Oblast, Kharkiv Oblast, Kyiv Oblast and in the capital itself (Figure 1). The medium degree of confrontation tendencies is observed in the west and the south of Ukraine, in Volyn Oblast, Lviv Oblast, Zakarpattia Oblast, Odessa Oblast, Zaporizhia Oblast, Kherson Oblast, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

This state of affairs could result from the fact that in the initial stage of the conflict people sympathized with IDPs, trying to help them. Now, the war has continued for 4 years, making people become used to daily reports from the frontline. Four years ago, these reports were perceived as the news of particular importance, while they seem to be quite common at present. Moreover, the IDPs do not always behave in an appropriate way, they tend to be demanding and arrogant (Stabilization Support Services, 2017).

Unless the war in Donbass finishes in a year or two, the standard of living will continue to be falling and social tensions will escalate, mainly between ATO and




Figure 1. Conflict-Triggering Potential in Regions

Source: author's own study based on: Stabilization Support Services, 2017, p. 6.

their families and IDPs, concerning social benefits and assistance. Media will still play a leading role – the conflict-triggering potential will rise or fall depending on their rhetoric and the manner of conveying the news.

Another important problem is IDPs isolation (being the result of various reasons), their reluctance to get integrated, their unwillingness to learn the language as well as the rejection of Ukrainian lifestyle. Among the issues demanding to be solved soon is integration process among the soldiers coming back from ATO zone. Most of them are suffering from war traumas, often not being able to cope with them. The lack of psychological assistance and support, both to the soldiers and to the IDPs, might result in the tensions within these groups, leading to the increased level of aggression. Suicide attempts are a common consequence of inability to cope with the new reality.

CONCLUSIONS

Migrations from the Crimea and Donbass resulted from different reasons. Migration from the Crimea was often independent in its nature, as the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people was regarded in the peninsula as an extreme organization and its leaders were prevented from entering the Crimea, thus not being able to provide any organized assistance. People from Donbass migrated on their own or in organized groups. Migration destinations were also different – the Crimean Tatars opted for the western regions of Ukraine, while the IDPs from Donbass tended to migrate to the regions neighbouring with the conflict zone, as they were afraid about not being accepted in the Ukrainian speaking regions. There were various factors affecting the degree of conflict tendencies in particular regions – political, religious and linguistic ones; before 2014, these factors were not so significant. Lowering the life standard both to IDPs and the receiving communities was also an important issue, so was the reluctance among the IDPs from Donbass to integrate, their certain alienation. The level of integration and self-organization among the Crimean Tatars in the receiving regions was noticeably higher. The major thing that could lower the tensions between the IDPs and receiving communities would be certainly the end of war in Donbass. This situation, however, is not likely to happen soon, so the degree of tensions in the Ukrainian society is going to increase along with lowered life standard of all social strata.

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ACTIONS OF THE CITY GUARD IN TORUŃ TOWARDS RESIDENTS' PERSONAL SAFETY: SELF-DEFENCE COURSES FOR WOMEN*

DZIAŁANIA TORUŃSKIEJ STRAŻY MIEJSKIEJ W ZAKRESIE
ZAPEWNIENIA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA INDYWIDUALNEGO
NA PRZYKŁADZIE KURSÓW SAMOOBRONY DLA KOBIEC

Katarzyna Amrozy* 

— ABSTRACT —

The article presents main assumptions about self-defence, particularly trainings aimed at educating women, with special focus on actions initiated by the City Guard in Toruń. The *Jestem bezpieczna* [I Am Safe] self-defence courses for women, organized since 2006, are an important element in strengthening individual security of female residents of Toruń. Although at times such courses are subject to criticism, they have their undeniable advantages, which are specified in this article.

Keywords: women's security; self-defence; individual security; personal security; sense of security; city guard

— ABSTRAKT —

W artykule przedstawiono główne założenia dotyczące samoobrony, zwłaszcza szkoleń ukierunkowanych na edukowanie kobiet, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem działań inicjowanych przez toruńską Straż Miejską. Organizowane od 2006 roku kursy samoobrony dla kobiet pod nazwą „Jestem bezpieczna” stanowią ważny element kształtowania bezpieczeństwa indywidualnego wśród mieszkanek Torunia. Choć przeprowadzanie takich zajęć bywa poddawane krytyce, wiąże się jednocześnie z niewątpliwymi zaletami, co wyszczególniono w niniejszym tekście.

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo kobiet; samoobrona; bezpieczeństwo indywidualne; bezpieczeństwo osobiste; poczucie bezpieczeństwa; straż miejska

* The author participated in the *Jestem bezpieczna* [I Am Safe] course in 2014 and 2015. Moreover, the author has trained aikido, judo, and now she is practicing Krav Maga. She has also participated in Combat 56 and STAY AWAY seminars.

** Nicolaus Copernicus University, Faculty of Political Science and Security Studies, Toruń, Poland.

The issue of self-defence, including methods tailored specifically for women, has enjoyed keen interest for a dozen of years. Such trainings are organized by most training schools of martial arts and it is hard to estimate the number of participants in these special courses. More and more often, actions are being taken to eliminate the risk of certain dangerous situations. Such measures include getting a guard dog, installing alarms, obtaining a gun permit, buying pepper spray or a stun gun, and attending special self-defence courses. It is impossible to be fully prepared for every threat, which does not change the fact that prevention and so-called situational awareness are important elements of education for individual security. There is also an increasing number of books on personal security issues which aim at preparing readers for threats that are not only the physical but also the mental ones (although attempting to learn any techniques from photos or without practicing them will not bring any effect).

The aim of this article is to provide an overview of courses organized by the City Guard in Toruń as part of broadly understood self-defence training for women, in particular the *Jestem bezpieczna* course. Such actions fall within the scope of individual (personal) and structural security. The article also presents any potential benefits of attending self-defence classes.

INDIVIDUAL (PERSONAL) AND STRUCTURAL SECURITY

Self-defence is one of the elements of individual security (also known as personal security or self-security), and in a broader sense – structural security. According to Witold Pokruszyński (2011), personal security refers to the safety of a person, with all of his/her material and spiritual values. In turn, structural security refers to the organizational and institutional aspects of social life in a local, regional, state and international context. The main reference point of individual security is a person, his/her needs, and methods of satisfying them. These two dimensions can converge and overlap, which is visible in self-defence classes organized by public institutions – the police, city guard, and the Ministry of National Defence – which in this way fulfil their role to serve the society, using their experience and sharing it in a specific way. What also comes as important are preventive actions – campaigns (online, television)¹ or programmes targeted at

¹ For example, the 4U campaign (implemented by the Internal Security Agency) regarding threats caused by terrorist attacks and by individual perpetrators, the *HAZARD? Nie, dziękuję* [GAMBLING?

specific entities. Involvement in such initiatives can increase the citizens' sense of security, both personal and in the place of residence, and will probably increase the willingness to cooperate with judicial authorities. Both the individual and the structural approach depart from the assumption that the state is the main entity to ensure the security of its citizens, and recognize that each individual, by using available means, becomes equally responsible for their own protection.

The sense of personal security depends on many factors: the environment in which a person grew up; own (or our relatives') experience; mentality; psychological and intellectual predispositions; assessment of the activities of law enforcement services and the judiciary; general situational awareness. Another element are the exaggerated images created by the mass media, often full of brutality and abundant in descriptions of violent cases; however, generally the number of such crimes is not high, and smaller, less spectacular illegal acts are more troublesome.

SELF-DEFENCE

At the beginning it should be emphasized that self-defence is not synonymous with any particular systems, sports, or martial arts. Generally, self-defence draws on the achievements in these fields, but it emphasises other elements and adapts to the needs of its recipients – in this case, women. Self-defence has not been clearly defined. Individual authors draw attention to its various aspects, which is often motivated by their own experience gained during training a specific discipline. According to Artur Litwiniuk and Wojciech Cynarski (2003), it is a combat system based on grappling and throws that has defensive application in various specific situations and life circumstances. Grappling defence techniques are adequately adapted not only to various types of attack but also to the conditions of combat and defence against a physically stronger or armed opponent. The above definition seems too narrow as it limits self-defence to the knowledge of grappling and throwing techniques, which not always can be used. Moreover, they require precision, and if an attacked person fails to perform them correctly, it is difficult to proceed with any further activities, which gener-

No, Thank You] campaign (prepared by the National Revenue Administration) aimed at raising the awareness of addictions and gambling.

ates additional stress. In turn, for Jan Harasymowicz (2003) self-defence means a self-preservation act or action taken by a person in a situation of danger and a direct attack on his/her health, life or own good; however, he does not specify what such act or action is based on. Jacek Sikora and Grzegorz Domaradzki (2011) define self-defence in a more precise way as they say that this is not a sport discipline or discipline, but only a practical skill, the acquisition of which is one of the goals of martial arts and sports training. It is based on selected basic techniques characteristic of a given hand-to-hand combat style (judo, karate, ju-jitsu, aikido, kung-fu, taekwondo, etc.), and its task is to parry, avoid, weaken or neutralize the opponent's attack and to overpower and immobilize the attacker in response to the attack. A similar definition is presented by Konrad Raczkowski (2008), according to which self-defence is a kind of compilation of useful techniques, derived from various systems, martial arts and sports, which combined with appropriate tactics of defence action (also verbal) give an opportunity to avoid physical confrontation with an aggressor or make it possible to successfully parry the attack of one or many people. A few points in the above approaches deserve attention – emphasis on drawing from other disciplines with regard to their practical application and without focusing on specific and complicated names of techniques. Most importantly, self-defence understood in this way does not mean the need for physically confronting or overpowering the attacker. It becomes more important to avoid the fight and only to parry attacks as the last resort.

Defence actions should be based on simplicity and economy of movements; preferably, their performance should be guided by instinctive reactions, despite some physical limitations. During the classes, it is also worth making the participants aware of the possibility of counterattacking with everyday objects (keys, handbag, umbrella, etc.) or special tools such as pepper spray, an expandable baton, the Kubotan (*Jak używać kubotanu?*; How to use the Kubotan?). It is much more beneficial if participation in training is voluntary. Other issues that are important for any training, not only in self-defence, are regularity, repetition, and humbleness. What can be the motivation to participate in training? It is mainly about the desire to improve the sense of security, agility, mental strength, preparation for potential dangerous situations. For other participants, this can be a form of preparation for recruitment to law enforcement services. Another group of people who attend classes are victims of various crimes (assault, theft, harassment, rape, sexual and physical violence, inappropriate behaviour in public space).

Skills acquired during self-defence classes are not limited to physical fitness. First of all, the training regards situational awareness of threats (understood as careful avoidance of certain situations), deciding on alternative solutions (for example, ordering a taxi instead of lonely walking back), trusting one's intuition and taking preemptive action when noticing danger. At the same time, the participants are warned against exaggeration that leads to refraining from any activities, and on the other hand – against feeling “immortal” and believing that participation in the course will protect them against all threats. When asked what she teaches at self-defence courses, a Krav Maga instructor Anna Krupska said that she trains the participants in gaining time and space for themselves – a distance that will allow them to act. During the course women learn to effectively ask for help, look for a solution even in a difficult situation, e.g., get into the range of CCTV cameras, as a self-defence course has to touch many aspects to be complete. It must build physical fitness, improve coordination, and make the participants familiar with their bodies so that they are able to maintain balance or fall in the safest way. The course teaches techniques (what to do when the attacker attempts to punch) and tactics – where to stand, which way to turn, how to shield your child. The course also works on the mental component. It helps believe in oneself, in one's abilities (Ludwinek-Zarzeka & Krupska, 2017). According to Monika Kowalska and Mirosław Michalski (2014), the participants also learn how to deal with fatigue and stress, how to control their emotions and act with maximum rationality and efficiency in the face of danger and under the influence of strong stress, emotions and fatigue. All this is based on a strong will, desire to survive and to overcome one's own weakness. It is also a good idea if self-defence courses discuss pre-medical first aid and legal provisions regarding self-defence. In special cases, centres tasked with helping female victims may also be invited to help with such initiatives.

SELF-DEFENCE COURSES FOR WOMEN

Organizing self-defence courses addressed specially to women is sometimes criticized, e.g., by aforementioned Konrad Raczkowski (2008), who says that the advertised and promoted so-called “quick self-defence courses” addressed specifically to women are “a fiction”. Although they present to the participants certain dangerous situations and ways of neutralizing them, they do not achieve permanent changes in psychological and motor spheres. Great interest in such

training is related to the commercialization of the issue of individual security, which can result in a lower level of quality of such classes as they might lack necessary elements and approach the issue with nonchalance, use anachronistic and complicated techniques as well as promise 100% efficiency. Self-defence classes are accused of not reflecting the realities of a true fight – in everyday situations we may not be wearing tracksuits and comfortable shoes, and we may be more distracted; in other words – we are not in artificially created optimal conditions. Opponents of self-defence courses for women also argue that in this way, women will already be put in the role of a victim (Höller, Maluschka, & Reinisch, 2010), and the very issue of women's personal security (and other groups that are at increased risk of violence: children, teenagers, the elderly, the disabled) is neglected. It is also argued that self-defence courses are organized mainly in large cities, which, due to commuting and the resulting costs, excludes female residents of smaller towns. Others say that such workshops only serve marketing and PR purposes, promoting law enforcement services and their command.

Up to a certain level, a well-organized training can prepare the participants to properly respond in an unexpected situation. It is not only about skills within individual techniques, but also about developing instinctive reactions, reducing inhibitions to use violence and aggression, and understanding the potentially paralyzing fear. The courses are also not intended to teach the participants how to respond to every possible threat as it is neither possible nor real. Contrary to one of the above opinions, self-defence courses teach women to step out of the role of a victim in everyday life, and not to perpetuate this stereotype. This is one of the first steps towards further development in the area of personal security, a point of reference that can be expanded to other, more specialized, trainings. As in the case of other disciplines, the training process does not end when one leaves the mat (Larkin, 2020). What the participants get from the classes depends on themselves – their willingness, approach to the exercises, expectations towards the seminar, preparation for mental change – as well as on the instructors – their training, skills, and approach to the participants. Such actions, undertaken to ensure the safety of an individual and their relatives, make sense even if no circumstances to use the learned skills ever occur: any such course is valuable, even if it lasts a short time. Of course, the knowledge acquired from the course needs to be broadened, but it is worth trying, searching, finding out as there is a chance this will cause a change in one's life (Ludwinek-Zarzeka & Krupska, 2017).

Contrary to a popular but erroneous belief, there is no such thing as a “victim type”. Some people perpetuate the opinion that women can avoid being raped by avoiding dangerous places or wearing less provocative clothing. Yet rape occurs regardless of the time of day, and at any age or in any social group. All statistics and research show that there is no such thing as a “typical rape” or “typical rape victim”. Such attacks simply cannot be predicted (*Samoobrona dla kobiet*, 2020). Some other contemporary threats (e.g., terrorist attacks or attacks by an active shooter) are also characterized by randomness and unpredictability in the selection of victims – sometimes it is enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Therefore emphasis should be placed on the psychological dimension of self-defence and on the instructor helping build the right attitudes. Training with different people, also with the instructor, to some extent familiarizes the participants with potential forms of aggression and violence. Varied classes which take place not only in the training room but also, e.g., on public transport, in the square, in the basement, are also beneficial.

JESTEM BEZPIECZNA [I AM SAFE] COURSE

Since 2006, the free *Jestem bezpieczna* course has been organized annually (except 2018) by the City Guard in Toruń. This is one of the many tasks carried out by this service, which affects its image among the community. The City Guard website has reports on their activities since 2012, which are included in the table below.

Table 1. The *Jestem bezpieczna* Self-Defence Course

Year	Edition	Number of participants/how many finished	Target group	Date
2012	X	61/45	NCU female students	no info
2013	XI	47/43	general profile	3 January – 7 March
	XII	30	female residents in Stawki district	10 May – 28 June
	XIII	42/39	female residents in Stawki and Czerniewice districts	13 September – 29 November

Year	Edition	Number of participants/how many finished	Target group	Date
2014	XIV	47/44	general profile	mid-January – the end of March
	XV	22	female residents in Podgórz district	15 April – 17 June
	XVI	40/35	female residents in Rubinkowo district	8 May – 26 June
	XVII	47/32	general profile	2 October – 4 December
2015	XVIII	48/40	general profile	March – May
	XIX	23/15	general profile	28 September – 7 December
2016	XX	31	female residents in Na Skarpie district	April – June
	XXI	52/39	general profile	September – December
2017	XXII	52	general profile	April – June
	XXIII	54	general profile	October – December
2018	no course organized			
2019	XXIV	53/30	general profile	no info

Source: Author's own work based on *Sprawozdania z działalności Straży Miejskiej* (for the years 2012–2019).

Main goals set by the city guards for the self-defence course for women include learning the right reactions and self-defence techniques useful in various dangerous situations as well as ways to avoid an attack (Winiarska, 2020). Moreover, the goal is to teach women the methods of preventing dangerous situations and proceeding during an assault. The participants of the course also learn how to use everyday objects in self-defence (Samorząd Studencki UMK w Toruniu, 2013). This falls within the scope of educational and preventive measures, as well as those aimed at reducing crime.

The training consists of two parts. The first part is self-defence training run by qualified instructors: Adrian Tabor, Tomasz Świerczyński, Jarosław Górecki, and Tomasz Pisarkiewicz. It includes twenty 90-minute classes usually conducted in several groups, held in the training room at the headquarters of the City Guard. In the second part, which is a 3-hour or 4-hour workshop, the participants together with an experienced psychologist Jarosław Paralusz discuss the main psychological aspects of security, e.g., how to recognize a possible victim and

aggressor and how to control fear in an emergency. An important topic of the training is the preventive aspect – the participants learn how to avoid threats in public transport, a car, an apartment, or at a party (Paralusz, 2015). Course materials of these classes are internal documents and it is not possible to access them without joining the course. The participants enrol by phone. To complete the course, it is necessary to attend minimum 80% of classes (some of the women have failed to meet this requirement, and some have simply resigned). The offer is addressed to women of all ages. There have been also editions organized with District Councils and addressed to residents of individual districts.

Jestem bezpieczna trainings are promoted mainly through the City Guard website and the local media. Information about 2020 training addressed to female students was also on the website of the Faculty of Political Science and Security Studies at the Nicolaus Copernicus University (*Kurs samoobrony*, 2020). The City Guard in Toruń also conducted classes for female students of pedagogy (Paralusz, 2016, June 13) as well as for women living and working in the old town, i.e., *Nie bój się bronić* [Do Not Be Afraid to Defend Yourself] (Paralusz, 2016, October 12). There have also been self-defence workshops for teenagers from secondary schools (Paralusz, 2017, February 3), employees of the Statistical Office in Bydgoszcz (Kowalski, 2015), students from the ERASMUS programme (Paralusz, 2017, March 21), tour guides, St. Brother Albert Aid Society in Toruń, employees of the Municipal Family Support Centre in Toruń and the Powiat Labour Office in Toruń, employees of restaurants, and volunteers from “Powrót z U” (Society of Families and Friends of Child Addicts). There were also *Aktywny, bezpieczny i zdrowy senior* [An Active, Safe and Healthy Senior] seminars within the *Miesiąc dla zdrowia* [Month for Health] campaign and the Watch Docs Festival. The City Guard invests in tools useful during the trainings – e.g., in a special outfit for the instructor and a dummy imitating the human torso (*Manekin treningowy dla kobiet*, 2016). This allows the participants to face the fear of experiencing pain, but also prepares them to deal with the possibility of harming someone. At the same time, this proves that self-defence is not treated as a single action to promote the City Guard in Toruń. Good instructors know that these dozen-hour courses are not enough for the participants to be ready to repel any attack, but such trainings can motivate the women to look for further alternatives to continue their work towards the goals of the programme.

CONCLUSIONS

“A woman should focus on remembering as many details about the attacker as possible”; “Participating in a self-defence course makes no sense, I will not learn anything there in such a short time”; “The techniques will not actually work as they do during the training”; “I have no need to attend such classes”; “Women are fragile and cannot fight”; “You should not have dressed/behaved in this way / You should not have been walking there” – these are just some of the common misconceptions about the broadly understood self-defence of women which are still present in social awareness. There are also other objections expressed by women: “The techniques are too difficult”; “I have too little time to such a thing”; “I do not know if I could hit someone”; “I am too weak and thus something bad may happen to me during the training”; “My friends are not attending such classes, so why should I?”; “My husband will defend me” (Kaczmar, 2015).

Simple solutions promoted during some classes will not always be feasible, particularly when the attacker is prepared for them. Tim Larkin (2020) said that an average person will not be able to follow the scenario of “hit here and now kick there”. Such a scenario does not actually exist because each situation is different and also because at the start of the fight your opponent’s brain will work instinctively. There are no perfect solutions or perfect points to attack in self-defence, just as there are no good and bad ways of defence; they are only the effective and ineffective ones (Dougherty, 2015). The issue of self-defence should be approached with a deep understanding of problems, flexibility, and adaptation to the needs of the participants. Proper self-defence is designed to prevent a threat by quickly assessing the situation, recognizing warning signals, reacting appropriately, and taking the initiative.

For dozen years, the *Jestem bezpieczna* course has been part of actions undertaken to promote personal and structural security. It is worth mentioning that in Toruń such trainings were also carried out by the Ministry of National Defence (in 2016 and 2018). The main intention of the organizers of the *Samoobrona Kobiet* [Women’s Delf-Defence] project was to popularize among the civilians the training system of the Polish Armed Forces on hand-to-hand combat, to teach the basic self-defence techniques and to improve grappling and incapacitating in the area of self-defence (*Ruszył projekt Samoobrona Kobiet*, 2016). It can be noticed that these assumptions are in line with those implemented locally by the City Guard. STAY AWAY (2020) seminars organized by International Krav Maga Federation (2017, 2018, 2020) were another initiative to increase women’s sense

of security. Krav Maga itself was developed as a combat system for self-defence through simple methods, so it can also work for women. Jan Długosz (2018) in the article *Samooszutwo* confronts the concept of “crash courses in self-defence”, promoted by the ministry, with the realities of training: already during the first class each instructor sees the differences in the initial potential between the participants – some of them have a naturally high level of coordination or low level of anxiety, while others cannot correctly repeat the simplest sequence of movements. These differences disappear with time, but real improvement requires at least two years of hard work in a constant cycle of two or three trainings a week. So what can you do during 12 trainings conducted in three months? Practically – nothing.

However, even a short course can change approach to personal safety and motivate participants and their environment for further work. Thus it would be a good idea to promote the *Jestem bezpieczna* course more widely in the media, especially on the Internet. Not every interested person will go to the City Guard website, but it is important that the information about the workshops reaches a large audience. This could be achieved through creating an official Facebook profile of the City Guard, which would inform about enrolment to the course, present its programme, and provide other relevant information. As the City Guard in Toruń has a lot of experience, the training could be addressed also to other social or professional groups – such courses have already taken place.

Expanding the programme of psychological workshops and extending their time seems to be another idea for improving the course. Within a few hours it is difficult to convey and thoroughly discuss such issues as aggression, sources of stress, assertiveness, behaviour in extreme situations, crime prevention, and security measures and devices. Perhaps surveys should also be introduced before or after the course: in the first case – to find out what women would like to work on and what is important for them (Kruczyński & Drożdżiak, 2003). In the second case, such feedback after the course could help improve training methods. Successful defence in the face of a direct threat depends on: the ability to focus, experience, technical skills, physical fitness, individual mentality, knowledge of anatomy, and courage. Repelling an actual aggressor does not look like in the movies or staged fights, which present spectacular defence against several attackers – in fact, this is not a show in front of the audience, but a real situation (Skworz & Larkin, 2014). Generally, for individuals and the society it is easier to build security through prevention rather than bear costs of crimes.

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REVIEWS



CULTURAL SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY THREATS

Janusz Gierszewski, Andrzej Pieczywok, Juliusz Piwowarski, *Wyzwania i zagrożenia w obszarze bezpieczeństwa kulturowego*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2020, pp. 222

*Kamila Rezmer-Płotka** 

Security is a sphere of social life that must constantly be adapted to the changing world and new challenges on many levels. Globalization processes do not facilitate this in any way, a good example of which is the current coronavirus pandemic. However, before the world experienced the dangerous virus, climate security, migration and the fight against terrorism were widely discussed security issues. All of them function within the field of the so-called cultural security, which were examined by Janusz Gierszewski, Andrzej Pieczywok and Juliusz Piwowarski in the publication *Wyzwania i zagrożenia w obszarze bezpieczeństwa kulturowego*. This is a topic that is extremely interesting and of the moment,

which is a reason not only security researchers but also political scientists undertake studies on it. At this point, one can mention, for example, the work of Joanna Rak, who analyzed the Polish Sejm discourse on cultural security through the prism of distinguished attitudes towards it, such as: nativistic, vitalistic, autonegativistic, and counter-acculturative (Rak, 2018).

The reviewed publication consists of an introduction, four substantive chapters and a conclusion. The authors' main intention was to identify challenges and threats in the area of security and to answer the research question: "What are the contemporary challenges and threats in the area of cultural security in national, regional (local) and individual terms?" (p. 10). The first chapter is an analysis of factors that have an impact on cultural security, and according to the authors, these are: the globalization of culture,

* Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Faculty of Political Science and Security Studies.

both legal and illegal migration, terrorism, religion, and climate change. In the second chapter, the authors focused on the threats in relation to regional and border culture, due to the division into regions in Europe. In chapter three, cultural threats were considered from the perspective of the individual. The individual dimension of security is to be determined by: fear, risk, uncertainty, emotionality, types of personality and identity (p. 120). In turn, the existential dimension is considered by the authors within the space of modern information and communication technologies and threats that may arise from them for the individual (p. 129). The last chapter refers to sustainable development in various dimensions and is an attempt to indicate the directions of changes that would allow to obtain positive effects in this area.

Unfortunately, the publication is not without weaknesses. First, the authors point to the factors that they believe influence the level of cultural security and among them they list: globalization, migration, terrorism, religion, and climate (p. 24). The purpose of the monograph was to identify challenges and threats, and in this case they are listed at the very beginning of the publication, without proper research or analysis. This may cause an impression that the authors have tried to create a *subjective* catalogue of threats. Secondly, the last chapter on sustainable development lacks references to the European Union and its hori-

zontal policies. The authors mentioned, for example, the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and arrangements made there (p. 181), or a conference organized by UNESCO (p. 182), while the most important organization from Europe's point of view, whose actions have a significant impact on sustainable development, was omitted.

Despite these shortcomings, the reception of the book is positive. The book content brings readers closer to the answer to the research question posed by the authors, and the book structure is transparent, making its reception a pleasant experience. The topics have been presented in an accessible way and easy to understand for anyone interested in cultural security.

The reviewed publication is recommended especially for students of internal and national security, but also for political scientists who are increasingly undertaking research on the concept of cultural security. It definitely helps to discern possible directions of studies on the most current topics. It is also a good offer for academic teachers who want to familiarize students with the subject of contemporary threats and challenges faced by international security.

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