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
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# POLITICAL SYSTEMS

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## POLISH GEOPOLITICAL CODES ILLUSTRATED WITH THE EXAMPLE OF THE ELECTORAL PROGRAMS OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES IN 1991–2011

POLSKIE KODY GEOPOLITYCZNE NA PRZYKŁADZIE  
PROGRAMÓW WYBORCZYCH NAJWAŻNIEJSZYCH PARTII  
POLITYCZNYCH W LATACH 1991–2011

*Jarosław Macała\**

— ABSTRACT —

This article is concerned with the research on Polish geopolitical codes following 1989. The problem has not yet been the subject of broader scientific studies or publications. In this aspect, the research is of particular importance for the analysis of foreign policy of Poland, which had to redefine its place in Europe and to fundamentally rebuild external relations, that is also to define the new geopolitical codes. The code system used in this text is based on Colin Flint's definition, with the key division into allies and enemies. Based on the analysis of discourse, it can be stated that the most important allies of Poland in these codes are the USA, the European Union, Germany, and the enemy is Russia. In general, the fundamental change of Poland's geopolitical codes following 1989 – from the east side to the west – can quite easily be seen in the electoral programs: the enemies of the People's Republic of Poland's

— ABSTRAKT —

Artykuł dotyczy badań nad polskimi kodami geopolitycznymi po 1989 r. Problem ten nie doczekał się na razie szerszych studiów naukowych ani publikacji. W tym aspekcie badania mają szczególne znaczenie dla analizy polityki zagranicznej Polski, która musiała na nowo określić swoje miejsce w Europie i gruntownie przebudować relacje zewnętrzne, czyli także zdefiniować nowe kody geopolityczne. Systematyka kodów zastosowana w niniejszym tekście opiera się na definicji Colina Flinta, z kluczowym podziałem na sojuszników i wrogów. W oparciu o analizę dyskursu można stwierdzić, iż najważniejszymi sojusznikami Polski w tych kodach są USA, Unia Europejska, Niemcy, wrogiem zaś Rosja. Na ogół dosyć czytelnie widać w programach wyborczych zasadniczą zmianę kodów geopolitycznych Polski po 1989 r. ze wschodniej na zachodnią: wrogowie z okresu Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej

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period became allies, and the forced ally became an enemy. However, their concretization is generally not original and rather schematic. The Polish geopolitical codes have been exerted with strong influences of the hegemonic geopolitical codes of the West, mainly those of the United States. On the other hand, the last geopolitical code, the attempt to explain to the public the geopolitical imaginations of our elites, has been the weakest. This largely confirms the authoritarian dimension of Polish top-down transformation as well as the dominance of the elites over the society.

**Keywords:** geopolitics, critical geopolitics, Polish geopolitical codes, Polish political parties, election programs

zostali sojusznikami, a przymusowy sojusznik został wrogiem. Jednak ich konkretyzacja jest na ogół mało oryginalna i schematyczna. Na polskich kodach geopolitycznych odciskały się wyraźnie silne wpływy hegemonicznych kodów geopolitycznych państw Zachodu, głównie USA. Natomiast najslabiej obecny był ostatni kod geopolityczny, czyli próba wytłumaczenia wyobrażeń geopolitycznych naszych elit opinii publicznej. W dużej mierze potwierdza to autorytarny wymiar polskiej, „odgórną” transformacji, a także dominację elit nad społeczeństwem.

**Słowa kluczowe:** geopolityka, geopolityka krytyczna, polskie kody geopolityczne, polskie partie polityczne, programy wyborcze

## INTRODUCTION

The school of critical geopolitics and the related geopolitical codes issues are little known and underappreciated among our researchers. It is visible in the small number of publications. Undoubtedly, it is the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary field of research, particularly challenging in terms of methodological terms. Even more so: the scientific penetration of geopolitical codes refers to ambiguous methods related to discourse analysis.

In my opinion, the problem of Polish geopolitical codes, especially in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, due to its cognitive values, extensive and diverse source database, but also due to the complex matter should be the subject of individual and team research of scientists from different disciplines. In this aspect, the research is of particular importance for the analysis of the Third Republic of Poland's foreign policy, which had to redefine its place in Europe and to fundamentally rebuild external relations, that is also to define new geopolitical codes (Zięba, 2012). Such reflections and their practical implementation are generally the work of political elites. The elites, however, must take into account social moods and associated emotions.

Scientific literature on Poland's foreign policy following 1989 is large and constantly growing. Yet, the eponymous problem is virtually absent in it. Thus, it seems reasonable to refer to the views of the political elites of the Third Republic

of Poland, which influenced the election appeals created for the parliament campaign, that is to say, being by definition the response to the needs of the electorate. Foreign policy and security issues were part of the canon of the electoral declarations, but they were often enriched with more pressing issues in the field (Skrabacz, 2013). The aim was to win voters for a particular vision and related activities. Thus, the subject of research shall be the analysis of political discourse which includes the official statements or program documents formulated by the positionally defined political elites, including electoral programs.

In this brief overview I will try to prove the local, or at best the regional, European dimension of Polish geopolitical codes and their dependence on the strong states of the West, mainly the USA. In examining the title geopolitical codes I shall largely refer to Colin Flint's systematics, focusing more on the codes of allies than the enemies of Poland; bearing in mind, however, that the problem is too broad and difficult to present in such a short presentation.

## CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

In contemporary geopolitics an increasingly important role is played by the critical approach, little known in Poland, which is, however, rather difficult to define. Its rather distinctive features are worth noticing: the opposition to the positivist vision of the world and science, which also means that social sciences and humanities are not devoid of values and neutral. On the contrary: any knowledge reflects the interests of the observer-researcher and is influenced by certain ideas, interests, groups, parties, social classes, nations and states.

It is then important to critical geopolitics to present the cultural context of the emergence of the theory, and above all, the value system and views of those dealing with international relations or geopolitics. Geopolitical theories are not the scientific analysis of the relationship of politics with the space, but constitute pluralistic shifts, ideas, images, embodied in the discourse created and propagated by a particular person or group of people, mostly from the power circles. Geopolitics is a way of seeing the world (in this case, the space) by the elites of a given state or nation (Potulski, 2010).

As a basis for research it applies "the top to bottom" model, creating geopolitical imaginations by elites to achieve specific benefits. It should be borne in mind, however, that there is no one-way communication, as the geopolitical images of society must also influence their formation by the elites. Geopolitics

is seen as practical discourse describing the international situation in a spatial approach, in terms of its own, striving to justify such actions, identifying threats and choosing allies and enemies. In other words, critical geopolitics tries to study how politicians try to shape the world through their statements and actions (Macała, 2015).

## GEOPOLITICAL CODES

The term was first used in 1982 by John L. Gaddis, the well-known American historian of international relations, as a notion describing the values and interests of American political elites during the rivalry with the USSR for supremacy. The concept was adopted by numerous historians, political scientists, specialists on international relationships, political geographers investigating the geopolitical codes of each country, though often in a broader and different sense than Gaddis suggested.

For our research purposes, it seems very important to take into account the concretization of geopolitical codes by the eminent political geographer Colin Flint. In his assessment, the understanding of the geopolitical code allows one to clarify a lot of international activities by analyzing the binding discourse. Thus, the way of imaging reality by the elites of power and the ability to impose their ideological interpretation on the public opinion at a national scale, but also on other states. This applies both to the superpowers as well as, to an even greater extent, to weaker states, where the global or regional hegemon is able to impose its own geopolitical code.

Each country has its original geopolitical code based on five main assumptions:

1. Who are our current and potential allies?
2. Who are our current and potential enemies?
3. How can we maintain our allies and nurture potential allies?
4. How can we counter our current enemies and emerging threats?
5. How do we justify the four calculations above to our public, and to the global community? (Flint, 2008).

Geopolitical codes are dynamic, they set a certain range of possibilities for foreign policy, depending on strength, territory, location, capabilities, aspirations, interests and influences of individual nations, and perhaps more on the identity specificity, establishment and scope of their culture. Hence their three

basic levels: local, regional, and global. They are, however, usually intertwined to some extent. The local level of the codes is limited in principle to the impact on neighboring countries, the regional level involves countries that aspire to influence, not only the immediate neighbors. Those in power look for maps of such geopolitical codes that will allow it. In the end, some states are able to do global politics when those ruling them impose codes enabling them to influence the world order. These codes are more or less respected by other states (Flint, 2008).

### RETURN TO EUROPE

The fundamental direction in the discourse of Polish elites is a strategic turn towards Western alliances, signed over the years with the abused metaphor of “return to Europe”, the return to the center, the break with “the eastern mentality” and the periphery. As an antidote to the threat of loss of barely achieved independence, with a clear negative figure of a “buffer state”, “located in the precarious intermediate zone” between Russia and Germany. Since in the general opinion the greatest threat to our sovereignty and security was unpredictable Russia, and Poland was too weak, the choice of allies was not particularly large (Słodkowska, 2001a; Zięba, 2012).

The elites treated the West victorious in the Cold War in the convention of “soft power” as a magnet drawing with its strength and attractiveness (Horolets, 2006). This also affected the local and regional reach of our geopolitical codes, adequate to the capabilities and interests of Poland. It is no accident that the course of the West was symbolized by the antagonistic semantic statements: freedom, democracy, peace, prosperity, contrasted with the People’s Republic of Poland’s period: enslavement, totalitarianism, poverty and backwardness. The alliance with the West was justified in several ways, for example, by common cultural heritage, especially the Christian one, shared history and/or the liberal-democratic values of the European culture. This, combined with the popular sympathy, but also the West’s complex in our society, legitimized the choice of the elite and facilitated the acceptance of relatively non-partner political and economic allies in our country (Słodkowska, 2001a; Słodkowska, 2001b; Horolets, 2006).

## STRATEGIC ALLY

To seek a guarantee of Poland's security and independence, it was crucial to build a lasting alliance with the only hyperpower after 1991, the symbol of freedom, power, security and prosperity (Słodkowska, 2001a). The Program of Freedom Union (1997), formulated in the era of a concrete road to entry into NATO, declared that an alliance with a global power was a condition of Poland's security, necessitating the need to give unilateral privilege to the United States (Słodkowska, Dołbakowska, 2004). The problem was that our elites did almost everything the Americans wanted for the sake of maintaining the alliance. On the other hand, the other party saw the relations with Poland through the global scale of their interests, treating it as a subordinate vassal. This asymmetry of potentials and the disproportionate Polish-American relations were expressed by words from the Civic Platform Program (Słodkowska, 2002), that is, after the accession to NATO: "in our relations with the United States we try to present a policy based on the principle of reciprocity".

The vassalization of Poland in her relations with the United States reached its climax during the presidency of George Bush junior. Its symptom was the uncritical acceptance of the American hegemonic code of the global "war on terror" by our elites. To reduce the threat and strengthen the alliance with the Americans, Poland participated in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Zięba, 2012).

The visible example of the subordinate treatment of Poland by the USA was our small benefits from participating in these wars, which translated into less and less pro-American social sentiment. Hence in 2005, the Self-Defence (Samoobrona) and the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) negatively evaluated the full acceptance of the US geopolitical code of "war on terror". The US did not follow the established rules of the world order, and their support jeopardized Polish-American friendship (*The Self-Defence Electoral Program*, 2005; *Electoral Declaration of the Polish Peasant Party*, 2005). At the same time, in the opinion of the PPP's adherents, succumbing to Washington's policy undermined our position in the EU (*Electoral Declaration of the Polish Peasant Party*, 2005; Gardziel, Gawroński, 2008). Following this trait, the Civic Platform argued that "Europe, and in particular the European Union, should be the focus of the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland" (*A Better Life. For Everyone. The Electoral Program of the Civic Platform*, 2007).

The new narrative in bilateral relations was signaled by the statement that maintaining the alliance with the US “requires our sober approach and care for real benefits” (*A Better Life. For Everyone. The Electoral Program of the Civic Platform*, 2007; Zięba, 2012). CP thus promised that its policy towards the United States would be less submissive and generally stiffer, criticizing the servility of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Law and Justice. It was symbolic when Donald Tusk’s government withdrew the Polish troops from Iraq and its skepticism towards the anti-missile shield.

### THE STRONGEST DEFENCE ALLIANCE

NATO, as the most powerful military alliance in the world and the foothold of Western freedom and democracy in Europe, was to be the chief security guard of our country in the codes of Polish political elites (Słodkowska, 2001b). Thus, in the electoral programs of the post-Solidarity movements and in state politics since the early 1990s, Poland’s security and internal stability were linked to NATO accession and to such guarantees as were enjoyed by the West during the Cold War. This was clearly demonstrated by the program of the Freedom Union striving for “full integration of Poland with the democratic countries’ security structures”, that is, mainly with NATO (Słodkowska, Dołbakowska, 2004; Skubiszewski, 1999). The primary goal of the accession was to weaken the threat from the East, i.e., protecting Poland against Russia’s imperialistic policy, the greatest opponent of our presence in the Treaty. It also justified the postulate of broadening the Alliance’s reach to our neighbors from the region to strengthen their sovereignty and security against the growing threat of Russia (Słodkowska, Dołbakowska, 2004; Kuźniar, 2008). In the discourse of electoral programs, there were often statements about the quality of our membership in NATO, and therefore our guarantee of security. The postulate of the Solidarity Electoral Action (*Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność*) applying for “full” membership can be treated in such a way (Słodkowska, Dołbakowska, 2004).

Still, most of our elites saw the price for this in the form of submission to the hegemonic position of the United States, as it was Washington that made the final decisions in the Alliance. It should suffice to mention our acceptance of NATO’s transformation into a global alliance, such as support for out of area operations, primarily within the US interest. The symbol in the discourse may be words from the program of the Civic Platform: the Alliance “should be ready

to conduct peacekeeping operations and combat asymmetric threats, including terrorist ones” (*A Better Life. For Everyone. The Electoral Program of the Civic Platform*, 2007). It was not determined, however, which and where, that is, the American indications were to be followed.

However, even the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts have shown many of NATO’s internal weaknesses, with growing discrepancies within the EU. Hence the fears of the effectiveness of the support of Poland’s security only on the external foundations, which forced the submission to allies. As one of the few parties L&J noticed this problem: “the events from the recent years have shown that sheer NATO and the European Union membership does not guarantee full security” (*Modern-United-Safe Poland. The Law and Justice Program*, 2009). Each country has to take primary care of its own security, which for many years was misunderstood not only by the majority of the elites, but also by the society convinced that the international prosperity of Poland would last forever.

#### DEEPENING INTEGRATION OR EUROPE OF HOMELANDS?

The majority of Polish political elites supported Poland’s accession to the European Union. Still, even the foundations of this road and the vision of Europe we were to enter were different. They were more concerned with the sphere of values, e.g., respect for “national interests and traditions” (Słodkowska, 2001b; Słodkowska, Dołbakowska, 2004), especially in the field of protection of our Christian identity and sovereignty. Hence the Solidarity Electoral Action, whose representatives were in power in 1997–2001 and conducted accession negotiations, treated the integration with the EU with caution. It was expressed in the words that the “dangerous visions of «Europe devoid of values» should be rejected as a threat to the return of totalitarianism and narrowing politics down only to a game of businesses in which victory is secured to the rich and powerful – no matter who is right” (Słodkowska, 2002). That is why many right-wing and people’s circles continually used the slogan of the creation of the “Europe of homelands”, i.e., the protection of the identity and subjectivity of nations on the grounds of equality (Słodkowska, Dołbakowska, 2004; Słodkowska, 2002). A strong state was supposed to facilitate the defence of Polish interests. On the one hand, the postulate of equality in relation to the “old Union” countries pointed to serious concerns about the subordinate role of Poland, and was followed by a disagreement to “deeper integration”. Undoubtedly, the protection

of the sovereignty and the subjectivity of nations was generally in conflict with this process.

On the other hand, it was the Union that set the conditions, not the aspiring state. Hence, in the discourse layer for the Eurosceptic part of the representatives of political elites, the aim of “integration” with the EEC/EU should be on the “partnership” basis rather than “too submissive” because it meant accepting unfavorable solutions for Poland. The idea was supported by an antagonistic division into the “old” and the “new” Europe: the old EU being a selfish “rich club” discriminating against its poor cousins from the East, although the essence of the Union should be the mythical word “solidarity” (Słodkowska, 2001b; *Modern-United-Safe Poland. The Law and Justice Program*, 2009; Horolets, 2006).

Part of the elites, the so called Euro-enthusiasts, emphasized the real incompatibility of integration in their geopolitical codes. We had to strive for accession, because only the accession to the EU served the development of the whole country and all social groups, it became an opportunity to catch up with the civilization delay of Poland and increase its role in Europe. So the offer for voters was unequivocal: if you want to be safe and rich as the West, you should agree even to the difficult and unfavorable entry conditions that the EU stipulated. After all, “only through the European Union are we able to achieve the standard of living of European countries” – the context was clear that it was all about the so-called old members of the EU (*Electoral Manifesto of the Democratic Left Alliance*, 2005).

Using high levels of public support for Poland’s presence in the EU, many of those circles following the accession used in their discourse the transactional phrase “deepening integration”. For example, the Democratic Left Alliance assessed that “Poland’s best interests are to deepen and broaden integration within the European Union” (*Tomorrow for Poland. A Program for Poland. The Democratic Left Alliance*, 2011). This could be seen as a vague acceptance of the gradual federalization of the Union. As Poland was too weak in the Union, apart from admitting new members, it was in her interests to institutionalize empowerment of EU bodies and the Euro area at the expense of the powers and sovereignty of the Member States (Gardziel, Gawroński, 2008). It was believed that “Brussels would defend us” against the unfavorable attempts against Polish position and modernization to create a “double-speed Europe” and to strengthen the national egoisms (*Tomorrow Without Fear. A Program for Poland. The Democratic Left Alliance*, 2011).

## GERMANY – OUR ADVOCATE OR MASKED ENEMY?

In the electoral discourse of the first years of transformation, the fear of the power of united Germany as a threat to our sovereignty and territorial integrity was clearly visible. It was relatively easy to fuel such emotions among voters. Reasons: first and foremost, a difficult history, and with it, the negative stereotypes and phobias, and a large disproportion of potentials, especially in the economic sense. Finally, the ambiguity of German policy in the years 1989–1991 (Słodkowska, 2001a; Zięba, 2012).

However, when the elites had embarked on their strategic Euro-Atlantic course, they realized that, metaphorically, “the shortest route to Europe” is through Germany. Hence, in the discourse, the restraint of animosity was recommended first, and later the development of such relations that Germany would become a desirable “advocate” of our integration with the West, which assumed the “advocate-client” relationship. On this basis our elites tried to find a “community of interests” in security, politics and economics with the FRG, which to a large extent enabled Poland to join NATO and the EU. However, the hopes of breaking the difficult past, the historic reconciliation, as in the German-French model, turned out to be futile. Despite successes in the field of political and economic relations, the historical disputes have not ceased (Zięba, 2012).

A new wave of fears of Germany in electoral programs emerged with Poland’s accession to the EU, when her declared “community of interests” weakened and divergences and disagreements arose, for example against Poland’s involvement in the Iraq war. Gradually, however, they subsided, and the discourse of major political forces again adopted the words “partnership”, “community of interests”, “close cooperation”. In the programs of the most prominent political parties during the period of the Civic Platform-Polish Peasant Party coalition, the need to maintain good relations with Germany was not questioned, despite differences of opinion, as it was in our interest. For some, especially those in power, they justified Berlin’s patronage over Warsaw. For others, it was too high a price, as symbolized by the 2011 Law and Justice criticism of “client attitude” attributed to the CP-PPP government. Jarosław Kaczyński’s party demanded that mutual relations should be developed on a partnership basis, based on “the principles of subjectivity, equality and symmetry of both parties” (*Modern-United-Safe Poland. The Law and Justice Program*, 2009).

## NEVER UNDERESTIMATE THE STRENGTH OF RUSSIA

When analyzing the discourse of electoral programs, one can conclude that the constantly identified enemy of Poland, although not named directly, has been Russia. This geopolitical code of our elites was supported by most Poles, and the scale and justification of mutual animosity were relatively simple and legible. To all, the key to the security and independence of Poland and the regaining of freedom in the choice of allies was to become free from “the effects of many years of military, economic and political dependence on the Soviet Union” (Słodkowska, 2001a; Zięba, 2012).

Russia was generally regarded as the successor of the USSR, which negatively affected the geopolitical environment of our country. It was expressed in the multi-level imperial policy. Right-wing electoral programs signaled it in the statement that the Kremlin cannot put up with the loss of its satellite states and still continues its Poland-threatening policy (Słodkowska, Dołbakowska, 2004). The second plane of Russia’s hostile actions is a possible internal disintegration, though rarely raised. In this direction, the discourse of the Law and Justice was particularly directed, warning of the consequences of “having many of our partner’s assets within our country”, i.e., intelligence (Słodkowska, 2002). The fear of Russia was also stimulated in another way, dramatizing its internal chaos and the instability of state structures, the importation of pathologies such as crime and illicit trade (Słodkowska, 2001a; Słodkowska, Dołbakowska, 2004).

Because the electoral discourse repeatedly warned, “we must not underestimate the power of Russia” (Słodkowska, Dołbakowska, 2004), it justified the return to the West in the 1990s to find allies there to ensure Poland’s sovereignty and security. Undoubtedly, Poland’s entry into the Western political-military and economic security structures has strengthened our state’s position in relations with Russia but has not improved them. Polish elites understood the need to reduce tension and develop cooperation. In 2007, the Civic Platform suggested a pragmatic approach, developing our mutual relations “on interestedness, getting rid of unnecessary emotions and empty gestures”, or “rejection of history fatalism”, at the same time perceiving “unfriendly accents and unconquerable complexes” in Russian politics (*A Better Life. For Everyone. The Electoral Program of the Civic Platform*, 2007). A more optimistic narrative about Polish-Russian relations emerged after the Smolensk catastrophe, which was supposed to be a tragic, yet a chance to overcome mutual reluctance. It appeared in the Civic Platform program, in sync with the narrative of the Democratic Left Alliance.

The Alliance believed in 2011 that “there is a historic opportunity to develop a new formula of Polish-Russian cooperation” (*Tomorrow Without Fear. A Program for Poland. The Democratic Left Alliance*, 2011).

It was perceived quite differently by the Law and Justice in 2011, in the shadow of the Smolensk disaster, with the party frightening voters that the policy towards Russia by the government of Donald Tusk was of “deep asymmetry and completely unilateral concessions, not only without reciprocity but even without expecting it” (*Modern-United-Safe Poland. The Law and Justice Program*, 2009). It defined the degradation of Poland’s status in relations with Russia. In other words, the CP-PPP government was accused of conducting pro-Russian politics, and L&J in 2005–2007 allegedly maintained Poland’s subject status in these relations.

## OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION

Much less readable for most elites and citizens was the hostility to the European Union, which was demonstrated by some nationalist milieu, presenting the Community in black colors as a threat to our identity and sovereignty. The categorical opposition to Poland’s integration with the European Union appeared in the discourse of these circles: it is the enemy that will rule us with the “dictate of Brussels”, as did the dictate of Moscow previously. Such a change of polarity of political dependence appealed to civil emotions and the fears of repetition of Poland’s servile status. Thus, the integration with the EU was dramatized as an external dependence of power, implementing foreign interests in our country, leading to economic and political disaster. No nation should allow “the unilateralism of the economic and political dependencies of its State” (Słodkowska, 2002).

The EU enemy was perceived somewhat differently in the EU by the Self-Defence, formally advocating Poland’s entry into the Community. Already after its accession in 2005, it argued that the conditions negotiated by Poland were “second class” membership, that is to say, the confirmation of our subordinate status of “worse Europe”, leading, according to the rare in our discourse argumentation, to “colonial dependence of Poland on international economic and political organizations”. The Self-Defence confirmed at the same time its anti-establishment image, arguing that it was possible to negotiate better accession conditions, but it was not wanted by the group of Polish elites, servile to the

West. For “betrayal and servitude to foreign interests, they will receive the due reward from the hands of their lords” (*The Self-Defense Electoral Program*, 2005). In other words, the “Targowica” – the commonly perceived negative symbol of treason and exploitation by foreign interests – among our elites was to be blamed for the poor and humiliating conditions of Poland’s integration with the Union.

## SUMMARY

Undoubtedly, the title issue was not one of the most important ones in the electoral programs of the political parties, and the way of its presentation disappoints with its fragmentary and generalized approach. In general, the fundamental change of Poland’s geopolitical codes after 1989 – from the east to the west – can quite easily be seen in the electoral programs: the enemies of the People’s Republic of Poland became allies and the forced ally became an enemy. However, their concretization is generally not original and rather schematic. The Polish geopolitical codes have been exerted with strong influences of the hegemonic geopolitical codes of the West, mainly those of the United States. On the other hand, the last geopolitical code, the attempt to explain to the public the geopolitical imaginations of our elites, has been the weakest. This largely confirms the authoritarian dimension of Polish transformation as well as the dominance of the elites over the society.

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## CULTURAL SECURITY IN THE POLITICAL PROGRAMMES OF THE LAW AND JUSTICE

### BEZPIECZEŃSTWO KULTUROWE W PROGRAMACH POLITYCZNYCH PRAWA I SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI

*Arkadiusz Lewandowski\**

— ABSTRACT —

The present paper raises the issue of cultural security in the programme-related ideas conceived by Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (hereinafter referred to as the Law and Justice or – to use an abbreviated term – PiS) in 21<sup>st</sup> century. In the present paper, the issues related to national identity and national culture were scrutinized, the former and the latter being two constituents of cultural security of the state.

Political programmes of the Law and Justice specified mainly the dangers to national identity in the context of European integration and of striving for the unification of European culture. On the other hand, in the realm of national culture, what was noticed was the phenomenon of neglecting the said issue and not considering it important from the point of view of security of the state.

**Keywords:** cultural security, security of the state, politics of memory, Law and Justice, Polish political parties

— ABSTRAKT —

Artykuł podejmuje zagadnienie bezpieczeństwa kulturowego w koncepcjach programowych Prawa i Sprawiedliwości w XXI wieku. W ramach tekstu dokonana została analiza problematyki tożsamości narodowej i kultury narodowej jako dwóch składowych bezpieczeństwa kulturowego państwa.

Programy polityczne Prawa i Sprawiedliwości w głównej mierze określały zagrożenia dla tożsamości narodowej w kontekście integracji europejskiej oraz dążenia do unifikacji kultury europejskiej. Z kolei w obszarze kultury narodowej dostrzegano zjawisko lekceważenia tego zagadnienia i nieuznawania go jako istotnego z perspektywy bezpieczeństwa państwa.

**Słowa kluczowe:** bezpieczeństwo kulturowe, bezpieczeństwo państwa, polityka historyczna, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, polskie partie polityczne

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## INTRODUCTION

Since 2005, Polish political scene has been dominated by two political parties: the Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO), both of which were founded four years before, at the moment of the collapse of the Solidarity Electoral Action (*Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność*). The first parliamentary elections in which the two said parties took part assured to them the spot in the parliament (back then as the opposition towards the coalition government formed by the Democratic Left Alliance – *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*, and the Polish People's Party – *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, respectively). However, that has been so-far the only case of the elections in which neither of the said two parties won; what is more, it was the unprecedented case where the two parties did not occupy the first/second position in the general election.

A stable and strong position of these two parties in Polish political-party system (Antoszewski, 2009) contributed to both parties gaining the possibility of creating the agenda of public debate as well as of determining the directions of political actions – either as the ruling party or as the strongest opposition party. One of the tools exploited for the sake of shaping the remits of debate within electoral competition were political programmes whose importance is particularly underlined by the Law and Justice. Hence, it is natural that the political programmes of the two respective parties arouse interest on the part of the researchers of the political life of the Third Republic of Poland.

The present paper can be subsumed under this tendency as well and constitutes an attempt at analyzing political programmes of the Law and Justice as related to the perception of the cultural security phenomenon. The aim of the paper is the specification of the significance of national identity and national culture for the cultural security of the state as conceived of in election programmes by PiS. The specific research problems were:

- a. What dangers for national identity were recognized?
- b. What dangers for national culture were recognized?
- c. To what extent and in what manner should the state react when it comes to guaranteeing the cultural security of the state?

The primary basis for research will be political programmes of PiS published in 2003–2015. So delineated a period of research is justified by the fact that its limits coincide with the events vital from the point of view of the analyzed issues. The date commencing the scrutinized period coincides with the period of the intensified political debate on Polish accession to European Union, the

debate being accompanied with the referendum on accession as well as with the eventual process of Poland accessing European Union structures in May, 2004. The upper time limit is in turn determined by the last parliamentary elections, dating back to 2015.

As far as my research is concerned, I mainly availed myself of the qualitative analysis of the text, which takes heed of the occurrence or non-occurrence of characteristic content (as opposed to the content occurring most frequently). The said analysis investigates the intentions cherished by the sender and pays attention to the context of the occurrence of some specific content (Palska, 1999; Szczepaniak, 2012).

## CULTURAL SECURITY

Cultural security is one of the areas in which the dangers for the state are recognized and analyzed. Taking interest in this area as a distinct field of study was determined by ridding of purely military conception of the security of the state and in turn embarking on post-Cold-War comprehensive approach whose theoretical foundations were the achievements of the Copenhagen School headed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998). The theoretical assumptions put forward by the representatives of this school posited that security is to be regarded as an indivisible category, comprised by both external and internal dimensions, that is a military and extra-military one (Kaźmierczak-Pec, 2014; Marczuk, 2009). Therefore, cultural security may be identified with one type of security – next to such types as political, military, economic, social or, for that matter, an ecological one, all of them being regarded by Buzon as extra-military one (Zięba, 1999; Ziętek, 2013).

The essential aim of cultural security is not only protecting material cultural property or cultural heritage but also, broadly speaking, protecting the values being of the essence to national identity. It also encompasses protecting cultural distinctiveness related to ethnicity and national minorities, enabling cultural openness, a free flow of the values commonly regarded as essential, promoting national culture in the world and setting the conditions favorable to its development (Hrynicky, 2014).

Cultural security may be also defined as: on the one hand – protecting one's culture, which is considered as multi-generational achievement, against the undesirable influence of other cultures. Furthermore, cultural security may

be associated with the state ability to multiply one's so-far cultural heritage (Czaja, 2004; Hrynicky, 2014). Grażyna Michałowska (1997) in turn believes that "cultural security in its national aspect denotes the conditions under which a society may conserve and cherish the values essentially determining its identity and simultaneously take advantage of the experience and accomplishments of other nations. Thus, it is a state of sort of necessary equilibrium; however, it is impossible to delineate it either empirically or theoretically".

In the literature, when it comes to defining cultural security, what is noticeable is to tackle the said issue in two of its aspects.

On the one hand, cultural security is regarded as being associated with political security. The above-mentioned connection is manifested – among others – in defining dangers or protected values and attributing to certain phenomena the aspect of cultural security, the said phenomena shaping the policy of the state. On the other hand, some authors resign from the state-centered approach when defining cultural security. They identify the subject of cultural security with extra-state members, that is cultural and religious communities, which means nations, ethnic groups or the adherents of a given religion (Włodkowska, 2009). Wojciech Hrynicky (2014) conceives of that dualism of understanding cultural security in the following manner: "Due to the broad understanding, cultural security may be considered on two planes. It is of dualistic nature – it refers to the state realm (the cultural security of the state) and to the social one (the cultural security of individuals and of cultural communities – nations, ethnic groups and religious groups). Both these realms are inextricably intertwined – especially in the legal sense, because particular legal precepts assure the protection of those elements of culture that are of importance to an individual. The said precepts manage to do so by virtue of assuring the protection of cultural elements being essential from the point of view of the state".

A slightly different typology, albeit also a two-element one, of cultural security was provided by Waldemar Kitler (2002), who claims that we encounter cultural security when we talk about "the state taking all possible actions aimed at protecting cultural good and also when we talk about making use of cultural heritage of the nation aimed at shaping desirable states of affairs in international environment and finally when we talk about strengthening national character". Such a construal of the issue of cultural security opens the perspective of the research on politics of memory as run by the state with the intention of exerting influence on the international arena (Gawin, Kowal, 2005).

While defining the concept of cultural security, one can, following Jan Czaja (2013), enumerate its key areas such as:

- The protection of the values of symbolic culture (spiritual one) being essential to national identity (e.g., language, religion, literature);
- Protecting material cultural property and cultural heritage;
- A feeling of cultural security which concerns both the nation and individuals or ethnic groups;
- The openness of the culture being construed as maintaining the state of equilibrium between its internal development based on domestic values and the internalization of external elements coherent with the former;
- Running the external cultural policy aimed at promoting one's own culture and country as well as at setting the external conditions favourable to the development thereof.

To recapitulate the above considerations, what is to be considered as cultural security is the state's ability to protect one's cultural identity, cultural property and national heritage in the context of being receptive to global influences, which in turn allows for the development of culture by virtue of internationalization of the values coherent with one's identity (Czaja, 2004).

The concept which is significantly correlated with cultural security is cultural identity, oftentimes referred to as national identity. Grzegorz Radomski (2016) notes that the values critical for the question of identity are pointed out in all the definitions of cultural security and are primarily regarded as subject to protection. What I shall mean by the said identity is a bundle of properties representative of a given culture, which amount to their respective distinctness and make them different from one another and which make the people living under a specific culture identify with the values and thus simultaneously branding on their minds the feeling of their respective distinctiveness (Michałowska, 1991).

According to Agata Włodkowska (2009), in the national sense, cultural identity is a factor shaping the positive sentiment of nationalism, which combines a historical memory of the nation and favours the citizens' identification with the state and its political goals. The said identity itself comprises: dwelling on a given territory, the commonness of cultural bonds (based on religion, language, institutions and history), as well as being emotionally attached to the place of common place of residence.

Thus defined cultural security is vulnerable to a series of dangers. In the context of Polish state, what can be subsumed under the category of dangers

are – among others – the decreasing feeling of cultural bond among people, the limited sovereignty of the state, decreasing level of financial means dedicated to culture and the growing cultural dependency resulting from assimilating strange values (Kośmider, 2014).

## NATIONAL IDENTITY

The process of integrating Poland with the EU gave rise to many political debates related not only to the sovereignty of the Polish state but also to the issue of the cultural identity of the Polish society. The said issues were particularly strongly emphasized in the period of the referendum on accession dating back to 2003, when it was Poles who decided about Polish accession to the European Union. It was also underlined in 2004–2005 during the times of – respectively – elections to the European Parliament and to the Polish parliament. Back in those days, as Czaja notes, what started to matter more and more were the issues of identity and new global, economic, politico-social and cultural challenges (e.g., endowing the European Union with identity-bearing traits) that made the individuals, social groups, nations, states face the problem of confirming their respective identity anew (both in the local, regional sense, as well as in the nation-state or the international one; Czaja, 2001).

In the scrutinized period, the issue of national identity was a point of political issue between the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice (Lewandowski, 2016). The differences in style of their respective political thinking was correlated with their distinct perception of the phenomenon of European integration and the vision of united Europe. The Civic Platform, being subsumed under the Euro-enthusiastic parties (the period 2003–2006 excluded), did not resort in its rhetoric to a sharp distinction between national identity and European integration, or else – “European values”. As opposed to the Civic Platform party, the Law and Justice, party labelled as Euro-realist, being a proponent of Europe consisting of nation-states, that is sovereign European states cooperating on the internal level, presented an entirely different hierarchy in which national identity is absolutely superior to European values (Grzesik-Robak, 2008; Migalski, 2009).

According to PiS, national identity was defined by: the teachings of the Catholic Church, Polish tradition, and Polish patriotism (Balcer, Buras, Gromadzki, Smolar, 2016; *Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina*, 2014). That value needed protecting, and the protection was to be put into practice by the virtue of maintaining

sovereignty within European structures. This way of thinking was conspicuous during the first elections to the European Parliament with the Polish political parties taking part. It was back then when the Law and Justice used two slogans in their electoral campaign: “Dignified Representation in Europe” (*Godna reprezentacja w Europie*), and “Europe as the Solidarity of Nations” (*Europa solidarnych narodów*), with the latter one reflecting fully the nature of the views cherished by that party on the process of European integration and the shape of the European Union.

One of the then leaders of PiS, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski, stressed that it is necessary in Europe to restore the type of thinking based on national interest and on casting doubt on the ideology of Euro-enthusiasm (*Europejski program PiS*, 2004). What is more, the declarations made by the politicians of PiS back in those days stressed the importance of the sovereignty of the states and the protection of national interests within the EU. On the other hand, the European Union itself was identified with the realization of the idea of Europe of nation states (*Bronić w Unii polskich interesów*, 2004). Back then, it was also emphasized that Europe should maintain its Christian nature, to show solidarity and be solidary and equal. During the campaign for the European Parliament in 2004, Jarosław Kaczyński said: „All those foundations were laid down by Europe itself. Its future is not a super-state but Europe of independent nation-states. We do not want to confront the interest of Poland and that of Europe. We are concerned with maintaining equality and cultural diversity; we want Europe with common-access free-market” (*Europa Ojczyzn*, 2004). The leader of PiS estimated that in integrating Europe “one needs to decisively struggle for national dignity of a big European nation which we constitute” (*PiS ma wizję wspólnej Europy*, 2004).

PiS iterated its views on the nature of its vision of the European Union in 2005 during the electoral campaign for the national parliament. However, back then there appeared an explicit reference to the issue of national identity. In the electoral programme of the Law and Justice dating back to 2005, the expression *national identity* appeared 10 times in 144 pages. In the preamble to this document, the authors, while enumerating challenges the Polish state faces or will face in the future, included the very issue of national identity itself. As they suggested:

“In this area, what is equally threatening are strong centralizing tendencies present in the European Union, the trends associating the hope for the future of our continent with the development of the super-state and with the creation of the new pan-European identity at the expense of nation-states and their respec-

tive identity. In social practice, the agenda of constructing the new *European* awareness would be reducible to imposing on weaker nations the identity of the strongest ones” (*IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich*, 2005).

While referring broadly to the problem of European integration, the representatives of PiS suggested that the policy run by the Union back then was dominated by short-term economic interests of the “old” member states, the interest having pushed aside the values that the founding fathers of the European communities had in mind. They added:

„The Union lacks a vision and is afflicted with the crisis of cultural identity. It is exactly that moral emptiness that St. John Paul II warned us against in his historical speech in the Polish parliament, reminding us of the words of the encyclical *Centesimus Annus*, that democracy without values gets easily transformed into an explicit or implicit totalitarianism” (*IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich*, 2005).

Continuing that thread, the politicians of PiS attracted public attention to the duty incumbent on Poland, again referring to the words by St. John Paul II on the need for Poland to bring the new spirit of Christian solidarity to Europe (*IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich*, 2005). That aspect was significant to the extent that what PiS representatives found unacceptable was the area of integration which involved the uniformization of cultural policy (the so-called 4<sup>th</sup> pillar of the EU), the said uniformization potentially resulting in developing the identity based on the “secular European religion” devoid of Christian roots (Sanecka-Tyczyńska, 2011).

The spiritual and moral aspect of national identity in the context of European integration was reflected in the brochure bearing the title *Polska Katolicka w Chrześcijańskiej Europie* (*Catholic Poland in Christian Europe*, 2005). That document stressed the necessity of introducing to the then designed European constitution a reference to God and Christianity as a proper measure for determining the identity of the Old Continent.

In that document, the representatives of PiS also noted the issue of sovereignty of nation states of integrating Europe. They stressed the necessity of protecting sovereignty of Poland when it comes to moral and cultural issues, treating this claim as an element of assuring national interest and the overall security of the state (*Polska Katolicka w Chrześcijańskiej Europie*, 2005). Despite the fact that in the referred document the expressions *national identity* and *cultural security* do not occur, the way of defining the problem related to the presence of Christian values and to them being endangered in the policies run by the European Union

allows for considering the said issues as essential ones from the perspective of PiS' views on cultural security.

Facing up to the above-mentioned dangers and simultaneously striving for strengthening national identity, the PiS politicians suggested specific actions realized by the state institutions. In the electoral programme of 2011 they suggested:

“With reference to the accomplishments dating back to 2005–2007, we will prioritize again the significance of the politics of memory and of shaping patriotic attitudes. [...] One of the means of building Poles' taking pride in their own history and in the accomplishments in the cultural and material realm shall be social campaigns designed in such a manner that follows the pattern of educational programme *Patriotyzm jutra (Patriotism of Tomorrow)*, directed at young Poles and based on the positive message (as other countries do). The said campaigns are going to embrace – among others – disseminating knowledge on the break-through events in the Polish history as well as on exquisite figures of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Such campaigns will be also directed at those young Poles who emigrated” (*Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska*, 2011).

National identity was then to be strengthened also by the education system. It was believed that school graduates should be familiarized with the common reservoir of knowledge and be acquainted with common symbols, references and images that are key to Polish identity. The means thereto was to restore the proper rank to teaching Polish literature and history in public schools (*Zdrowie, Praca, Rodzina*, 2014).

Still, in the programme documents of the Law of Justice, what was manifested was a criticism of the policies run in the realm of culture and education, the policies being realized in 2007–2015 by the ruling coalition of the Civic Platform and the Polish People's Party, the policies being in turn judged as destructive. It is because it was believed that the said policies were directed at weakening national sentiments and national tradition. The actions taken by the already mentioned coalition PO-PSL in the area of education were explicitly evaluated by the programme *Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina* (2014) as “employing educational means for the sake of deconstruction of our identity”.

At this point, it was worthwhile to add that showing activity in the realm of creating patriotic attitudes, as suggested by Jarosław Kaczyński, was one of the characteristic postulates of that party throughout its existence on the political scene.

## NATIONAL CULTURE

In the context of the issue alluded to in the title, the second significant element of cultural security of the state was national culture. The Law and Justice party declared that national culture is a source of national identity and the endurance of the nation is properly measured by the extent to which we take care of our national culture and cultural heritage (*IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich*, 2005). Yet, according to PiS, not all the parties nor political circles operating under the Third Republic of Poland cherished the same views on that issue. In the 2005 programme of the party headed by Jarosław Kaczyński, what was noted was the matter of regarding the issue of national culture as a secondary problem. In this document, what was stated goes as follows:

“Public debate in Poland mainly revolves around economic or political issues. Those issues – however significant and urgent – occupy almost the entire attention of both political elites and of the public opinion. That being the case acts obviously to the detriment of other equally important problems being thus neglected; or else, one thinks that the attempt at solving the latter problems may be postponed. What falls prey to this sort of thinking is most frequently education and culture. [...]. Nonetheless, the consequences of this negligence in the sphere of education or culture, however intractable and invisible at the beginning, they gradually increase and may prove to be exceptionally dramatic and irrevocable at the end” (*IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich*, 2005).

In 2014, the belief was still held that what is a key to strengthening cultural politics is “overcoming the tendency to treat culture lightly, as a peripheral area being unimportant from the point of view of the fundamental national interests” (*Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina*, 2014).

It is to be stressed that in those two enumerated cases, in 2005 as well as in 2014, the Law and Justice party was in opposition, which certainly facilitated the formulation of the accusation of not treating the issue of national culture seriously.

The programme by PiS also specified the necessity of state intervening vigorously into the realm of culture. The aim of the activities by state's institution, as thought of by the PiS politicians, should be the care for the development of culture as the source of the existence of the nation. Furthermore, what should be the purpose thereof is grounding the sentiment of national identity as well as the protection of the accomplishments of

previous generations. Society consciously participating in the cultural life of the nation reflects, as was promptly stated, the condition of this very nation. Culture, on the other hand, is one of the most important factors determining development and simultaneously providing the capital which would allow Poland and Poles to face up to tough challenges future has in store for us (*IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich*, 2005).

The task of the state is also to provide a broad access to Polish cultural heritage, e.g., by digitalization and mass availability of all the literary works of Polish classical literature; but also, by assuring a free-of-charge entrance to museums for pupils and students alike. Improving the access to culture was supposed to occur also by dint of protecting and strengthening the local institutions of culture (e.g., libraries) – also manifested by assuring the necessary infrastructure in the form of theatres, cinemas and museums (*Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina*, 2014).

What is correlated in PiS documents with the issue of national culture and its strengthening in the world was one additional area of actions for the sake of cultural security. The politicians of this party subsumed the increase in its rank of Polish culture in the world under the category of such actions that were labelled as politics of memory (later on referred to as identity politics).

According to PiS programmes, the politics of memory was supposed to – among others – serve to promote our own heritage and appeal to the social awareness of Poles and influence an international debate (Paruch, Rydel, 2011). It was also to serve the purpose of spreading a good and just image of Poland in the international reception. Finally, it was to facilitate the permeation of Polish culture into foreign countries (*Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina*, 2014). As stated, the special role in this realm was to be realized by Instytut Adama Mickiewicza (The Adam Mickiewicz Institute), which should become a vibrant equivalent of similar institutions existing, e.g., in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden. The said institute was supposed to collaborate closely with Polish facilities abroad (*Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska*, 2011).

Stressing the importance of national culture was reflected in the opinions held on financing thereof. In 2005, the Law and Justice assumed the actions of endorsing culture by the state on the basis of solid and efficient state's patronage (*IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla wszystkich*, 2005). This postulate was expressly stressed in the election programme of 2011: "The Law and Justice ceaselessly states that the spending on culture and protection of national heritage – especially upon Poland entering the European Union – should remain under

the special protection and their growth should assist the economic growth” (*Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska*, 2011).

In the election programme of 2011, what was noticeable was allowing for situation in which financing culture would be done via extra-budget means. It was declared that the Law and Justice notices the need to specify both the legal bases anew and the conditions of organizing and financing the institution of culture – including sponsoring culture in order to increase the attractiveness of sponsoring valuable cultural projects (*Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska*, 2011). The authors of the analyzed document wrote what follows:

“Within our patronage, we will stimulate the actions oriented at the development of the material base of culture. Who should partake in it are self-governments being supported by the state – also the European Union means shall be employed. Private sponsors can come in handy too. [...] One of the instruments stimulating the activity of the institution of culture in the acquisition of financial means from extra-budgetary resources will be the mechanism of co-financing of valuable projects from public and private means” (*Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska*, 2011).

However, there was still the proviso that national culture is the realm within which what is invested is human capital and the realm itself cannot be treated as a social or a commercial sphere, which in turn means that investing in it does not involve perceiving it solely in the light of potential profits.

## SUMMARY

The problem – presented in the paper – of the occurrence in the public programmes of PiS of the issues related to cultural security (as far as cultural and national identity goes) allows us to formulate the characteristics of the trends noticeable in the analyzed documents.

It is to be noted that, in PiS’ opinion, what exerted the influence on cultural security was undoubtedly European integration, which was accompanied with premonitions related to its anti-Christian nature and striving for building super-state, which was supposed to have a bearing on emerging dangers for national identity. In the face of all of that, what became an essential task was:

- to assure sovereignty to the Republic of Poland – in both cultural and moral dimension;

- striving for implementing the conception of Europe of nation states – as far as European dimension goes;
- taking such state actions that were aimed at strengthening national identity.

The latter of the analyzed dimensions of cultural security, that is national culture, which was also present in the programme documents of PiS, was also described as the one being constantly endangered. The first danger involved a negligent approach to the analyzed issue by the majority of elites of the Third Republic of Poland. As a result, as believed by the PiS politicians, the Polish national culture was poorly recognized by Poles themselves and barely recognized beyond the borders of Poland. What is important is also the fact that the documents of PiS appreciated the significance of politics of memory (national politics) in the international aspect, with the significance for the actions aimed at attaining cultural security of Poland.

Answering the research problems posed in the introduction to the present paper one must state – on the basis of the analysis of political programmes of the Law and Justice – that both national and cultural identity are the important elements of the conception of cultural security, as conceived of by the said political party. Maintaining a proper level of security calls for, according to the conceptions cherished by Jarosław Kaczyński's party, the state actions for the sake of protecting national identity or for promoting national culture, which is also a distinctive feature of political thinking of the said party.

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## THE PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION AND THE SENATE UNDER THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC\*

OPOZYCJA PARLAMENTARNA I SENAT  
W V REPUBLICIE FRANCUSKIEJ

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— ABSTRACT —

The paper is devoted to the role of the French Senate (under the constitution of the Fifth Republic) as an organ that can remain a tool in the hands of opposition to the government. It has been pointed out that in the French formula of the semi-presidential system, which was created as a result of the rationalisation of a parliamentary model, bicameralism may be the field of special expansion of the executive which aims at the effective implementation of its own legislative activities. The author argues that this has a particularly negative impact on the status of the parliamentary opposition. This is the case even when the opposition has a majority in the Senate. The French second chamber, although the body is relatively strong, can be neutralised in legislative proceedings designed to implement the government's programme. The author analyses the problem of marginalising the parliamentary opposition in relation to the two major political arrangements of the Fifth Republic: the so-called

— ABSTRAKT —

Artykuł jest poświęcony roli francuskiego Senatu (pod rządami konstytucji V Republiki) jako organu, który może stanowić narzędzie w gestii opozycji antyrządowej. Wskazano, że we francuskiej formule systemu semiprezydenckiego, która została stworzona w efekcie racjonalizacji systemu parlamentarnego, bikameralizm może stanowić obszar szczególnej ekspansji egzekutywy, która dąży do efektywnego wdrożenia swoich własnych zamierzeń legislacyjnych. Autor dowodzi, że ma to szczególnie negatywny wpływ na status opozycji parlamentarnej. Jest tak nawet wtedy, gdy opozycja dysponuje większością w Senacie. Francuska izba druga, choć jest to organ relatywnie silny, może być neutralizowana w procesie ustawodawczym zmierzającym do implementacji programu rządowego. Autor poddaje analizie problem marginalizacji opozycji parlamentarnej w odniesieniu do dwóch podstawowych układów politycznych V Republiki: tak zwanego efektu większościowego (władza

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majority effect (the executive branch is politically homogeneous) and cohabitation (the executive branch is politically divided).

**Keywords:** French Fifth Republic, Senate, parliamentary opposition, majority effect, cohabitation

wykonawcza jest politycznie jednorodna) oraz koabitacji (władza wykonawcza jest politycznie podzielona).

**Słowa kluczowe:** V Republika Francuska, Senat, opozycja parlamentarna, efekt większościowy, koabitacja

## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The political practice under the constitution of the Fifth Republic of 1958 has shown that the French political system can successfully operate in two basic variants: in the conditions of majority effect (*fait majoritaire*) and of cohabitation. The first one assumes that both segments of the dual executive branch (the president of the Republic and the government led by the prime minister) come from the same political camp and enjoy support of at least the first chamber of parliament. In turn, cohabitation is based on the principle of political power-sharing within the executive power in which the head of state and the head of government are political opponents. In such circumstances, the government always has a majority of seats in the first chamber – the National Assembly (*Assemblée nationale*), because the French semi-presidential system, as a result of the extreme rationalisation of a parliamentary model<sup>1</sup>, provides a political

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<sup>1</sup> The process of rationalisation of a parliamentary system of government in the strict sense of the word was launched generally after the Second World War with the rise of a chancellor system in Germany and a semi-presidential system in France. Both models share a significant constitutional foundation. This common component is to strengthen the government – as one of the organs of dual executive power – over the legislature in order to prevent the latter from destabilising the institutional framework of the state. Thus the logic of the rationalisation process consists, first and foremost, in giving cabinets stable parliamentary majorities (Gicquel, 1992). However, in the case of France, rationalisation has gone a step further, as the position of the head of state was also strengthened (for example, by introducing universal presidential elections in 1962, chairing the meetings of the Council of Ministers held in the presidential palace, as well as due to almost unrestricted possibility to dissolve the first chamber of parliament). As a result, the French rationalisation followed two paths, moving, however, in the same direction – the reinforcement of the executive as such. Therefore, it can be said that in the case of contemporary France, the combination of various institutional factors (such as the powerful presidency elected by universal suffrage and the mechanisms of rationalised parliamentarianism) causes the French presidents to become beneficiaries of solutions taken from two different institutional areas: presidentialism and parliamentarianism (Levy, Skach, 2008).

responsibility to at least one of the houses of parliament. It has to be the first chamber as a nationwide representation which is elected by universal suffrage. Taking into consideration contemporary constitutional systems, the issue of political responsibility before the second chamber remains open and depends on the position of the body within the constitutional structure. Symmetry of bicameralism in a parliamentary system requires that the second chamber be in this respect equal to the first chamber. An alternative solution, that is asymmetrical bicameralism, allows for the functioning of the government in the conditions of different majorities in both segments of the legislature<sup>2</sup>. The latter possibility has been adopted under the French constitution of 1958 (Constitution du 4 octobre...). The Senate, which differs politically from the National Assembly, is not an obstacle to the efficient activity of the cabinet. This is particularly true in the case of political identity of the executive branch, that is during the aforementioned majority effect. The second chamber is then the only body within the structure composed of the executive and legislative bodies, in which there may be a predominance of opposition parties.

Therefore, it can be stated that the formula of majority effect is not an internally homogeneous configuration. It may occur in a strong or weak form, depending on the political attitude of senators. The same applies to the phenomenon of cohabitation, which may also exist in two variants: with the Senate that supports the cabinet or with the Senate that is an ally of the president. As a result, the political structure of the French semi-presidential model is based on two basic configurations and their four further subtypes (Jakubiak, 2016). All this creates a complex institutional environment for the functioning of the French party system, including major opposition groups. Political parties that are against the ruling camp may, in spite of their inferior political position, have control over some of the institutional components of the system of government. Under the variant of semi-presidentialism, in which there is a bicameral parliament

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<sup>2</sup> The existence of symmetry or asymmetry of the houses of parliament largely depends on the manner in which they are formed. If second chambers are institutions based on appointments or co-options, the symmetrical relations between both segments of the legislative power do not have any justification today. However, the use of democratic electoral mechanisms in relation to the entire bicameral parliament causes the tendency to strengthen the contemporary second chambers (Lane, Ersson, 2000). On the other hand, their strong legitimacy within the symmetrical structure can sometimes do not prevent from attempts to introduce asymmetry of bicameralism. It should be emphasized that such actions do not have to be successful, as evidenced by the example of Italy. The introduction of asymmetry of chambers in that country was rejected in a nationwide referendum of 2016.

combined with the dual executive power, such opposing institutions may be the president and the second chamber (however, the latter only provided that the government is not politically responsible before the body and does not have to be supported by a majority of its members). The control of the opposition to the government over the presidency means the existence of cohabitation. In turn, such an influence exerted on the second chamber is more universal – it may occur not only during the periods of coexistence between presidents and prime ministers from different political camps, but also in the configuration of majority effect. Hence, it can be argued that it is the scope of the impact of the opposition through the Senate that constitutes a significant component in the structure of the French constitutional system, and at the same time affects actions taken by the executive in relation to the legislative. It is worth paying attention to the political importance of the second chamber under the 1958 basic law in conjunction with each of the main political configurations. It will enable to assess the extent to which the body can be used as a tool in the hands of the parliamentary opposition.

It can be argued that from the point of view of opposition parties, the Senate gains special importance during majority effect in a weak form, as well as during cohabitation combined with politically differentiated houses of parliament. In both cases, the majority in the second chamber is in opposition to the government. In the second one, however, the Senate is linked to the head of state, because the executive branch remains politically divided. It needs to be emphasized that all these configurations have already occurred in political practice. The purpose of this article is to show that both of the political variants have – although due to the political composition of the executive they differ substantially from each other – a common denominator. It is a high level of activity of the government, which aims to neutralise – in terms of political influence – the second chamber dominated by the opposite political camp. The said activity is strongly associated with the use of procedures to rationalise a parliamentary system of government. They have been conceived as instruments to stabilise the executive (mainly the government, which is – in a parliamentary system – responsible to the legislature, and for this reason it needs to be specially protected). It can be assumed that configurations in which opposition parties dominate the Senate using the body against the government involve two basic effects, namely the marginalisation of the second chamber in the legislative procedure as well as passivity of the executive in the use of legitimising impact of senators. As a result, the two above mentioned configurations lead ultimately to deepening the asymmetry of the

French bicameralism. Such a government strategy has a negative impact on the ability of opposition parties to exert a considerable influence on the process of exercising power. The neutralisation of the parliamentary opposition is another important aspect of rationalised parliamentarianism.

#### THE OPPOSITION-DOMINATED SENATE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF MAJORITY EFFECT

In the first period of the Fifth Republic (until de Gaulle resigned from the office of the president after the 1969 referendum) there was no unequivocal support of senators for the policy of the ruling camp. The then Senate was basically conflicted with the Gaullists. The body seemed to be more centrist or even centre-left than centre-right. As a result, supporters of the head of state constituted a minority in the second chamber. Until 1962 they did not have, moreover, the absolute majority in the National Assembly (Chantebout, 2004; Avril, 1994). Serious tension between the executive and senators was caused by some constitutional changes proposed by the head of state. In 1962, the proposal to introduce universal presidential elections was submitted. Opposition of senators, and in particular of Gaston Monnerville, the president of the chamber, was associated, *inter alia*, with application of article 11 of the constitution. It regulates a legislative referendum and is not intended to alter provisions of the basic law (Mastias, 1980; Jakubiak, 2012). However, in this way it was possible to bypass the entire parliament, whose participation in the normal amendment procedure is required. A similar situation also occurred almost seven years later, when the Gaullists wanted to limit the constitutional position of the Senate. It was a confirmation of the maintenance of the above-mentioned conflict (Avril, 1994). The situation was normalised only after taking over the presidency by Georges Pompidou. The direct successor to de Gaulle and the prime ministers of this period (Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Pierre Messmer) did a few gestures to the Senate, which indicated that the earlier conflicts between the executive and the second chamber belonged to the past (Smith, 2009). A remarkable factor that contributed to this was the progressive marginalisation of the formations representing the political centre. The process emerged at first in the National Assembly but it slowly began to be seen in the Senate. Good relations between the government and the second chamber persisted until gaining power by the left in the early 1980s.

The taking of power by the left in 1981 occurred in both the presidential and parliamentary dimension. François Mitterrand's victory in the presidential elections paved the way for the unprecedented success of the left in the parliamentary ones, which took place due to the dissolution of the National Assembly by the head of state (Debbasch, Bourdon, Pontier, Ricci, 1985; Chapsal, 1984). It is worth noting that the main reason of the dissolution was the president's desire to secure a favourable majority in the first chamber (Jakubiak, 2013)<sup>3</sup>. The Senate remained outside of this kind of influence of the head of state, because the senators' term cannot be shortened by dissolving parliament. As a result, the change of the existing political configuration did not include the second chamber, which was still centre-right. Thus, the presidential strategy could at best lead to majority effect in its weak version. For this reason, the Senate began to play a role of bastion of the parliamentary opposition to the government and to the president (Reydellet, 2001). Although the organ was critical of the ruling camp under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, only during the exercise of power by the left (after 1981) it had a particularly strong reflection in the course of legislative proceedings. Firstly, the procedure of the last word (*dernier mot*) of the first chamber (article 45 paragraph 4 of the constitution) – a mechanism that allows situational reliance on asymmetry of chambers in order to discriminate the Senate – was then used by the government on an unprecedented scale. It was the only way to neutralise the opposition of senators. For example, in 1985, the right to take a final decision by the National Assembly was used 45 times. The so-called mixed parity commissions (*commission mixte paritaire*), which serve to maintain the symmetry of legislative process and to avoid the procedure of the last word, were then convened 60 times, but they developed a common position, which was later supported by both chambers, only in 15 cases. A similar situation occurred in earlier years of the left-wing domination on the French political scene. Overall, in the period 1981–1985 these commissions were set up more than 200 times, however their effectiveness was exceptionally low. In almost three-quarters of the cases it was necessary to use the procedure of the last word given to the National Assembly (Maus, 1998).

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<sup>3</sup> Such a strategy proved that the left, which came to power in 1981, intended to uphold the presidential paradigm previously introduced by the Gaullists. Until the first cohabitation of 1986, the socialist head of state appeared to be a powerful political actor to whom the then prime ministers were subordinated (Elgie, 1999). It should be emphasized that, generally speaking, outside periods of cohabitation the head of state is evidently stronger and the prime minister becomes only “the president's manager” (Bell, 2000).

Data from this period should be compared with the scale of the government's impact on the relations between the chambers in the 1970s, when the entire legislature was politically homogeneous and supported the president and the cabinet. Significant differences can be seen in connection with the use of the procedure of the last word of the National Assembly. In the 1970s, the number of mixed parity commissions was also quite high, but in nearly all cases the bodies were able to come to an agreement, which was subsequently accepted by both parts of the legislature. Thus, in that decade the final decisions of the first chamber were taken sporadically. In the years 1975–1980 there were only 6 cases of application of article 45 paragraph 4 of the constitution. In this respect, this period is also remarkable in comparison with the 1960s, when there was a bit more such cases, although not more than 10 per year (Maus, 1998). However, the situation was then atypical because of the aforementioned conflict between the Gaullist camp and the second chamber, which began on a large scale in 1962. An essential source of disputes was also a failed attempt to limit the position of the Senate in a referendum in 1969. The goal was then, among other things, the elimination of the constitutional arrangements based on the symmetry of the chambers. After such changes, the Senate would not have been able to block effectively some important activities of the executive branch.

The strategy consisting in neutralisation of the parliamentary opposition dominating in the second chamber was confirmed at the next occurrence of majority effect in a weak version – after the start of Mitterrand's second term in 1988. As a result of the parliamentary elections, which took place after two years of cohabitation (1986–1988), the left formed – after the dissolution of parliament and early legislative elections – a government that was able to cooperate with the newly elected head of state. Also in this case, the Senate retained its centre-right profile, becoming the only bastion of the opposition to the governments of the left. Again, the effectiveness of mixed parity commissions strongly decreased. In about half the cases, attempts to reach an agreement between the National Assembly and the Senate failed, which led to final decisions taken by the first chamber (Maus, 1998). It should be noted, however, that the National Assembly existing in the years 1988–1993 in some respects distinguished from that of the years 1981–1986. The differences related primarily to the political configuration of the first chamber. The situation of the left was not so favourable. The Socialist Party (*Parti socialiste*, PS) had in fact only a relative majority of seats in the National Assembly (275 out of 577 mandates), which, combined with

the negatively oriented Senate, complicated its situation (Amson, 2002)<sup>4</sup>. These inconveniences after the double elections of 1988 were reflected in the intensive use of the most important instruments of rationalised parliamentarism – not only the mixed parity commissions and the procedure of the last word, but also other constitutional tools. One of them was laid down by article 49 paragraph 3. On this basis, it is possible to combine a bill discussed in the legislature with the issue of confidence in the government raised in the first chamber. The cabinet headed by Michel Rocard, which was established in 1988, especially often made use of this opportunity<sup>5</sup>. All this meant that rationalised parliamentarism was in these conditions particularly aimed at limiting the position of both segments of the legislature, because the overriding objective was to ensure the effective functioning of the executive.

It is worth noting that the political configuration in which the Senate is the only body within the legislative and executive that represents the opposition to the ruling camp has also occurred in recent years. It took place in 2011, when left-wing parties won a slight advantage in the second chamber (Gohin, 2013). Although it was not a clear and very disciplined majority, it had an impact on the relations between the two parts of the legislature. The best evidence of this is the parliamentary session statistics in the years 2011–2012. After the period of almost complete disappearance, in the years 2002–2011, of the procedure of the last word of the National Assembly, the tool has become necessary again (*Les Cinquante-six ans...*). It needs to be emphasized that the then political configuration was quite unusual. The Senate had in fact a rather left-wing profile, whereas the other legislative and executive bodies belonged to the centre-right camp. It was the first time during the Fifth Republic such a formula of majority effect in a weak variant had happened. What is more, even after the presidential and parliamentary victory of the left in 2012, the procedure of the last word has not lost,

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<sup>4</sup> It is worth highlighting that the French Communist Party (*Parti communiste français*, PCF), which entered the cabinets in the years 1981–1984, did not form a coalition with the PS after 1988 (Szarka, 2000).

<sup>5</sup> It allows, under certain conditions, to adopt legislation without voting in the first chamber. During the existence of the Rocard government, which functioned for 3 years (1988–1991), this regulation was used 28 times. (Chevallier, Carcassonne, Duhamel, 2007). In previous years this mechanism had been applied much less often, especially at the beginning of the Fifth Republic (Maus, 1998). The particular importance of this regulation can be seen in the context of the status of the parliamentary opposition in the French model of rationalised parliamentarism. As Machelski noted, this procedure reverses the majority logic, because it is not the government that is forced to seek the majority. Such actions should be taken by opposition groups (Machelski, 2016).

contrary to expectations, its importance. This proved that the government could not count on permanent and unconditional support of the second chamber.

The variable role of the French Senate is also visible against the background of parliamentary responsibility of the government. The authority before which the prime minister and other ministers are politically responsible is only the first chamber. Even so, the French Senate has been included, to some degree, into the structure of the relationship between the parliament and the government based on the question of parliamentary responsibility of ministers. The second chamber may in fact be used as an additional source of legitimacy of the government or the entire dualistic executive. According to article 49 paragraph 4 of the constitution, there is no obligation to verify support of senators for government policy. It is therefore clear that the practice in this field must depend on existing political configurations. The fact that the opposition to the government occupies most seats in the second chamber greatly diminishes the likelihood of using the said constitutional provision. The risk of rejection of policy proposed by the government is then particularly high. In political practice, the procedure has not been used very often – for the first time in 1975 by the then prime minister Jacques Chirac (Maus, 1998). If it takes place, it is when the prime minister aims to strengthen the position of the cabinet in relation to other organs of the state. There is no doubt that the application of this provision can only occur when the head of government is confident of a favourable outcome of the vote. For this reason, the political specificity of the Senate, which can sometimes operate outside the configuration of majority effect, severely limits the applicability of article 49 paragraph 4 of the constitution. Parliamentary legitimacy of governmental policy is in such conditions provided exclusively by a nation-wide representation in the National Assembly. As a result, majority effect in its weak form, which means that there is no control of the ruling camp over the majority of senators, does not give the cabinet full parliamentary legitimacy.

However, the situation was not so schematic in practice. Differences between practice between 1981–1986 and 1988–1993 show this. During the first *alternance* period and the functioning of the governments created by the left-wing parties, the aforementioned configuration prevented the then prime ministers (Pierre Mauroy, Laurent Fabius) from verifying support for their policies in the second chamber. This was consistent with the logic of rationalised parliamentarianism. Hence, only those mechanisms that served to neutralise the Senate were used with considerable intensity. Their aim was to weaken opponents of the government that dominated the body. As indicated above, opposition

parties of that time were undertaking in the Senate permanent actions aimed at amending the legislation proposed by the government (Smith, 2009). The political position of the cabinet was thus built on two pillars. These were the president who expected from his governments the implementation of the policies defined by the head of state, as well as the National Assembly chosen after the elections of 1981. In turn, despite the similar structure of the political scene, the next period in which the president and the government came from the left, and centre or centre-right senators dominated in the second chamber (1988–1993), was a bit different. It is indicated by the strategy adopted by Rocard. He had to take into account the fact that the National Assembly was not stable politically due to the lack of an absolute majority, which could support the government. However, despite different political attitudes of the National Assembly and the Senate, in some cases the prime minister sought in the latter body the approval of the government policy. Such a situation took place twice. In both cases the aim was to obtain support of senators with regard to policy in particular areas. Not all elements of the programme of the executive were therefore put to the vote. Rocard selected only those issues which did not arouse intense controversy between the major parties. The first vote referred to the declaration concerning the French foreign policy towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (1989). In turn, the declaration presented at the beginning of 1991 was devoted to the Middle East. Both were supported by a clear majority of senators. In the latter case, 290 members of the second chamber favoured the cabinet and only 25 were opposed to the government policy in this field (Maus, 1998). Such a strategy of the prime minister resulted from a special international context at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. In the configuration of majority effect in a weak version, this was definitely an exception to the rule. Generally speaking, under such conditions heads of government did not stand for the Senate's support for the policy created by the executive.

It is also worth noting that after the political change of the Senate majority in 2011, when majority effect was again combined with the second chamber that represented the opposition, the article 49 paragraph 4 was not the only constitutional provision that allowed the government to apply for senators' support. Three years earlier, as a result of the comprehensive constitutional reform of 2008 (*Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008–724...*), a new regulation contained in article 50–1 had been introduced. It gives the government the opportunity to make a declaration on a specific issue (the procedure can be also initiated by a parliamentary group, so it reinforces the status of the opposition). This is followed by

a debate, and – if the cabinet decides to do so – by a vote. The latter is therefore not obligatory. Furthermore, such a declaration may be presented in each of the chambers. One of the most important advantages of the new constitutional provision is that there is no need to vote on parliamentary confidence in the government. As a result, the prime minister is able to use the article 50–1 only in part. Because of the lack of a clear majority in the Senate, the aforementioned regulation was applied in 2012 by the then socialist prime minister Jean-Marc Ayrault (Gicquel, Gicquel, 2015; *Vote sur la politique...*, 2012). The strategy chosen by the head of government showed that even after the partial renewal of the Senate in 2011, the centre-right opposition to the left-wing governments still had much to say. Anyway, thanks to the article 50–1, the prime minister could build relations with the second chamber in a more flexible way. As a result, the article 49 paragraph 4, as a more rigorous constitutional provision, may in practice lose its importance. On the other hand, after the amendments made in 2008, the Senate can expand its role as a body that is a constant point of reference in the activities of the government. All this may be seen as one of the manifestations of the revised relationship between the executive and the legislative, which was the main objective of the reform adopted in 2008<sup>6</sup>.

#### THE OPPOSITION-DOMINATED SENATE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF COHABITATION

Compared with majority effect in a weak version, a specific situation occurs under cohabitation. The coexistence of the president and the government from different political camps can – as indicated above – take two forms: with politically homogenous parliament (the same political camp dominates in each of the chambers) and with politically divided parliament (various majorities in the chambers). The first variant of cohabitation took place during the functioning of the centre-right cabinets created by Jacques Chirac (1986–1988) and Édouard Balladur (1993–1995). The politically homogeneous parliament supported the

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<sup>6</sup> Proponents of the introduction of new constitutional provisions stressed the need to weaken the existing mechanisms of rationalised parliamentarism that were designed and adopted in the 1950s. It is also worth highlighting that in the aftermath of this reform, the constitution regulates the status of the parliamentary opposition, although the act mainly refers to the rules of procedure of the chambers (art. 51–1). From the point of view of the current tendency which involves the constitutionalisation of the opposition, such a novelty may be considered a step forward.

government, which remained in opposition to the president. The legitimacy provided by senators, though it was not crucial, strengthened, at least to some extent, the position of the prime minister and ministers. The second form of cohabitation has occurred only once so far. It took place during the years 1997–2002, when the socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin led the government. In the latter case, the hostile attitude of the majority of senators was particularly important because – in contradiction to the configuration of majority effect in a weak form – the government functioned in the conditions of rivalry with the centre-right president Jacques Chirac. The second chamber was therefore regarded as a valuable ally of the head of state who cannot, under cohabitation, determine the state policy, but is limited to using the so-called power of disturbance (*faculté d'empêcher*), as opposed to the power of decision (*faculté de statuer*; Branchet, 2008)<sup>7</sup>. The power of disturbance may be imposed on the legislative branch (for example, its dissolution), but also on the government (for example, the refusal to sign a governmental ordinance issued on the basis of article 38 of the constitution<sup>8</sup>). As a result, in some cases the president is able to disrupt heavily the functioning of the cabinet. In such a situation, the negative attitude of the Senate is of particular importance for the government, which is forced to deal at the same time with two obstacles – the head of state and the second chamber.

The formula of cohabitation in the conditions of a politically divided parliament means therefore a system in which the role of the anti-government opposition seems to be particularly strong. It covers not only the presidency but also the second chamber. Compared with other variants, this is – taking into consideration the strength of opposition parties – the optimal one. The second chamber acts then as an organ that supports the head of state as the main rival

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<sup>7</sup> This configuration leads to the limitation of the role of the president, whose status begins to resemble the position of the head of state in the classical parliamentary model (the president as a political arbitrator, not a leader who is in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the state). As Stevens noted, the politically heterogeneous executive power means “a less interventionist and more aloof presidency” resulting from a much more parliamentary interpretation of the basic law (Stevens, 2003). However, such a reading does not lead to the re-emergence of a powerful parliament known from the period before 1958 (Knapp, Wright, 2001).

<sup>8</sup> Thanks to the article 38, the government can enter the legislative sphere, which is normally reserved for the parliament. However, the consent of the latter body is always required. Ordinances are then signed by the head of state. This situation in which the president refused to sign such a legal act occurred three times in 1986 – at the beginning of the first period of cohabitation (Gouaud, 1996). It has never repeated since then.

of the government. Hence, from the perspective of the government that has to function next to the president from the opposite political camp, it is particularly important to neutralise – like during majority effect in a weak form – the second chamber. As the third period of cohabitation showed, it became again much more common to use the procedure of the last word of the National Assembly. This was necessary in case of about one third of the legislation then adopted. It should be pointed out, however, that, despite the circumstances of cohabitation, this percentage was lower than during the 1981–1986 period. This means that the *navette* procedure (aiming at reaching an agreement between the chambers) was at the turn of the 1990s and the new century a little more effective. On the other hand, the government did not seek support for its policy in the second chamber. Due to the dominance of the opposition to the left-wing government, the application of article 49 paragraph 4 was not an option. Under difficult conditions of political coexistence within the executive branch, such an action would not be rational, because it could indirectly lead to a significant weakening of the prime minister in relation to the head of state. It is also worth mentioning that, paradoxically, during the third cohabitation the position of the Senate chairman was taken over by Christian Poncelet, the fourth president of the Senate under the constitution of 1958 and the first member of the Gaullist camp to occupy this position (Chevallier, Carcassonne, Duhamel, 2007). All this increased criticism of the left camp towards the second chamber. For the politicians of the ruling coalition of the plural left (*gauche plurielle*) the aforementioned attitude to the body had a particular justification in the political situation of that time.

#### FINAL REMARKS

Nearly sixty years of the constitution of the Fifth Republic has proved that the French semi-presidentialism can successfully run a couple of different political configurations. Bearing in mind that this period was dominated by the formula of identity of the presidential majority and the parliamentary one, and cohabitation of the president and the prime minister from different political camps was an exception rather than a principle, it should be noted that it is the Senate which could weaken the optimal – at least from the point of view of the politically homogenous executive branch – formula of majority effect. The opposition to the president and the government gained in such circumstances one of the four centres of power within the dual executive and the bicameral legislative, although

it needs to be emphasized that the second chamber is undoubtedly the least significant of them. This is due to two related factors. Firstly, the most important mechanisms of rationalised parliamentarianism serve to eliminate institutional blockades that would make it possible to effectively impede the implementation of a political programme supported either by the entire executive branch (majority effect) or only by its governmental segment (cohabitation). Secondly, the Senate has no possibility to overthrow governments that do not bear political responsibility before this body. In this respect, the second chamber differs from the other components of the basic constitutional structure. Under the conditions of majority effect, the cabinet is responsible both to the president and to the National Assembly, and in the process of cohabitation only before the first chamber. The Senate is completely devoid of this right. Such a provision is also directly linked to the question of rationalisation. This means minimisation of the threat that the government may face from parliament as such (Szymanek, 2005)<sup>9</sup>.

Therefore, in political practice the specific autonomy of the French second chamber, understood as resistance to political trends reflected in the elections to the National Assembly, clearly loses a lot of its importance. A different selection mode, the lack of correlation between the mandates of deputies (five years) and senators (six years; before the reform of 2003 – nine years), as well as partial replacements of members of the Senate, means that majorities in the chambers do not have to be the same. What is more, political divisions in the Senate may not correspond to those in the National Assembly. This is manifested, for example, by the composition of the body in the 1960s and the small size of the Gaullist group. In turn, in the National Assembly the party enjoyed a clear advantage over other fractions. It leads to the conclusion that the then Senate was not incorporated into the structure of majority effect. Such an integration process took several decades, bringing visible results only in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Currently, the political structure of the Senate is based on the domination of two parties: the Republicans (until 2015: the Union for a Popular Movement – *Union pour un mouvement populaire*, UMP), and the PS. The political role of other groups has been clearly reduced. Thus, the tendencies in the party system perceived through the prism of the composition of the first chamber, have become clearly noticeable in the second chamber (Jakubiak, 2016).

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<sup>9</sup> This danger is the most serious in the systems where both chambers can adopt a motion of no confidence independently of one another. The government is then at double risk. This worsens, at least in theory, its actual position, negatively affecting the level of political stability of the body.

What is more, attention should be paid to the fact that during the first five decades the French Senate was rather centrist (at the beginning of the Fifth Republic), and then consistently centre-right. As mentioned earlier, only in 2011 left-wing parties gained some advantage in the Senate, which lasted exclusively until 2014. Such a political configuration of the French second chamber did not coincide, in many cases, with the political composition of the National Assembly. The latter was much less stable, as confirmed by the phenomenon of alternation of power carried out periodically from 1981 to 2002. The Senate remained then immunized with the frequent political changes in the first chamber. The centre-right maintained a solid majority, although senators continued to be traditionally more independent of the deputies in the National Assembly. This is what led to a situation in which the second chamber could become – during periods of left-wing governments – a stronghold of the parliamentary opposition. Alternation of power in the National Assembly did not mean automatic alternation in the Senate. In this respect, there was no connection between the two institutions<sup>10</sup>. The political composition of the second chamber was related more to the results of local elections than to the parliamentary ones. In such conditions the Senate could play the role of chamber of resistance to the political camp which dominated other state bodies (the presidency, the government, and the first chamber). As mentioned above, such political “separateness” of the Senate as an organ which may, though not necessarily, be included in the political structure of majority effect, does not, however, have a fundamental significance. The cause lies in the government’s irresponsibility before the second chamber, which does not encourage the government to seek support of senators (Boyer, 2011).

It is also worth noting that despite the said autonomy of the Senate, the second chamber has not become an object of a specific institutional engineering. The latter may be regarded as the introduction of legal changes, which aim to ensure the expected results as to how the political system works (in the political practice of the Fifth Republic one of such purposes was to minimise the risk of further periods of cohabitation). As far as the Senate is concerned, such engi-

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<sup>10</sup> From this point of view, some attention should be devoted to the relationship between the National Assembly and the Senate after the beginning of Emmanuel Macron’s presidency in 2017, as the far-reaching decomposition, in the legislative elections held in the same year, of the political structure of the first chamber has taken place (the marginalization of political formations which dominated the political scene in previous years and the emergence of a strong parliamentary representation of the political movement supporting the new president). However, analysis of this problem requires a longer time perspective.

neering would involve permanent inclusion of the second chamber into the construction of the majority effect (for example, by unifying the length of term of office of both chambers and the mode of selection of their members). At the same time, this would probably mean giving up the formula of incongruence of both chambers, which aim is to provide a diverse political representation in the French parliament as such. In conjunction with the aforementioned departure from the formula of cohabitation, the main result of such actions would be the consolidation of majority effect in a strong form, in which the majority of senators coincides with the majority of deputies in the National Assembly, and the dualistic executive is supported by the entire bicameral parliament. As a result, the likelihood of majority effect in a weak version would be significantly restricted. However, steps aiming at limiting the incongruence of the chambers have never been taken. The shortening of the term office of senators to six years, which was carried out in 2003, cannot be treated in this way. However, this kind of changes would have forced, if introduced, to answer the question of the sense of further maintaining such a transformed second chamber in the institutional structure. The possible amendments could also go in the opposite direction, which would lead to the weakening of the logic of majority effect (Boyer, 2011). This way of thinking is illustrated by unsuccessful reform of the second chamber, which was initiated by de Gaulle in the second half of the 1960s. His purpose was to remarkably reduce the role of the Senate, above all in legislative proceedings (Chapsal, 1984). In case of success, this reform would have led to a fundamental change in the structure of the French rationalised parliamentarianism. It seems that if the reform had not failed, the second chamber could no longer have been neutralised by the executive only if necessary (through the procedure of the last word of the National Assembly), but it would have been permanently marginalised as a result of one constitutional reform.

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## COMMENTS ON THE ISSUE OF THE INSTITUTION OF A NATIONWIDE REFERENDUM IN POLAND: THE CASE OF THE REFERENDUM OF 6 SEPTEMBER 2015

UWAGI NA TEMAT INSTYTUCJI REFERENDUM  
OGÓLNOKRAJOWEGO W POLSCE NA PRZYKŁADZIE  
REFERENDUM Z 6 WRZEŚNIA 2015 R.

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— ABSTRACT —

Polish politicians of different political options, especially while proposing new reforms, declare that citizens should have a say in many issues under discussion. In reality, however, instruments of direct democracy stipulated by the Polish constitution (The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997) and laws are not frequently applied (see: people's initiative, social consultations), both due to Polish people's low degree of public activity and because of the lack of parliamentary customs and the authorities' accompanying lack of willingness to work out new solutions by way of serious debate and considering the society's ambitions and expectations, also those representing positions others than those of the government majority.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the institution of a referendum in Poland and to present the approach of the Polish political class to the

— ABSTRAKT —

Polscy politycy reprezentujący różne barwy partyjne w procesie planowania kolejnych reform i zmian jednoznacznie deklarują, że obywatele powinni mieć zagwarantowany głos w debacie publicznej. W rzeczywistości jednak instrumenty demokracji bezpośredniej, które wprowadzają przepisy obowiązującego prawa, nie są z reguły stosowane (patrz np. inicjatywa obywatelska, konsultacje społeczne w procesie ustawodawczym). Wśród powodów tego stanu rzeczy można w szczególności wskazać na niski poziom aktywności politycznej Polaków oraz kulturę polityczną przejawiającą się w postaci braku zwyczajów parlamentarnych lub dobrej woli większości rządzącej w zakresie inicjowania współpracy przy tworzeniu nowych rozwiązań prawnych.

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest omówienie instytucji referendum w Polsce na przykładzie

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institution of a nationwide referendum using the example of the referendum of 6 September 2015. We also discuss the history of this institution in Poland and address the issue of its legal foundations, as well as present arguments of the followers and opponents of this form of direct democracy. It is also necessary to analyse the motives behind the initiating entity's decision concerning the organisation of a nationwide referendum from a broader perspective and to evaluate its implications in the sphere of politics.

**Keywords:** referendum, citizen rights, electoral campaign, political system

referendum z 6 września 2015 r. Przedmiot rozważań będą stanowić uregulowania prawne dotyczące jego przeprowadzenia oraz prezentacja argumentów zwolenników i przeciwników wykorzystania tej formy demokracji bezpośredniej w obliczu trwającej kampanii wyborczej. Analizie zostaną poddane także motywy, które towarzyszyły decyzji prezydenta RP o zorganizowaniu w 2015 r. referendum ogólnokrajowego. Ocena będzie dotyczyć także jego politycznych skutków.

**Słowa kluczowe:** referendum, prawa obywatelskie, kampania wyborcza, system polityczny

Poland is not Switzerland. Despite numerous assurances from Polish political elites and citizens' expectations, the quality of Polish democracy, particularly of political debate, which is full of negative emotions, is far from this model. There is a popular saying in the Polish language: "to work like a Swiss clock". It refers to conscientiousness when it comes to fulfilling one's duties. Other qualities that come to our minds when we think of Swiss people are: accurate, thorough, diligent, inquisitive, reliable, methodical, careful, and punctual. All these personal traits are not specific to Polish people, though. For Poles it is always too early until it is too late (Malaparte, 2004).

We are totally different nations. These differences concern not only the standard of living, the way professional obligations are treated, customs, religiousness, and the political system, but also the way the idea of the common good is defined and built. It does not change the fact that each time we talk about the institution of a referendum in Poland, we always seek analogy to Swiss constitutional solutions (Sarnecki, 1978). It is obvious that what is the foundation and undoubted value of the democratic system is citizens' right to directly participate in the exercise of state authority. It is reflected not only in their right of legislative initiative (Jabłoński, 2002; Eckhardt, n.d.) or the people's veto, which is stipulated in some national laws, e.g., in Switzerland. Under this law, proper entities (citizens) have the right to object to an act that is due to enter into force. It is also materialised in the form of electoral laws – stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (*Journal of Laws*, 1997) – implemented during elections and in the institution of a referendum (Linder, 1996).

The aim of this paper is to discuss the institution of a referendum in Poland and to present the approach of the Polish political class to the institution of a nationwide referendum using the example of the referendum of 6 September 2015. We also discuss the history of this institution in Poland and address the issue of its legal foundations, as well as present arguments of the followers and opponents of this form of direct democracy<sup>1</sup>. It is also necessary to analyse the motives behind the initiating entity's decision concerning the organisation of a nationwide referendum from a broader perspective and to evaluate its implications in the sphere of politics.

It must be emphasised that Polish politicians of different political options, especially while proposing new reforms, declare that citizens should have a say in many issues under discussion. In reality, however, instruments of direct democracy (Podolak, 2015) stipulated by the Polish constitution (The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997) and laws are not frequently applied (see: people's initiative, social consultations), both due to Polish people's low degree of public activity and because of the lack of parliamentary customs and the authorities' accompanying lack of willingness to work out new solutions by way of serious debate and considering the society's ambitions and expectations, also those representing positions others than those of the government majority. The main research methods applied include text analysis, the analysis of statements made by politicians and representatives of the doctrine, the historical method, and the legal and institutional analysis.

It is estimated that since the 1990s, about 40 citizens' committees have been established in Poland, and nine of them have been able to make the parliament adopt the regulations they petitioned for. It must be noted that most draft acts prepared as part of people's initiative concern the interest of professional groups (e.g., teachers), issues of axiology and outlook (the problem of in vitro, prenatal protection, equal rights). In the 6<sup>th</sup> term of the Sejm of the RP, the biggest number of citizen bills was submitted since the act on the exercise of legislative initiatives, i.e., 19<sup>2</sup>. As Krzysztof Eckhardt notes, it accounts for almost

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<sup>1</sup> For more details on direct democracy see: Tallian, 1977.

<sup>2</sup> See: Citizen Bills. (n.d.). Citizen bill on changing the act on family planning, prenatal protection and conditions of the acceptability of abortion and some other acts, parliamentary paper no. 3727, was submitted on 9 November 2010; Citizen bill on the return to the Republic of Poland of people of Polish origin, who were deported and exiled by the government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, parliamentary paper no. 3605, was submitted on 15 September 2010; Citizen bill on changing the act on the educational system and the act on the income of local government units,

1% of all submitted bills (Eckhardt, n.d.). Moreover, by August 2011, two of them were passed as acts<sup>3</sup>. It should be noted here that in the 3<sup>rd</sup> term of the Sejm, five initiatives were formally submitted to the Marshal of the Sejm. There were eleven of them in the 4<sup>th</sup> term, while eight citizen bills were submitted to the parliament in the 5<sup>th</sup> term (*Sejm przeżywa zalew...*, 2011). This unsatisfactory state of affairs is also confirmed by the findings of Dariusz Skrzypiński's study, according to which only from 0.25% to 0.5% of submitted citizen bills become acts (Skrzypiński, 2010; Eckhardt, n.d.).

The Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection Adam Bodnar expressed the hope that the situation in which instruments of participative democracy are not sufficiently applied in Poland might be improved when the new act on petitions would enter into force on 6 September 2015 (*Journal of Laws*, 2014)<sup>4</sup>. This act provides precise constitutional legal foundations of this institution, which, as the experience of many countries shows, facilitates the development of civil society.

Bogusław Banaszak defines a referendum as an "institutional form which guarantees that entitled people can directly vote on the matters that are important for the state or a specific area" (Banaszak, Preisner, 1996). Maciej Jabłoński (2014a) indicates that what is "the essence of the contemporary model of

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parliamentary paper no. 3374, was submitted on 11 August 2010; Citizen bill on the activity of housing cooperatives, parliamentary paper no. 3317, was submitted on 2 July 2010; Citizen bill on changing the act on pensions and disability pensions from the Social Insurance Fund, parliamentary paper no. 3178, was submitted on 27 May 2010; Citizen bill on changing the act on the electoral law to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and the Senate of the Republic of Poland, the act on the electoral law to communal councils, district councils and provincial councils, and the act on the electoral law to the European Parliament, following the introduction of gender parity on the lists of candidates, parliamentary paper no. 2713, was submitted on 22 January 2010; Citizen bill on changing the act on the criminal code, parliamentary paper no. 2249, was submitted on 16 September 2009; Citizen bill on restoring the day free of work on Three Kings' Day, parliamentary paper no. 2063, was submitted on 17 April 2009; Citizen bill on changing the act on personal income tax, parliamentary paper no. 2000, was submitted on 31 December 2008; Citizen bill on changing the act on the right to free and concessionary fares in public transport, parliamentary paper no. 1892, was submitted on 23 March 2009; Citizen bill on restoring the feast day of Three Kings, parliamentary paper no. 826, was submitted on 24 June 2008; Citizen bill on changing the act on the educational system and the act on the income of local government units, parliamentary paper no. 605, was submitted on 24 April 2008; Citizen bill on changing the act on pensions and disability pensions from the Social Insurance Fund and some other acts, parliamentary paper no. 150, was submitted on 15 January 2008.

<sup>3</sup> The abovementioned act on quotas and the Act of 19 March 2009 on changing the act of the educational system and changing some other acts (*Journal of Laws*, 2009).

<sup>4</sup> The Senate of the RP adopted the act on petitions on 7 August 2014. President of the RP Bronisław Komorowski signed it on 27 August 2014.

a referendum is the fact that it enables all citizens who hold political rights (at least suffrage) to participate in the process of universal voting on the specific matter (matters) concerning the functioning of the state (or a specific territory), and resulting in legitimising or replacing the activity (or prior arrangements) of specific decision-making bodies (usually legislative and executive ones)<sup>5</sup>. According to Maria Marczevska-Rytko (2001), the nationwide referendum should address issues that are important for the whole society.

In the constitutional orders of democratic states it is a referendum that is the prominent institution of direct democracy (Grabowska, 2009; Leszczyńska, 2010; Marczevska-Rytko, 2001; Gallagher, Uleri, 1996). The institution of a referendum dates back to ancient times – Greek city-states and the Roman Republic. The contemporary version of this institution has been modelled after the 16<sup>th</sup> century Swiss people's assemblies (communes; *Zarys instytucji referendum...*, 2013; see also: Musiał-Karg, 2008; Marczevska-Rytko, 2010). In 1690, John Locke noted, in *The Second Treatise of Government*, that “if a controversy arise betwixt a Prince and some of the people, in a matter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great consequence, I think the proper Umpire in such a case should be the Body of the People”. As Matt Qvortrup (2015) points out, this philosophically has become the basis of the constitutional justifications for referenda. In the constitutional practice, a referendum became established in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

It is indicated in the doctrine that a referendum fulfils a number of important functions in democracies. According to scholars, it has the following predominant functions: „the society's right to directly use the attribute of sovereignty (e.g., while amending the constitution); the legitimising function, which consists in strengthening the people's democratic legitimation for the decisions made by the state through universal voting; the articulative function reflected in the fact that citizens have the right to express their preferences concerning issues important for the state; the scrutiny function, which gives citizens the right to influence the contents of decisions made by state authorities, which may result in adopting or rejecting them (*Zarys instytucji referendum...*, 2013; Rytel-Warzocho, 2011). Petr A. Kucherenko, Badma. V. Sangadzhiev and Murad C. Velibekov, in turn, list the following functions: “mandatory – a final decision on certain issues; – advisory – identifying, the mapping of the will of the people and formed by them

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<sup>5</sup> For more details on the concept of a referendum see also: Pietrzak, 1997; Zieliński, 1995.

a body of power; – regulatory – participation of the people in the system of social management based on the concepts of representative government and people's sovereignty" (Kucherenko, Sangadzhiev, Velibekov, 2016).

It is assumed that a referendum in democratic systems varies from consultative and optional to mandatory and binding (Nurmi, 1997).

In the period of the Polish Second Republic, the institution of a referendum had no constitutional foundations (Jabłoński, 2001). It was included neither in the provisions of the Constitution of 17 March 1921 nor in the articles of the Constitutional Act of 23 April 1935. After World War II, despite the lack of constitutional regulations, on 27 and 28 April 1946 the acts on holding the people's referendum was passed (*Journal of Laws*, 1946, No. 15, item 104, and *Journal of Laws*, 1946, No. 15, item 105). The referendum was finally held on 30 June. The decision of the state authorities was incidental and was of the political and propaganda nature. Its principal goal was to delay the universal election to the Sejm and to persuade the society that it may "co-decide on the most important constitutional matters". The results of the rigged referendum were used for fighting the opposition and establishing a unicameral parliament. After these goals were achieved, despite promises, the institution of a referendum was not introduced in the articles of later constitutions: the so-called Small Constitution of 1947, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 22 July 1952, and its further amendments. In the period of the Third Polish Republic, a referendum was introduced in the act of 6 May 1987 on amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which added a new par. 3 to art. 2, in the following wording: "The exercise of state power by the working people shall be done through expressing their will by way of a referendum. The principles and mode of a referendum shall be statutorily specified". On the same day, the Sejm also passed an act on social consultations and a referendum. The institution of a referendum was also stipulated in the next two amendments to the constitution of 1989, i.e., by the act of 17 October 1992 on mutual relations between the legislative and executive branches of the Republic of Poland and on local government and by the act of 23 April 1992 on the procedure of the preparation and adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (the so-called Small Constitution), which specified all points concerning the subject and object of a referendum. Without going into much detail, it is worth noting that the first referendum in free Poland was held on 18 February 1996. It was the referendum on the issue of granting property rights to citizens, referred to as the people's referendum (*The Regulation...*, 1995; *The Resolution of the Sejm...*, 1995). It was also in the form of voting in

a referendum held in 7 and 8 June 2003, that the decision on Poland's accession to the European Union was made (*Zarys instytucji referendum...*, 2013).

At present, along with the articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Pietrzak, 1997), the institution of a referendum is specified by some statutes and regulations, i.e., the act of 14 March 2003 on nationwide referendum (*Journal of Laws*, 2003; see also: Uziębło, 2003), the act of 15 September 2000 on a local referendum (*Journal of Laws*, 2000; see also: Czaplicki, Dauter, Kisielewicz, Rymarz, 2007), the Standing orders of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 30 July 1992 (M.P., 2016), and the Standing Orders of the Senate of the Republic of Poland of 23 November 1990 (M.P., 2014, 2015).

Referring only to Polish constitutional regulations in this respect<sup>6</sup>, it should be noted that, under art. 4 par. 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, "Supreme power in the Republic of Poland shall be vested in the Nation", which exercises it indirectly or through its representatives (art. 4 par. 2). Moreover, under art. 62 par. 1 of the fundamental law, Polish citizens at the age of at least 18 have the right to participate in a referendum<sup>7</sup>. The institution of a referendum is also used when the parliament debates on an international agreement, which grants "an international organisation or an international authority the powers of state authorities on some matters". Under art. 125<sup>8</sup> in relation with art. 90 par. 1–2 of the Constitution, a nationwide referendum may be held in respect of matters of particular importance to the state [which also includes receiving citizens' approval of the ratification of an international agreement]<sup>9</sup>.

Zbigniew Witkowski and Maciej Serowaniec (2016) examine the institution of a nationwide referendum, analysing it in the context of the empowerment of the society, processes of strengthening political and legal culture in the country, and using democratic lawmaking procedures.

The subjects entitled to call a nationwide referendum include: the Sejm (the decision is made by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half

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<sup>6</sup> For more details see: Jabłoński, 2002a; Górka, Litwin, 2008.

<sup>7</sup> In the case of a nationwide referendum, the right to vote has the nature of the so-called exclusive citizen right (see also: art. 2 par. 1 of the act on a nationwide referendum). Foreigners cannot participate in referenda concerning issues specified under art. 125 par. 1, art. 90 par. 3, and art. 235 par. 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. In the case of a local referendum, under art. 2 par. 1 of the act, "residents of the local government unit, as members of the local government community, express their will by way of voting".

<sup>8</sup> See: Garlicki, 2001, p. 8.

<sup>9</sup> See also: Jabłoński, 1999.

of the statutory number of deputies) and the President of the Republic with the consent of the Senate (in this case, the consent is given by an absolute majority vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of senators)<sup>10</sup>. The Supreme Court determines the validity of a referendum, deeming its result binding if more than half of the number of those having the right to vote have participated in it<sup>11</sup>.

Moreover, under art. 170 of the Polish fundamental law, a local referendum is held with respect to matters concerning a self-governing community. The Constitution lists such cases, which include, for example, the dismissal of an organ of local government established by direct election. It must be noted that this exemplification had the nature of an open catalogue. The principles of and procedures for conducting this type of a referendum are specified by statutory regulations.

Chapter XII of the Constitution of the RP is entitled *Amending the Constitution*. Also this part of this act, which constitutes the foundation of each democratic state, includes provisions concerning a nationwide referendum. The constitution-makers specify that if the entitled subjects (at least one fifth of the statutory number of deputies, the Senate or the President of the RP) submit a bill to amend the Constitution which relates to chapters I, II or XII, they are obliged to submit to the Marshal of the Senate – within 45 days of the adoption of the bill by the Senate – the motion to hold a confirmatory referendum. The Marshal is then obliged to order the holding of a referendum within 60 days from the date of receipt of the application. Under the Constitution, the amendment to the Constitution is accepted if the majority of those voting express their support (art. 235 of the Constitution).

Under the binding act of 15 September 2000, a local referendum is held on the territory of a commune, district or province. The voting may concern subjects such as self-taxation or dismissing a decision-making body chosen in elections, as well as a commune leader, mayor or city president before the end of their term. A local referendum may be called at the initiative of a decision-making body or inhabitants with voting rights: 10 per cent of commune residents or 5% of province residents. As M. Jabłoński indicates, the voting is deemed valid when the electoral threshold has been reached. The results of a local referendum are binding when at least 30% of those with voting rights have participated in it. If

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<sup>10</sup> For more details see: Jarosz, 1994.

<sup>11</sup> See: Chapter IV of the Constitution of the RP..., 1997.

the referendum concerns the dismissal of a local government body chosen in direct elections, it is valid if not less than three fifths of those who participated in the election of this body voted in it (art. 55 of the act on a local referendum)<sup>12</sup>.

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At the initiative of Bronisław Komorowski, on 6 September 2015, the first nationwide referendum in five years was held. The president submitted his bill to hold a nationwide referendum to the Senate on 13 May 2015. The bill was proceeded with unprecedented haste. Within one week, it was approved by three Senate committees and was made the subject of a plenary sitting (Senate document 899). The moment this initiative was announced, the observers of the Polish political scene had no doubts that it was politically motivated. The decision on this matter was made in an unusually short time, and the preparations were full of chaos and lacked consistency. Not only experts, constitutionalists, but also citizens believed that the real aim of the referendum was to win the voters of Kukiz'15 party, and thus seal the victory of Bronisław Komorowski in the 2<sup>nd</sup> round of the presidential election, rather than discuss important constitutional issues (Witkowski, Serowaniec, 2016). Critics were also abundant among the voters of the then president. They noted that “the institution of a referendum cannot be used only for taking over resolutions and decisions that the Constitution explicitly specifies as lying within the powers of the parliament or other state authorities” (Garlicki, 2001).

As it was expected, the referendum was not deemed valid. A few days before voting, as many as 47% of Poles did not know what the questions would be. 51% of those eligible to vote declared that they knew the subject of the referendum (*Co drugi Polak nie wie...*, 2015). The turnout appeared to be the lowest in the history of this institution in Poland, reaching only 7.8%. Commenting on low attendance, one of the advocates of the idea of single-seat constituencies, Paweł Kukiz said in Monika Olejnik's show that “the number of people voting in the referendum cannot be considered to be a huge disappointment, because, after all, three million citizens turned out at the polling stations. It is a success, bearing in mind the fact that the questions were formulated ineffectually, and for a few months we have been observing a hate campaign against this referendum”. For-

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<sup>12</sup> See also: Jabłoński, 2014b.

mer Prime Minister Leszek Miller, one of the present leaders of the Democratic Left Alliance, judged that the referendum had been “a total failure. 100 million zlotys is equivalent to 400 thousand sets of books for school students or three thousand children in new kindergartens. All this went down the drain yesterday. “This referendum was called as the panic reaction after the first round of presidential election. Komorowski and his team imagined that if they appealed to the supporters of Kukiz, they would swing the balance in their favour. Now President Komorowski is bitterly aware that he was mistaken” (Oficjalne wyniki referendum..., 2015). Government spokesman Cezary Tomczyk was much less critical, saying that “the turnout was low, but for me it is largely the failure of Pawel Kukiz and of the slogans that he bandied around on the presidential campaign, and later in the referendum campaign” (Oficjalne wyniki referendum..., 2015). President’s counsellor, Prof. Tomasz Nałęcz, stated that “[it] was torpedoed due to party leaders’ joining forces, although I admit that some of them, owing to their political closeness to the president, expressed more understanding for the idea” (*Prof. Nałęcz: Referendum utrupili liderzy partyjni...*, 2015).

As the reasons of the failure of the president’s concept, scholars mostly pay attention to imprecisely formulated questions, which concerned: changing the electoral law in the elections to the Sejm of the RP, the system of financing of political parties by the state budget, and introducing a principle that any doubts pertaining to the interpretation of the tax law will be interpreted in the taxpayer’s favour. As Tomasz Adam accurately noted, it was the constitutionality of the questions that raised doubts among experts. Out of five legal opinions, only two, prepared by Prof. Wojciech Orłowski and Prof. Marek Chmaj, deemed their conformity to the fundamental law (*Opinie prawne w przedmiocie zgodności...*, 2015; see also: Adam, 2016). The other experts pointed out that the positive answer to the question on single-seat constituencies would require amending the constitution. As a result, citizens would gain the right of initiative with respect to amending the fundamental law, which is not stipulated in any binding constitutional regulations. According to Marcin Michał Wiszowaty, it is unconstitutional to treat a referendum as the form of “pressure from the executive branch on the legislature, with the application of the institution of a referendum in order to achieve desired results in the sphere that does not lie within the powers of the executive (the specific amendment to an act, the specific amendment to the Constitution). This can be classified as trying to ignore legislative bodies when introducing changes to the law” (Wiszowaty, 2015; see also: Adam, 2016). The legal opinions also referred to the lack of precision in the formulation of the

second question and to the ongoing legislative process of the revision of the regulations concerning the financing of political parties. It was emphasised that this kind of the president's initiative, which relates to the issues that have already been considered by the parliament, may be deemed to be the executive's attempt to interfere with the powers of the legislature. In the case of the third question, it was also pointed out that it concerned the ongoing legislative proceedings (*Opinie prawne w przedmiocie zgodności...*, 2015). What is more, Marcin Michał Wiszowaty noted that the principle mentioned in the question was already binding in the Polish tax law (Wiszowaty, 2015; see also: Adam, 2016).

Krystyna Pawłowicz (2015), in turn, stated that "in the matters of amending the Constitution, only 'the confirmatory referendum' rather than 'the pre-constitutional one' is acceptable".

## CONCLUSION

In political systems, institutions of direct and indirect democracy coexist (Nurmi, 1997).

It is indicated in the literature that the degree to which citizens exercise their right to launch people's initiative reflects the level of participatory democracy in the state. In my opinion, although there is no doubt that this fact should be considered to be a significant measure in this respect, one cannot forget about other, equally important, determinants. A referendum plays a crucial role in representational democracies if due attention is paid to its proper arrangements (Nurmi, 1997).

Gordon Smith classified Polish referenda as controlled referenda, i.e., the ones in which it is up to the government whether it will be held and when and what will be voted (Witkowski, Serowaniec, 2016; Rachwał, 2010).

The referendum of 2015, just like the earlier ones, was prepared with too much haste (*Henryk Wujec o referendum...*, 2015). Such a fast pace of proceedings could not be rationally justified. It was undoubtedly an element of the ongoing political battle, which was quickly deciphered by voters. The opposition expressed accusations of its rights' being violated and showing disrespect for the constitution. The opinions that the rules of democracy and principles of constitutional culture are infringed were also frequent. However, the political class made a decision – not for the first and probably not for the last time – to treat it as a tool for achieving its own goals. As Tomasz Adam notes, the Senate of

the RP constitutes a certain barrier to the unconstitutionality of the referendum proposed at the president's initiative. In the face of the ongoing battle for the victory in the presidential election, however, it was political considerations that played the key role here. Therefore, we should once again emphasise the role of the Constitutional Tribunal in the political system of the state. As the same author points out, this court should obligatorily control referendum proceedings (Adam, 2016).

The existing body of literature provides a number of positive effects of the application of direct democracy tools in established democracies. On the other hand, one cannot ignore threats that result from using them for particular purposes, especially in authoritarian states. Leaders of political parties, who often cynically formulate their goals and programmes, initiate referenda on the basis of their own calculations and benefits (Setala, 1997). Witkowski and Serowaniec express the opinion that "as the result of the quality of human mind, referenda have a natural tendency to become a personal plebiscite, which is about being in favour or against a particular politician or group who are the authors of the bill to be voted. The content, strengths and weaknesses of the bill itself become unimportant" (Witkowski, Serowaniec, 2016).

Despite assurances from the Presidential Palace, the referendum of 2015 could not contribute to an increase in the degree of citizens' involvement in public affairs. In fact, the effect was totally adverse. Citizens dissociated themselves from politics, deciding not to participate, especially as the issues raised in the referendum were not understood by the majority of society (Witkowski, Serowaniec, 2016).

Poland's previous experience, in which referenda have been poorly prepared in terms of organisation and content, seem to prove the thesis that, in the political practice, this institution is used by political parties (which is quite fortunate in this case) as a weapon in the political battle. This rather negative picture of a referendum is reinforced by the fact that referendum campaigns are rarely accompanied by a sober, pragmatic and content-related campaign. They in turn involve manipulations, political calculations and mere politicking (Rachwał, 2010).

Such a perception of the goals of this institution generates a number of constitutional problems, while other subjects, including citizens, undermine the meaning of a referendum, usually expressing negative opinions about it.

One cannot oppose the view that imprecisely formulated referendum questions may lead to a multitude of interpretations, which in turn reduces citizens'

interest. Constitutional experts emphasise that imprecise and faulty questions cannot serve as the basis for clear conclusions and settlements. Hastily planned and conducted referenda lead to the intensification of political disputes and to the deepening of divisions in the society, negatively affecting citizens' political involvement (Witkowski, Serowaniec, 2016). Moreover, as Z. Witkowski and M. Serowaniec (2016) point out, what makes a referendum unpopular in the Polish political reality is the lack of the established tradition of participation in it and the common conviction that citizens do not have a real impact on state matters.

A.V. Dicey considers a referendum to be “the one available check on party leaders” and “nothing more nor less than a national veto” (Qvortrup<sup>2015</sup>; see also: A.V. Dicey to Lord Salisbury, 1892).

According to Giovanni Sartori (1987): “The gist is that the greater the number of people involved, the less effective is their participation – and this is to the vanishing point. Thus, when vast territories and entire nations are involved, direct democracy becomes an unusable formula. I have also and concurrently held that an electronic, «referendum democracy», while technically feasible, would be disastrous and, in all likelihood, suicidal”.

In Latin, *referre* – means to ‘to refer back’ and is understood as the “first step towards more democracy” (Qvortrup<sup>2015</sup>).

The existing body of literature provides a number of opinions of both the supporters and opponents of the institution of a referendum. Those in favour of a referendum quote the following arguments, presented in the table below.

**Table 1.** Arguments of the supporters of the institution of a referendum

Arguments
A referendum makes it possible for members of a given society (entitled citizens of the state or members of a local community) to speak (express their opinion or will) through taking a specific position on the issue which is the subject of a question asked in a referendum.
Universal voting in a referendum strengthens the democratic legitimation of the sovereign (people, Nation) for decisions made at the state level; it confirms its role as the source of legitimisation of political decisions.
A referendum makes it possible for the sovereign (people, Nation) to make decisions in public matters, in a transparent way, without political elites' being involved.
A referendum makes it possible for the sovereign to participate in the exercise of power personally and to influence the functioning of the state, as well as limiting the omnipotence of the parliament, especially with regard to the pursuit of particular interests. Thus, it enables the voter to free themselves from the dominion of a legislature controlled by privileged or minority interests.

Arguments
It educates the voter and makes them directly interested in legislation.
It enables direct contact between the legislators and voters and gives the legislators an added sense of responsibility in proposing laws, making them less likely to propose undesirable or useless measures.
Wire pullers and bribers aspire to use money and influence to have measures especially advantageous to them passed by a legislature. If they realise such measures – it may be subsequently rejected by the people.

Source: *Zarys instytucji referendum...*, 2013; *The Referendum in Theory and Practice*, 1924.

The opponents of a referendum quote the following arguments, presented in the table below.

**Table 2.** Arguments of the opponents of the institution of a referendum

Arguments
Resorting to a referendum results in inconsistencies in the law.
It decreases citizens' respect for participatory government; it is a kind of vote of no confidence in the activity (in parliament) of democratically elected representatives.
It is time-consuming and protracts the decision-making process.
Its organisation and conduct involves high costs.
The lack of understanding the subject of voting, resulting from insufficient knowledge. This leads to vulnerability to manipulation within the framework of the referendum campaign, which may in turn hamper the objective and well-thought out settlement of the problem.
Each referendum may turn into a sort of popularity contest rather than being the content-related settlement of an important issue (of importance for the state or a local community) raised in the referendum.
Citizens' passivity, their lack of willingness to participate in political ventures usually results in low attendance.
A referendum is in direct opposition to representative government.
It leaves a possibly more enlightened minority at the mercy of a possibly less enlightened majority.
It is not a true expression since great numbers do not cast any vote.
It detracts from the authority of the legislative bodies.
Confusion is caused in the minds of the voters "by the avoidable complexity" of the ballot.

Source: *Zarys instytucji referendum...*, 2013; *The Referendum in Theory and Practice*, 1924.

One must agree, although not uncritically, with the opinion that referenda, especially those at the local level, "provide the voter a unique opportunity to shape public activity" (Mikesell, Blair, 1974). It must be remembered, however, that a referendum will not play this role if the political elites treat it as a measure of popularity of their party or as an element of the battle for power.

The Polish political class has always had doubts when it came to the instrument of direct democracy, particularly a referendum. Z. Witkowski and M. Serowaniec note that it was already at the stage of drafting the constitution that left-wing politicians talked about a threat of a “permanent referendum republic”, which would become a “very dangerous gate for numerous initiatives that lead to deep divisions within the society and are a burden to the state budget. They believe that a referendum can effectively influence the work of the parliament, thus generating concerns that might destabilise the functioning of the state, especially as referenda were expected to concern mainly the matters of conscience” (Witkowski, Serowaniec, 2016).

Having this in mind, it must be stressed that for a referendum to contribute to the strengthening of civil society in the state by encouraging all those eligible to vote to participate, it must be thoroughly prepared. Time matters as well – a referendum should be preceded by a serious and unhurried debate. Referendum questions should concern important issues and must be formulated in the manner that will not raise doubts and generate disputes (Witkowski, Serowaniec, 2016; Rachwał, 2010). The initiators of the referendum of 8 September 2015 definitely failed to fulfil these conditions, and, as a result, voters refused to take part in thus party-like plebiscite. By deciding not to participate, they protested against using the institution of a referendum for one’s particular purposes.

The Internet was buzzing with disputes. The idea of holding a referendum was heavily criticised: “A party for 100 million, and the party-room is empty”, “Where is our 100 million?!” “We are witnessing one of the first votes where the lack of participation is the fulfilment of citizens’ duty”, “Does anyone know anyone who’s going?”, “Today’s referendum is a sad day for democracy”, “Poles sense falsehood and hypocrisy a mile off, that is why they stayed at home”, “It seems evident that we have beaten the record low turnout”. One of internet users summed up the situation in strong, though justified words: “Today we can say no – to all parties and political options, with our joint efforts we were able to disgrace the idea of a referendum” (*Zakończyło się referendum...*, 2015). Internet users’ sceptical view was in line with experts’ opinions. Tomasz Lis wrote on Twitter: “There has never been such an election silence. The biggest silence was in polling stations”.

When Bronisław Komorowski was asked to comment, he said that “a referendum became an orphan after I lost the election. There was no one who would call for participation in a referendum, and parties showed no interest. I thought

Paweł Kukiz would put more heart and energy into explaining what the system of single-seat constituencies is really about” (*Komorowski: Referendum zostało sierotą...*, 2015).

To conclude, it should be pointed out that a referendum is usually an institution of political democracy. As M. Marczevska-Rytko (2001) notes, history shows that it is often used by undemocratic regimes as a PR tool to obtain the confirmation of the people’s support for the system.

The referendum of September 2015 was an example of a total fiasco of the president’s referendum initiative. The reasons included: imprecise questions, faultily formulated questions, excessive haste in preparing the initiative, debate reduced to a minimum, and inappropriate time due to the ongoing electoral campaign and using the institution of a referendum for political purposes (*Cowynika z referendalnego...*, 2015). Moreover, the issues to be voted were not important enough to hold a referendum. Professor Krzysztof Skotnicki, Chairman of the Polish Constitutional Society, in the programme *Rozmowa Dnia* (*The Talk of the Day*) in Radio Łódź rightly commented that such a referendum [as the referendum of 6 September 2015, author’s note] means “spoiling democracy. Polish people, who are little interested in political life, can become even more discouraged to participate in elections [...] none of the political forces has even tried to explain what the questions are about” (Berkowska, 2015).

A referendum is an institution which, according to Andrzej Antoszewski and Ryszard Herbut (1997), may be considered in terms of benefits and losses of political parties. Both scholars point out that the practice accompanying the application of this tool (how often and with respect to what matters it is called) rather than the act whether the regulations concerning its introduction are of the constitutional importance. This thesis is confirmed by the example of the referendum of September 2015. The decision to hold it was politically motivated – which has been mentioned earlier – but it benefited neither the governing party nor the opposition. Its implications should be discussed from the perspective of losses for the system. The referendum prepared in such a manner reduced the already low level of Polish people’s trust in the political class and undermined the foundations of this important institution, which – in a democratic state – should be used to increase citizens’ interest in the sphere of public life.

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# INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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## TWO BRITISH REFERENDA ON THE EU, TWO DIRECTIONS OF TRAVEL

DWA BRYTYJSKIE REFERENDA W SPRAWIE UE,  
DWA KIERUNKI PODRÓŻY

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— ABSTRACT —

EEC/EU membership has been one of the thorniest issues in British politics over the last 45 years. The 1975 referendum confirmed the UK's will to stay in the EEC, but it failed to put to rest the argument over Europe. The 2016 referendum took Britain into the opposite direction, but it also reinstated the issue of the EU to the prime slot in British politics, where it is going to stay for the many years needed to settle the new relationship with the EU. The main drivers behind both referenda were the power struggle between the main parties and the gradual entrenchment of Euroscepticism as the dominating standpoint in British right-wing politics. The substantive concerns with EEC/EU membership were merely a backdrop to the partisan battles leading to both referenda, but the crucial differentiating factor in 2016 was the Conservative perception of the threat posed by UKIP. The Eurozone crisis and austerity policies at home added to the potent mix of disillusion

— ABSTRAKT —

Członkostwo Wielkiej Brytanii w EWG/UE było jednym z najbardziej drażliwych problemów w polityce brytyjskiej w ciągu ostatnich 45 lat. Referendum z 1975 r. potwierdziło wolę pozostania Wielkiej Brytanii w EWG, ale nie udało mu się wyciszyć sporów na temat Europy. Referendum w 2016 r. poprowadziło Brytyjczyków w odwrotnym kierunku, niemniej przywróciło kwestię UE do naczelnego miejsca w polityce brytyjskiej, gdzie pozostanie przez wiele lat celem uregulowania nowych stosunków z UE. Głównymi powodami obu referendów były walka o władzę między partiami politycznymi i stopniowe umacnianie się eurosceptycyzmu jako dominującego punktu odniesienia w polityce brytyjskich ugrupowań prawicowych. Istotne obawy związane z członkostwem w EWG/UE stanowiły jedynie tło kampanii zwolenników, prowadzące do obu referendów, ale istotnym czynnikiem różnicującym w 2016 r. było postrzeżenie przez Partię Konserwatywną zagrożenie ze

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among the voters, who became receptive to promises of return to past glories of the UK freed from the shackles of Brussels.

**Keywords:** Brexit, referendum, Euroscepticism, David Cameron, voting, political parties

strony UKIP. Kryzys w strefie euro i polityka oszczędności w kraju przyczyniły się do silnego rozczarowania wyborców, którzy stali się otwarci na obietnice powrotu do chwalebnej przeszłości Zjednoczonego Królestwa, uwolnionego z kajdan narzuconych przez Brukselę.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Brexit, referendum, eurosceptycyzm, David Cameron, głosowanie, partie polityczne

## INTRODUCTION

The main drivers behind the two nation-wide UK referenda on the EEC and EU membership, in 1975 and in 2016 respectively, cannot be reduced to just the questions that were placed on the ballot papers. The background of both reflected the complex political and economic issues dominating the EEC/EU and the UK at the time. The 1975, just three years from the official signing on, the UK was conflicted over the level of contributions that it was asked to pay – perceived as much too high; and the price of agricultural products artificially hiked by the CAP. Politically, the model of neoliberal free-markets dominating the EEC was an anathema for the Labour party.

In 2016, the main issues behind the formal in/out question were different, as was the main reason for calling the referendum in the first place. Although the growing anti-immigrant sentiments, fuelled by the tabloid press on the back of the 40 unbroken year of Euroscepticism played a vital part, the more direct reason was much closely related to changing landscape of political allegiances, which were perceived to threaten the established share of political influences. The single most important factor was the stratospheric rise of UKIP confirmed in its 2014 success at EP elections. This was followed by UKIP's excellent result in the UK general elections in 2015 where it scored almost 4 million votes, which represented 12.6% share of the overall votes cast. Under the notoriously unrepresentative "First Past the Post" voting system this result translated into just one UKIP MP, which does not alter the fact of impressive 9.5% growth in UKIP's votes share since 2010 (*Election 2015*).

The following research questions were put forward in the article: 1) What were the main drivers behind both referenda? 2) Was the partisan politics and

the Eurosceptic post-imperial nostalgia the most decisive factors driving the campaigns and determining the results of the referenda? 3) What explains such divergent results in 1975 and 2016?

### WHY REFERENDUM IN 1975?

The political system in the UK is a classic example of a democracy based on representation, where the most important decisions are made by the parliament. The specificity of the British system stems from the absence of codified constitution, and the uncertainty as to its exact contents. The most common elements included in the UK Constitution are statutes, common law, constitutional conventions, prerogative powers, international treaties as well as writings of the leading constitutional theorists such as Dicey, and Bagehot. Tony Wright MP suggested that “the constitution is... whatever it is at any one time and we make it up as we go along” (House of Lords, 2001–2002).

Referendum in the UK is an advisory and optional vote. The decision to conduct one is made by the parliament in every instance and follows from the accepted political option and not from the requirement of constitutional practice. The results of the referendum are advisory and are subject to interpretation by the parliament, which ultimately determines whether the will of the people expressed in the popular vote will be confirmed by authorities’ decision (Foster, 2016; Bokszczyński, 2003). The place of the referendum in the British political system is determined by the facts that there is no constitutional representation of institution of direct democracy, and there is no single general law about referendum as well. Matters related to the organisation of the referendum and the rules regarding campaign are each time regulated by the relevant legal act. The EU Referendum Act that introduced the Brexit referendum, was passed by MPs at second reading on June 9, 2015 by 544 in favour to 53 against (Duff, 2016).

In United Kingdom there were only three national referendums held: in 1975, on continuation of participation in the European Economic Community (Dibout, 1976), in 2011, on the change of electoral system, and in 2016, regarding the issue of continuation of EU membership. The White Paper on the referendum states that the government agrees to the referendum’s binding outcome, although from a legal point of view popular vote’s role was only advisory (Butler, 2001). The referendum in 1975 was proposed by the Labour Party backbenchers (Wistrich 2001). This was met with sharp criticism from the leading politicians

of all parties. Despite this, the House of Commons adopted the Referendum Act in April 1975. The referendum in 2016 was carried out on the basis of the 2015 EU Referendum Act (Weatherill, 2016).

The decision to hold a referendum on the continuation of membership in the EEC in 1975 resulted primarily from internal problems in the Labour Party and the struggle for power between Labour and the Conservatives. Whereas in 2016 it was the result of a backbenchers rebellion over the threat of UKIP. By putting the in/out EU referendum on the table, David Cameron attempted to strengthen his position among the Conservatives backbenchers, and, by fending off the threat of UKIP, to bolster the standing of Conservatives as the governing party.

#### BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES REGARDING CONTINUATION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE EEC IN 1975

The main political parties were in conflicting positions regarding the referendum on the continuation of British membership in the Common Market. During the referendum campaign, party disciplinary voting disappeared (Dutheil de la Rochère, 1989).

The continuation of membership was advocated by the so-called pro-European coalition formed ad hoc, which included leaders of the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, and the Liberal Party. The coalition brought together both the representatives of the opposition parties and the members of the ruling Labour Party. Within the main formations there were internal tensions regarding the speed and direction of European integration (Usherwood, 2002). Only the Liberal Party unequivocally adopted a pro-integrative attitude. On the opposing side were politicians from the left wing of the Labour Party, the majority of the trade unions and representatives of the right-wing movements from other political groups. Against United Kingdom's continued membership in the EEC were also peripheral parties: the Scottish National Party, the Scottish Labour Party, the Ulster Unionist Party, Plaid Cymru and the Communist Party (Pierce, Valen, Listhaug, 1983).

The idea of the referendum provoked mixed feelings in the Conservative Party, while Prime Minister Edward Heath was sceptical of this institution and maintained that the referendum would not be appropriate to carry out such a fundamental change in the political system. He supported his opinion by constitutional conventions, as well as his past political experiences (Kuzelewska,

2006). He emphasized that the parliamentary system was completely capable of making the final decision to join the EEC (Butler, Kitzinger, 1976). A number of Conservatives were reluctant to accept the presence of the United Kingdom in the Community and, although they were a minority (referred to as “Conservatives against the Treaty of Rome”), they argued in the *Sunday Telegraph* that conservatives should vote “no” because this way they could lead to the fall of Harold Wilson and his government (Butler, Kitzinger, 1976). Some activists of the Conservative Party wanted to be seen as a Eurosceptic fraction for whom the values of national independence and freedom were unquestionable. These groupings argued that accession could seriously compromise these principles (Alexandre-Collier, 2002). However, the majority of the Conservatives were pro-European, especially their leaders: Edward Heath, Margaret Thatcher, elected in March 1975 as the Conservatives’ leader, and William Whitelaw, her rival in the battle for leader’s position (King, 1977).

In the Labour Party the situation was more complex. This resulted in a sharp division within its ranks. In April 1970, the Labour unexpectedly lost the parliamentary elections, and the Conservatives came to power. Despite Prime Minister’s Harold Wilson previous initiative on the issue of membership, the moment when the Labour Party accepted its role as the opposition party, voices challenging the EEC membership became louder. Officially, the Labour Party was not against joining the EEC, but was opposed to the terms negotiated by the conservative government: “no Entry on Tory terms” – in particular the financial terms of membership (Bidegaray, Reynié, 1998). The consequence of Labour dissatisfaction was their boycott of the European Parliament and the decision not to take-up their seats by Labour MEPs (Haahr, 1992).

In 1970, the Labour left wing representative Anthony Wedgwood Benn proposed to the Labour Party leadership to hold a referendum on the UK membership in the EEC. This idea did not meet with the recognition of party colleagues, but became a challenge for the future policy of this formation (Butler, Kitzinger, 1976). For the third time in 1972, Tony Benn (already as chairman of the party) submitted the question of referendum, which was adopted by the National Executive Committee 13:11 (King, 1977). The party’s vice president, Roy Jenkins, protested against the tactics adopted by the Labourites. Firstly, in his view, the referendum should not be limited to one subject; secondly, it would lead to the division of political parties and the inconsistency of the government; and thirdly, it would probably be used as a weapon against the parliament (Butler, 1978).

Ultimately, the decision to hold a referendum was made by Prime Minister Harold Wilson as a result of an acute split in the ruling Labour Party, which threatened party disintegration (Morel, 1993). The question that was put to the voters on June 5, 1975 was: “Do you think the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (the Common Market)?”.

### WHY REFERENDUM IN 2016?

Taking the decision to hold the EU referendum places David Cameron at the centre of the debate. According to Inglehart and Norris, Cameron’s decision to offer the 2016 EU membership referendum was a way of using Britain’s European Union membership as a way to appease Eurosceptics within his party. Equally vital was the containment of UKIP’s growing popularity within traditional Conservative electoral base. The latter was of particular relevance, since the new Conservative government formed after the May 2015 elections had only a slim majority of twelve seats. This narrow margin and the just over 11 million votes cast for the Conservatives was uncomfortably close to the almost 4 million votes for UKIP, a party that was considered of marginal importance in the 2010 general elections, securing just below 1 million votes (*Elections 2010*). The rise of UKIP (which is a single-issues party: taking Britain out of the EU) was not just a development that needed to be taken seriously in itself. Potentially more serious was UKIP’s threat to the three main political parties. This threat has been confirmed in the referendum where the voting patterns are better explained by support for UKIP, rather than Labour. There was a very strong correlation between UKIP’s support and the Brexit vote (Goodwin, Heath, 2016). This correlation suggested that Labour might be losing its electoral base to UKIP.

Based on these UKIP-related context, it is likely that one of the main drivers behind Cameron’s decision was to offer the country a voice on the political issues that have been dominated by UKIP. More specifically, Cameron’s objective was to arrest UKIP’s electoral success by offering its voters a moderate, hence less extreme political “home” as an alternative. This was to be achieved by incorporating the UKIP political programme that promised to tackle the uncontrolled immigration from the EU, and to stand up to the bureaucratic, undemocratic and overbearing EU – a dominant in the UK perception of the EU. The expected outcome was an influx of UKIP voters to the Conservative party, and an eventual demise of UKIP. The final outcome of the June 8 general elections confirmed this

prediction. UKIP has been wiped-out of the mainstream UK politics (*Has the General Election...*, 2017).

Second main driver behind Cameron's EU referendum decision, although not entirely separate from the UKIP conundrum, lies within the Eurosceptic ranks of Conservative party. The issue of Europe has been causing tensions among the Conservative backbenchers for the past 40 years. "I believe and still believe that the fact that we hadn't had a referendum on this issue for 40 years, despite the fact that the European Union was changing... was actually beginning to poison British politics – it was certainly poisoning politics in my own party" (*Cameron Defends Decision...*, 2016).

These tensions intensified during the Conservative-Liberal Democrats coalition due to the Lib Dems strong pro-EU position which fed into these concerns (Oliver, 2015). In summary, the second key driver behind Cameron's decision was to appease the Eurosceptic Conservative backbenchers, and to "settle" the issues of Europe, and indirectly of UKIP, both of which were consuming parliamentary and governmental attention for far too long.

Additional key factor – of a different nature – in the decision to call the referendum was the muted reception in the UK of the *New Settlement for the UK Within the EU* negotiated by David Cameron in the European Council. Despite the apparent success of securing satisfactory agreement on all four areas listed in Cameron's letter of November 10, 2015 (the "emergency brake" on in-work benefits, the "adjustments" on child benefits, safeguards on Eurozone area governance and the EU competitiveness), the reaction of the media was almost universally hostile. *Daily Telegraph* described the deal as a "slap in the face for Britain" as it was clear that the settlement will not curb migration. The tabloid press displayed a high degree of viciousness in its dismissal of the Cameron's deal as insubstantial "pile of manure" (Greenslade, 2016).

#### THE POSITION OF BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES REGARDING CONTINUATION OF THE EU MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU IN 2016: UKIP AND THE TABLOIDS

There is a consensus confirming the existence of a "clear anti-EU bias among the British public" (Kellner, 2009). The main drivers behind it seems to be concerns that played a key role in the outcome of the EU referendum on June 23, 2016: British sovereignty, under threat from the power-grabbing undemocratic EU;

and immigration, seen as threatening British national identity and culture, and also as putting strain on housing and health services, and exerting downward pressure on wages and employment.

It can be argued that the growing contentiousness of the European issue over the years provided a “connective glue” to the national debate on the state of Britain’s economy and Britain’s role in Europe (Wallace, 2012). The specific parts that were being glued together included the flow of migrants into Britain, the Eurozone crisis, and policies of austerity at home. The party politics have been focused on scoring political points by using these issues in the main political parties’ manifestos aimed at undermining the EU. Wallace asked if the Eurosceptic public opinion forces political parties to take “defensive position on EU policies”, or if the political parties use the Eurosceptic rhetoric for their own political gain, and influence the public (Wallace, 2012). We suggest that these two factors are best seen as interwoven. Euroscepticism is a two-side coin – it is one of the strongest divisive issues politically and socially, but it is also one that has a strong rallying/unifying power for Eurosceptics of many political persuasions and political affiliation. The persistence and a huge political and emotive charge that is associated with Euroscepticism makes it an ideal target to be exploited for political gain. And that is what seemed to have happened: a number of politicians have whipped-up Euroscepticism over the years leading up to the June 23 referendum. Arguably, this could not have happened without the contribution of the rabidly anti-European tabloids.

It is clear that quality of the media debate influences public perception of politics (Fossum, Schlesinger, 2007). There are strong reasons to suggest that British media have been successful in infecting the British public with Euroscepticism of an aggressive variety. A contributing factor was the UK politicians’ tacit acquiescence to the hostility in the UK media’s style of reporting on Europe. Another, was the unavailability of any competing coverage of European matters on European level. The British people were never informed what the EU is and does. Instead, they were fed a diet of sustained, one-sided Euro-bashing (Fossum, Schlesinger, 2007). Immediately after the vote in the 2016 referendum, the top search on Google was for “What is the EU?” and “What is «Brexit»”?

The glaring absence of European-level newspapers, magazines, or TV channels arguably made it easier for the Murdoch-owned media empire to fill this gap with EU-hostile coverage. The *Daily Mail* and his editor-in-chief Paul Dacre contributed to this with his own brand of rabid Euroscepticism. The one-sided Euro-bashing was exacerbated by the gradual closure of British newspaper offices

in Brussels – from six in 2005 to only three that remained open in 2012. David Rennie in his report for the Centre for European Reform (CER) explains the reason for these closures by quoting a newspaper executive – “true Eurosceptics hate Europe so much that they don’t want to read about it” (Rennie, 2012). These developments made it possible to turn what should have been a conversation or a debate into a monologue, a one-sided anti-European rant of the Murdoch-owned papers, and the *Daily Mail*, the effectiveness of which has been strengthened by the scant coverage of the EU affairs in the independent printed media and the TV news services. The printed media in the UK are generally anti-European, with only some exceptions, such as *The Independent* and *The Guardian*. One of the more aggressively anti-European papers is *The Sun*, a Rupert Murdoch title, which is said to have a huge influence over the UK electorate. *The Sun*, and the Murdoch empire more generally, is widely considered as determining the final outcome of elections in the UK – the clearest example of such influence. With a circulation of 2.5 million (down from 3.5 million in 2003), *The Sun* is by far the most popular of the British tabloids, followed by the *Daily Mail*, at just under 2 million. By comparison, the quality broadsheet *The Guardian* sells only just over 200 thousand copies a day on average. Even the broadsheets and the TV coverage tend to veer towards the Eurosceptic in the wake of the Eurozone crisis.

The media seized on anti-European stirrings in the political debate already in the wake of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. It is clear that both politicians and the media must have sensed in the British public a receptive audience for their Eurosceptic rhetoric at that time. More importantly, the introduction of Eurosceptic discourse into the mainstream political debate, that gradually took place a decade or so after Maastricht, legitimised it and turned it into a respectable platform, in contrast with its previous fringe position associated with the UKIP and BNP. Such a move arguably facilitated a further “hardening” of the “hard Euroscepticism”, that is a fundamental opposition to political and economic integration with the EU understood as ‘a principled objection to the current form of integration in the European Union on the grounds that it offends deeply held values, or more likely, is the embodiment of negative values’ (Szczerbiak, Taggart, 2003). There is a strong correlation between affiliation with the Conservative party (and, most obviously, UKIP) and Euroscepticism of the “hard” variety (Clements, Nanou, 2012). However, Kopecky and Mudde critique the soft/hard distinction (2002).

The dramatic change in the British media treatment of European issues has often been described as “a journey [...] from permissive consensus to destructive

dissent”, or from “uninterested acquiescence” (Daddow, 2012) to spreading the “hard” version of Euroscepticism. However, Hooghe and Marks suggest that the level of Euroscepticism increased throughout Europe since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (2009). This transition may be best understood as a reflection of wider changes in political discourse on Europe deployed by successive UK governments and the main political parties (Daddow, 2012). The gradual hardening of anti-Europe narrative was also reflected in the media coverage of EU-related matters, which became “hysterical” and “sensationalist”, using the worst stereotypes (e.g., *Daily Mail*, 17 Aug. 2011, accused Germany of turning the Eurozone into a “Fourth Reich”). The politicians not only failed to counter such a tone of media reporting, but bolstered it by their own agenda: immigration and the referendum of the EU, leaving the public subjected to, in effect, a successful, concerted anti-EU propaganda campaign. This failure to counterbalance the EU debate led to accusations of politicians’ complicity in “denigrating the EU for party gain” (Daddow, 2012).

In contrast to the first EU referendum, the 2016 referendum was preceded by decades of tabloid mud thrown at everything European, with the two biggest selling papers, *The Sun* and *Daily Mail*, clearly taking the lead. The reasons for this switch of sides are complex, but relate mainly to the change of ownership from Maxwell to Murdoch, who is a rabid anti-European. When asked why does he hate Europe so much, Murdoch allegedly replied: “When I go into Downing Street they do what I say; when I go to Brussels they take no notice” (Martin, 2016). This campaign intensified in spring and summer of 2016. Two days before the referendum, *The Sun* devoted its first 10 pages to pro-Brexit coverage. There was barely a day in the period leading to June 23 without an anti-EU headlines in *Daily Mail*. The same paper branded the judges of the Supreme Court “the enemies of the people” after the court decision giving the Parliament, rather than Government, the right to decide if art. 50 TEU should be triggered. The justice secretary offered only very weak defence of judicial independence, stating the principle of press freedom as a key element of liberal state (*Brexit Ruling...*, 2016).

The successful shaping of the Brexit narrative by the tabloids fits in the Gramsci’s thesis of manufacturing “common sense”. This means the creation of assumptions that draw on traditions and taken-for-granted ideas to give meanings to new developments and to suggest solutions to new problems (Hall, O’Shea, 2014). The power of common sense manufacturing lies in shaping and influencing perceptions and points of view, rather than imposing one. It works

by aligning with the innate wisdom of common people by appearing intuitive and “obvious”.

Headlines such as: *Migrant Influx Is Threatening to Destroy Our Way of Life; Muslim Bus Driver ‘Put Children’s Lives at Risk’ by Stopping for Prayer; Benefit Cheats Are Spared Jail as Fraud Numbers Rocket*, arguably resulted in vast estimates of the number of immigrants, Muslims and benefit fraudsters (Beckett, 2016). The real figures are much smaller, by the perception once created is very difficult to change, as it fits with the common sense view of the majority of tabloid reading Brits.

As argued by Andy Beckett: “In an era when agreed facts are becoming rarer, and voters are increasingly impatient and distracted, but also disorientated by shock events, influencing how issues are talked about is more important than ever – possibly more important, in fact, than influencing elections” (Beckett, 2016).

The tabloid Euro-bashing clearly influenced not just the way the EU was talked about; it was successful in creating a particularly hostile reception of its policies and activities. The damage was relatively easy to inflict, as no media managed to counterbalance this with neutral, informative coverage of Europe. Positive stories related to the EU simply did not exist, not in the tabloids that dominate the media market, and not in the broadsheets. It is clear that the hard line anti-Europe media and the political class whose fortunes depend on the favourable headlines had a decisive impact on the vote in the EU referendum – “the way the media covers an EU political development is more prevalent and relevant to the public than often considered in the literature” (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2011).

In light of the above, the close result of the referendum might even be seen as a positive surprise. The reality, however, point out that the EU might not have been the primary issue for many voters, instead, it seems that immigration, hardship linked to George Osborn’s policies of austerity, shrinking public services and falling living standards might have been the primary drivers behind the vote to leave. The less obvious, and partly unexpected additional factors were as follows: “the cynical but failed strategy that Boris Johnson followed by heading the «Leave» campaign in an (unsuccessful) attempt to take over the Conservative party leadership, [...] public miscalculations by Leave voters under-estimating the impact of their actions, and the capacity of referenda to mobilize protest voting” (Inglehart, Norris, 2016).

## IMPERIAL SHADE OF BRITISH EUROSCEPTICISM

The Eurosceptic narrative employed by the “Leave the EU” campaign drew on the post-imperial nostalgia that reasserted British standing in the world as a “great trading nation” whose economy is underpinned by unmatched stability of its legal and political system. Any suggestion that trade relations outside of the EU might never match the current arrangements in terms of economic benefits for the UK are dismissed by arguments based on grandiose assertions linked directly to the post-imperial Euroscepticism. One of such arguments asserts that a number of countries, particularly British former colonies, will be very keen to sign trade deals with Britain, the rules of which will be dictated by the UK.

The strong bearing of nostalgia on the current shape of British Euroscepticism has been identified by the literature on this subject as one of the most common and pervasive threads. On the level of societal culture, the desire to bring back blue passports – as opposed to the red-cover ones introduced by the EU, the return of imperial system of weights and measures (including money), and the reinstatement of death penalty – were the other key nostalgic drivers behind the vote to leave (*Here's the Crazy Things...*, 2017).

Gifford, for instance, convincingly argued that the growing Euroscepticism in Britain can be best explained by the “structural susceptibility of the British post-imperial order to politics of populism” (Gifford, 2006). There seem to be number of key elements of such susceptibility: imperial mentality, British exceptionalism and national identity defined in opposition to Europe.

Imperial mentality was clearly one of the main reasons for the UK to stay outside of the three European Communities in the 1950s, stemming from the British Commonwealth – the source of Britain’s power and influence on international scene. By 1963, this power and influence started to wane. The dismantling of the empire threw Britain into a post-imperial hegemonic crisis. The main aspect of this crisis related to the gap between the imperial mentality shaped over two hundred years and the reality of the physical loss of the empire, coupled with the diminishing role of Britain in the post-WWII Europe. Part of this was the weakening of the special relationship between Britain and the US that formed during the WWII. The main reason was the US pressure for Britain to be more closely involved in the European integration in 1950, 1954, 1959–1960 and after 1989 (Wallace, 1991).

Related to the imperial mentality is the concept of British exceptionalism – the assertion that British political development, its history and culture, and even

its geographical location are unique, hence antithetical to Continental Europe. Such a construction, in turn, defined British national identity as incompatible with the European one, thus providing a fertile ground for Euroscepticism to offer a narrative that allowed to reclaim Britain's special status, which had eroded by the loss of the colonies. The distinctive concept of the British state which was built on the tradition of Magna Carta and English common law, centrality of Parliamentary sovereignty was used to project Britain as "a free country confronting the unfree European Continent" (Wallace, 1991).

Those cornerstones of the British constitutional arrangements are routinely contrasted with the EU's faceless bureaucracy and the infamous "democratic deficit". In particular, the rule of law and the legality principle entrenched in the constitution since Magna Carta and the English common law – described as democratic and responsive to the concerns of the people (Steillen, 2011). The sovereignty of Parliament, an elected assembly that represents the people, is seen as the very embodiment of popular democracy. Contrast with Hugo Brady's suggestion that "lectures" on this lustrous history of the British institutions is likely to irritate the other EU MSs, which all have "stories to tell about the uniqueness of their own legal systems" (2013). Those myths of national constitutionalism have been skillfully employed by the Eurosceptics to re-invent the national identity that has been in crisis after the fall of the British empire (Wallace, 1991; Gifford, 2006).

The development of Euroscepticism meant that the deep rifts and divisions over Europe never went away, as they run through the cross sections of social, economic and political groups and affiliates. Deep and often destructive divisions on most things European affected all major political parties and became one of the permanent features of British politics with UKIP and the Conservatives leading the field. The leading Eurosceptic party is obviously UKIP, followed closely by the Conservatives, where only 10 per cent of its MPs declare themselves Europhiles, with the biggest group – potential Eurosceptics – at 49 per cent, followed by potential leavers at 21 per cent, and leavers at 11 per cent (*Euroscepticism...*, 2015).

It is worth reminding ourselves that the main Eurosceptic at the 1975 referendum was the Labour party and its electorate. The 2016 referendum has seen not so much a reversal of this dynamics, as some dramatic shifts that defied party lines. The overall picture of voting patterns and political allegiances was complex, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss it more fully. One crucial negative correlation was that between significant number of traditional Labour

voters who opted for “Leave” despite the Labour party campaign for “Remain”. There was a positive link between the majority of Conservatives voting to leave the EU and the more than 90 per cent of UKIP votes.

### THE DRIVERS BEHIND THE 2016 REFERENDUM RESULT

In contrast to the first EEC referendum in 1975, the 2016 one presents a much more complex and unclear picture as to the reasons and politics behind it. Even more challenging would be to map the voting patterns on the map of party allegiances – as explained above. One of the key reasons behind this lack of clarity was the nature of arguments used by the two sides of the campaign – Vote Leave appealed to patriotic imperial nostalgia, to revive the UK as the world trading nation but removing the shackles of the EU, and regaining full sovereignty over its laws and borders. These were the typical native, populists’ arguments made without much attention given to the details or the factual accuracy (Doherty, 2016). The infamous quip of Michael Gove that people are fed up by experts telling them what to do, advanced the post-truth politics where the people know that they are being fed lies, but they do not care, or mind.

We should not forget the impact of personal ambitions of politicians such as Boris Johnson, who saw the referendum as a unique opportunity to take their own career right to the top job of the Prime Minister. This is obviously nothing new, as momentous events of this kind are always likely to be exploited for a personal political gain. However, the potent mix of tabloid-stoked aggressive Euroscepticism and imperial nostalgia with the lack of impartial evidence-based information might have bolstered the existing popular appeal of Boris Johnson in an unprecedented way. It seems that this combination unleashed a potent response of the electorate which surprised even the main players on the Leave side.

The Remain campaign, on the other hand, tried to frighten British people by making very dark predictions of a total economic demise of the UK outside the EU – refer to as “project fear” by the Leavers. There was very little information about the actual, measurable benefits of the EU membership, nor much mention of the less tangible ones. Nor was there any rational, evidence based discussion of the EU disadvantages. Such discussion is yet to take place, even as the actual shape of the Post-Brexit UK is slowly emerging in the wake of Theresa May’s letter of March 29, 2017 to Donald Tusk, formally triggering art. 50 TEU.

## HOW DID THE BRITISH VOTE IN 1975 AND 2016?

In the 1975 UK referendum, 67% voted in favour of remaining in the EEC. The distribution of votes in the whole country was in principle uniform. Of the 68 constituencies or counting areas of the UK only two, both Scottish, rejected the continuation of membership – in the Shetland Islands, where 43.7% voted in favour, and in the Hebrides (the Western Isles), where 29.5% voted “Yes”. This was in line with the general tendency of more support for continued membership in the south rather than in the north. Orkney and Shetland, as well as the Western Isles are the least populated parts of United Kingdom. In Shetland, there are less than 13,000 registered voters, and in the Hebrides only 22,000. Probably Shetland inhabitants voted against the EEC because they felt like a separate community, more akin to the Scandinavian (Norse) sailors rather than contemporary Scots. In addition, their anxiety was intensified by the future of the fishing industry. In turn, the inhabitants of the Western Isles were heavily influenced by the Scottish National Party and its leader, Donald Stewart (King, 1977).

**Table 1.** Results of British Referenda in 1975 and 2016 on EEC/EU

<b>1975 referendum</b>	“Yes” votes (%)	“No” votes (%)	Turnout (%)
England	68,7	31,3	64,6
Scotland	58,4	41,6	61,7
Wales	66,5	33,5	66,7
Northern Ireland	52,1	47,9	47,4
UK (overall)	67,2	32,8	64,5
Final results	62,3	32,7	64
<b>2016 referendum</b>	“Yes” votes (%)	“No” votes (%)	Turnout (%)
England	46,8	53,2	64,6
Scotland	62	38	61,7
Wales	48,3	51,7	66,7
Northern Ireland	52,1	47,9	47,4
UK (overall)	55,7	44,3	64,5
Final results	48,1	51,9	72,2

**Source:** Butler & Kitinger, 1976; King, 1977; *Leave or Remain EU Referendum Results and Live Maps* (2016); *The Electoral Commission* (2017).

The referendum on continuation of British membership in EEC turned out to be a nationwide victory: England voted “Yes”, Wales voted “Yes”, Scotland voted “Yes”, and even Northern Ireland voted “Yes”, although it was the region with the lowest support for remaining in European structures (52.1%) and with the lowest voter turnout (47.4%). The highest turnout was in Wales (66.7%), with the highest number of euro-enthusiasts recorded, alongside England. It is also worth noting that the greatest number of void votes were cast in industrial districts, which were a natural backbone of the Labour Party. Casting invalid vote can be interpreted as an expression of opposition to government policy (Bristow, 1975). In turn, in 2016 only Scotland and Northern Ireland voted in favour of remaining in the EU (Uberoi, 2016).

#### CLOSING REMARKS

The 1975 referendum did not fulfil the hopes of its initiators – it did not solve the internal problems of the Labour Party. The Labour Party’s position on participation in the Common Market remained non-uniform, which fuelled future internal conflicts and partially contributed to the split of the party and the birth of the Social Democratic Party in 1981. The Labour Party represented heterogeneous standpoint also towards further integration efforts (Baker, Gamble, Randall, Seawright, 2002).

The diverse drivers behind the two referenda reflect the two very different Britain – the 1975 one, which saw a clear economic benefit in joining, despite Labour’s fear of the neoliberal free trade policies promoted by the EEC; and the 2016 one, tired of austerity at home, not helped by the flow of migrants, and witnessing the dream of EU economic prosperity dissolving in the Eurozone crisis. The post-imperial nostalgia embodied in the wish for the return of blue-cover passports, imperial system of weights and measures, and even the reinstatement of the death penalty played an important role in the vote for Brexit. But the most dangerous post-imperial delusion seems to be the desire to regain the global position of power and influence. Outside the EU, and with Trump in the White House, Britain has already lost a quantum of her power as the bridge between the EU and the US.

More than six months after the results were counted, the meaning of Brexit remains unclear. There are a number of reasons behind it. First of all, the government failed to produce a plan outlining what options would be available in case

Vote Leave wins. The only legal document, the EU Referendum Act 2015, did not contain any details, or even board guidelines on the UK's future outside of the EU (Uberoi, 2015): the question on the ballot paper reduced a number of issues into one – to stay in or to leave the EU. Such choice of question opened the door to speculations and double guesses. It was in stark contrast to Scottish government which had published a 670-page White Paper outlining in detail potential shape of independent Scotland (*Scotland's Future*, 2013).

Not clear what the vote was for – even less clear is the type of outcome that will satisfy the “leave the EU” imperative.

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## CONFUCIAN THOUGHT AFFECTING EDUCATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES VS. SOCRATIC EDUCATION PHILOSOPHY IN WESTERN COUNTRIES\*

POGLĄDY KONFUCJUSZA ODDZIAŁUJĄCE NA EDUKACJĘ  
W KRAJACH POŁUDNIOWO-WSCHODNIEJ AZJI A FILOZOFIA  
EDUKACJI SOKRATESA W KRAJACH ZACHODNICH

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— ABSTRACT —

Socrates and Confucius constitute roots of western and eastern civilization respectively and represent very different cultural values and educational traditions. Both of the philosophers lived around 4–5<sup>th</sup> century B.C.E., but there were huge differences in the social and cultural environments in which they lived. Different cultural and social factors in ancient Greece and China led to differences in Socratic and Confucian approaches to learning. Their educational philosophies have been discussed on the base of the aim of education, the content of education, the teaching process, and the nature of the contemporary education. The method used in the described study is hermeneutics, or interpretation of the literary (here scientific) texts, thus the study is cross-cultural in nature and concerns the features of the contemporary education in both cultures.

— ABSTRAKT —

Sokrates i Konfucjusz stanowią o fundamentach odpowiednio zachodniej i wschodniej cywilizacji i reprezentują bardzo różne wartości kulturowe oraz tradycje edukacyjne. Obaj filozofowie żyli około IV–V wieku przed naszą erą, lecz w bardzo różnych środowiskach społecznych i kulturowych. Różne czynniki kulturowe i społeczne w starożytnej Grecji i Chinach doprowadziły do różnych poglądów Sokratesa i Konfucjusza na uczenie się. Ich filozofie edukacji zostały poddane dyskusji na bazie celów edukacji, zawartości merytorycznej, procesu nauczania i natury współczesnej edukacji. W opisanych badaniach użyto metodę hermeneutyczną, zwaną inaczej interpretacją tekstów literackich (tutaj naukowych), z tego powodu badania mają charakter interdyscyplinarny i dotyczą cech współczesnej edukacji w obu kulturach.

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**Keywords:** Socrates, Confucius, culture, education, learning, Western countries, Asian countries

**Słowa kluczowe:** Sokrates, Konfucjusz, kultura, edukacja, uczenie się, kraje zachodnie, kraje azjatyckie

## INTRODUCTION

The major actions in many countries concern an enhancing quality of education. Because of globalization, we can compare the effective of different educational systems in many countries placed in different continents. The OECD publishes comparisons on the effectivity and quality of educational systems in many countries. In 2014, Pearson Education released its annual global educational performance report. Once again their findings provide a roadmap for teaching students in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and for why Asian nations are racing ahead. Pearson found that when national educational systems placed a priority on basic skill development such as numeracy and literacy, these countries should be on the top of countries overall in the international tests. Not surprisingly, the South East Asian countries such South Korea (No. 1), Japan (No. 2), Singapore (No. 3), and Hong Kong (No. 4) clinched the top four spots in an education index produced by Pearson. These four countries beat 39 countries in the Global Index of Cognitive and Education Attainment compiled by the EIU which measures learning ability as well as literacy and graduation rates.

An accompanying report said that these countries are well characterized by a strong community culture dedicated to education (Morris, 2014). Huib Wursten and Carel Jacobs (2017) stated that the conclusion of “the learning curve” is that two issues, highly influenced by culture, were globally recognized as the core of understanding educational quality:

- Supportive culture for education, and
- The need for a high status of teachers.

All the territories of Vietnam, Shanghai (China), Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and Malaysia are described as “Confucian Heritage Cultures – CHC”, because Confucian societies are characterised by the strong emphasis they place on education. Talking about education Confucius said that: (a) moral training is a key part of education and that such knowledge cannot remain academic, but must be reflected in behaviour: a good teacher must be a good moral exemplar; (b) education should be open to all; (c) education is a serious business (*The Analects*).

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## METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of the presented research is to look at how culture affects education of students from the chosen East-South Asian countries as well as the European Union countries, here called Western<sup>1</sup> countries. The proposed main research question was following: How do societal and educational cultures affect the Asian educational experiences of students from CHC and Western European students? The sub-questions ask: What were the social and cultural contexts that formed Socratic and Confucian philosophy of education? What is the impact of their educational philosophies on Western and Asian education? What is the type of societal culture in CHC and Western countries? What societal and educational cultures affect learning in CHC and Western countries? How does culture affect communication in CHC and Western classroom setting?

In the qualitative paradigm of the empirical research we want to look at a personal interaction between two cultures: a background culture and experienced culture. A qualitative research does just that; researchers attempt “to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (Juszczyk, 2013). The method employed in the study is hermeneutics, or interpretation of the literary texts, thus the study is also cross-cultural in nature. We have taken into account the chosen published opinions on the influence of culture on society and education, the selected published results of the empirical research conducted by different authors in this subject. Cross-cultural study refers to the process of looking at cultural phenomena from the perspective of both cultures in which they occur (Pusch, 1997).

The culture can be shared not only by a group but also individually experienced (Ark, 2013). The analysis has been done in the framework of the critical theory, which can be defined as a social theory where issues of concern focus on the idea of power and justice and the ways that notions such as race, class, ideologies, education, and cultural dynamics interact and how we can better understand these interactions to create justice for all involved (Kincheloe, McLaren, 2000). The study attempts to provide a better understanding of how the Asian and European students interact with their education and how culture, origin of which are the Confucius and Socrates’ philosophy, impacts on education in these countries.

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<sup>1</sup> In the literature the term “the West” largely refers to Europe and the United States, which found their origin in the ancient Greek and Roman culture, and the term “the East”, Northeast Asian countries, especially China, Japan, and Korea, which are under the impact of Sinitic cultures.

## EXPLANATION OF WORKING TERMS

Before we start our discussion, we should explain a few working terms: philosophy of education, culture, societal culture, educational culture, and culturally relevant pedagogy:

- Philosophy of education is close to epistemology, or theory of knowledge, a component of philosophy, and it concerns with virtually every aspect of the educational enterprise (Chambliss, 1996);
- Culture is empirically a multi-faceted concept and in anthropology, different cultures have developed different concepts of responsibility, self and understanding (Markus, Kitayama, 1991) – a meaning system shared by the majority of people who live or interact in the certain space that helps dictate how people work with one another, how they communicate, how they govern themselves, how they interact with the land, and how they educate. Culture can manifest itself in a variety of ways, explained by many authors (Gudykunst, Matsumoto, 1996; Hall, 1976; Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Ting-Toomey, Chung, 1996). M.D. Pusch (1979) defines culture as “the sum of total ways of living, including values, beliefs, aesthetic standards, linguistic expression, patterns of thinking, behavioural norms, and styles of communication which a group of people has developed to assure its survival in a particular physical and human environment”;
- Societal culture – the thoughts and views shared by a group of people that affect communications, interactions, how others are treated, and how one interacts with the world around them (Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, 1996);
- Educational culture – the thoughts and views shared by a group of people about how members of the culture should be educated and what is valued in that education;
- Culturally relevant pedagogy – based on the idea that learning is the process that is mediated by the culture and social structure of the area. This means that no curriculum is natural or culturally unbiased; curriculum relies on culture and political power at the time of its creation (Irvine, 2010; Ladson-Billings, 1995; Moore, 2000).

## THE CONFUCIAN EDUCATION MODEL IN CHC COUNTRIES

Kong Qiu, generally known in China by the respectful appellation Kongfuzi, “Master Kong”, lived from 551–479 B.C.E. Jesuit missionaries Latinised this to Confucius, and that of his famous follower Mengzi to Mencius, the names by which they are generally known in the West. Confucius was the first in an age of Chinese philosophers contemporary with the great philosophers of Ancient Greece, but the main focus of Chinese philosophy was government and ethics rather than logic. He was a great thinker and educator as well as one of the most learned people in China at that time. For Confucius, the primary source is the *Analects* (1990), which was compiled by disciples within a generation or two after Confucius’ death (Chen, 1990; Tweed, Lehman, 2002), but his ideas are still unfamiliar to many in the West. He is praised in China as a great teacher and Confucius’ heritage is central to people’s fundamental beliefs in education including China, Japan, and Korea. Confucianism, as the Golden Rule or a national cult, affected the state’s politics, economic, society, culture, and education during many centuries (Hwang, 1999, 2001).

According to the opinion of Don Starr (2012), this philosophy was based on three Hs: humanism, harmony, and hierarchy. He added that there are three Confucian principles underlying this: education is serious; progress is achieved through hard work; everyone can succeed if they work enough. The last of these marks an important Confucian concept about individual perfectibility. Failure to learn is seen as the result of lack of application rather than lack of ability. Some people are slower than others, and they can be helped by the teacher or fellow students outside the class if necessary, but all can succeed in the end.

Confucianism, which was transmitted to Korea through continental China before the diffusion of Chinese civilization (Yun, 1996), has been the main tendency of traditional thought that deeply spread its roots in Korean society, and the Korean people respected Confucian learning and attached great significance to education (de Bary, 1996; Juszczuk, Kim, 2017).

W.O. Lee (1996) characterizes the conception of education in the Confucian tradition with the help of the following major themes: (a) the significance of education: “The significance of education stands out in the Confucian tradition. Education is perceived as important not only for personal improvement but also for societal development”; (b) continuous development; (c) educability for all and perfect ability for all; (d) learning effort and will power.

As for teaching method, Confucius adopted the approach of “educating someone according to his natural ability” and “heuristic education” (*The Analects*). He claimed that he was “a transmitter and not a maker” (*The Analects*). For him learning was viewed as a process by which individuals’ minds acquire what is out there; and education is taken in terms of cultural transmission, service to society, and moral transformation. Therefore its teaching model one can describe as the model of “knowledge-transfer”, where knowledge is presumed to transfer from one who has it to one who does not (Wang, 2013). Gary Alan Scott (2000) writes that the “knowledge-transfer” model assumes that learning is defined by an increase in the sum of the factual information at one’s disposal; and so, from this point of view, new information is merely added to whatever knowledge one previously had, like new data is added to a data bank or inventory is added to a warehouse.

#### CONFUCIUS’ IDEAS ABOUT EDUCATION – IN PRACTICE

The specific features of Confucian Heritage Cultures in education are: a process of learning by induction, the generation of concepts and the inference of high-level principles through repeated observation, practising and memorisation of empirical examples. Learners make meaning by generalising concepts from and in relation to what they already know, or what they have observed. In this “model” of Asian learning an inductive pedagogy is used (Watkins, Biggs, 1996).

Confucian values and norms are mainly centred on examinations. Most Asian students have to memorize their lessons, especially definitions, rules, procedures, facts, concepts, and short reading selections such as poems and very short passages. In some schools, students who failed to memorize their notes are made to stand in class until they can recite whatever was assigned to be memorized. The examination includes fill-in-the-blanks items, definition of terms, and enumeration. Teachers find these test items easy to prepare and to check. If they give test items with multiple choice questions, the choices are not chosen well, leading to too obvious answers or confusing answers (*Education style*, 2017). Regarding the reflections of Confucianism in contemporary Korean higher education, Confucian leadership is based on two main themes: personal order and socio-political order. As Jeong-Kyu Lee (2001) writes, based on the dual Confucian leadership, the characteristic of leadership in Korean higher education is still hierarchically authoritative in general. In recent years, with the achievement of higher stages of

economic development in Korea, Confucian values and principles are gradually decreasing, while Western values and assumptions are rapidly increasing.

In Asian schools the relationship between students and teachers is clearly social hierarchical since students should show respect to teachers and avoid disagreeing with them as much as possible. Due to the hierarchical and formal relationship, the thought of talking to teachers about matters outside school makes Asian students cringe. The courses in most Asian education systems are heavily lecture-based, meaning that teachers unilaterally transfer information to students. When the teacher is talking, students are taking meticulous notes, trying to write as much down as they can. If the teacher asks a question, students shy away from answering them as they are embarrassed of speaking in front of their classmates or afraid of getting the answer wrong (Zhao, 2007; Mak, 2011). The significant phenomenon observed in many Asian countries is education in so called “private academies”, in which numerous Asian students enrol after school, where there are teachers who teach the same material taught at school. These private academies also distribute additional homework for students. Numerous private academies are intensive and they open intensive courses during vacation and also make students stay at the academy until late evening. This phenomenon is unprecedented in South Korea (Bray, 2009).

The academic success of Confucian Heritage Culture students has been attributed, at least partially, to the efforts parents put into their children’s learning and how much these parents value education. Chi-Chung Lam and co-workers have found that parents in Hong Kong respect and trust schoolteachers and they are very cooperative with teachers, but they are not ready to take a role of “decision makers” and would like to be “distant assistants” (Lam, Ho, Sui, Wong, 2002). This role of parents results in enhancing student achievement, reducing absenteeism and dropout rates, and improving homework habits (Ho, 2000). According to I.W. Pang, they tend to restrict their involvement to home because that makes both parents and teachers feel most comfortable (Pang, 1997).

## SOCRATIC EDUCATION PHILOSOPHY

Socrates (469–399 B.C.E.), the Greek philosopher, remains one of the most influential figures in the history of Western philosophy. He was interested in ethics, conducts of life, and moral truth, or the higher ends in what one must do to be good (Abbs, 1993). Socrates talked in public – in the market place, outside

the gymnasium, at parties, or wherever he happened to be. Moreover, he would talk philosophy with virtually anyone – fellow philosophers or sophists, public figures, playwrights, rich people or poor people, adults or children, and even slaves (Wang, 2013).

Socrates used the question-and-answer technique in his search for true knowledge. The process is described with details by Nel Noddings (2007). The simple question would be such as “What is truth?”, or “What does it mean to be just?”. When the other person answered, Socrates responded with another question that prompted him or her to think more deeply so as to offer a new answer. Such a strategy used by Socrates, which came to be known as the *Socratic Method*, has been regarded as perhaps one of the earliest teaching strategies ever described in education history, as writes Darcy Miller (2008). *Socratic Method* is a dialectic method of teaching that “involves dialogue and questioning, emphasizing the exchange of ideas and suppositions that then transforms knowledge itself” (Miller, 2008). Gary Alan Scott (2000) characterises Socratic method of education as the “integrative” model, in which new knowledge is thought to be substituted for, or integrated with old knowledge or belief in such a way that both the content and the form of one’s knowledge might be said to be fundamentally reformulated, reconstituted, or reconfigured. The incompatibilities and inconsistencies in the various beliefs and opinions must be reconciled, and new ideas can be appropriated or assimilated to the old knowledge.

#### COLLECTIVISM IN CONFUCIAN CULTURE VERSUS INDIVIDUALISM IN WESTERN CULTURE

One of the most important dimensions of national culture identified by G. Hofstede (2001, described also by Wursten, Jacobs, 2017) is individualism vs. collectivism. In individualistic cultures, like almost all of the rich European/Western countries, and Poland, the USA, and Australia, people look after themselves and their immediate family only; in collectivist cultures, like Asia (South Korea, China, Japan, and Singapore) and Africa, people belong to “in-groups” who look after them in exchange for loyalty. In individualist cultures values are in persons, whereas in collectivist cultures identity is based on the social network to which one belongs. In individualist cultures there is more explicit, verbal communication. In collectivist cultures, communication is more implicit (Hall, 1976; Hofstede, 1980; Ting-Toomey, Chung, 1996; Kim, Lim, Dindia, Burrell, 2010).

According to Triandis, McCusker, & Hui (1990), individualists tend to think of individuals as the basic unit of analysis. Individualists are mostly concerned about having the freedom to do their own thing. In the individualistic cultures certain values are emphasized, such as freedom, equality, creativity, bravery, independence and competition from the in-group (Triandis et al., 1990). In contrast, collectivists tend to think of groups as the basic unit of analysis of society (Triandis et al., 1990). This tendency will become even stronger in collectivist cultures because the emphasis on in-group harmony requires in-group members to conform and to be homogeneous. In collectivistic cultures, behaviour is regulated largely by in-group norms, which are more important determinants of social behaviour. Furthermore, harmony is an important attribute. The in-group is supposed to be homogeneous in opinion, and no disagreements should be known to out-groups (Wang, 2013). With regard to values, collectivist cultures stress social recognition, loyalty, tradition, being humble, honouring parents and elders, obedience to authority and proper behaviour as key values (Triandis et al., 1990).

Learners from CHC context prefer working in groups and perform better in groups (Chan, Watkins, 1994; Park, 2002; Hofstede, Hofstede, 2005). Cooperative learning strategies have been strongly recommended for collectivist learners (Salili, 1996). Group learning is assumed to be culturally appropriate in CHC and many Asian collectivist nations. Group learning, from a Western perspective, means working within a social constructivist environment in which students, using their collective knowledge, may exceed the knowledge of their teacher and thereby bring the teacher's knowledge into question (Nguyen, Terlouw, Pilot, 2006).

The education in Asian countries focuses, similar as in Western countries, on "critical thinking skills", on "problem-solving", on "creativity", which are seen to be readily compatible with apparently rote styles of learning. Such shifts might be understood as reflecting the influence of "Western" approaches to learning, or as the results of economic developments in many Asian economies (Mason, 2014; Durkin, 2008).

Taylor (1990) points out that in addition to learning style differences between cultural groups, variations also exist in the rules for general discourse in oral (verbal) communication. Teachers and students will naturally follow the assumptions and rules from their respective cultures. Any analysis of interpersonal communication in the classroom is incomplete without considering non-verbal aspects of communication. Understanding of a communication derives from the

interaction of the verbal and non-verbal activities with each other and with the context in which they occur (Hall, 1985). Minimum communicative competence includes the meaning of a smile, eye contact, conversational distance, and actual touching; in Asian cultures are important the following aspects: time, space, and context (Littrell, 2006). Teaching in most East Asian countries is traditionally dominated by a teacher-centred, book-centred method and an emphasis on rote memory (Liu, Littlewood, 1997). These traditional teaching approaches have resulted in a number of common learning styles. According to some Western academics, the CHC students are modest and diligent (Park, 2000), but at the same time, some of their typical learning characteristics are described negatively such as rote, silent and passive style of learning (Cf. Sit, 2013).

Jin Li (2012) grew up thoroughly Chinese even though she has lived in the USA for many years, thus in her book *Cultural Foundations of Learning: East and West* in such manner she summarized the Confucian learning tradition, which holds to the following: (a) learning is the most important thing in life; it is life's purpose; (b) learning enables one to become a better, not just smarter person; (c) learning is a life-long process; (d) the kind of knowledge that sets one person apart from another does not come to one automatically. One must seek it. Seeking knowledge requires resolve, diligence, enduring hardship, steadfastness, concentration, and humility. In contrast, students from Western cultures have a different approach to learning, which follows the key themes: a. human curiosity about the external world is the inspiration for knowledge; b. a relentless spirit of inquiry into the universe will lead to knowledge; c. mind is the highest human faculty that enables this inquiry; d. reason (not heart) is the process by which we know the world; e. the individual is the sole entity for inquiry, discovery and ultimate triumph.

## CONCLUSIONS

Different cultural and social factors in Ancient Greece and China led to differences but also to similarities in Socratic and Confucian educational philosophy, which has been examined from the perspectives of the aim of education, the content of education, the teaching process, and the nature of education. The basics of Socrates' education were individualistic and rationalist traits, while Confucius' teaching was distinctively marked with collective and intuitive characteristics. Their philosophies of education impacted not only their disciples, but Western

and Asian educational practice as a whole. Studying a particular teaching or learning style in these countries, the cultural contexts should always be taken into consideration. In traditional Confucian culture, a love of learning is a moral imperative and is achieved over time by the development of moral virtues, filial piety, modesty, effort, and perseverance. In contrast, Western students value independence and individual effort in order to achieve the “prize” in the shape of grades, income and status. But Asian students are influenced by Western culture via social media, the Internet, movies and cross-cultural exchanges. However, there are still Confucian characteristics that persist, because Confucian culture is deeply rooted in South-East Asian families.

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## RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICAL ADVANCEMENTS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION: THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA

ROSYSKIE POSTĘPY GEOPOLITYCZNE  
W REGIONIE MORZA CZARNEGO: ANEKSJA KRYMU

*Ostap Kushnir\**

— ABSTRACT —

The annexation of Crimea is not an ordinary event in contemporary international relations. Since WWII, there has been no precedent in Europe when one state under dubious premises has forcefully annexed a part of another state. This article scrutinizes the Crimean case in the context of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis and uncovers the rationale behind Russia's aggressive policies in the Black Sea Region. To accomplish this task, several steps have been undertaken. Primarily, the recent speeches of Russian officials and Kremlin-originated documents have been analyzed. Secondly, the tactics favored by the Kremlin to achieve its geopolitical goals have been explained and assessed (through applying frameworks of meta-geography and soft power security). Thirdly, the future prospects for Crimea with its gradual transformation in the counter-NATO fortress have been outlined.

— ABSTRAKT —

Aneksja Krymu nie wydaje się być zwykłym wydarzeniem we współczesnych stosunkach międzynarodowych. Od czasów II wojny światowej nie doszło jeszcze do precedensu w Europie, kiedy jedno państwo na podstawie wątpliwych przesłanek forsownie aneksowało fragment innego państwa. Ten artykuł ma za zadanie analizę aneksji Krymu w kontekście trwającego kryzysu ukraińskiego i określenie podstaw agresywnej polityki Rosji w regionie Morza Czarnego. W tym celu zostały podjęte następujące kroki. Przede wszystkim przeanalizowane zostały ostatnie wypowiedzi rosyjskich urzędników i oficjalne dokumenty Kremla. Po drugie, opisana i wyjaśniona została (poprzez zastosowanie metodologii meta-geografii i *soft power security*) ulubiona taktyka Kremla do osiągnięcia swoich celów geopolitycznych. Po trzecie, przedstawione zostały perspektywy rozwoju Krymu uwzględniające jego stopniową transformację w antynatowską twierdzę.

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**Keywords:** Ukrainian crisis, Black Sea Region, Russian geopolitics, Russian foreign policy, Crimean annexation, critical geopolitics, meta-geography

**Słowa kluczowe:** kryzys ukraiński, region Morza Czarnego, rosyjska geopolityka, rosyjska polityka zagraniczna, aneksja Krymu, geopolityka krytyczna, meta-geografia

## INTRODUCTION

The chain of events which started in Ukraine on the 21 of November 2013 and continues up to now, came as a shock to many. On that day, the authorities of Ukraine officially suspended the state's European aspirations, this action triggered massive anti-governmental rallies. These rallies became extremely violent over time, encouraging external intervention in the originally internal conflict. Consequently, Ukraine lost the Crimean peninsula to Russia and has since plunged into war with Russian-backed separatists in its eastern part (Tsygankov, 2015). Western states, in their turn, faced with the first forceful breach of sovereignty in Europe in the new millennium, imposed sanctions to cool Russia's aggressive behavior down, and as such a revival Cold War discourse can be observed.

It is in everyone's interest to have Ukraine as a peaceful and cooperative partner. From the geopolitical perspective, the state is situated on one of the world's major crossroads, in particular on an intersection of Europe-Asia and Nordic-Mediterranean transport corridors (Delanoë, 2014; Götz, 2015; Kushnir, Domaradzki, 2013). Its position on the northern Black Sea shores also provides Ukraine with a strategic depth in promoting regional trade and security. However, external actors tend to perceive their cooperation with Ukraine differently. On the one hand, the West considers Ukraine as a self-sufficient player which requires assistance in strengthening its democracy, free market, and good-governance. This *modus operandi* seems to be coherent and attractive for present day Ukrainians, as proved by their participation in the anti-governmental rallies (Wawrzonek, 2014). On the other hand, Russia is keen to keep Ukraine within its political orbit, thus establishing some kind of a supervised "buffer zone" between mainland Russia and the rest of Europe (Götz, 2015).

Actually, Russia seems to be one of the most ambitious and ambiguous actors in the region. Its behavior is not always rational, but fueled by the geopolitical necessity to expand and attempts to restore "historical justice" – at least this is how the Kremlin perceives it (Horbulin, 2015).

As one may recall, the Black Sea became a Soviet controlled “pool” after World War II. However, the Kremlin’s domination in the region was severely undermined by the USSR demolition after the Cold War. Sovereign Russia yielded influence over its former satellites – Bulgaria and Romania – with their Black Sea ports and industries. The most of the northern coastline was “inherited” by the re-emerged Ukraine. These and other factors triggered geopolitical discomfort for Russia; its presence in the Black Sea littoral was limited to around 450 km of the coastline on the Caucasus (Delanoe, 2014). Here lies the root of the “historical injustice” – Russia, as the direct descendant of the USSR, was stripped of its significant maritime possessions it perceived as indisputably Russian. Throughout the recent decades the Kremlin drew plans to bring these lands back and – simultaneously – re-establish control over the “pool”. The annexation of Crimea, as well as earlier Russian engagement in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Adjara (unsuccessful), were nothing but firm steps to fulfill these plans.

To achieve its goals in the post-communist space, the Kremlin utilizes various tactics which can be generally defined as the export and subsequent enrooting of the Russian model of governance (Socor, 2005; Jackson, 2006). This model presumes the presence of strong authoritarian leaders whose powers are nourished by organized crime and the state’s secret services. On acquiring key positions, these leaders introduce a sophisticated bureaucracy, which in its turn cultivates “shadow” economics and establishes indirect governmental supervision over big and/or strategic enterprises. The legitimacy of such a political shift is not questioned as an aggressive media brainwashing and the blatant prosecution of political opponents is pursued. The way Crimea was annexed can provide a bright example of these tactics in action. What are worse, Kremlin agents were able to fulfill their tasks because of the passiveness of the Ukrainian authorities and the lenience of a “united” Europe. In a word, the key decision-makers in Kyiv and in the West disregarded the first signs of the Kremlin’s geopolitical offensive.

This article addresses the issue of the annexation of Crimea by Russia from various perspectives. Primarily, it describes and explains the way Russia supported and cherished Crimean separatism between 1990 and 2014. Secondly, it uncovers and critically assesses the rationale behind Russian revisionist and expansionist politics in the region. Thirdly, it scrutinizes the tactics utilized by the Kremlin to achieve its geopolitical goals (on the example of Crimea). Finally, it reveals the geopolitical importance of Crimea to Russia, as well as draws prospects of the development of the peninsula for the nearest future.

As the methodology is concerned, it will reside in combining classical and critical geopolitics. The first – state-centered Hobbesian approach – will allow to explain the rationale behind the Russian aggressive behaviour in its neighborhood. It seems feasible – on the first glance – that such type of behavior solidifies the power of the Kremlin on domestic level through evoking “rally around the flag” effect, as well as reassures the state’s ability to project its power and national interests globally. In a word, classical geopolitics is a suitable tool to assess costs and benefits the Russian state experiences while conducting aggressive foreign policy. In its turn, critical geopolitics will allow to unveil the mechanisms which Russia utilizes to achieve its objectives in the post-Cold War world. The paradoxical assumption here is that Russia pursues national interests through a utilization of mechanisms which emerged in liberal democratic societies to limit the state’s power (i.e., empowerment of the individuals and non-state actors, political pluralism, freedom of speech and communication, social networking, and others). One should particularly consider in this regards Colin Flint’s meta-geographic frameworks (Flint, 2006).

#### LOGICS BEHIND RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

The beginning of 2007 was a milestone for contemporary Russian geopolitical expansion. At this moment several specific factors came into being: Russia regained its economic sufficiency and foresaw uninterrupted growth; the U.S. witnessed signs of domestic fatigue with the War on Terror and global engagement; the EU was to enter the first waves of economic crisis; the series of noticeable revolutions took place in the European neighborhood, and others. In a word, that was the time when the appropriate environment emerged which allowed Russia to re-draw its foreign policy and start the implementation of its old-new objectives.

On 12 February 2007, during the 43<sup>rd</sup> Munich Conference on Security Policy, President Vladimir Putin delivered one of the key speeches of recent times. He outlined the forthcoming changes in the Russia’s geopolitical objectives (Putin, 2007). In some respect this speech may be regarded as a declaration of Cold War 2.0; at least, it contained clear allusions to sinister Soviet rhetoric.

Putin seemed to speak honestly on his new *modus operandi*. He stated with bitterness that the world after 1991 became unipolar with the U.S. taking the unchallenged lead. That was a wrong turn, according to the President. The

U.S. accumulated too much power thus making impossible the natural development of other sovereign entities; every state on the globe was doomed to exist in the shadow of Washington's interests. What was worse, these interests were not always complying with international law (Forsberg, Herd, 2015).

Putin also addressed the role of international organizations which he considered to be biased and one-sided. For instance, he declared that the OSCE acted as the U.S. and the EU subsidiary, not as a neutral force for common good. As he put it: "People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries" (Putin, 2007). Referring to NATO, Putin stressed its "two-faced" nature. To prove this, he mentioned the Alliance's expansion into Eastern and Central Europe, contradicting the promises given by the NATO General Secretary Manfred Wörner to the Soviet Union on 17 May 1990. In a word, on the OSCE and NATO examples Putin demonstrated his proneness to perceive international organizations as nodes in Western networks. This should be kept in mind in order to explain contemporary Russian political behavior.

Apart from this, Putin sent a clear message to the world that the Kremlin would defend its interests as never before. That would be a proper response on the external provocative actions. According to the President, his state had always been "cheated" by its Western "partners" through empty promises, unilateral actions and unfulfilled obligations. This should not and would not be the pattern in the future: "We very often [...] hear appeals by our partners [...] to the effect that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs. In connection with this I would allow myself to make one small remark [...] Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time [...] we would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all" (Putin, 2007).

As one may see, Putin's speech in Munich signaled the climax of Russia's dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. The President argued that the global architecture was unjust, the U.S. undermined principles of international coexistence, and Russia found itself in a position of geopolitical inferiority<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The same objectives were reiterated in the Foreign Ministry report *A Review of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy* published on 27 March 2007. The report presented Russia as a power ready

To fix these flaws, Putin announced his state's likely return to the Soviet-style non-compromised policies (Hughes, Sasse, 2016).

Seven years later, on 18 March 2014, Putin delivered another noticeable speech (Putin, 2014). That was his address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in the Kremlin. The speech – commonly referred today as the Crimean speech – was delivered on the eve of the military conflict bursting out in the Donbass region, Eastern Ukraine. That speech stressed, factually, the same points and positions as they had been outlined in 2007.

Primarily, Putin reiterated that there was no longer stability after the dissolution of the bipolar world. The U.S. along with its allies were inclined to undermine international order and instead preferred to follow the “rule of gun”, not the rule of law. Russia as the USSR successor felt itself plundered and robbed in the environment of the U.S. hegemony<sup>2</sup>.

Secondly, international institutions and organizations discredited themselves in ensuring global security and order. Putin considered them to be nothing but biased agents acting under the supervision of Western states.

Thirdly, Russian interests were systematically ignored, especially in the post-communist space. Putin was of the opinion that Western states were constantly lying to him about their intentions and future actions (i.e., NATO expansion, EU neighborhood program, and others; Forsberg, Herd, 2015; Götz, 2015; Tsygankov, 2015). Moreover, they were always secretly conducting the policies of “containment”, thus attempting, as Putin said, “to sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position” (Putin, 2014).

Finally, Putin underlined that no one should underestimate Russia's deliberation to take decisive and “just” actions: “Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected” (Putin, 2014).

There were, however, some new interesting points in the address to Parliament. For instance, Putin presented recent revolutions – so called “colored” revolutions – in the post-communist space as Western-inspired and Western-orchestrated (Darczewska, 2014). These revolutions brought nothing but harm to the citizens

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to influence international relations by challenging the actions of others if they were “unilateral” and disrespectful of international law (for more details see: Tsygankov, 2015).

<sup>2</sup> As Forsberg and Herd present it, Putin's Russia struggles to replace the U.S.'s “power vertical” with a “democratic multi-polarity” and “a new version of interdependence”. Putin also considers his state to be on “the right side of history”, aiming to become an independent pole in this post-Western global order (for more details see: Forsberg, Herd, 2015).

of the targeted states; new emerging orders completely disregarded the “way of life, traditions, and cultures of the indigenous population” (Tsygankov, 2015). Thus, Putin presented these revolutions as artificial, bringing illegitimate elites to power. In the case of Ukraine, he stated that the forces behind the 2014 Maidan “resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup” (Putin, 2014).

In respect to the annexation of Crimea, Putin stressed that “Crimea is our common historical legacy and a very important factor in regional stability. And this strategic territory should be a part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian” (Putin, 2014). Except for the symbolic and strategic importance of Crimea to Russia, Putin perceived the annexation as a “right and just action”. He claimed that Crimea had been given to Ukraine in 1991 as a “sack of potatoes” with Russia being too weak to claim its rights on the peninsula. In between 1990–2014, Russia had to restrain its Crimean ambitions because of its respect to Ukrainian sovereignty. However, as Putin presented it, the 2014 illegitimate *coup d'état* in Ukraine provided Russia with a legitimate right to act (Putin, 2014).

Both of the above-mentioned speeches unveil the implementation of Russia's behavioral patterns provisioned by Klaus Dodds in 2007 (Dodds, 2007). These patterns derived from the excessive assertiveness the Bush administration implemented in its War on Terror, thus undermining the global geopolitical architecture. Therefore, Putin's interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) are nothing else but attempts to mirror the ambiguous U.S. actions. However, Putin not only mirrors these actions, but provides them with specific meaning to meet Russia's objectives. Both speeches mentioned above – as well as a majority of Putin's other public speeches – clearly illustrate this. Utilizing aggressive policies, as Putin accuses the U.S. to utilize, Russia re-draws the world order, gains global weight, and withstands its national interests (Forsberg, Herd, 2016)<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Gerber and Zavisca define the contemporary Russian political and media narrative in the following way: “1) the United States is a powerful but malign force that seeks to dominate and subjugate the world; 2) it pursues this aim by fomenting instability, chaos, and, ultimately, «color revolution» in countries it perceives as rivals; 3) its means of doing so include funding groups that oppose the legitimate leaders of these countries and otherwise promoting discontent under the guise of support for abstract institutions it calls «democracy» or «human rights»; and 4) Russia, with its resources and its alternative institutions and culture, is the only force in the world capable of resisting U.S. domination and control” (for more details see: Gerber, Zavisca, 2016).

Putin seems to be sure that Western states perform “orchestrated revolutions” or “legalized interventions” in order to lead their favorites to power in key states or regions. At least this may be indirectly deduced from the 2002 National Security Strategy which outlines the U.S. objectives in the War on Terror. In particular, the Strategy articulates the U.S. intention to “defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants” (*The National Security Strategy...*, 2002). This statement may be widely interpreted; thus, the 2002 Security Strategy – along with the next years’ Strategies and similar documents – provide a fertile soil for Kremlin analysts to claim that the U.S. secret services are actively engaged in fighting “legitimate authorities” in third states overseas (i.e., Syria, Libya, Iraq, Egypt and others). This is where the U.S. national interest resides. Therefore, Russia as an actor with global ambitions should follow – apparently – the same pattern of the “strong”.

This pattern, by the way, was outlined for the first time in the 2000 Russian Military Doctrine (*Military Doctrine of Russian Federation*, 2000) and re-stated in the Military Doctrine of 2010 (*Military Doctrine of Russian Federation*, 2010). Both documents appeared during Putin’s time in power. Both clearly specify the key military dangers for the Russian Federation which may require military responses. In the Doctrine of 2010 one should particularly consider provisions *8b*, *8d*, *8u*, and *20*.

The provision *8<sup>b</sup>* states that any attempt to destabilize the situation in various countries and regions, thus undermining their strategic stability, poses a danger to Russia. The provision *8<sup>d</sup>* defines as dangerous any territorial claim against Russia and its allies, as well as interference in their internal affairs. In its turn, the provision *8u* justifies Russia’s action in case there is the emergence of any armed conflict on the territories adjacent to Russia or its allies. All three provide *carta scribi* rationale for Russian engagement into global and regional affairs. Apparently, the Kremlin reserves itself the right to define the magnitude of any global or local danger.

As far as military action is concerned, the provision *20* states that Russia finds it appropriate to (i) use armed forces in case of external aggression against it or its allies; (ii) in case the UN or any other collective security body initiates peacekeeping or peace restoring mission; or (iii) in case Russian citizens require protection overseas (Laruelle, 2015). It is clearly stressed in the Doctrine that if armed forces are called into action, Russia will operate within the frameworks of international law and its international obligations. The final decision on deploying troops belongs to the President of Russia.

Much in line with what the Russian Military Doctrines claim can be discovered in the recent 2014 Kremlin-originated report *On Russia's National Identity Transformation and New Foreign Policy Doctrine* (Zevelev, 2014). According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the report provides justifications for the Russian harsh policies abroad: "The key concepts of this report are four: first, that of «a divided people»; secondly, the theme of «protecting compatriots abroad»; third and more broadly, «the Russian World» or «Ruski Mir» in Russian; fourth, the importance of acknowledging and sustaining, embracing and promoting «the Great Russian civilization». I mention this because I think it would be an error to think that Crimea and Ukraine are just the products of a sudden outrage" (Brzezinski, 2014).

As one may deduce, Brzezinski argues that the Russian authorities are deliberate to construct – or restore – what they call the Great Russian civilization<sup>4</sup>. They are prone to accomplish that task through the strengthening of Russia's presence in the states with significant Russian minorities or simply Russian speaking people. Hence the task is treated as right and historically decisive and almost sacred, any occurring conflicts of interest are likely to be disregarded or – whether possible – resolved by the implementation of international law<sup>5</sup>. Russian deliberation to achieve the favorable results is so significant that Putin demonstrates his readiness to challenge the global balance of power, openly assaulting the U.S. and Western states, and to provide military assistance to the third parties, and even put the welfare of Russian citizens at risk (Kushnir, 2016).

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<sup>4</sup> The same as Brzezinski, Szostek states that the contemporary Russian authorities are accomplishing "Civilizational Mission" which, to the word, is widely supported by the common people. According to Szostek, this mission emphasizes "the distinctiveness of Russia's culture and values and its responsibility to protect and unify those with whom it has historical ties. Russian-speakers in neighboring states are considered «compatriots» (*sootchestvenniki*), whose «educational, linguistic, social, labor, humanitarian, and other rights» Russia must protect" (for more details see: Szostek, 2014).

<sup>5</sup> Emphasizing sacredness of the Russian "Civilizational Mission" one should consider the spiritual principles of the so-called "Russian World". Having analyzed the public speeches of the Russian Orthodox Church leaders, Wawrzonek concluded that "the Ruskiy Mir is a separate and autonomous civilizational space, formed [...] by elements such as the spirit of tolerance and respect for the rights of dissenters, Russian language and culture, and «common views on social development». According to Patriarch Cyril, the mentioned former values have been established by the «common boundaries and one geographical area in which our people lived» (here one should consider Kievan Rus, Russian Empire, and Soviet Union)" (for more details see: Wawrzonek, 2014).

To draw some intermediary conclusions, in 2007 Russia entered a new era in its foreign policy which envisages unilateral attempts to reshape the post-Cold War order. These attempts are mainly inspired by a specific interpretation of the U.S. global actions during the War on Terror and the evolution of the EU's neighborhood policy. Russian authorities – and President Putin in particular – perceive the recent Western activities as a special kind of military or “soft power” operations which allow for the establishing of legal supervision over key states or territories. Moreover, Russian authorities attempt to follow the “Western example”: Crimean annexation is the brightest example and the biggest Russian success in this regard. To commemorate it, Putin even proclaimed 27 February to be the Day of Secret Services in Russia – that was the day the Russian flag weaved over the Crimean parliament in 2014 for the first time.

#### THE CASE OF CRIMEA: HOW RUSSIA MADE IT

It was the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry who argued that in order to achieve its goals in the 21<sup>st</sup> century Russia utilizes the 19<sup>th</sup> century tactics “by invading another country on completely trumped up pretext” (Dunham, 2014). However, upon deeper scrutiny, this statement may appear to be arguable. The fact is Russia does not apply straightforward tactics of military intervention; its behavior in recent conflicts is more complex and smart. To explain this with the Crimean example, one should consider the meta-geographical framework advocated by Colin Flint within the critical geopolitics approach. Flint states that: “Geopolitics is not just the calculation of countries trying to expand or protect their territory and define a political sphere of influence; it is also about countries, businesses, and political groups making connections across the globe [...] Political power is not just a matter of controlling territory, it is also a matter of controlling movement, or being able to construct networks to one's own advantage across political boundaries” (Flint, 2006).

In a word, it may seem that the old-fashioned state-centered geopolitics has given its positions up in the liberal democratic environment; the trans-national networks and cross-boundary cooperation are what matters now. Those actors – especially non-state actors – who can establish and control such networks are taking the lead in global decision-making and projecting their influence on new territories. That is the truth Kremlin analysts have perfectly learned, converted

in accordance to their needs, and started to utilize when pursuing their state's interests<sup>6</sup>.

The pro-Russian networks in Crimea existed in a dormant state since the 1990s and were promptly awakened with Putin's coming to power in 2000s. These networks incorporate several key nodes, among them are the Russian intelligence, Russian military bases with their infrastructure, the Russian Orthodox Church, pro-Russian NGOs, Russian media, and others. In 2006, the Secret Service of Ukraine (SSU) in one of its reports pointed out these nodes and warned about dangers they can inflict on the state. According to Taras Kuzio, the report was not perceived with all due cautiousness though (Kuzio, 2006; *ICC News Digest*, 2006).

To assess pro-Russian nodes and their efficiency with more precision, one should consider the 2011 research by Lada L. Roslycky. The latter presented and assessed Russian activities in Crimea as the "soft power" security threat for Ukraine. Through utilizing its informal, but all-penetrating presence on the Crimean peninsula, the Russian side managed to switch the attention of the indigenous people "from the interests of the state to which they belong and toward the interests of the intervening actor" (Roslycky, 2011). In a word, Russian side attempted to pursue its national interest not through applying brutal power, but through working with networks and the persistent formation of a favorable socio-political environment – with brutal power as the ultimate argument for nonconformists. This tactics bared its fruits on the "volatile" soil of Crimea and can be scrutinized through the prisms of meta-geography and critical geopolitics.

Speaking of the presence of Russian intelligence services in Crimea, their key mission resided in securing the Black Sea Fleet deployed at the Ukrainian territory and monitoring the dynamics of regional affairs. Apart from this, according to Kuzio, Russian intelligence attempted to shape the social moods and political

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<sup>6</sup> One should consider the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine in this regard. In 2013, Russian Chief of General Staff Valerii Gerasimov emphasized that the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has exceeded the military operations in their effectiveness; the non-military operations should occur at a rate of 4:1 over military operations. Gerasimov raised the importance of nurturing social dissatisfaction within the target state, undermining the authority of local governments, weakening the adversary's military potential, and creating a vacuum of power. This can be achieved, in particular, through manipulations with information and special operation in cyber-space. The armed forces – under the peacekeeping disguise – should arrive on the final stage of the conflict to secure the success (for more details see: Gerasimov, 2013).

life in Crimea through collecting secret information, conducting pro-Russian propaganda, and providing indirect support to separatist powers (Kuzio, 2006). Russian intelligence strove to incorporate their agents or sympathizers into the republican government, local administrations, law enforcement services, and civil society. As Roslycky argues, “Ukraine’s intelligence services identified Russian intelligence forces as targeting the most pivotal elements of Ukraine’s power from within its own territory” (Roslycky, 2011).

Apart from Russian intelligence services, the role of the Black Sea Fleet should not be underestimated. At the beginning of 2014, the fleet was served by c. 12 000 service men – including c. 3000 marines – stationed mainly in Crimea (Delanoe, 2013; Delanoe, 2014). To maintain that amount of people necessary infrastructure was erected – starting from barracks and shipyards, ending with schools and university. This kind of social-through-military policy could not but attract Crimeans and shape their world views. Apart from this, Russian marines and officers often befriended local people and had families with them, this tightened “international ties” even more. Therefore, the “soft” and “hard” power the Black Sea Fleet possessed – including the network of people united around the fleet – was another significant factor contributing to the success of the annexation of Crimea.

As far as the NGOs are concerned, a majority of them functioned as double agents. Officially, their aim resided in the promotion of inter-cultural dialogue and trans-boundary cooperation; this was justified and appropriate for the region with significant Russian-speaking population. Unofficially, they were nurturing anti-Ukrainian moods among civil society and promoted ideas that Crimea should be “returned” to Russia. Apart from this, numerous organizations were also suspected by the SSU in conducting direct separatist activities or money laundering (Kuzio, 2006). In particular, one should speak here about the *Russian Community of Crimea* and the youth pro-Russian movements: Proryv, the Eurasian Youth Union (till 2011), and Nashi. These organizations also functioned in other separatist areas in the Black Sea Region, namely in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. For extra efficiency, they were closely cooperating with Russian intelligence, Russian military, and local organized crime groups (Roslycky, 2011).

Another node in the network constituted Russia’s mass-media. Factually, one should distinguish here between Russian-owned and Crimean pro-Russian mass-media. The latter were well-financed from local sources; this allowed them to produce high-quality materials or buy Russian production, thus attracting

wider numbers of consumers as if to compare with the mainland Ukrainian or Crimean independent media. As Russian-owned media are concerned, they were traditionally enjoying high viewers' and readers' rates. They were also granted a right to broadcast or distribute materials with no restrictions in Crimea (Szostek, 2014). In their activities both kinds of mass media aimed to discredit Ukraine as a sovereign state and undermine Kyiv's European and Trans-Atlantic aspirations. They also cherished pro-Russian moods in society and nurtured nostalgic feelings for the Soviet times (Gerber, Zavisca, 2016). The new media – including numerous social networks and blogs – pursued the same goals, but targeted younger generation.

According to Jolanta Daczewska, Russian-owned and pro-Russian mass media in Crimea were implementing principles of political propaganda in their activities. One should consider in this regard (i) *the principle of massive and long-lasting impact* (media were constantly reiterating key anti-Ukrainian slogans and stereotypes; for instance, Ukrainian-speaking people were presented as fascists), (ii) *the principle of desired information* (on the one hand, media convinced Russians and Russian-speaking recipients that Ukrainian authorities would ban their language; on the other hand, media promised recipients sufficient assistance and cultural “salvation” from Russia), (iii) *the principle of emotional agitation* (media messages incited emotions and encouraged recipients to act without critical assessment of the acquired information), (iv) *the clarity principle* (media simplified their messages and divided the world into black-and-white), (v) *the principle of supposed obviousness* (media linked their messages to political myths: the Russian sentiment equals patriotism, Ukrainians equals fascists, Maidan equals chaos, etc.) (Darczewska, 2014). In a word, Russian media activity in Crimea provides an appropriate illustration to Valery Gerasimov's statements about the role of non-military means in achieving Russia's national interests.

The last but not the least among the key nodes of the Russian network is the Russian Orthodox Church. Roslicky and Wawrzonek argue that the Church always maintained strong connections with the Russian state (Roslicky, 2011; Wawrzonek, 2014). Indeed, in the era of developed absolutism – from 1654 to 1918 – it was the Monarch who headed the Church. In the communist times the activities of the clergy were supervised by the Secret Services. In modern times, clergy claims that Church must monitor political life in states that are Orthodox by nature and try to adjust it to the spirit of Orthodox civilization (Wawrzonek, 2014). Thus, the political role of the Russian Orthodox Church – regardless of the epoch – has always exceeded its religious and social mission. Concerning

the Crimean case, the Orthodox Church regularly organized marches against the arrival of NATO vessels in Sevastopol or against the sole idea of Ukrainian cooperation with the West. The temples were often used to store pro-Russian or separatist literature. It also happened that the clergy encouraged people to share the Russian perspective in any political dispute; Russia was portrayed as the only force for good in the world of sin. Not to speak that Patriarch Cyril perceived Crimea as one of the pivots of “Holy Russia” and the “Russian World” (Suslov, 2014).

Obviously, there were other nodes in the Russian network on the peninsula – Black Sea Branch of Moscow State University, Night Wolves motorcycle club, local self-defense forces, visiting Russian officials, and others. However, their long-term contribution to the annexation of peninsula was not as significant.

As the Maidan was coming to its end in Kyiv – in particular when President Viktor Yanukovich fled the country in February 2014 – Kremlin decision-makers activated all nodes in Crimea. Blockade and seizing the Crimean parliament, orchestrating the dubious appointment of Sergey Aksyonov as the Prime Minister, and finally the running of the pro-independence referendum – that would be impossible to complete within days without any preparation (Hughes, Sasse, 2016). Especially, in consideration to the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet which was stationed in Sevastopol and the Crimean Tatars who were actively protesting against any anti-Ukrainian rallies.

On Aksyonov’s coming to power, a traditional Russian model of governance was enrooted on the peninsula. The Prime Minister appeared to be an authoritarian leader backed by Russian intelligence, military, organized crime, NGO, and mass media. With their help, he almost immediately subdued or blocked those regional actors which could hypothetically sustain Ukrainian sovereignty. As the final accord, on the 16 March 2014, Aksyonov initiated a referendum on Crimean status searching for legal premises to secede the peninsula from Ukraine to Russia. With 95% of votes in favor of leaving Ukraine, the Kremlin – unlike the rest of the civilized world – recognized the referendum results and accepted Crimea as one of Russia’s federal subjects (Hughes, Sasse, 2016).

As for now, Crimea *de jure* is Ukrainian, but *de facto* Russian. Aksyonov and his supporters installed the Russian state system on the peninsula with as little delay as possible. There were also border crossing points erected on the roads connecting Crimea to Ukraine. However, only several non-European countries in the world recognized the change of Crimea’s status. That came as a surprise for the Kremlin. The non-negotiable position of the West and its pressure on Russia

to follow the principles of international law – with the consequent imposition of sanctions – became a heavy and unexpected burden for the Kremlin. The fact that the majority of Crimean denizens represented Russian culture and ethnicities did not sound convincing. However, this is a topic for another research.

To draw intermediary conclusions, the annexation of Crimea was nothing, but a series of long-prepared secret operations under the supervision of Russian intelligence. It was perfectly calculated from the perspective of applying “hard” and “soft” power. To justify the change in Crimea’s territorial belonging, the Kremlin referred to the provisions of Russian military doctrine and the UN Charter, reiterated its intention to protect compatriots abroad, and stressed the necessity of restoring the post-Cold War justice. Factually, as Russian officials – including the President – presented it, Russia had no other option but to intervene into Crimean affairs, taking into account the blatant events in Kyiv, emerging challenges to Russian sovereignty, and the threats for the Russian speaking people in Ukraine. Here one may recall the statement by Dodds who claimed that third states are prone to follow the U.S. example of conducting aggressive trans-boundary foreign policies. However, the rationale behind the U.S. War on Terror and Russian annexation of Crimea was different; and thus Russia’s action triggered more than just criticism from key members of international society.

## THE FUTURE OF CRIMEA: WHY RUSSIA MADE IT

Western political scientists tend to assess the annexation of Crimea from at least four major perspectives: (i) annexation as a revival of Russia’s imperialism and power aspirations; (ii) annexation as Putin’s attempt to consolidate power and address domestic issues; (iii) annexation as a hyper-reaction on democratic aspirations in the Russian “Civilizational Space”; and (iv) annexation as Putin’s personal dissatisfaction with the Western policies in Ukraine and Ukrainian civilizational choice (Tsygankov, 2015). This research aims to prove that the rationale behind Russia’s Crimean annexation resides in achieving geostrategic objectives which are largely predefined by the imperial traditions, memories, and fears that the Kremlin may irretrievably lose control over lands which were once Russian. It was in 1853 that Tsar Nikolay I welcomed the inclusion of island Sakhalin and Amur region into Russian Empire by stating: “Once the Russian flag is raised over it, let it never be lowered!”. This statement, which was given

a fresh breath in pro-Russian social networks after the annexation of Crimea, can partially explain the contemporary Russian expansionist politics.

The most obvious deduction concerning Russia's annexation of Crimea is that it was easy to accomplish in right time and circumstances. Throughout 25 years of state's independence no one in Kyiv seriously considered the systematic promotion of Ukraine's interest on the peninsula – especially the aspects of “soft power” and pro-Ukrainian networks. This could not but contribute to the fast and swift annexation of Crimea.

However, from another perspective, Ukraine's modest engagement into the affairs of Crimea can be explained as a problem of a young state with a complex territorial and ethnic composition. Decision-makers in Kyiv had neither experience how to govern over Crimea, nor full understanding of how important it was to establish good governance there. In its turn, Ukrainian civil society was not strong enough to efficiently raise the importance of Crimean issues. Not to mention Ukraine's oligarchs and post-Soviet elites were prone to keep the “informal practices” and non-transparent governance on the peninsula, this allowed them to generate significant “grey” incomes. Finally, no one in Ukraine perceived Russia as a serious threat; for a majority of the political elites, oligarchs, and civil society Russia has always been a “brotherly nation” with close historical ties.

However, the geostrategic and symbolic importance of Crimea to Russia was worth breaking amiable relations with Ukraine. It seems the Kremlin decision-makers were simply waiting for the right moment.

It was in the 1940<sup>s</sup> that Yuriy Lypa, one of the prominent Ukrainian geopoliticians, who argued that the state which ruled the Crimean peninsula commanded the whole Black Sea Region; Crimea was nothing but the command post of the Black Sea (Lypa, 1942). Little has changed since that time; geography still matters, regardless of technological breakthroughs and the implications of globalization.

If to take the Cold War perspective, Crimea was utilized by the Soviets in order to project their power in the Black and Mediterranean seas. This allowed the Soviets to secure the sea corridor to the Middle East where the Kremlin nurtured military and energy partnerships with several states (Delanoë, 2014; Götz, 2015). After 1991 Russia, as the USSR's successor, struggled to regain control over Crimea and thus restore the corridor and re-establish control over the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov; the 450 km of coastline Russia inherited after the Cold War were far from sufficient for the regional projection of power. Not to mention that Russia's Middle Eastern policies were never abandoned.

As of today, some new arguments should be considered in order to explain the Kremlin's geostrategic thinking. In particular, control over Crimea provides a strong defensive point to Russia "against potential air and sea incursions on its southern flank" (Delanoe, 2013). This particular argument gains extra weight in light of Putin's mistrust towards NATO. The latter – according to Russian President (Putin, 2007) – adherently breaks its promises not to expand eastwards and urges Russia to renew its arms race (Putin, 2015). Indeed, following such antagonistic logics, the situation looks grim from the prospective of the Kremlin. As one may recall, Turkey remains an old and proven NATO member with a modern fleet, Romania hosts the biggest NATO air base in Europe, and several Eastern European states continuously reiterate their NATO aspirations (i.e., Georgia and Ukraine). Thus, Russia urgently needs to feel itself protected from any possible threats and dangers originating in the Black and Mediterranean Sea basins (Götz, 2015). Not to speak of the civil wars and insurgencies smoldering on in the Caucasus and in the Middle East; they do also have significant implications for Russia's security.

In order to address old and new challenges, Russia is prone to modernize its Black Sea Fleet and upgrade its military capabilities. The State Armament Program 2011–2020 should be particularly considered in this regard. As Igor Delanoe writes: "Russia has started a wide modernization program of its military forces – the State Armament Program (SAP) 2011–2020 – and the upgrading of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is believed to be one of the most ambitious parts of it, with the expected commissioning of 15–18 new units" (Delanoe, 2014).

Before the annexation of Crimea, Russia was considerably limited in its re-arming ambitions and development of its naval power. One should mention here the bilateral agreements signed between Kyiv and the Kremlin in 1997 and 2010; these agreements imposed restrictions on the amount of troops and vessels Russia could deploy in Crimea. Having annexed the peninsula, the Kremlin unilaterally tipped the scales in its favor. With all restrictions removed, Crimea is doomed to become a major Russian stronghold in the region.

SAP 2011–2020 defines growth of the Russian Black Sea Fleet as one of its key state priorities. Apart from pulling on water 15–18 new units – including ships and submarines – the naval infrastructure of Sevastopol with its eight deep-water bays will be significantly improved (Boltenkov, 2011; Delanoe, 2014; Götz, 2015). Not to mention that the new supportive military bases are to be erected in the occupied Caucasian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They will host both on-water – whether possible – and land-based units.

As the purely land-based units in Crimea are concerned, Delanoë writes that: “Russia plans to induct Su-24M and Su-30SM for air strike capacities and Il-38 N for patrolling and anti-submarine capabilities. The annexation of Crimea has also opened the path to the deployment on the peninsula of new missiles systems such as the Bastion-P coastal battery and S-300 PMU anti-aircraft missiles near Sevastopol, effective since March 2014” (Delanoë, 2014).

All this demonstrates that Russia is deliberately willing to cement its southern flank. Implementation of SAP 2011–2020 along with the recent updates to Naval Doctrine 2011 (e.g., development of the Black Sea ship-building facilities and improvement of the social support for sailors), as well as public statements of Russian officials reveal very unequivocal signals (Bodner, 2015). There are also some intelligence leaks that the Kremlin considers deploying nuclear weapon in Crimea (Keck, 2015). In a word, the annexation of peninsula became a notable move in the Great Russian geopolitical game.

The Ukrainian response to this Russian move is apparently vague. President Petro Poroshenko reiterates that the restoration of Kyiv’s authority over Crimea is an issue of major complexity and cannot be fulfilled in the nearest future. In his Annual Address to the Parliament on 4 June 2015, Poroshenko did not refer to the Crimean issue at all (*Dzerkalo Tyzhnia June 05*, 2015). What is worse, in more than two years after the annexation, Ukraine has not worked out a consistent strategy of returning Crimea; the only thing officials are speculating about resides in granting a special status to Crimea as a Ukrainian territory along with applying all diplomatic efforts possible to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity (*Dzerkalo Tyzhnia September 06*, 2016).

However, from another perspective, a vague Ukrainian response is an unavoidable digression of a young state that should accept on its way *per aspera ad astra*; Ukraine is not in a position – *de facto* – to take a strong individual stance against Russia. So far Kyiv attempts to establish the broadcasting of the state’s media on the peninsula, coordinate its diplomatic efforts with foreign partners, and provide any support necessary to the Crimean Tatars (Bianov, 2014). Factually, the only powers consistently defending pro-Ukrainian position and cooperation with the West are the Tatars.

The Russian-Tatar relations have always been tense, or even gravely conflictual. In 1783, after Catherine the Great conquered the peninsula, the Crimea Tatars – indigenous population – were banished and deported. In 1940s, under Stalin’s mass deportation policies approximately 200,000 Tatars were forced to move to Central Asia where many of them died. It was only in 1991, after Ukraine

declared independence, that the Tatars started to return to their homeland. As a result, the Crimean Tatar population counts nowadays approximately 300,000 (Roslycky, 2011).

With the Crimean annexation Tatars are destined to experience new challenges. Their social and political activists are often suppressed by militiamen or prosecuted by the pro-Russian authorities. According to Mustafa Dzhemilev, the Crimean Tatar leader, a total of 18 Tatars were reported missing during the first year of annexation (Shandra, 2015). A majority of them contacted their families later, however some people were found dead. Pro-Russian authorities are also working hard to undermine the power of the Mejlis (one of the highest executive-representative bodies of the Crimean Tatar people) or to create an alternative governing body. For various reasons, selected Tatar individuals agreed to cooperate with the new authorities. However, on a larger scale, Tatars link their well-being with the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea (Shandra, 2015).

To draw intermediary conclusions, Crimea faces hard times at the moment, with no certain prospects for the future. On the one hand, its economy is severely undermined by the broken ties with mainland Ukraine and the targeted Western sanctions. Social activists – mainly of Tatar origin – experience regular violations of human rights and political prosecution. On the other hand, the Russian Black Sea Fleet and other military facilities are well supported and rapidly built up by the Kremlin. Considering the current dynamics, Crimea will become an economically underdeveloped and blockaded territory crammed with weaponry. This is how the contemporary Russian geopolitical interest in the Black Sea Region looks like.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

With numerous anticipatory signs, on 12 February 2007 President Putin publicly announced some updates to Russia's geopolitical objectives. Delivering a speech at the Munich Conference on Security, he openly criticized the post-Cold War order in the world and positioned Russia as the defiant power. Putin claimed that his state was destined to take an individual stance regarding the conditions imposed by the U.S. unilateral War on Terror, NATO eastward expansion, and the evolving EU neighborhood programs. Moreover, the President condemned Western states in conducting double-faced policies; from Putin's perspective,

all “colorful revolutions” and the Middle East interventions were nothing but “special operations” by Western states to secure their global domination through promotion of democracy. This type of “deceptive behavior” was totally wrong, according to Putin; what was worse, this placed Russia in a position of inferiority.

To increase Russia’s global geopolitical weight, Putin and the Kremlin analysts decided to “mirror the West” and conduct their own “special operations”. This can partially explain Russia’s military offensive in Georgia in 2008 and the Crimean annexation from Ukraine in 2014.

Speaking of the latter, it was indeed a special operation considered in advance, much earlier than February 2007. It took years for Russia to establish multi-component all-penetrating networks in Crimea, wait for a suitable moment, and – finally – undermine Ukrainian governance on the peninsula through selective application of “hard” and “soft” power. It was in 2009 that Volodymyr Horbulin, the Head of the Council for Foreign and Security Policy, stated that Russian strategic goal since 1990<sup>s</sup> resided in establishing control over – at least – South-Eastern part of Ukraine (Horbulin, Litvinenko, 2009). In turn, in 2011, Roslycky wrote the following about Crimea: “Using the Russian Black Sea Fleet as an element of Russia’s hard power, certain activities of Russian intelligence agencies, pro-Russian organizations and other actors were presented in the light of soft power [...]. Activities of the Russian intelligence services (particularly the 642<sup>nd</sup> Department of Psychological Warfare), the Moscow State University Black Sea Branch and NGOs have targeted every component of Ukraine’s soft power security. The Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Cossacks are also linked to the promotion of religious strife and anti-Western perceptions” (Roslycky, 2011).

Acting in tight coordination with one another under the supervision of Russian intelligence, it took a few weeks in 2014 for Russian networks to transform Crimea into a Russian federal subject.

To justify the change in the status of Crimea, from the perspective of international law, the Kremlin referred to the provisions of Russia’s military doctrine and the UN Charter – the latter guarantees the right to every nation for self-identification – as well as reiterated its intention to protect compatriots abroad. Factually, according to the Kremlin’s public statements, the annexation of Crimea was an inevitable taking into account the *coup d’état* in Kyiv, the threats for the Russian speaking minorities in Ukraine, and the results of the referendum in Crimea. These statements did not convince international society, and in particular Western states. The latter even imposed sanctions on Russia in order

to moderate its geopolitical ambitions and prevent the Kremlin from further interference into Ukrainian affairs.

The history of Russian expansionism – and geopolitical advancements – demonstrates that the Kremlin combines strategic long-term planning with spontaneous but well-timed ruthless actions. Having its objectives cautiously concealed or misrepresented, the Kremlin always waits until the right moment to strike. When such a moment comes – as it was with the post-revolutionary weakened Ukraine – all means necessary are utilized to achieve the desirable outcome (Horbulin, 2015). This pattern of expansionist behaviour has a long tradition; one may trace its roots to the times of Tsar Nikolay I or even earlier – to Ivan the Terrible times.

To provide an example, Horbulin states that Stalin's strategic objective in 1930<sup>s</sup> resided in establishing full control over Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. There was never developed, however, a detailed plan how to achieve that objective. Stalin adopted his decisions *ad hoc*, according to the situation; each step was determined by the weakness of the opponent. This approach proved to be efficient; Baltic States fell under the Soviet rule in 1940 (Horbulin, Litvinenko, 2009).

In the case of Crimea, “Russian President Vladimir Putin said he was ready to put his country's nuclear forces on alert when he annexed Ukraine's Crimean peninsula last year, in case of an intervention by the U.S. and its allies” (Meyer, 2015). As one may deduce, controlling Crimea was a Russian strategic objective; its annexation did not depend on the political loyalty of Ukrainian authorities – it was just a matter of time and opportunity; Crimean annexation required significant courage and improvisation in 2014; in case of any complications, the Kremlin was ready to utilize the most powerful weapon in its arsenal. This said, contemporary Russia is an outward oriented state which utilizes every proper opportunity to expand or indirectly strengthen its influence in the target states<sup>7</sup>.

The geopolitical importance of Crimea to Russia resides in its necessity to add a defensive depth to its southern flank and to nurture the feeling of security in

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<sup>7</sup> British historian Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975) defined Russia as the permanent Byzantium-type state-empire. Russian leaders were considering their decisions and actions always correct and indisputable. This encouraged them to pursue domestic and foreign policies with totalitarian confidence; state institutions were also appropriately shaped. The nature of the Byzantium state, as described by Toynbee, makes Russia permanently hostile towards the third states, and especially towards the West. These two powers are civilizationally incompatible (for more details see: *Civilization on Trial*, Toynbee, 1948).

the face of NATO. The issue of security, *apropos*, has always been important to the Kremlin. If to refer to George Kennan's "long telegram", written in 1946, the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs has always been portraying the outside world as "evil, hostile, and menacing" (Kennan, 1946). On the one hand, this allowed Soviet leaders to strengthen their legitimacy within the state and gain more support from common people. On the other hand, this justified increased military expenditure and fueled Soviet geopolitical expansion. The same pattern – security through expansion – is applicable for 21<sup>st</sup> century Russia; following this pattern is only the matter of proper opportunities and right circumstances.

If to look even deeper into history, the mentioned above Lypa argued that the constant search for external conflicts was stiffening Russian statehood. "War could be easily started because the majority of the population supported it eagerly: peasants were waging heavy wars with the administration on their lands that they were reluctant, or even looked with hope to gain new territories" (Lypa, 1995). Looking from this perspective, the annexation of Crimea seems to be an ordinary deal for Russia; there were even no objections or protests among the population condemning this act. On the contrary, a majority of Russians were exalted and unanimously approved the deliberations of their leaders. As of now, regardless of deteriorating living standards, Russians still gladly believe the state's propaganda and continue to support their leaders in doing a "just and right thing".

As far as Ukraine's efforts to bring Crimea back are concerned, they can hardly be defined as efficient and sustainable. Moreover, contemporary authorities tend to overlook the issue of annexation in their public speeches; at best they express themselves in general terms. This makes some sense though; in the conditions Ukraine is now – torn between insurgencies and corruption – it cannot afford itself a strong stance against Russia's geopolitical ambitions. Thus, the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea – which inevitably requires the engagement of the West – is not on the agenda now.

Considering the current dynamics, Crimea under Russian rule is transformed into an economically obsolete territory located at the outskirts of world civilization. The only industry which will flourish in Crimea is military; factually, the peninsula will evolve into the abundantly armed anti-NATO fortress. This is how the contemporary Russian geopolitical interest in the Black Sea Region looks like.

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## INEQUALITY: DORMANT THREAT TO STABILITY IN THE BRICS\*

### NIERÓWNOŚĆ: UŚPIONE ZAGROŻENIE DLA STABILNOŚCI W BRICS

*Marek Rewizorski\*\**

#### — ABSTRACT —

Being perceived by the West as a powerful yet heterogeneous “deconstructing power” and an external threat to western supremacy in global governance, the BRICS members are facing a serious “dormant threat” coming from within – economic inequalities. By asking whether inequality, like “bad cholesterol”, may silently kill the sustainability of growth by restraining access to education, health or knowledge, this article provides an assessment of the relation between the increasing inequality and rising political instability in BRICS countries. The first section of this article investigates various approaches to income and wealth inequalities, and provides a literature overview. The second section accentuates the deconstructing features of inequality in BRICS countries, which are encapsulated as the “3Ws”: weak markets, weak governments, and weak institutions. The third section looks into the inequality dynamics in BRICS members

#### — ABSTRAKT —

Postrzegani przez Zachód jako potężna a jednocześnie heterogeniczna „potęga dekonstrukcyjna” i zewnętrzne zagrożenie dla zachodniej supremacji w globalnym zarządzaniu, uczestnicy BRICS stoją w obliczu poważnego wewnętrznego „uśpionego zagrożenia” – nierówności ekonomicznych. Pytając, czy nierówność, podobnie jak „zły cholesterol”, może po cichu „zabić” trwałość wzrostu poprzez ograniczenie dostępu do edukacji, zdrowia lub wiedzy, zanalizowano związek między rosnącymi nierównościami a wzrastającą niestabilnością polityczną w państwach BRICS. W pierwszej części artykułu przesłedzono **różne podejścia do nierówności dochodowych** oraz dokonano przeglądu literatury. W drugiej części zaakcentowano dekonstrukcyjne cechy nierówności w państwach BRICS, które ujęto w formule „3S”: słabe rynki, słabe rządy i słabe instytucje. W trzeciej części zanalizowano dynamikę nierówności wśród członków BRICS, dowodząc,

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showcasing that the huge income disparities in BRICS (GINI > 0,40), combined with high food and house prices, not only fuel opportunity inequalities and growing social anger, but also lead to political instability and setbacks on the path to balanced growth. The final **part** presents the main conclusions.

**Keywords:** BRICS, economic inequalities, political stability, institutions, growth

że ogromne dysproporcje w dochodach BRICS (GINI > 0,40), w połączeniu z wysokimi cenami żywności i mieszkań, nie tylko powodują nierówności w zakresie możliwości awansu społecznego i napędzają gniew społeczny, ale także prowadzą do niestabilności politycznej i stanowią przeszkody na drodze do zrównoważonego wzrostu. W końcowej części przedstawiono wnioski i uogólnienia.

**Słowa kluczowe:** BRICS, nierówności ekonomiczne, stabilność polityczna, instytucje, wzrost

In international debates the establishment of the BRICS group is often perceived as “one of the most significant geopolitical events of the new century” (Lukov, 2012). Taking into account the growing economic power of its members, demography, natural resources, combined gross domestic product (GDP), participation in the leading international organisations and structures, common principles (openness, pragmatism, solidarity, mutual assistance, inclusiveness), and common strategic interests, the BRICS states strive “to extend their participation in key institutions of global governance” (Held, 2010). At the same time their positions in the international political order are far from convergent. Oliver Stunkel noted that while Brazil and India are pushing for a more fundamental redistribution of institutional power in today’s global governance structures, Russia and China – both permanent members of the UN Security Council – are essentially status quo powers, reluctant to change a system that has served them well during the past decades. In his view, “the BRICS are troubled by internal rivalries and contradictions that have stymied the group’s ability to take any significant action toward a primary goal: reforming Western-dominated international financial institutions” (Stunkel, 2015). Despite the stark differences arising from their divergent interests, values, political systems and objectives, even their critics admit the increasing institutionalisation of the group. Its members more and more frequently, albeit not always fruitfully, attempt to coordinate positions, and thus constitute a block of states speaking with one voice. Rejecting the “western” vision of the global order, denying the neo-liberal nature of global governance and aiming at its transformation, they are becoming a heterogenic group of powers capable of occasionally uniting in their resistance against the

“G7 world”. Coming into sight as players with a significant amount of political clout, as exemplified by their united stance during the meeting in March 2014 on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, where the grouping’s foreign ministers opposed restrictions on the participation of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the G20 Summit in Australia in November 2014, they showed their ability to cast a veto against the univocal attempt to isolate Russia and rebuild “the G20 cathedral”, according to purely western origins.

Being perceived by the West as a powerful yet heterogeneous “deconstructing power” and an external threat to western supremacy in global governance, the BRICS members are facing a serious “dormant threat” coming from within – economic inequalities. By asking whether inequality, like “bad cholesterol”, may silently kill the sustainability of growth by restraining access to education, health or knowledge, this article provides an assessment of the relation between the increasing inequality and rising political instability in BRICS countries. The first section of this article investigates various approaches to income and wealth inequalities, and provides a literature overview. The second section accentuates the deconstructing features of inequality in BRICS countries, which are encapsulated as the “3Ws”: weak markets, weak governments, and weak institutions. The third section looks into the inequality dynamics in BRICS members showcasing that the huge income disparities in BRICS ( $GINI > 0.40$ ), combined with high food and house prices, not only fuel opportunity inequalities and growing social anger, but also lead to political instability and setbacks on the path to balanced growth. The final part presents the main conclusions.

## INEQUALITY, GROWTH AND POLITICAL STABILITY – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Inequality has not been amongst the hotly debated issues for a long time. Since global capitalism’s universal overcoming of Marx’s assumption that inequality will inevitably push workers towards overthrowing the power of capital owners, only scant analyses dared to focus on how inequality might put developing states in a vulnerable position, undermining the status quo, sparking urban riots and mass demonstrations, thus hurting emerging economies and, ultimately, catalysing far-reaching social and political reforms. The US economist Kenneth Rogoff, in the Portuguese business newspaper *Jornal de Negócios*, noted that “[i]nequality is the big wild card in the next decade of global growth, and not just

in North Africa” (Rogoff, 2011). As he puts it, “[n]ot just corruption and political repression [leads to tensions and instability – M.R.]. High unemployment, glaring inequality, and soaring prices for basic commodities are also a huge factor [...]. Within countries, inequality of income, wealth, and opportunity is arguably greater than at any time in the last century. Yet, with inequality reaching levels similar to 100 years ago, the status quo has to be vulnerable. Instability can express itself anywhere” (Rogoff, 2011). Similar comments on the scale of inequality were made by Thomas Piketty (2014). The French economist, in his opus magnum *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, noted that since the 1970s, income inequality has increased significantly in the rich countries, especially the United States, where the concentration of income in the first decade of the twenty-first century slightly exceeded the level attained in the second decade of the previous century. However, he optimistically assumed that “the very rapid growth of poor and emerging countries, especially China, may well prove to be a potent force for reducing inequalities at the global level, just as the growth of the rich countries did during the period 1945–1975” (Piketty, 2014). In earlier studies, which the French scholar conducted with a number of prominent economists (Piketty, Saez, 2003; Atkinson, Piketty, Saez, 2011), inequality over the entire twentieth century was explained, and empirical evidence produced, undermining Kuznets’ hypothesis according to which inequality everywhere can be expected to follow a “bell curve” (it should first increase and then decrease over the course of industrialisation and economic development; Kuznets, 1955). Piketty showed that, after a downward swing, inequality in Western states sharply increased in the last quarter of the century (Milanovic, 2010).

Asking what effect economic inequality exerts on growth, economists (and more rarely, political scientists) are divided into several camps. To measure the above-mentioned disparity they use an extensive set of economic indicators, such as: (1) purchasing power; (2) inflation-adjusted gross domestic product *per capita*; (3) Theil Index; (4) Atkinson Index; (5) the Gini coefficient; (6) educational indicators, such as the age-specific number of years of education attained; (7) environmental indicators, such as the use of improved sources of drinking water and sanitation facilities; (8) demographic variables, such as: the size of rural and total populations, and life expectancy; (9) health indicators, such as infant, child and maternal mortality rates. The most commonly used is the so-called “Gini coefficient” (or Gini Index), which has become by far the most popular measure for inequality since it was first introduced by the Italian

statistician Corrado Gini (1884–1965) almost a century ago (Luebker, 2010). It can theoretically take any value between zero (perfect equality, i.e., everybody has the same income) and one (total inequality, i.e., all income goes to a single person). However, in some cases the Gini coefficient is multiplied by 100, and then ranges between 0 and 100.

A number of scholars suggest that a high Gini coefficient is a negative contributor to growth (Alesina, Rodrik, 1994). Additionally, numerous studies indicate a close relationship between high income inequalities (GINI ca. > 0.40 and higher) and rising political instability (Alesina, Perotti, 1996). According to them, income inequality leads to social discontent and fuels social unrest. The latter, by increasing the probability of coups, revolutions, mass violence, generating policy uncertainty and threatening property rights, has a negative effect on investment and, as a consequence, reduces growth (Alesina, Perotti, 1996). In various studies Persson and Tabellini (1994), Bertola (1993), and Perotti (1993) highlighted the link between the exacerbating of equality and a mounting demand for fiscal redistribution which, if financed by distortionary taxation, acts as factor impeding growth rates. In a widely quoted paper Alesina and Perotti (1996) tested 72 countries for the period 1960–85 measuring socio-political instability with indices which capture the occurrence of more or less violent phenomena of political unrest. Having asked the questions of: (1) does income inequality increase political instability?, and (2) does political instability reduce investment?, they gave positive answers to both questions. More specifically, Alesina and Perotti noticed that “political stability is enhanced by the presence of a wealthy middle class [...] political instability has an adverse effect on investment and, therefore, on growth” (Alesina, Perotti, 1996).

A contrasting view on the link between inequality and growth was expressed by Kaldor and Kalecki, who independently came to the conclusion that significant income inequalities have a positive effect on growth (Kaldor, 1960; Kalecki, 1971). They based their arguments on models with fixed savings rates in which workers were assumed to have a zero savings rate. According to the model, a transfer of resources from workers to capitalists would raise the economy’s aggregate savings rate and therefore the growth rate (Rodríguez, 2000). To put it simply, the “Kaldorian” pro-inequality model held that more inequality favours more accumulation, because the rich save more than the poor. This view was supported by Hongyi Li and Heng-fu Zou (1998) who showed that more inequality can produce higher growth. However, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) found a non-linear relationship: inequality appears to be

good for growth at high levels of income but bad for growth at low levels of income. It is noteworthy that in BRICS countries, where a small proportion of super-rich people amass a significant portion of the national wealth, the negative impact of inequality on growth can be especially pronounced. Massive social inequalities in emerging economies may be exemplified by data summarised in the *Global Wealth Report* (2013), published annually by Cr dit Suisse. According to the 2013 report, 5.6 per cent of the Russian population possesses between \$10,000 and \$100,000, 0.6 per cent between \$100,000 and \$1 million, while 0.1 per cent has more than \$1 million. The bank indicated that Russia has the highest level of wealth inequality in the world, apart from small Caribbean nations with resident billionaires. In 2013, 110 Russian billionaires (0.00008 per cent of the population) owned 35 per cent of all wealth, while 94 per cent of the adult population, estimated at 143 million, owned less than \$10,000 (Global Wealth Report, 2013).

The third approach to the inequality and growth debate focuses on the distinction between positive and negative inequality. In asking how inequality affects economic efficiency, Branco Milanovic compares inequality to “good” and “bad” cholesterol. “Good inequality”, he writes, is “needed to create incentives for people to study, work hard, or start risky entrepreneurial projects” (Milanovic, 2010). “Bad inequality” on the contrary “discourages from individual efforts, provokes discouragement, bad habits and provides means to preserve acquired positions rather than motivate to excel” (ibid.). Fran ois Facchini (2008) puts forward similar arguments. Not only does he refer to the distinction between “good” and “bad” inequalities, but based on Baumol’s production-predation model (Baumol, 1990), according to which good inequalities would be the result of productive entrepreneurial activity, while bad inequalities would be the consequences of their unproductive activity, Facchini argues that “the positive or negative relationship between inequalities and growth in production depends upon the way individuals are enriched” (Facchini, 2008). If they are enriched by the discovery of a market profit, this has a positive effect on growth and economic progress. If they are enriched by the discovery of a rent, that, on the other hand, has a negative effect on growth.

INEQUALITY AND THE “3WS”: WEAK MARKETS, WEAK  
GOVERNMENTS, WEAK INSTITUTIONS

Shifting the debate about the distinction between “good” and “bad” inequality to BRICS, and – more generally – to developing countries, it is worth recalling Nancy Birdsall’s assumption about “constructive” and “destructive” inequality. In a press article published in 2007, this renowned economist noted: “[d]istinguishing between constructive and destructive inequality is useful. To clarify the distinction: inequality is constructive when it creates positive incentives at the micro level. Such inequality reflects differences in individuals’ responses to equal opportunities and is consistent with efficient allocation of resources in an economy. In contrast, destructive inequality reflects privileges for the already rich and blocks potential for productive contributions of the less rich” (Birdsall, 2007). Against conventional textbook economic approaches, describing a tradeoff between growth and equality, where rising inequality (also in countries like China, Russia or Brazil) contributes to boosting economic growth and the enrichment of entrepreneurial individuals who get high returns from their risk-propelled investments, Birdsall lauds the role of tax-financed redistribution programmes in developing countries, which neo-liberals have always considered as bad, undermining individual responsibility and the work ethic, and thus making them responsible for sluggish growth. She accentuates the deconstructing features of inequality in the developing world, no matter if the debate is on East Asia, Latin America, or Africa (e.g., South Africa’s GINI coefficient in 2011–63.4 – was among the highest in the world). They can be encapsulated as the “3Ws”: weak markets, weak governments, and weak institutions.

Weak markets and weak governments in developing countries translate into less effective compensation for market failure. Moreover, governmental institutions are less coherent in their activities, which adversely affects the accountability of the select few who are in power. The example of Brazil, which in the second half of 2015 was severely hit by rising inflation (standing at approx. 9.53 per cent in August), weak GDP growth (-2.6 per cent), a large fiscal deficit (9 per cent of the GDP) and high public debt (72.6 per cent), shows the structural weaknesses of an economy once hailed as a star performer in the emerging world (Garcia-Herrero, 2015). With the Dutch disease of de-industrialisation and falling productivity, combined with unit labour costs more than doubling from 2001 to 2011 and poor infrastructure described in the *Economist* special report as a “road to hell” (*The Economist*, 2013a), the market renders it difficult for the

government to provide public services for citizens in the education or health sectors, not to mention rising housing inequality. In Brazil, where in 2010 about 14.6 million people were illiterate (*MercoPress*, 2011), despite a downward trend, illiteracy rates are still among the highest in Latin America. The government still fails to find a solution to this problem, particularly in the poor north-east, where the rate is almost double the Brazilian average, standing at 17 per cent, and a lot higher than the south and south-east rates which do not exceed 4.7 per cent. The worst state is Alagoas in the north-east, where 22.52 per cent of the population remained illiterate over a ten-year period. With nearly 90 per cent of illiterate people aged 25 and over, and almost 70 per cent of all illiterates being found in the rural population (Couto Soares, Scerri, Maharajh, 2014), Brazilian investment in human capital in the long-term perspective needs to be huge. However, despite the dropping illiteracy rate from 13.6 per cent in 2000 to 9.6 per cent in 2010, the objective is merely “wishful thinking” with a sluggish economy, decelerated additionally by a downturn in Brazilian commodity exports (soybeans, crude oil and iron ore) to China and the depreciation of the Brazilian real against the dollar, implying that Brazilian companies will have to pay more for their dollar-denominated debt.

The weak institutions dilemma refers to the fragility of behavioural systems and relations that regulate the life and activity of individuals (Mihăilescu, 1974). Where social institutions are fragile, inequality discourages the civic and social life that underpins the collective decision-making necessary for healthy, functioning societies. Being, in fact, an asset of social capital, social institutions enhance civic engagement and levels of mutual trust among community members. There is some evidence to suggest that poverty (incidental to economic inequality) is linked to depletion of social capital (Wilson, 1991) and that a lower level of social trust is associated with higher rates of many major causes of death, including coronary heart disease, malignant neoplasms, cerebrovascular disease, accidental injury, and infant mortality (Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner, Prothrow-Stith, 1997). Refocusing from the behavioural to the political environment, a correlation between a high rate of inequality (typical for all BRICS members) and a low rate of social capital has been affirmed by Vladimir Shlapentokh, who – surveying the attitudes of Russians towards their social institutions – noted that Russians mistrust state social institutions and political institutions in particular. There is not one institution that can garner more than 40 to 50 per cent of the nation’s trust. According to Shlapentokh, in terms of their lack of confidence in social institutions, the Russians are behind not only the most advanced countries in

the world, but even countries known for their unstable political systems, such as Colombia or Nigeria (Shlapentokh, 2006). With rising inflation, weak GDP growth, a tense political situation emanating from corruption scandals and the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which has delayed the action needed for economic recovery, it is no wonder that Russia – a significant member of the BRICS family – has experienced protest movements. There was a wave of dissatisfaction on the Russian political scene in 2011 and 2012. Urban demonstrations were a classical instance of the electoral protests common in regimes of “electoral authoritarianism”. Many journalists and political commentators compared it to the wave of protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in 2010–2013 (especially as the Russian protesters also used social networks like Facebook and Vkontakte).


In BRICS and other developing countries, inequality, accompanied by such factors as weak markets, governments and institutions, is a serious setback for growth and an invitation to political instability. However, reducing inequality does not mean an “automatic transmission” to high growth, or efficient government with cohesive social institutions. This stems from the fact that inequality is multidimensional, it bears not only an “income face” but also restricts access to basic services, infrastructure, knowledge, innovation, affects spatial disparities and various consumption patterns. In the case of such BRICS members as India, Brazil or South Africa, inequality factors are additionally influenced by strong dependency, as these countries inherited extremely backward economies with asymmetric social and economic structures from the colonial rulers. The example of India shows that the majority of its population, especially rural residents (about 70 per cent of population), the uneducated and poor, are incapable of coping with market problems, and thus have been excluded from access to opportunities for economic advancement, created by a surge of Indian ambitions to play an important role in the world economy (Nakonieczna, 2014). The deepening mismatch between “the haves” and “the have-nots” translates into unbalanced consumption of the fruits of globalization. Arundhati Roy (2005) writes: “India lives in several centuries at the same time, making progress and simultaneously losing ground”. The rift between the fabulously rich, supported by corrupt local authorities and foreign investors, and the extremely poor, exploited in the labour market, deprived of basic civil rights and discouraged from active civic and social life, may be a stumbling block for those political parties which promote economic development at the cost of rising inequalities. This fate has

befallen the Indian Bharatiya Party (BJP), which lost power in the parliamentary elections in 2004 (Nakonieczna, 2014).

Multidimensional inequality in BRICS may refer to opportunities (access to land, health, knowledge, financial means) and outcomes (income, wages, the intersectoral differential between wages and productivity, and, finally, patterns of employment – formal and informal). Francesca Beausang notes that: “[t]wo individuals with the same opportunity may end up with different incomes, based on who is the more ambitious or hard-working; that seems like a fair outcome. More problematic is the situation where two individuals, with the same ambition and work ethic, end up with different incomes because they did not have the same opportunity” (Beausang, 2012). The next subsection of this article will look into both opportunity and outcome inequalities in BRICS.

#### ENTERING THE DORMANT DRAGON’S DEN: BRICS AND THE THREAT OF INEQUALITY

According to OECD estimates, BRICS, in particular South Africa and Brazil, are among the most unequal societies in the world. The estimates show that the group members’ income inequality in the late 2000s has risen compared to the early 1990s, apart from Brazil (Fig.1).



**Figure 1.** Income inequality in BRICS countries measured with GINI coefficient

Source: Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising, Paris: OECD 2011.

The World Bank roughly confirms these estimates. According to the World Development Index (WDI, 2016), the GINI coefficient in the BRICS countries is as follows: Brazil – 52.9 (2013); Russia – 41.6 (2012); India – 33.9 (2009); China – 42.1 (2010); South Africa – 63.4 (2011). The OECD and World Bank's estimates differ with reference to China, which appears to be well above the 0.4 level that is usually considered a critical threshold for political unrest. According to inequality data published by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics in 2013 (first release since 2000), China's Gini peaked at 0.49 in 2008 before falling to 0.47 in 2012 (*The Telegraph*, 2016). However, these figures may be downgraded, as shown in a study of approx. 8,500 households carried out by the Survey and Research Center for China Household Finance, a body set up by the Finance Research Institute of the People's Bank of China and Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, which found that the Gini coefficient in China was 0.61 in 2010, with 10 per cent of households capturing up to 57 per cent of the country's disposable income (Caixin, 2012). The survey also estimated the urban jobless rate in July 2012 was 8.05 per cent, almost double the official figure. Additionally, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a state research institute, estimated inequality at 0.54 in 2008 (Bloomberg, 2012).

The huge income disparities in BRICS (GINI > 0.40), combined with high food and house prices, not only fuel opportunity inequalities and growing social anger, but also lead to political instability and setbacks on the path to balanced growth. High food prices and expenditures have played a part in fostering civil unrest in Egypt and other Arab countries, and raised concerns about a possible food crisis in developing countries, as world food prices reached their highest levels in January 2011 (a typical Egyptian family spent about 40 per cent of monthly income on food in 2011). Food price inflation, poverty and lack of opportunities, as exemplified by the tragic self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a young fruit vendor, in December 2010, led to a series of unprecedented demonstrations in Tunisia, which soon spread to other Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. A mounting wave of unrest engulfed Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen. The Arab streets, full of desperate individuals who lived under the same very difficult conditions, shared Bouazizi's experience of unemployment, but also found an opportunity to express their frustration and dissatisfaction with a corrupt system that was seen as a "law enforcement facility" against the poorest, and for the increasingly flagrant theft of land and resources by the elite. As the share of household spending devoted to food purchases increases, food prices have a greater impact on living standards, poverty rates,

economic development and domestic politics. According to Credit Suisse's Emerging Consumer Survey (*Credit Suisse*, 2015), consumers' food purchases in China and India in 2014 were at roughly 16 per cent and 21 per cent of total monthly spending, respectively. Consumers in South Africa, Brazil and Russia spent about 16 per cent, 17 per cent and 34 per cent of income, respectively. Given that food items are fundamental in consumption patterns, for consumers in Russia and India household expenditures on food purchases became quite a challenge because of food inflation, which weakens households' purchasing power. It suffices to indicate that in November 2015, the country with the highest monthly food inflation in BRICS was Russia (17.7 per cent), followed by Brazil (11.6 per cent), and India (6 per cent) (*The Economist*, 2016). Food inflation has been one of the harshest consequences for ordinary Russians, mostly due to the country's confrontation with the West over Ukraine and the ongoing economic crisis. The steep devaluation of the rouble and bans on imports of European produce due to Moscow's retaliation to the sanctions pushed the average cost of food up by 20 per cent in the 12 months between July 2014 and 2015 (Bazenkova, 2016). Average prices in some categories increased even more. The cost of vegetables and fruit over the given time increased approx. 23 per cent, sugar increased by 29.6 per cent, fish and seafood by 31.4 per cent, grains and legumes by 43.4 per cent. In a society where 94 per cent of the adult population, estimated at 143 million, owns less than \$10,000, such food inflation undoubtedly has a negative impact on social capital, trust and contributes to public dissatisfaction and instability. Examples of civil unrest may be easily found amongst BRICS members. Among the most memorable were the protests which India experienced in 2011 inspired by Anna Hazare, India's most prominent anti-corruption campaigner, fighting corruption scandals and rampant food inflation. In addition to the above-mentioned, social unrest, which gathered a crowd of 100,000 in Moscow in December 2011, as well as protests, riots and demonstrations in China, which doubled from 2006, rising to at least 180,000 cases in 2010, forced governments to talk about the "softening" of economic policy in order to avoid open rebellion instigated by public anger over high food prices, unemployment and the unrestrained power of officials. For instance, in February 2013, China's State Council approved a 35-point income-distribution plan intended to tackle the nation's wealth gap, addressing such issues as raising minimum wages to at least 40 per cent of average salaries, loosening controls on lending and deposit rates, and increasing spending on education and affordable housing (Bloomberg, 2013). The deficit in the provision of adequate housing and

amenities is even more evident in India, where the shortfall of proper shelter places one-fourth (93 million) of the Indian urban population, estimated in the 2011 national census at approx. 377 million people (*Census...*, 2011), below the poverty line. Additionally, in Indian cities in 2011, approximately 20 million inhabitants were living in 49,000 slums. Housing inequality in India also has a “socio-religious face”. This applies to communities like the Dalits (16.5 per cent of the population; IDSNS, 2013), which are at the bottom of the Hindu caste system and the largest minority – Muslims (14 per cent of the population), also vulnerable to poverty. According to the *Housing Condition and Amenities in India 2008–09* report (*Government...*, 2010), Hindus have more housing space (41 square metres) than Muslims (37.8) and Dalits (34.7). Additionally, Muslims and Dalits are disadvantaged in their access to (separate) kitchens, private latrines, bathrooms and drinking water facilities. Since 1950, the Indian government has been trying to use the world’s oldest affirmative action programme, including quotas targeted at the Dalits, classified as the “Scheduled Caste”, Adivasi, the 8 per cent of India’s population, labelled as “Scheduled Tribes” and so-called “Other Backward Classes”, a diverse group of lower classes that represent about 27 per cent of the country’s population. The Indian system of reservations, which is a type of affirmative action whereby a proportion of seats is set aside for the disadvantaged in the Parliament of India, state legislative assemblies, central and state civil services, public sector units, central and state government departments and all public and private educational institutions (Tummala, 1999) in some respects has succeeded. In 1965, Dalits held less than 1.6 per cent of senior civil service positions. That rose to 11.5 per cent by 2011. However, in other areas the progress (if any) was meagre. Very few Indians have formal jobs, let alone government ones. Ineffective job policies contributed to increasing Indian red tape, making it difficult to dismiss dysfunctional or corrupt bureaucrats. In education, where quotas and scholarships were introduced in 1920, more Dalit and tribal children were encouraged to attend schools at primary and secondary levels, but at the same time, setting aside special places in colleges and universities for Dalit and other backward applicants, resulted in lowering demands from them as applicants, which caused widespread resentment among young people competing for the opportunity to enter a professional career. According to Pratap Bhanu Mehta, an academic at the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi, the affirmative action, despite its light side, also has a dark side, which stems from its structural weakness. As he aptly notes, “[t]he current system is not about equal opportunity, it is about distributing the spoils of state power strictly

according to caste, thus perpetuating it” (*The Economist*, 2013b). This gloomy notion about the inevitability of the failure of a policy focused on the distribution of limited state resources may be up to date. Even Brazil, which provided more equal access to education for the workforce in the mid-1990s, and initiated income transfer programmes directed towards reducing extreme poverty, reached a standstill if not a reverse. The incomes of the Brazilian bottom 5 per cent in the mid-2000s declined by 14 per cent. Inequality reduction policies lifted the poorest out of poverty in rural areas, while neglecting the poor in numerous cities and those who are not “the poorest of the poor” (Beausang, 2012). In other words, the Brazilian government, having limited resources, has chosen to help those in dire need without taking care of the others, and thus silently agreed to perpetuate structural mechanisms of inequality. As F. Beausang aptly notes: “Brazilian inequality is deeply rooted in the structural mechanisms that perpetuate it, the most entrenched of which are the coalitions between social classes, particularly landowners and business, which oppose urban wage workers and the rural masses. Since colonization, these coalitions have prevailed in the concentration of land and political power. They have blocked attempts to change the distribution of income or provide social services for the poor” (ibid.). Hence the persistence of inequality, regardless of changing political regimes and development strategies.

## CONCLUSION

BRICS members, since the financial crisis broke out in 2008, have experienced massive riots, protests, acts of civil disobedience rooted in increasing income and wealth inequality, poor opportunities to gain decent education, health services, access to housing and amenities, ethnicity, colour and gender disparities, and, finally, strong territorial inequality (urban-rural divide) in social and economic terms. Inequality and poverty, inevitably linked to the historical dependency of Brazil’s and South Africa’s political economies, continue to constitute a worrying reality, notwithstanding recent improvements in the case of Brazil. Increasing inequality in both China and India where “the Gini has overtaken the growth rates” (Couto Soares, Scerri, Maharajh, 2014) poses a serious threat to political stability. Finally, Russia, with a record low rate of social capital and incredibly high concentration of national wealth in the hands of 110 billionaires, jealously guarding 35 per cent of the nation’s wealth, draw a rather gloomy picture of the

emerging powers, where high levels of inequality, like “bad cholesterol”, have combined with rising inflation (in particular food and housing), large fiscal deficits and public debt, stifling growth and showing the structural weaknesses of economies once hailed as star performers in the emerging world. Apparently, describing BRICS members as “giants with feet of clay” would be more appropriate. With weak markets, weak governments and weak institutions, they are unable to calm the social unrest which, as Bandura (1977) notes, occurs when individuals consider themselves highly capable but perceive that they have little control over the social or political processes in their country. The example of the recent powerful protests which began in Brazil in June 2013, where the protesters initially demanded lower-cost public transportation, but eventually expressed their dissatisfaction with the quality of government services, shows that individuals can “engage in protest or outright rebellion when they see problems in their society or with their position in society and at the same time believe they can effect change only by protesting the established system” (Flechtner, 2014).

There is, however, a question of why, despite the GINI coefficient in BRICS being significantly higher than those of Egypt and Tunisia in 2010–2011, the recent bursts of public dissatisfaction have not swept away the ruling elites in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa?

Firstly, the answer may be the partly hidden socio-historical differences between the emerging powers and the MENA world. The Arab uprising in Egypt and Syria, the war against Qaddafi and public unrest in Tunisia, which had a much more devastating impact on political stability than the “soft” protests and riots in BRICS, have a long history rooted in the acts of disobedience in Muslim societies after Muhammad’s revelations. Even in the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> centuries, there was a strong connection between the ruler and the urban population or, in other words, the palace and the market. According to Albert Hourani, in medieval Arab societies sometimes the alliance of interests or a certain balance of power between the ruler and those he relied on, could be shaken. The discontent of the possessing classes in the city did not usually take the form of open disobedience, because certain privileged groups had too much to lose. However, among the ordinary people, the discontent could take the form of disturbance of the order. As Hourani puts it: “[t]he skilled craftsmen and shopkeepers would not easily revolt except under pressure of hardship, the oppression of officials, high process, shortage of food or materials; their normal condition was one of acquiescence, since their interest lay in the preservation of order. The proletariat, however, the mass of rural immigrants, unskilled casual workers, beggars and habitual

criminals on the outskirts of the city, was in a more permanent state of unrest” (Hourani, 2005).

Secondly, the more violent turn of the political unrest in Egypt and Tunisia in comparison to BRICS can be explained by the correlation between the rising aspirations of the young population, acquired thanks to a relatively large number of them obtaining a higher education diploma and high unemployment. Tunisia and Egypt in 2010 had a relatively high percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 enrolled in higher education (more than 30 per cent; WDI, 2013) while in Brazil it was 14.4 per cent. Access varied across regions. In the south of Brazil, 19.2 per cent of young people in the age group attended higher education in 2010, while in the northeast the index was below 10 per cent (IPEADATA, 2011). The higher education rate in Tunisia, Egypt and other MENA countries was mixed with very high unemployment among college graduates (far exceeding that in BRICS), which in the MENA region is higher than that prevalent among uneducated and illiterate Arabs.

Thirdly, the lower intensity of protest against injustice and inequality in BRICS countries in comparison to MENA may be explained by the “tunnel effect”, introduced by economists Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) and further developed by Debraj Ray (2010). In Hirschman and Rothschild’s model, perceptions of inequality in a developing society are compared to car drivers stuck in a traffic jam and waiting in a lane. As long as the neighbouring lane was moving they felt relieved, believing their turn was next. In the case of BRICS, with record-high inequalities, societies are willing to accept disparities when they think that in the course of time they will benefit (the lane will start moving). However, if only one lane moves (a certain group pick up benefits) and the rest stand still (cut from benefits), the sentiment of anger takes over and contributes to a rising tide of political instability. According to Ray, economic growth combined with increased inequality would stimulate aspirations on condition that people who are not benefiting from the growth could expect to benefit soon. In India, where affirmative action brought moderate success, or in Brazil, where Bolsa Familia and other income transfer programmes gave hope to “the poorest of the poor”, a part of society still prefers to wait and see, or “wait in a lane” believing that growth will be used to fulfil the aspirations of all levels of society. However, with the limited resources which BRICS (except from China) have at their disposal, and the de facto “bad inequality” which spreads faster than growth, help will likely be reserved to those in dire need, while neglecting vast groups of society that may contribute to long-term development.

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## ATTRACTION ATTRIBUTION AS A THEORETICAL BASIS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INSTRUMENTS EVALUATION

ATRYBUCJA ATRAKCYJNOŚCI JAKO TEORETYCZNA  
PODSTAWA OCENY INSTRUMENTÓW DYPLOMACJI  
PUBLICZNEJ

*Marina Samsonova\**

— ABSTRACT —

The article tackles the issue of measurement and evaluation of the effectiveness of public diplomacy instruments, such as strategies. The author suggests applying the approach based on the phenomenon of *attraction*. The evaluation of quality of public diplomacy is presented as the evaluation of influence of capabilities of public diplomacy instruments, and their certain set (aggregate) in subjective and functional strategies of public diplomacy. The article also argues a state that the more public diplomacy instruments meet the conditions of successful attraction and affiliation, the more likely they would be attractive to the population of a host country and would provide an involvement effect.

**Keywords:** public diplomacy, public diplomacy strategies, phenomenon of attraction, evaluation instruments

— ABSTRAKT —

Artykuł dotyczy kwestii mierzenia i oceny skuteczności instrumentów dyplomacji publicznej, takich jak strategie. Autorka proponuje zastosowanie podejścia opartego na zjawisku atrakcyjności. Ocenę jakości dyplomacji publicznej przedstawiono jako ocenę wpływu skuteczności jej instrumentów oraz pewnego ich zestawienia w subiektywnych i funkcjonalnych strategiach dyplomacji publicznej. W artykule postawiono również tezę, że im bardziej instrumenty dyplomacji publicznej spełniają warunki skutecznego przyciągania i przynależności, tym bardziej będą one atrakcyjne dla ludności kraju przyjmującego oraz zapewnią efekt zaangażowania.

**Słowa kluczowe:** dyplomacja publiczna, strategie dyplomacji publicznej, zjawisko atrakcyjności, instrumenty oceny

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The role of public diplomacy in the current international affairs is, undoubtedly, huge when compared to the era of classic interstate interaction. Public diplomacy as an instrument of research and building of public opinion, and also a tool of promotion of a state positive image abroad, is becoming one of the most influential means of international cooperation.

Public diplomacy as an instrument of a state's foreign policy is a relatively young phenomenon. Thus, its aims and values would not be of a great difference since mainly it is focused on development of its positive perception among foreign publics. Public diplomacy practices concern, for example, cultural and education cooperation with other states. Another important value of public diplomacy is international security and prevention of traditional international security threats. Thus, for instance, among current papers on public diplomacy issues there are some researches considering it in the context of traditional perception of this diplomacy, such as smart power combining both military and non-military means of international interaction. Mihai-Marcel Neag in his paper uses public diplomacy along with such concepts as military diplomacy and defense diplomacy, claiming the importance of all together in the sake of global collaboration and cooperation when dealing with the problems and opportunities brought about by economic interdependence, globalization, climate change, terrorism, and other matters (Neag, 2014). However, some new issues of public diplomacy would emerge with time and global development. Thus, for instance, with modern highly developed information and communication technologies, use of satellite and Internet technologies, public diplomacy turns into an instrument of global information influence, creating potential possibilities for completely new challenges.

In order to research public diplomacy of contemporary states, the criteria of effectiveness are quite necessary. Whilst operating these criteria, a researcher can evaluate efficacy of both – general public diplomacy strategy as well as the measures taken to implement it.

The researchers of the effectiveness of public diplomacy use various measure coordinates. Thus, according to Artem Tsvetkov, these criteria are the two indicators: approaching goals vs distancing from goals which are objectively achievable within the frames of public diplomacy; total vs fragmentary mobilization of resources which are available to the actors of public diplomacy (Tsvetkov, 2010).

The approach chosen here by the author of the paper is based on the phenomenon of attraction. This choice might be argued as follows. Science, culture, education, tourism, and sports obtain the potential of influence due to the fact

that they provide mechanisms of attraction. According to a notorious American political scientist Joseph Nye, a state can achieve wanted results in world politics when other states are willing to follow the lead of this state, admiring its values, modeling themselves on the given example, and trying to reach its level of prosperity and openness. In such context it is crucial in world politics to shape agenda and *attract* others, rather than making them change by threatening to use military power or economic sanctions. Through such soft power others want the same things, and what is more, not by coercion, but by the means of attraction (Nye, 2004).

In practical implementation of international cooperation – from information technologies to bioengineering – a final strengthening of *attractiveness* of a nation state image indicates the presence of a public diplomacy direction (Tsvetkov, 2010).

Public diplomacy dimension is initially a measure of a *potential of attractiveness* of both certain public diplomacy strategies in whole, as well as single measures. The attractiveness of a state and its positive image are provided, in our opinion, by the *quality* of the instruments of public diplomacy strategies. The more attributes of the phenomenon of attractiveness of a subject/object there are, the higher the probability of its influence on a positive attitude towards a state. Therefore, in order to measure the quality of the instruments of public diplomacy, it is necessary to reveal an aggregate of features of the phenomenon of attractiveness of a subject/object – **attraction**.

In political and social psychology by the notion of *attraction* a positive orientation towards an “alien” in a form of interest, attention, sympathy, and friendly attitude is meant (Montoya, Horton, 2004). At the basis of the attitude there lie emotions and feelings, opinion of another person as an object of attention, positive attitude towards an “alien” might be explained by certain commonalities of people. The attraction paradigm of Donn Byrne stands for the claim that common points between two individuals increase their mutual sympathy, and, therefore, influence their interaction and behavior (Baron, Byrne, Johnson, 2003). In Russian scientific tradition of social psychology attraction is considered as both a process of moulding of object attractiveness, as well as a result, a product of this process, namely, positive attitude towards this object (Andreyeva, 2009).

*Attraction* as a social attitude of a friendly kind is essentially possible both among individuals (interpersonal), and among groups of people (intergroup). Social interpersonal attraction might be interpreted in several meanings: power

and process of attraction; something pleasant, interesting; object which draws attention, meets expectations and taste; something people are willing to do, see, visit; a person encouraging sympathy; interaction which resists separation and aimed at concurrence (*Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 2016). Thus, as it can be inferred, in American tradition attraction is characterized in a wider manner, namely, as both a process of attraction, so as its intensity, the effect of which depends on an *object*, *measures* aimed at this object, and characteristics of a *subject of attractiveness*.

The potential of transformation of interpersonal contacts into fully functional interpersonal cooperation is contained in the following psychological determinants of attraction: need in affiliation, common kinship, regularity of interaction, and dimensional proximity (Shadricheva, 2016).

*Dimensional proximity* fairly creates availability of contacts with another person, facilitates obtaining information about them, in other words, it contributes to shaping their differentiated image and increases possibility of interaction with them. Dimensional proximity influences regularity of interaction. In the aggregate they increase the extent of acquaintanceship among individuals, decrease the influence of uncertainty factor, and, therefore, chance of threat, which influence increasing interpersonal attraction. However, mere dimensional proximity is not considered to be a determining factor, influencing attraction. Firstly, the effect of numerous interactions fades away in time. Secondly, life experience shows that people being in close proximity tend to not only choose, but also reject each other. Thus, it is necessary to take into consideration a number of factors.

The following factor determining interpersonal attraction is a *need in affiliation*, and namely, to create and maintain favourable relationships with other people, to have a will to be appealing, draw attention, interest, to have a feeling of being valuable and significant person.

The extent to which this need is expressed by different individuals indicates considerably their *type of interpersonal behaviour*. Those individuals whose need is mildly expressed tend to be seen as incommunicable, avoiding others. While those who express their need in affiliation to a greater extent are constantly looking for a contact with others, they are communicative, and trying to be noticed. For those with a strong need in affiliation general focus on people, their insolation intolerance happen to be factors increasing the attractiveness of a different individual, especially at the initial stage, as a potential communication partner (Buunk, 2001).

Another factor of forming and developing attraction, pointed out by the researches, is a *common activity*. Experiments prove that common activities draw people together. However, they are rather common activities that result in success, even in the context of a game, that facilitate increase in attraction, than those that do not. Among the factors favourable for forming and development of attraction between subjects of common activity there are regularity of interactions between people as well as a fact of anticipation of joint meeting. George Homans in 1950 pointed out that if regularity of interaction increases, then the level of mutual sympathy grows, which also tends to work in reverse (Homans, 1984).

The factors considered above might be determined as external determinants of attraction because of the very fact that they appear for contextual or intrapersonal *conditions*, facilitating or restraining convergence of people. Apart from that, as soon as individuals make contact, a whole *new group of factors* appears, generated by the very process of interpersonal communication. Among the *external*, or in fact interpersonal, determinants of attraction there might be referred the following ones: physical attraction, communication style, regularity of interactions, convergence factor, complementation, supporting behaviour, successfulness, and emotional state.

According to some researches, there is a factor determining interpersonal attraction which states that people are eager to connect with those whose traits complete their own ones. A theory emphasizing differences instead of common people traits was suggested by an American psychologist Robert Winch, having named it a *theory of complementary needs*. The theory stands for the following: when choosing a spouse and even friends, people often chose those who fill their needs, and the highest extent takes place when two persons have complementary needs, rather than similar ones (Aronson, 1990).

The *quality* of public diplomacy strategies is determined by one more result, which is improvement of mutual understanding. Cultural diplomacy, according to Milton Cummings, is an exchange of ideas, information, values, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, which could facilitate improvement of mutual understanding (Cummings, 2003). Soft power is also an ability to attract, and often attraction leads to mutual understanding. In other words, when speaking in behavioural concerns, soft power is an attractive power, as J. Nye stated (Nye, 2003).

The mentioned above characteristics of attraction and conditions of its determination allow us to systemize *criteria and attributes of quality of public*

*diplomacy strategies and their instruments. Quality criteria* in the aggregate characterize the extent of *attraction intensity*; attributes of criteria characterize the extent of *low/high* intensity of attraction:

1. instrument value – attributes: educative value (something pleasant, interesting; object which draws attention, meets expectations and taste of other people); personal value (object which draws attention, meets own expectations and taste);
2. distance between interests of actors and recipients – attributes: contemplative activity (something people are willing to do, see, visit); common activity (interaction which is opposed to separation and is aimed at concurrence);
3. frequency and periods of interpersonal interaction – attributes: single, maintaining.

These criteria and their attributes might be used as a *standard of instrument quality* of a public diplomacy strategy. It is important that rationalization, development, and realization of each instrument of strategies would be based on the mechanisms of attraction and its attributive characteristics. It is only in this case the effects of public diplomacy – *propinquity effect* and *involvement effect* – and, therefore, attractiveness of a state, its positive image, and values, could be expected.

The evaluation of quality of public diplomacy is the evaluation of influence of capabilities of public diplomacy instruments and their certain set (aggregate) in subjective (culture, science, education, economics, sport, and tourism) and functional (presence strategy, influence strategy) strategies of public diplomacy. It also concerns the involvement of a host state population in implementation of instruments and strategies of public diplomacy. The more public diplomacy instruments meet the conditions of successful *attraction and affiliation*, the more likely they would be attractive to the population of a host country, and would provide an *involvement effect*. This is the mechanism of how public diplomacy serves as an instrument of foreign policy of a state, providing influence on public opinion of the population of hosting states on the basis of stable state of *mutual understanding, mutual relation, and cooperation* of people of different cultures, nationalities, and countries, involved into practices of international cooperation in various public diplomacy strategies.

When speaking of practical instances of effectiveness evaluation, international educational exchange programs can be mentioned. They are considered to play a significant role in public diplomacy, basically, due to the assumption that direct

first-hand contact between individuals of different nations diminishes stereotypical perceptions and prejudices as well as facilitates intercultural communication. Thus, Antonio F. de Lima Jr. points out their roles in his article as follows. Firstly, they are considered as a way to work in favor of improvement of an image of a country and to cast its foreign policy in a better light (de Lima, 2007). Secondly, de Lima states, that international educational exchange programs are “genuine fashion for governments to develop durable, stable relationships with foreign publics, which would also work for the successful implementation of foreign policy” (de Lima, 2007). Indeed, what would be expected from direct involvement of foreign students into a host society is their understanding of a host country including development of sympathy towards its culture and values, and further support for host’s country foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the process of integration into a culture and also developing sympathy includes a variety of factors, which makes the process rather complicated and not necessarily ending in expected results. However, educational exchange programs are the key elements of public diplomacy of many countries, and they are considered as effective means of foreign policy. And since they are implemented through educational institutions, that makes universities and other establishments dealing with international education actors of public diplomacy of various countries, including Russia, and the United States.

Thus, for instance, speaking of the United States’ experience in public diplomacy, de Lima quotes H. Finn, saying “if the US Department of State has a brand name around the world, that name is Fulbright” (de Lima, 2007). Indeed, Fulbright Program is a widely known international education exchange program of the US Department of State. According to the same paper, the Program played a crucial role in consolidating the leadership of the US in the post-WWII world, opposing communist ideology, spreading American ideas and values. Besides, after 9/11 through Fulbright program the US established exchange with the key countries, namely Afghanistan and Iraq, therefore increasing understanding of American society in the Islamic countries. Through educational exchange programs, including the Fulbright Program, it is possible to eliminate stereotypes and prejudices. International students play a role of culture carriers, therefore, providing mutual understanding at a direct personal level, which is unavailable in their home countries. Face-to-face contacts between representatives of different nations help diminishing stereotypical perceptions and facilitate cross-cultural communication. The image of the United States in the world can show the effectiveness of its public diplomacy strategies.

In our opinion, measurement and evaluation of a public diplomacy strategy on the basis of criterion of low/high intensity of attractiveness of public diplomacy instruments might contribute into optimization, and, thus, effectiveness of selecting by influence state a strategy according to current state of public opinion of a host state.

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## RUSSIAN PHOBIA OR A REAL THREAT? PROPAGANDA-RELATED ELEMENTS OF RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE IN UKRAINE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY\*

ROSYJSKA FOBIA CZY RZECZYWISTE ZAGROŻENIE?  
ELEMENTY PROPAGANDOWE ROSYJSKIEJ WOJNY  
INFORMACYJNEJ NA UKRAINIE I ICH IMPLIKACJE  
DLA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA EUROATLANTYCKIEGO

*Anna Antczak\*\**

— ABSTRACT —

The article discusses Russian information warfare focusing mainly on propaganda issues, which were used during the conflict in Ukraine, and tries to find an answer to the question of to what extent these undertakings are dangerous to Euro-Atlantic security. It provides a political background of the conflict in order to better understand why Russia is using particular information warfare tools. The article analyzes manipulation techniques and the use of specific elements of Russian identity such as the attitude to history and the role of the Orthodox Church. Finally, it discusses a possible influence these actions may have on security and stability of

— ABSTRAKT —

Artykuł dotyczy wojny informacyjnej prowadzonej przez Federację Rosyjską i koncentruje się głównie na kwestiach związanych z narzędziami propagandowymi, które były wykorzystywane podczas konfliktu na Ukrainie. Artykuł stanowi także próbę znalezienia odpowiedzi na pytanie, do jakiego stopnia rosyjskie działania są groźne dla bezpieczeństwa euroatlantyckiego. Kwestie te są zaprezentowane na tle politycznych realiów konfliktu, aby lepiej zrozumieć, dlaczego Rosja wykorzystuje konkretne narzędzia walki informacyjnej. Artykuł analizuje techniki manipulacji, w tym stosowania specyficznych elementów tożsamości rosyjskiej, takich jak historia czy Kościół

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the EU and NATO and their particular member states.

**Keywords:** information warfare, Russia, Ukraine, propaganda, security

prawosławny. Artykuł zamyka analiza możliwego wpływu tych działań na bezpieczeństwo i stabilność UE i NATO oraz poszczególnych państw członkowskich.

**Słowa kluczowe:** wojna informacyjna, Rosja, Ukraina, propaganda, bezpieczeństwo

## INTRODUCTION

“After the latest wave of collective ecstasy, the morning-after letdown came” – that is the way Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1994) comment on a common conviction that we are living in an era of peace, in a world free from world wars, especially the ones including world great powers. The example of Ukraine shows that war can take place in Europe at NATO’s borders and be provoked by a great power which finally even took part in it. Now, the main question is whether the Russia-Ukraine conflict may have long-lasting significant consequences with respect to the European order and security, which could bring serious implications for the Euro-Atlantic security. Thus, the main aim of this paper is to identify the drivers for the possible escalation of the conflict and their implications for Euro-Atlantic security with the greatest attention given to propaganda-related issues. Hence, the main question to be answered is: to what extent can Russian information warfare tools based on propaganda be perceived as a real threat to European security? It is not the aim to evaluate Russian proceedings with respect to ethical issues or to claim that what they do is unprecedented. It is just about showing how this process functions. This article, examining current literature on Russian propaganda (with the main focus on the research conducted by P. Karber, M.H. Van Herpen and J. Darczewska), contributes to the debate on Russian information warfare, providing deeper insight into strategies, methods and tools used as well as the reasons of their employment. The article begins with concise insight into the conflict. The main part is devoted to the analysis of Russian propaganda and information warfare, and its influence on Euro-Atlantic security.

## POLITICO-STRATEGIC BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

A short analysis of strategic movements of the Russian Federation will be a starting point for further considerations. Moscow's neo-imperial approaches were started by the coming into power of Vladimir Putin, who claimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, all his actions have been directed at regaining hegemony in the region and subordinating or at least having the power of influencing strongly the former Soviet republics. To achieve this, a project of "New Generation War" was created. It combines low-end (including hidden state involvement) and high-end direct superpower actions (Karber, 2015). This strategy was first tested in Chechnya and Georgia, then improved and again tested in Ukraine in order to improve it even more. Russian idea of a new generation warfare is based on five main elements (Karber, 2015): political subversion (mostly propaganda), proxy sanctuary (taking over local political centers and training of guerrilla fighters), intervention (sudden deployment of troops near the border), coercive deterrence (dislocation of tactical nuclear delivery systems and accompanying manoeuvres), and negotiated manipulation (abuse of the negotiated ceasefires).

There are also quite a few internal factors which facilitated the conflict to emerge. As there have been many publications on that topic issued so far, just to mention them: clashes between aspirations of the pro-Western part of the Ukrainian society and the decisions of president Yanukovich; social stratification – the issues of ethnicity, political beliefs and wealth; oligarchy; corruption; uneven distribution of resources; poverty of the society; deep divisions according to the future political path (the EU *versus* Russia); weak "offer" of the EU and NATO towards Ukraine; energy dependency, lack of common European energy market; weakness of the state in economic terms; clash between the state integrity and the idea of self-determination of nations; particular vulnerability to separatist forces due to regional diversity; high decentralization of the country; multi-ethnicity and strong Russian minority. As far as Russia is concerned, its foreign policy is consistent with the traditional aspiration – to establish an informal empire in the post-Soviet area. It is also worth remembering that almost every Russian regional project in Eurasia has first been introduced, tested, and applied to two states – Belarus and Ukraine. While the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine discredited Russia's hopes of including Ukraine in a super-national body, Moscow at least maneuvered to ensure that Ukraine would not join NATO. By fostering internal turmoil in Ukraine, Russia chose not to assume direct

control over Ukraine, but instead to promote and support its protégé, Viktor Yanukovich, to the highest political post. Russia assertively declared its intention to protect its geopolitical and economic interests in the international arena and in its immediate neighborhood, while liberal technocrats were against restoring Russia's direct rule over other members of the CIS (because of Russia's economy and budget). Nevertheless, a good idea was to split Ukraine into smaller pieces, which started to be realized using the "New Generation War" doctrine, which clearly stated that NATO expansion was one of the greatest external threats as well as that Russia had the right to intervene in its closest neighborhood including military intervention whenever neighboring countries' governments would not realize Russia-friendly politics (in line with Moscow's interests).

The emergence of the crisis in Ukraine forces reflection on the character of engagement in the conflict – if it is new warfare and if so, what are its most important characteristics? "New" war does not necessarily have to mean direct engagement of military force. Non-military means are often used in asymmetric conflicts against weak or failed states (because of their fragile institutional and governance system, social stratification, feeble armed forces, unstable political system, etc. – Russia benefited from all these factors in Ukraine). Different from a traditional way of subordinating territories by third parties or non-state actors was reflected in the actions undertaken by separatist groups composed of national, ethnic or religious minorities. They became a new and powerful weapon, and their claims – at least outwardly – hard to be questioned (i.e., the self-determination of nations fight, even though it is incorrectly perceived in this case). Separatism allows targeting dissatisfaction of the society with the current situation in such a way that compromise seems virtually impossible, as there are no common points to build consensus on. If national minority feels (or is inspired to do so) that the rights are not respected, it starts to seek for alternative solutions being hard to argue with and becomes propaganda susceptible.

#### SPECIFIC INSTRUMENTS OF RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE

Events in Ukraine clearly show the extent to which new technology can be incorporated into policy and information warfare. Very well organized Russian propaganda has played a huge role in the war, presenting in the media the members of the interim government in Kiev and their followers as fascists who brought Ukraine to the brink of a civil war. The message concentrated

mainly on emphasizing the illegitimacy of the Kiev government which takes unlawful actions against the separatists. This message was copied by a large part of the Western media, while Russian society was permanently misinformed and manipulated by government propaganda. The other important tool used is social media, giving the possibility to publish in real time, provide enormous power to anyone who uses these tools. Many young people are susceptible to the influence of these media (the ease of recruiting very young people to extremist groups). It is instantaneous communication which is going to be the most serious challenge for the armed forces in the area of information and psychological operations. Maintaining secrecy necessary to conduct a particular type of military action will become more difficult, because it may happen that the media will tend to outstrip military operations. Thus, they will become a more and more important participant of war affecting it directly, or even controlling it (deliberately or indirectly and unconsciously).

Russian propaganda often uses the motif of brutality of the proceedings of the opposing party (particularly desirable are images showing violence against women and children). Suffering of civilians (mostly children) during the armed conflict has become the primary weapon used by information warfare. Information and psychological operations are addressed in at least two ways – international community (in this case, suffering of the civilian population motif is most often used), and the local population (in this case propaganda can take many forms, depending on the effect that is intended to be achieved – to win favor, the conviction of the rightness of actions taken, the infallibility of authority, gaining support for authority, blind obedience, etc.<sup>1</sup>). Nationalism and xenophobia are widely propagated in order to unite “indigenous Russian population”. All actions taken by the authorities are supposed to bring about confusion and capturing the public into the trap of fears, phobias and anxiety (Van Herpen, 2015). “The regime deliberately tries to keep the minds of the society in a state of schizophrenia, so as to hinder the formation of civic culture and legalistic mentality” (Shevtsova, 2007).

Putin’s propaganda however has created a sense of danger and a non-existent image of the conflict. Not only has the West partly believed in it, but also has not found any answers yet. The way to fight against Russian propaganda, which should be a strategic priority especially for the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Georgia

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<sup>1</sup> In this case, propaganda offers crafted manipulated messages which are using the mixture of false or incomplete data and generally known facts or information.

and Moldova, must be the development (or empowerment) of comprehensive national strategies aimed at the media and strategic communication at the inter-governmental level, which should be consistent with policies of other countries (Lange-Ionatamišvili, Potjomkina, 2014). Information warfare is intended to have power over public opinion in order to serve the objective of the government, however in the twenty-first century, in the era of the knowledge society, it is a difficult task. Russia's imperial ambitions may be nineteenth century in nature, but what matters in the twenty-first century is the audience, and most importantly, the performance. In case of Russia, each message is carefully tailored for a concrete recipient. Russian success in the information war illustrates how concepts such as war, occupation, and intervention can be dismissed from their previous points of reference.

Putin's stimulus for propaganda arises from the ideology of two people: Igor Panarin (a professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a former KGB agent) and Alexander Dugin (inspirator of the Eurasian Union project). While Panarin considers the collapse of the Soviet Union as a result of the United States' and Great Britain's "First Global Information War" (Van Herpen, 2015) against the Soviet Union, Dugin stands in favor of "magical and mystical theories, mixed with fascist-oid, neo-imperialist geopolitical ideas" (Van Herpen, 2015). Russian propaganda is one of the most important tools of the "soft power", which in fact is redefined by Russia into "hard power in a velvet glove" (Van Herpen, 2015). First of all, it is reduced strictly to public diplomacy (no civil society involvement) – which means mainly manipulation and disinformation. In this way, soft power tools began to be perceived as a part of a zero-sum game with a state being the only winner (like in the case of hard power). Finally, Russian soft power uses also illegal tools like bribery, illegal funding of politicians and political parties, corruption and espionage. This in turn means focusing on three main components of Russian soft power, which is very often reduced to a very broad information warfare and propaganda: "mimesis", "rollback" and "invention" supported by other activities. As Van Herpen (2015) explains, "«Mimesis» consists of attempts to copy Western public diplomacy, «rollback» is a strategy of attacking Western public diplomacy initiatives, and «invention» includes new methods of information warfare" which are not necessary that innovative, as they originate from the Soviet KGB practices. These activities are strongly supported by the Russian Orthodox Church as a defender of traditional values, which is the Kremlin's tool to propagate messianic ideology, glorifying the state and being deeply nationalist, homophobic

and denying Western values being also supported by Russia's narrative based on historical memory.

Russian perfectly tailored propaganda (using half-truths and truths out of context) is focused on three dimensions: own society, the closest neighborhood, and the rest of the world. In the first case, Russia is aimed at gaining social support for its activities and evoking a sense of injustice, alienation and unfair rejection by the rest of the world, but mainly by the Western society. In such an atmosphere, the society feels exceptional and praises activities carried out by the state (reconstruction of Russian superpower) on the one hand, but on the other, it feels unreasonably alienated, which deepens the antagonism between the values of the East and the West. This makes it easier to manipulate the society, which is then more eager to bear the inconvenience of running the armed conflict (e.g., food shortages due to Western sanctions or reductions in social spending and wages) longer and more generously. Propaganda directed at the nearest neighbors is a warning intended to arouse fear and concern in countries that they can meet a similar fate. In this way, Russia may try to force subordination (e.g., the Caucasus, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus) or pursue other political objectives (in the case of the Baltic states, Scandinavia and Poland), while in relation to Ukraine Russia conducts deprecation policy. International propaganda is supposed to introduce continuous disinformation, confusion, manipulation and is an attempt to create permanent divisions among Western countries. Russian propaganda and provocation, which takes quite central stage, created a sense of danger and stopped the West to act more actively. Escalating internal and external propaganda, Russia spreads out anti-West moods and looks how far it may reach. Russia also benefits from the West's inability to act united, its organizations' bureaucracy and "political correctness", while Russian political declarations are unequivocal with respect to their actions (not only in relation to Crimea and eastern Ukraine, but also to refugees' issue, Syria conflict, ceasefires, etc.).

It is worth noting that Russian media coverage contradicts itself – it provides contradictory information to excite doubts in Western society about its fundamental principles and values. This is also aimed at undermining the authority of journalism, discouraging people from relying on the media coverage and introducing chaos by administering multiple versions of events instead. "Russia Today" – the second largest station broadcasting in English – invites a few "experts", each of them presenting a different point of view followed by a discussion which is to cause chaos in the mind of the recipient. One should realize

that Russian propaganda is not really directed at Ukraine, but at the Western world. The point is that Western societies behave in accordance with the will of the Russian President. It is all about diffusion of their faith and unity, to loosen the ties between the NATO and EU member states. United West poses a serious challenge for Russia, but West divided and weak does not any more. Then, the way to restore the Russian empire is open. Russian propaganda experts are much more familiar with the Western system of values and mechanisms of perception with the way of understanding events than Western societies understand the mentality of societies ruled in an authoritarian manner for centuries.

Russia's phenomenon is that it weaponizes absurdity and unreality to disrupt Western narratives, the concept of truth is no longer relevant. On Russian TV news broadcasts, the borders between fact and fiction are blurred and the newly invented concept of Novorossiia is a sign of the national manipulation system being globalized (Pomerantsev, 2014). While the Kremlin intensifies its propaganda activities, the West undergoes its own crisis with respect to the idea of truth. Russia in its media coverage tries not so much to convince, but rather leave the audience confused and passive. These actions are aimed at disrupting the Western narratives, with the central idea of "if nothing is true, anything is possible", which evokes the feeling of unpredictability or even threat (Pomerantsev, 2014).

Societies with centralized media dependent on authorities to a large extent are easier to be manipulated. They have been subjected to the same propaganda for years aimed at forcing worship for authority and its decisions, full identification with its objectives, as well as the ability for significant sacrifices for the "higher necessity" associated with the government. Most of the society does not perceive information they get to be a manipulated product of the governing elites. On the other hand, this society needs some kind of illusion to be able to survive while living in poverty, with no prospects for a change. Thus, the promise that at least the country will become "great and powerful" keeps them in the belief that they are better than others, and their behavior is right. While media propaganda practices seem to be obvious for postmodern societies, for others they are a source of worship and hope. For these reasons, postmodern societies prefer the message to be more personal and interactive (social media), thus perceived as more reliable. That is the type of tools which were used by the Ukrainian society during the protests on Kiev's Maidan. Currently, the aim is to individualize the message and show particular tragedies which are more persuasive and social media are a good tool for such kind of actions. Media also play a significant role

in the process of dehumanization of the adversary whose image is created in an extremely unfavorable way (highlights the “inhuman” features by focusing on the appropriate behaviors, actions, etc.) in order to achieve public support for the use of force against him.

Successfully conducted propaganda campaigns can have a significant and long-lasting impact on behavior, opinions, views, and even values presented by the whole society. A good example is the activity carried out by Russian government towards its own population in order to spread out disinformation and manipulate social moods. The Kremlin, controlling media coverage, has achieved one of the main objectives of its information warfare in an unprecedented way, namely Russians’ negative perception of Ukraine (64%), the EU (71%) and the USA (81%) together with the societies of these countries (Prus, Secieru, 2015). Information warfare, considered by Russia as one of the elements of the hybrid warfare, focused mainly on mass manipulation through the media, including social networking and fueling public sentiment, which is based on imperial resentment as well as a sense of injustice and mistreatment of Russia and its citizens by the West. No alternatives are allowed, and support for aggressive actions in Ukraine is won by persuading the society that national pride, Russia’s appropriate place in world politics and respect can be gained only by strengthening the power and expanding the zone of Russian influence. This message is tailored to suit the society’s sentiments, especially if it is devoid of any “audible” alternatives even in the social media. The Kremlin hires the so-called trolls<sup>2</sup> producing favorable content and placing it in social networks (Darczewska, 2014).

The main tools that are used may be covert or overt and these are: propaganda (white, gray and black); intelligence; analytical component dealing with media monitoring and the analysis of the current situation; the organizational component (primarily used to influence the media) as well as special forces operations, including sabotage (Darczewska, 2014). The very process of managing information operations is divided into five stages: forecasting and planning, organization and stimulation, feedback, operations’ correction and control of the implementation (Darczewska, 2014).

With regard to the Russian TV propaganda directed at the conflict with Ukraine, there are used the same techniques aimed at discrediting Ukraine as a state and undermining its credibility by ridiculing its political leaders and

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<sup>2</sup> To be discussed later.

society by accusing of fascist inclinations. The West is perceived as being passive on the one hand and possessing a hostile attitude to Russia on the other. Ukraine is presented as an aggressor and oppressor of the Russian minority, while the separatists as protectors of the civilian population living in eastern Ukraine. This is the setting in which Vladimir Putin presents himself as a hero and a courageous leader ready to face the whole world (if forced to do so) to defend his citizens and the values they believe in.

All Russian propaganda activities are in line with the basic rules of its successful application (Darczewska, 2014):

- the principle of mass and long-term operation (using multiple stereotypes, i.e.: “the orange plague” or “the Bandera (Nazis)”);
- the principle of desired information (relating mainly to the basic concerns and/or expectations of Russians and Russian-speaking population, e.g., to protect their rights and, therefore, the manipulated information about them been broken by the alleged ban on the use of the Russian language, would definitely not fall on deaf ears);
- the principle of emotional stimulation (evoking an appropriate emotional state in order to stimulate activity for emotional rather than rational reasons);
- the principle of intelligibility (simplified, “black and white” messages not allowing for own assessment, which is delivered directly through the keywords, e.g., Russophobia, spy, traitor, agent, etc.);
- the principle of an alleged obviousness (evoking associations between propaganda statements and created political myths, e.g., Russian spring – patriotism; Bandera – fascism; Maidan – chaos, Chechnya – terrorism, the West – liberalism and aggression; Ukrainians – radicals, nationalists, aggressors, “Ukrofacists” and anti-Semites, the USA – the enemy, etc.).

Moreover, manipulation with the image on Russian television is a commonplace. The same pictures serve as material illustrating and telling completely different stories. With all this, it is worth remembering that for most Russians, television is the main source of information and according to various polls, a large number of them believes that this message is true and objective.

Russian authorities can easily introduce propaganda messages to social circuit, because most of the media remain under the state control and influence. Thus, all news distributed is subordinated to the information strategy, even if the message seems to be chaotic and inconsistent at first glance. It just means that it has a specific task to fulfill (evoking chaos and causing irritation among the recipients), as it

was the case of the information about the shooting down of the Malaysian aircraft over Ukraine. It is also common to use the same image in completely different contexts in different TV stations. It is somewhat more difficult to control the Internet coverage, and therefore there were formed special teams to disseminate propaganda messages within the network. These are organized activities aimed at conducting information warfare through techniques available on the Internet, including the famous Russian trolling<sup>3</sup>. Of course, in terms of the tools used, the Internet warfare is no different from the one carried out in the traditional media. The biggest field of possibilities for the spread out of propaganda in Russia is television, because, as mentioned before, the vast majority of Russians receive all the information and “knowledge of the world” from there.

Russian propaganda uses mainly the technique of disinformation not even in order to influence the society’s perception of reality, but to create a completely new reality. It is mainly about creating the message so as it includes the following elements: the truth, something that society would like to be true, and the falsehood. A perfect example could be the message concerning the annexation of Crimea. The first element (truth): historically, Crimea had been more strongly associated with Russia than with Ukraine for a long time. The second component (the wishful thinking): Crimea is as “Russian” as Tula or St. Petersburg. The third element (falsehood): ethnic Russians in Crimea were haunted by the Ukrainian authorities and needed Russia’s support. Russian propaganda also relies heavily on stereotypes built on the canvas of the established historical memory and myth, historical and cultural heritage and the need to defend the values of the Orthodox Church with the consequent conviction of the spiritual uniqueness of Russia and its society. Such propaganda makes the audience believe in the content of messages without reflection, unquestionably and permanently. Most Russians are subjected (vulnerable) to the Kremlin’s propaganda mainly because it is easier for them to some extent – it is better to believe than to fight it, especially as it is effective while touching sensitive issues within the nation.

It is also necessary to mention that propaganda is present not only in Russian media, but is also targeted at the youngest audiences through other channels. It is manifested by an obligation to use the “standardized” textbooks (especially in

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<sup>3</sup> Trolling aims at carrying out malicious actions in social media, posting information subordinated to one idea, which is not (or does not have to be) consistent with the reality, regardless of their ethical or moral consequences. Trolling is to introduce confusion (e.g., to undermine credibility, etc.) or manipulation within the particular audience the message is directed at.

history) or teaching of Russian alphabet in accordance to “political correctness” (e.g., the letter “a” stands for “antiMaidan”, “d” for “Donetsk”, “p” for “Putin”) being accompanied with properly chosen “patriotic” illustrations. It is also worth mentioning that Russian patriotism is far from promoting the idea of pacifism and peace. On the contrary – from an early age Russians are brought up in the spirit of struggle and the need to stand up for their homeland, whenever it is “threatened” (the case of Crimea and eastern Ukraine as well as previously Georgia – it was in line with the propaganda message of the Kremlin).

The last crucial element of Russian propaganda is the image of the leader. The cult of Vladimir Putin as a strong, courageous, athletic, trustworthy, beloved by the people hero is a very important part of the indoctrination activities, which are used on a daily basis. They get intensified during the pre-election period and take diverse form depending on to which segment of audience they are directed at (the *macho* image, trustworthy statesman, a powerful governor, a leader sensitive to the plight of his society, etc.).

Russian propaganda is based largely on the use of history, which becomes both the weapon of information warfare and political discourse. Manipulation of facts on the one hand serves the unification of Russian society, on the other it is an excellent tool for introducing the message based on the binary oppositions technique because it supports the policy of confrontation as well as reluctance of Russian society towards Western societies. The Second World War and the victory over Nazi Germany became the object of mythologization, and for the Kremlin – a source of legitimacy for all the activities currently being undertaken, both in domestic (such as civil rights and liberties restriction) and foreign policy (e.g., actions against Chechnya, Georgia and Ukraine). The Second World War, called the Great Patriotic War by Russians, became the basis for the justification of any state’s action “against the resurgence of Nazism and fascism”, no matter what kind of action it would be. Glorification of war and its misrepresentation comes down to believing that the victory over Germany meant also the victory over the West in the sense that the Soviet Union managed to achieve the unreachable. Consequently, there arouses the belief that “we can beat anyone”, with the very victory being attributed more to a country as such rather than the people. For this reason, today it is easier for Russian authorities to achieve subordination and agreement for certain actions (successful state, which has the right to undertake internal and external activities in order to pursue with similar great deeds). Significantly, the Great Patriotic War is presented as being purely defensive and as such it provides a historical basis for justifying further

“exclusively defensive” Russian actions (in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, but also Syria and to some extent Turkey). Every action is justified by the necessity to defend (the population, values, culture, faith, sovereignty, etc.). With the same reasons Russian society is ready to bear some consequences and tolerate the negative effects of the actions taken by the Kremlin. The struggle against the neo-Nazi fascist forces in Ukraine has become a leitmotif to justify Russian aggressive actions in Ukraine (Prus, 2015). Hypocrisy of this type of rhetoric is all the greater, the more openly Russia cooperates with ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi political parties and organizations in Europe at the same time in order to influence the European Union countries (support for the Euro-sceptical movements which aim at the dissolution of the EU). Mythologizing and glorifying the Great Patriotic War rhetoric also served as a support to justify the annexation of Crimea (a site of military glory and victories of the Soviet Union during the war). These instruments of misinterpretation of history also cause deepening of hostile confrontation between Russian society and the West.

## CONCLUSIONS

The above analysis implies that Russia, as any other country tending to restore its power (in case of Russia – its former imperium), is using various tools to build its strategic position, which should not be surprising nor demonized. It should be just appropriately approached. Current situation in Ukraine strengthened Russian strategic position with respect to both – the EU and NATO, thus some of the European countries may feel threatened (especially the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to whom Russia is an “eternal enemy”). Western societies tend to be very vulnerable to propaganda (not only Russian, but also the one of Ukraine and Eastern European countries). Each of these countries has its own interests and wants to convey its message. In order not to get caught into the Russian propaganda ambush, nor to be pressured by Eastern European hysteric phobia or to be manipulated by Ukrainian self-interests of an “unsolicited child”, there is a need to determine real threats out of the possible challenges as objectively as possible. The fact is undoubtedly that Russian challenge brings about new threats to European security, especially for Eastern European countries. The greatest seems to be the new role of national minorities, as Russia uses minorities’ manipulations for political reason very skillfully, having spectacular successes in Ukraine, Georgia and Chechnya on this ground.

Russian propaganda is not a new threat, but still not properly approached. There is a need to conduct an in-depth analysis of this phenomenon in order to take appropriate measures. Russian propaganda and other hybrid warfare tools used should not be treated as a threat, as it only serves Russian interests. It should be approached as a challenge, while challenge as such can bring about threats or opportunities. If properly managed, some of the challenges Russia is bringing about to NATO and the EU can be skillfully turned into opportunities. The West just needs to learn not to underestimate Russia and keep intelligence as well as analytical bodies on stand-by so that they can provide in-depth research of Russian identity, culture and strategy. That would allow NATO and individual states to be better prepared for Russian actions. Challenges are always a driver for development and progress, as they should force pro-active approach and creativity.

The novelty of Russian warfare is primarily the use of means other than conventional. This applies mainly to long-term and well targeted policy, based on a precise strategy of building international links (networks) and the use of specific information warfare and propaganda. The analysis of Russian undertakings in Ukraine shows that the strategy of the “New Generation War” has been further developed and applied with the presumption it would reach specific targets. It managed to destabilize the country, divide the West, awakened fear in neighboring countries (mainly in the Baltic states and Poland as well as in Moldova and Georgia). It has also led to partition of Ukraine: ideological (with respect to the society) and physical (with respect to the territory). The annexation of Crimea has in turn become a fact the international community has long forgotten about and for which Russia has received a silent permission.

There is no doubt that the crisis in Ukraine has changed the relationship between NATO or the EU countries and Russia. It has certainly revived discussions on the need for the NATO’s existence as well as its priority areas of operation and strategic planning. It forced the decision makers to wonder about defense capabilities and the ability to provide real support to particular countries in the event of an armed attack (Monaghan, 2014). Finally, there is also a need to introduce changes in the strategic communications which failed in countering Russian information propaganda.

Nowadays, the Russian Federation is not a direct threat to NATO or the EU countries, but it is getting to be more and more assertive, which should not be underestimated. The Russian Federation would rather not risk military confrontation with NATO at this stage, but will continue actions directed at its

weakening and dissolution. Different approach to the situation and relations with Russia even among the countries of the Central-Eastern Europe region, not to even mention the whole NATO and inability to take solidarity actions, plays in favor of Russian strategy. Thus, the greatest challenge in this area will be to prevent Russia from undertaking actions directed at NATO fragmentation (or at least escalation of further divisions impeding common NATO activities). It is especially important for the Baltic states which feel threatened by Russian aggressive politics. This is an evidence for a clear change of strategy into asymmetric and hybrid warfare to which NATO is not fully prepared to answer to.

Russia counts on divisions within the EU and NATO which would work in its favor. NATO's strength and credibility relies on its unity, solidarity and ability to guarantee security of all its member states. If Russian methods are applied again, this time in the Baltic states, NATO will need to react. Therefore, new strategies need to be employed in order to be ready to prevent and counter Russian various hybrid war instruments. The greatest problem is that Russia is unlikely to use overt aggressive tools towards any of the NATO member states, but will try to destabilize some of them using non-military means. The impulse to unite and act should be internal (motivation) not external (negative motivating), it has to be pro-active (if NATO wants to maintain a specific global leadership with respect to security) not reactive. Therefore, claiming that NATO is grateful to Putin for re-uniting exposes its weakness.

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## IDENTITY ISSUE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH

ZAGADNIENIE TOŻSAMOŚCI W NAUCE O STOSUNKACH  
MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH – UJĘCIE KONSTRUKTYWISTYCZNE

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— ABSTRACT —

Constructivist approach of analyzing international relations brought many new elements to the thought on the nature of international reality, which made it possible to explain it and understand it better. One of these elements in the process of analyzing this reality is the concept of identity of participants of international relations. Its analytical phenomenon consists of the fact that it allows us to undertake attempts to understand interests and character of norms and values of participants of international relations. The most important statement brought to scientific thought on international reality by Alexander Wendt's notion of constructivism relates to the fact that states' interests in international relations are not given *a priori*, but they are shaped during interactions with others. Not only is the role of inter-state actors who influence states' interests in international relations underlined, but it also indicates the important role of other participants of international affairs in articulating national interests. From this perspective, the category of identity in international relations taken up

— ABSTRAKT —

Konstruktywistyczna perspektywa analizowania relacji międzynarodowych wniosła wiele nowych elementów do refleksji nad naturą rzeczywistości międzynarodowej, pozwalając na jej lepsze rozumienie oraz wyjaśnianie. Jednym z takich elementów w procesie analizy tej rzeczywistości jest koncept tożsamości uczestnika relacji międzynarodowych. Jego fenomen analityczny polega na tym, iż pozwala on podejmować próby zrozumienia interesów oraz specyfiki norm i wartości, którymi kierują się uczestnicy relacji międzynarodowych. Najbardziej istotne twierdzenie, jakie wprowadza do naukowej refleksji o rzeczywistości międzynarodowej konstruktywizm w wariacie Aleksandra Wendta, odnosi się do faktu, iż interesy państw w relacjach międzynarodowych nie są z góry dane, ale kształtują się w toku interakcji z innymi. Podkreśla się tutaj zatem rolę nie tylko aktorów wewnątrzpaństwowych, którzy mają wpływ na kształtowanie przez państwa interesy w relacjach międzynarodowych, ale także wskazuje się na istotną rolę pozostałych uczestników obrotu międzynarodowego w arty-

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by Constructivism takes account of the social, interactive nature of international reality making it possible to analyze its intangible part.

**Keywords:** social constructivism, identity, social construction of reality, linguistic turn, International Relations

kułowaniu interesów narodowych. Z tego punktu widzenia podejmowana przez konstruktywizm kategoria tożsamości w relacjach międzynarodowych uwzględnia społeczną, interaktywną naturę rzeczywistości międzynarodowej, pozwalając analizować jej niematerialną warstwę.

**Słowa kluczowe:** konstruktywizm społeczny, tożsamość, społeczne tworzenie rzeczywistości, zwrot językowy, stosunki międzynarodowe

## INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980<sup>s</sup> studies on International Relations (IR) pay increasing attention to the identity issue of participants of international relations. However, there is no coherent definition of this concept. In spite of that, it is more and more often used by researchers together with the constructivist turn in the International Relations. In this aspect the concept and the phenomenon of identity of participants of international relations is an inherent element necessary to explain and understand interests of states in international relations and to explain continuity and variability of this reality. Following the thought of Alexander Wendt, one of the most prominent representatives of Constructivism in IR, it is claimed that state's interests are shaped by their identities which change with time, and the natural phenomenon of identity more and more increasingly becomes a subject of scientific thought (Wendt, 2008).

The aim of this analysis is to evaluate scientific value of Constructivism in explaining international relations – especially the identity issue. This goal will be achieved by answering following questions: What is the nature of the concept of identity in the International Relations? What is the explanatory value of this phenomenon? Does Constructivism and the ideal of identity proposed by it enables explanation of the international reality?

Popularity of identity issue in the International Relations derives from the growing popularity of Constructivism among theoreticians of international relations during last three decades. It allows researchers to analyze the intangible aspects of the political reality such as: norms, values, discourses or ideas and also the phenomenon of identity, which is a peculiar product of these intangible elements. The interest in the aspect of identity in the science of International

Relations may also derive from a peculiar socialization of the thought on the international reality. The socialization of the science of International Relations was to make studies more focused on the social context of international politics. Representatives of the Constructivism (Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil) questioned both ontological and epistemological assumptions of previous theoretical approaches within the frames of the science of International Relations. They underlined importance of ideas, norms, institutions and identity for international politics and indicated correlations of agents and structures (Reus-Smit, 2006) .

It is assumed that Constructivism is best suited to explain identity issue in the International Relations among other approaches (i.e., Neorealism or Neoliberalism) due to its characteristics: ideational ontology and special attention to epistemological matters. "Social" character of the reflection on International Relations offered by Constructivism allows to undertake the reflection on soft elements of international reality like, i.a., identity issue.

The analysis will be made by using qualitative methods – by identifying the phenomena of identity in the works of the main representatives of Constructivism in International Relations: Alexander Wendt, Maja Zehfuss, Stefano Guzzini.

The article will be divided into three sections. The first one will touch upon the phenomenon of identity in Social Science in general. Genesis and way of its conceptualization will be shown. The second part of the article will be the analysis of the genesis and specificity of Constructivism in the IR. It will allow to point at the novel character of Constructivist explanation of international reality. The third part of the article will contain Constructivist way of explaining the identity issue in IR. Main works of Constructivist scholars will be presented.

This analysis makes it possible to understand of the theoretical thought on the phenomenon of identity within the frames of the science of International Relations and the importance of this concept for analyzing participation in the international relations.

## IDENTITY ISSUE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Studying identity of international actors within the frames of the International Relations was preceded by theoretical activity undertaken by scholars of the Social Sciences in the United States not later than in 1960<sup>s</sup> (Erikson, 1968). The concept of identity in Social Sciences is not unequivocal. Its content depends on

the context. There are, however, some common traits of this concept (Brubaker, Cooper, 2000):

- a) identity is understood as the base for political and social actions. Sometimes it is set against the category of interests in order to explain the non-instrumental reasons behind actions. The concept of identity is used in this context to underline the manner in which actions (individual or group actions) can derive more from self-understanding of the acting subject than from its purpose of executing a specific interest;
- b) identity understood as collective phenomenon – with this category an individual marks his/her similarity to others in the group. It can be understood as sameness itself deriving from characteristics of the given subject or as subjective feeling, experience or perceiving own similarity towards other members of the given group. Such identity reveals itself with the attitude of solidarity or common actions with other group members. From this perspective the difference between the concept of identity as an analytical tool and the social attitude is often unclear;
- c) identity understood as a major aspect of functioning in a social or political group. Here it is perceived as something to be appreciated, preserved and protected;
- d) identity as a result of social and political actions. This approach underlines the properties of identity being created in the process of social interactions. Therefore it is perceived in two ways. On one hand, as a product of social interactions and on the other, as an element necessary to undertake collective actions;
- e) identity as a product of discourse practices – it is an effect of various, competitive discourses.

Several attributes of identity can be distinguished. Identity is something that people/social groups/states have or they pursue it or they should have it. It is a trait which meaning should be sought and discovered (Brubaker, Cooper, 2000).

Within the frames of the Social Sciences the concept of identity joins works on basic social categories such as: social class, race, ethnic background, sex, disability and sexuality, showing the connection between psychological and social processes in given societies or political communities<sup>1</sup>. The research on identity

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<sup>1</sup> Examples of such works are: M. Wetherell (ed.), *Identity in the 21st Century. New Trends in Changing Times*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; J. McLaughlin, P. Phillimore, D. Richardson (eds.),

constitute basis for deeper thoughts on the nature of new and appearing social and cultural forms, as well as the influence of globalization, trans-nationality, post-colonialism and multiculturalism on social and political processes.

## CONSTRUCTIVIST TURN IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As mentioned above, the concept of identity started to be taken up by the science of International Relations in 1980s, together with increasing popularity of Constructivism in researches concerning this reality (Zehfuss, 2002, p.7).

Constructivism in the International Relations was an answer to changes in international reality in 1980s and 1990s: decrease of importance of state independence being a result of globalization processes, increasing economic and social importance of scientific knowledge, shift of power, etc. These facts made researchers understand that science does not depend on subjects it concerns but it rather shapes them. This statement was valid especially in the context of the Cold War, which was about to finish soon. Previous theories were neither able to predict the upcoming change nor understand its core later on. This cognitive pessimism of ontological background subsequently moved on to epistemological matters spreading doubt in the positivistic paradigm of science (Guzzini, 2000).

In the 1980s and 1990s, together with the so-called Constructivist turn in the science of International Relations, the matter of identity of participants of international relations became increasingly taken up in the thought on the nature of international relations. The end of the Cold War was an explanation challenge for main theories of international relations, especially Neoliberalism and Neorealism. They were neither to predict it nor explain it. These difficulties, as shown by representatives of Constructivist turn, stemmed from their materialistic and individual orientation, which precluded wider perception of the ongoing changes – for example from the social perspective (Wendt, 2008). This kind of perspective would allow touching upon many more aspects of these processes. The need to “socialize” the theory of international relations constituted reasons for development of researches in the vein of Constructivism. This peculiar socialization of the science of International Relations was to pay more attention to the social context of international politics. Representatives of Constructivism (Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil) questioned both ontological

and epistemological assumptions of the foregoing theoretical approach within the frames of the International Relations. They underlined the importance of ideas, norms, institutions and identity for international politics and indicated correlation of agents and structures (Reus-Smit, 2006). The substance of the Constructivist turn in the International Relations was to abandon the foregoing theoretical assumptions, which were found insufficient for understanding the reality. The Constructivist perspective in the International Relations was inspired by changes observed in Social Sciences such as philosophy or sociology. Their aim was to build an alternative way between the existing theories (Skolimowska, 2013).

Constructivism assumes that the character of international relations can not be analyzed without its context. The analyzed elements are: beliefs, ideas, opinions, discourses. There are two standpoints within this approach. The first one, rooted in Humanities, refers to hermeneutics and phenomenology. It pursues understanding of the meanings that people relate to social activity. It assumes epistemological positivism and uses hermeneutical methods in researches. The second one is more radical – it rejects the cognitive positivism, even declaring scientific nihilism. The first standpoint is called poststructuralism, the second – postmodernism (Bevir, Rhodes, 2006).

The reason behind popularity of Constructivism in the science of International Relations in 1980s, mainly in the USA, was also connected to the geopolitical situation of those times. Not only the end of theories was declared then, but also the “end of history”, as stated by Francis Fukuyama. The historical context (i.e., the end of the Cold War) and discussions among researchers of International Relations (especially Neorealists and Neoliberals) prepared ground for Constructivism, which became especially popular among researchers from the USA. Europe was dominated by the thought on International Relations developed by the English school, which analysis of interstate interactions focused on their roles in international relations.

The term “Constructivism” was introduced to International Relations theories by an American researcher Nicholas Onuf. He used it for the first time in his book *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*<sup>2</sup> published in 1989. Other representatives of this strand are, i.a., Peter Katzenstein, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Alexander Wendt.

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<sup>2</sup> Nicholas Onuf is a retired professor of International Relations at the University of Florida. He is an author of: *A Constructivist Manifesto*, [in:] K. Burch, R.A. Denmark (eds.), *Constituting Inter-*

The Constructivist perspective in International Relations states that the theory of international reality and its studies should be based on solid ontological and epistemological basis. Representatives of this strand ask new questions concerning the role of identity, norms in forming of national interests, character of processes of institutionalization and global management, and also the social construction of international regimes. The Constructivist debate within the frames of International Relations is held on the levels of metatheory and the theory of International Relations (Czaputowicz, 2016).

The genesis of Constructivism in the International Relations should be sought in the context of the third rationalism vs. reflectivism interparadigm debate, which related to theories in science. It concerned both ontological and epistemological matters. Due to that, researchers agree that it was the most important of all debates. The extreme positions were to be reconciled by Constructivism. That was Alexander Wendt's ambition. The appearance of Constructivism in the area of the science of International Relations was related to four factors: an attempt to reassess the concept of world theory and politics; the already mentioned inability of traditional approaches to catch the essence of changes in world politics at the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s; the appearance of a generation of young researchers, who spotted the necessity to change the foregoing paradigms (Reus-Smit, 2006).

The changes introduced to International Relations theory by Constructivism are called the "constructivist turn". Its essence is accepting positivistic epistemology together with inter-subjective ontology and opening epistemology to interpretationism. "Turn" in ontology consists in becoming open to ideation factors in researches of the international reality. Within the frames of the science of International Relations, Constructivism is not a unified strand. There are two basic strands of it: conventional and interpretative.

The conventional Constructivism, which dominates mainly in the USA, concentrates on the meaning of norms and identity in shaping the international politics (ideation ontology). Researchers of this strand assume the positivistic epistemological orientation stating the need to build bridges between different theoretical approaches. The research comprises mainly of quality and case-study

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*national Political Economy*, London 1997, p. 7–18; *Constructivism: A User's Manual*, [in:] V. Kubáľková, N. Onuf, P. Kowert (eds.), *International Relations in a Constructed World*, London 1998, p. 58–78; *Worlds of Our Own Making: The Strange Career of Constructivism*, [in:] D. Puchala (ed.), *Visions of International Relations*, Columbia 2002, p. 119–141; *Parsing Personal Identity: Self, Other, Agent*, [in:] F. Debrix (ed.), *Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World*, New York 2002, p. 26–50.

methods. They assume that the truth about the world can be discovered through objective research procedure. They are theoretically inspired by sociology, institutionalism and theory of organization. They do not pay much attention to meta-theoretical matters. They use the so called process tracing method in their research<sup>3</sup>. This strand is represented, i.a., by Jeffrey Checkel, Joseph Jupille, James Caporaso.

Interpretative Constructivism is most popular in Europe. It deals with the matter of language in shaping the social reality. The main analytical category here is the power of discourse. From epistemological perspective these researchers refer to post-positivism. They ask questions concerning possibility of a certain event happening. For example: instead of the question on what factors caused interests of a state in international relations to be changed, the Constructivists concentrate on the background of the event and on language constructions (discourse) which accompanied the change. In their researches they refer to induction methods and focus on the process of reconstruction of the state's interests in international relations. They concentrate on the language matter in the context of reproduction of identity in the social world. These Constructivists use the method of discourse analysis. They are theoretically inspired by language studies performed on the base of the social theory, i.a., by the following researchers: Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, or Jacques Derrida (Checkel, 2006).

All this shows that constructivism is not a unified standpoint: it is divided between those who perceive constructivism as a tool either for explaining or understanding the international reality (Wiener, 2006).

The above typology also proves that within the science of International Relations, Constructivism differs not only in the subject aspect, but also in the object one – due to the research tradition in which it is embedded. However, in the Anglo-American tradition of Political Sciences, Constructivism has the positivistic form. Researches of this strand state possibility to reach objective truth about the reality constructed socially with empirical research methods. Cognition here has the form of explaining the reality.

The continental (European) tradition in Political Sciences Constructivism has the post-positivistic form. Researchers of this strand deny the existence of

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<sup>3</sup> It is a research method in which a researcher accompanies the researched phenomenon to discover its hidden meanings. Using this method helps to identify the process, i.e., mechanisms and relations among independent variables and the effect of dependent variables. Process tracing forces the researcher to consider alternative ways leading to the given phenomenon taking place – this method offers possibility to draw more than one possible way of evolution of the given phenomenon.

objective truth about the reality, as it is influenced by subjective understanding and interpretations. Language is the only tool which makes it possible to reach it. Cognition here has the form of understanding the reality.

Constructivists claim that majority of, or even all significant elements in international politics result from detailed social conditions and historical processes, not from inevitable consequences deriving from human or society nature. The most well known contemporary constructivists are: Nicholas Onuf (*World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, 1989), Alexander Wendt (*Social Theory of International Politics*, 1999), John Ruggie (*Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, 1998), or Martha Finnemore (*National Interests in International Society*, 1997).

Constructivists state that the objective social reality does not exist. The social and political world are intangible objects and they do not exist outside of human consciousness. The international system is not anything external towards a person. It exists as inter-subjective awareness among people, it is a product of a man and has ideational character. It constitutes a set of ideas, a collection of thoughts, a system of norms developed by specific people in specific place. Inter-subjective character of international relations enables studying them with scientific methods, both in positivistic and post-positivistic sense (Jackson, Sørensen, 2012).

Constructivists use analytical categories from the areas of sociology, psychology or philosophy, which widens the theoretical discourse within the area of the science of International Relations<sup>4</sup>. Using such sources causes the fact that the Constructivists' thought naturally concentrates on individuals and groups rather than on states, international organizations or other actors of international politics. It is thanks to Constructivism that the international reality started to be perceived and studied in the categories of social reality. Assumptions of constructivism are as follows:

- international relations comprise mainly of ideas and norms; tangible factors play less important role (ontological idealism);
- the following are the ideation elements: inter-subjective opinions (ideas, concepts), for example: awareness of being a nation, considering own state as independent, sense of group identity, own political institutions; these opinions create and express interests and identity;

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<sup>4</sup> Before, the main inspiration for researchers of international relations were: law, natural science, or economy.

- the social world is not given and it does not belong to the world of nature; the world is created by man; knowledge on it can be obtained through explaining or understanding (epistemological positivism and post-positivism; Jackson, Sørensen, 2012).

Within the science of International Relations, Constructivism has been best developed by the American political scientist Alexander Wendt in his work entitled: *Social Theory of International Politics*. It is divided into seven parts including sociological and philosophical analysis of the social construction of international reality – the core of Constructivist perception of international relations.

Wendt's thesis are based on criticism of opinions of Kenneth Waltz, the author of *Theory of International Politics* (1979), which includes synthesis of Neorealism, and Robert Keohane, the author of *After Hegemony* (1984), who is considered to be the father of contemporary Neoliberalism in the theory of international relations.

Regarding the basic Neorealist paradigm, Wendt indicates errors in this type of thinking. He claims that it too hastily rejects the fact that states are causative subjects, they have human traits as intentionality, rationality, interests. Neoliberals in turn quickly reject the opinion that international relations are state-oriented, which leaves space for adversaries of Neorealism.

The second part of Wendt's book concerns the process of international politics. The author claims that this structure is created, reproduced and even modified under the influence of interactions among its states. The author calls them agents of international politics (Wendt, 1987). The model of these interactions assumes that states (as entities with anthropomorphic traits such as: interests, identity, needs, desires) choose specific behavior as response to external stimulus. It leads to their identity becoming real and subsequently to establishing their interests and consequently to choosing a specified behavior. The author indicates four factors which can lead to changes in relations among states within the structure. These are: co-dependence, homogenization, self-limitation, and community of fate.

Neorealists and Constructivists agree that states strive to survive and be safe. But what form of security policy derives from it? Do states try to become as powerful as possible, or they are rather satisfied with what they have? Wendt states that we can learn it by studying identity and interests, because they are shaped as results of interactions among states, which create group meanings being a construction according to which the future activities are organized. Through participation in this structure, actors can better understand their identities, role in the system and expectations towards them.

## IDENTITY ISSUE IN CONSTRUCTIVISM

The following analysis identifies the manners for explaining the phenomenon of identity from the perspective of works by Alexander Wendt. It also seeks an answer to the question on the manner of understanding identity, its role in international relations and strategies of constructing it. It shows differences in explaining this phenomenon from the perspectives of different variants of Constructivism. One of the assumption of Constructivist theory is: states construct each other through interactions. The main thesis of Wendt is: the character of identities and interests of states depends on interactions among them. Structures of identities and interests are created during these interactions.

The idea of identity in international relations derives from social psychology, especially from the theory of social identity. According to it, social groups define themselves basing on sets of ideas. The ideas can be articulated directly through a discourse or indirectly by common symbols, codes or signs. The purpose of these ideas is to create a definition of the given social group as a community separate from other groups. Members of such group are convinced about the existence of common base on which they create “imagined community” (Marquissen, Risse, Engelman-Martin, Knopf, Roscher, 2001).

Alexander Wendt, who is considered to be the main representative of Constructivism in the science of International Relations, claims that identity is a subjective court existing at the level of an individual, which has its roots in actor’s self-understanding. The importance of this understanding depends on the fact if other actors present the actor in the same manner (Wendt, 2008). Therefore identity comprises of two types of ideas: self perception and perception of others towards the given subject. In this aspect identity is constituted by structures internal and external towards the given subject. A. Wendt list several types of identity:

- a) personal or corporate – such identities are constituted by self-organizing structures which make actors distinctive subjects;
- b) concerning the type – identity which exists integrally with an actor and depends on the actor’s traits (depends on the states political system, for example democratic states, monarchies, etc.);
- c) concerning the role – it is identity which can exist only in relation with others, because it is the others that legitimize it and give meaning to it;
- d) collective (Keohane, 1984) – such an identity is related to the process of identification, i.e., considering self-image in the eyes of others during the process of constructing own identity.

The concept of identity of participants of international relations introduced by A. Wendt constitutes a revolution in the scope of understanding interactions among subjects of international relations. It assumes that identity is developed, supported and changed in the process of interactions among them, and international relations themselves are socially constructed (Wendt, 1999). Therefore identities also have variable and fluxional character depending on the character of participants of international relations in the given time and place.

Wendt also indicates the existence of the phenomenon of corporate identity, which he relates to a set of internal traits which self-organize the given political community. These are: individuals acting in the given community, physical resources, opinions and institutions (Wendt, 1994). A. Wendt classified identities by two different identities: corporate identity and social identity. Corporate identity is intrinsic and self-organizing identity that constitutes actor individuality. It is motivational energy to engage in action or interaction. The corporate identity of the state generates four basic interests: (1) physical security, (2) ontological security in relationships to the world, which create a desire for stable social identities<sup>5</sup>, (3) recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival, (4) development for better life at the collective level. On the other hand, social identity is cognitive and structural things which enable an actor to determine “who I am/we are” in a situation and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations. Social identities and interests are always in process during interaction.

Thus societal structures constitute identities as characteristics of actors, and the actors form their own interests on this basis: “Identities are the basis of interests” (Wendt, 1992).

Collective identity is a positive identification with the welfare of other. This is based on solidarity, community, and loyalty. This discourages free-riding by increasing diffuse reciprocity and the willingness to bear costs without selective incentives. Collective identity is different from an alliance, which is temporary coalition of self-interested states in response to a specific threat. Collective identity makes multilateral actions against non-specific threats by diffusing reciprocity and increasing the willingness to act on “generalized principle of conduct”.

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<sup>5</sup> Ontological security is understood as constant feeling of identity: being aware of aims, preferences and interests, which in turn gives possibility of further actions in the international environment.

There are three types of mechanisms that promote collective identities at the systemic level: Structural contexts, Systemic processes, and Strategic practice.

## CONCLUSION

The issue of identity of participants of international relations (and states – in relation to the analysis) has become a subject of scientific thought especially within the frames of development of the Constructivist paradigm in the International Relations. Explaining the phenomenon of interactions among participants of international relations within Constructivism has made it possible to see the process-like and variable character of identity. Constructivism, especially the conventional one, represented by A. Wendt, provides approach to the intangible aspect of international relations, which had not been available to researchers within the scope of traditional paradigms.

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## INTERNATIONAL RISK FACTORS OCCURRING IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION

### CZYNNIKI RYZYKA MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO WYSTĘPUJĄCE W REGIONIE MORZA KASPIJSKIEGO

*Joanna Piechowiak-Lamparska\**

#### — ABSTRACT —

From the perspective of structural realism, the category of international risk can be defined as a possibility of a sudden and unexpected change which may lead to negative outcomes. The aim of the article is to analyze and show international risk factors present in the Caspian Sea region. In the context of various variables of geostrategic character, the region seems prone to potential threats. The research applied the method of the analysis of strategic narratives, which made it possible to distinguish the most important risk factors in the context of the policy followed by global and regional superpowers: 1) political factors and international strategy; 2) extracting energy resources and the geopolitics of pipelines; 3) frozen territorial and ethnic conflicts; 4) economic factors; 5) military factors. The results show that for the majority of players the lack of stability is beneficial and they do not strive to solve the contentious issues at all costs.

#### — ABSTRAKT —

Kategoria ryzyka międzynarodowego z perspektywy realizmu strukturalnego może być zdefiniowana jako możliwość wystąpienia nagłej i nieoczekiwanej zmiany o negatywnych konsekwencjach. Celem artykułu jest analiza i wskazanie czynników ryzyka międzynarodowego obecnych w regionie Morza Kaspijskiego, który w kontekście syntezy wielu zmiennych o charakterze geostrategicznym wydaje się być podatny na występowanie potencjalnych zagrożeń. W badaniach zastosowano metodę analizy narracji strategicznych, która pozwoliła na wyodrębnienie najważniejszych czynników ryzyka w kontekście polityki mocarstw globalnych i regionalnych: 1) czynniki polityczne i strategia międzynarodowa; 2) wydobywanie surowców energetycznych i geopolityka rurociągów; 3) zamrożone konflikty etniczne i terytorialne; 4) czynniki ekonomiczne; oraz 5) czynniki militarne. Wyniki wskazują, że dla większości graczy brak stabilizacji jest korzystny i nie dążą oni do rozwiązania spornych kwestii za wszelką cenę.

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**Keywords:** international risk, risk factors, post-Soviet area, the Caspian Sea region, the South Caucasus, the superpowers great game

**Słowa kluczowe:** ryzyko międzynarodowe, czynniki ryzyka, obszar poradziecki, region Morza Kaspijskiego, Kaukaz Południowy, wielka gra mocarstw

## INTRODUCTION

Risk is a threat that something unexpected will happen and possibly cause damage. In research on international relations risk can be described as a possibility of a sudden and abrupt change which may (but not necessarily will) lead to negative outcomes. In the theory of international relations, risk is not considered as equivalent to danger, but precisely to the possibility of its occurrence (Demir, 2017; Berejikian, 2016). The factors contributing to the occurrence of risk in the international sphere can be divided and categorized in various ways. However, it seems that the most relevant approach to research on the post-Soviet area is the one based on the paradigm of structural realism whose main focus rests on political, economic, and military factors in their different configurations (Bishop, 2014; Clapton, 2011). Undoubtedly, another element worth noting is the social factor characteristic of constructivist analysis; however, the research approach adopted here intends to analyse the factors precisely on the level of international structure which includes “hard” realist security frame.

The aim of the analysis presented in this article is to show risk factors present in the Caspian Sea region and to group them by major categories. The text is of analytical character and its objective is to create a multilevel image of the broadly understood Caspian area (Aburas, Demirbas, 2015). The factors which were analysed here and considered the most influential ones include political factors and international strategy, fuel output and geopolitics of pipelines, frozen conflicts as well as military and economic factors in the context of the participation of global and regional superpowers (Bahgat, 2002). The selection of factors stems from the application of the method based on the analysis of strategic narratives in and about the region. According to Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin (2017; 2014), the concept of the analysis of strategic narratives is based on describing events in three major dimensions: formation, projection, and reception.

The players in the Caspian region, due to their geographical and geostrategic location along with their international position, create their own strategic narratives (De Graaf, Dimitriu, Ringsmose, 2015), yet they also become the elements

of and exist in the narratives of other players such as the USA, China, NATO, and the European Union. The article offers description of the Caspian Sea region and presents factors, derived from strategic narratives, which contribute to the occurrence of risk. The research process involved analyzing documents on strategy and external policy of the states in the region as well as other states or international organizations which pursue their interests there.

## CHARACTERISTIC OF THE CASPIAN SEA REGION

The Caspian Sea region is diverse in many respects. Moreover, the list of states which consider themselves to belong to the region remains a problematic issue. There are two approaches which can be distinguished here: 1) the narrow one, in which only the states that have access to the sea: that is, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran belong to the Caspian region; or 2) the broad one, which includes also Georgia and Armenia as these states are of considerable transit potential. The article adopts the extended list of the states since it more adequately embodies the geostrategic image of the region.

As a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the situation in the Caspian region has changed radically. Firstly, there has been an increase in the number of states with access to the sea, and the agreements on the legal status of the Caspian Sea concluded between the USSR and Iran have become void. Secondly, the presence of new players in the region has shaken the balance there, particularly due to the possibility of unfreezing the conflicts between them. Thirdly, the region has become open to cooperation with powerful players from the outside of the system in which the USSR held all the cards (Humphrey, Skvirskaja, 2014). Undoubtedly, in the last quarter of a century, the geopolitical situation in the Caspian region as well as the map of relations and connections between the players have undergone many changes.

Currently, it is possible to distinguish several groups of subjects which shape the relations in the region and actively participate in the game. First of all, the state which is pursuing its vital interests in the region is Russia, which is building its sphere of influence by long-standing agreements on individual output and transport of fuels as well as by buying them from others (Russia is still the biggest producer and exporter of fuels in the region). Moreover, it is worth noting that Russia is initiating, planning and promoting the establishment of international structures such as the Eurasian Economic Union (whose members

are Kazakhstan and Armenia). Russia regards the Caspian region as its direct sphere of influence and maintains it by skilful use of some frozen conflicts such as the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, or the separatist tendencies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The process aiming at destabilization of the region and closing it to the influences of Western players has repeated several times.

As a matter of fact, it is the group of external Western players which constitutes the second important group pursuing its interests in the Caspian Sea region. This group comprises the member states of the European Union which seek diversification of the supply of energy fuels, and more precisely, which want to become independent from Russia's supplies and its fuels policy (Babayan, 2016). An important part is played also by the United States, which since the dissolution of the Soviet Union has been trying to expand its sphere of influence in the near abroad states and limit Russian potential by using such instruments as strategic partnership with the states in the region or support for the BTC oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline (Austvik, Rzayeva, 2017). In 2013, the Committee on Foreign Affairs said that "successive United States Administrations supported development of energy resources in the Caspian Sea region, including construction of the landmark Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline that are main arteries delivering Caspian energy resources to global markets" and, in consequence, "the priority now becomes the realization of the Southern Gas Corridor to deliver additional volumes of natural gas from the Caspian Sea region to European markets" (H. RES. 284). It is important to mention here the attempts made by Georgia, and earlier also Armenia, to engage in close cooperation with NATO and the European Union. The project has been partially successful as despite the consequences of the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, Georgia signed the Association Agreement with the EU in 2015 and is still cooperating with NATO. The involvement of the EU is also reflected in the creation of the EU-US Energy Council during the 2009 summit.

Despite being limited by long-standing agreements with Russia, Azerbaijan is still a relatively independent player. This state, besides having a direct access to energy deposits, is trying to define its role by exploiting the transit potential and the possibilities of building new pipelines. Azerbaijan is also a part of a Chinese international project – the New Silk Road. As a consequence of numerous conflicts and animosities between the states in the region, a lot of plans have failed, for instance, the Nabucco project.

## FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE OCCURRENCE OF INTERNATIONAL RISK

### Political factors

Geopolitical factors play an important part in shaping the image of the Caspian region. This is a territory where a lot of players pursue their vital interests. Changing the Russian lake into a region which is geostrategically interesting for the USA, China, Turkey, or the European states has made the Caspian Sea region worth competing for. First of all, the political risk is connected here with competing interests of the post-Soviet states, Iran, and the Western players (Saparov, 2014).

It seems that the major factor which attracts attention of superpowers is the energy resources; however, another important factor lies in the tug-of-war policy and the strategy of building one's sphere of influence on the post-Soviet territory, which is followed mainly by the USA, as direct influence on the states in the region may deprive Russia of some part of its influences and weaken its position as the regional superpower. The Caspian Sea is important for Russia not only due to fuel output and transport of energy resources, but it also has considerable significance to its image (Maass, 2016).

### Extracting energy resources and the geopolitics of pipelines

The Caspian Sea region is an important part of the world market of energy resources, especially due to its rich deposits of natural gas and crude oil. As Bahgat (2002) suggested, in order to use these resources effectively and make them an effective tool in international politics, the region should deal with four major issues. It is worth noticing that after 15 years, the identified problems are still present.

The first issue concerns thorough and accurate assessment of the deposits of resources as well as establishment of borders on the Caspian Sea that would be respected (Zonn, 2015). Yet in 2017, the border issues between Azerbaijan and Iran have not been resolved, and the reserves have not been estimated, especially in the Iranian and Turkmen parts. The second issue is something of a rivalry between the states in the region and the superpowers which aspire to extend their spheres of influence by controlling the extraction of energy resources along with their further transport and sale. The problem is multidimensional

and involves long-standing trade agreements, strategies on energy, ecological issues of the Caspian Sea basin, and the need for diversification of fuel supplies (Naghizadeh, Farshchi, Karimi, Mirabbasi, 2016). On the one hand most of the Caspian resources at the stage of their extraction and transport is controlled by Russian energy companies (also by using agreements which oblige other states, e.g. Kazakhstan, not to cross the oil and gas sales limits); on the other hand, there are new traders, such as China or the British company BP who are ready to invest in new transport corridors. The third issue involves frozen ethnic problems, which are discussed in detail hereafter. These problems are still unsolved, which can destabilize the region in short time. The last issue influencing the exploitation of resources is the lack of appropriate transport corridors, and the need for modernization of extraction technologies. The most important and most ergonomic pipelines in the region are used by Russian energy companies (Eldarov, Holland, Kamilov, 2015). The fall of the Nabucco-West pipeline project shows that cooperation between the states in the region will require from them a lot of work and effort. This effort is also necessary for solving and finishing the inveterate ethnic, religious, and territorial conflicts (Kubicek, 2013).

### Frozen conflicts

The Caspian region is characterized by high instability caused by the constant possibility of resuming frozen conflicts. The most important of them, and those which have reoccurred in the recent years, include the conflicts in the South Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Moreover, there are independence movements in Chechnya, Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, i.e. in the North Caucasus, which belongs to the Russian Federation.

The War in Nagorno-Karabakh has been the reason of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 1980s. The unregulated status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is at the root of the lack of cooperation between the two states. This is a military conflict of ethnic character which has been going on regularly since 1994. Until today, there have been fights and incidents along the demarcation line. Russia's engagement in the conflict is also of great importance. The state has sympathized with Armenia and in this way partially controls the situation. The high tension was clearly reflected in the exacerbation of the conflict in April 2016 (Geukjian, 2016; Blank, 2015).

The biggest military conflict between the players in the region of the South Caucasus was the Russian-Georgian War in 2008. As a result of the war, two rebellious provinces – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – separated from Georgia and proclaimed independence. The conflicts caused by long-standing, unresolved disputes of ethnic origin led to the loss of territorial integrity of Georgia and influenced the process of European and Euroatlantic integration in the region. It is believed that the Russian engagement was a response to the attempt of Western players to extend their sphere of influence in the Caucasus (German, 2016). In consequence, the NATO-Russia Council was suspended for several months and the member states of the EU imposed sanctions against Russia (Freizer, 2017; Saparov, 2014). There is no doubt, however, that establishing the free trade zone between Russia and Abkhazia as well as Russia and South Ossetia can be understood as an informal annexation of the separatist republics by Russia.

### Economic factors

The economic issues in the Caspian region are strongly connected with international and energy policy. The states in the region, which came into existence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union – i.e. Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia – are developing unevenly, which causes substantial stratification. Despite the economic crisis, the best economic indicators are achieved by Russia, which compensates for the slowdown in the level of economic growth by remaining the most important trade partner for the states in the post-Soviet territory. Russia reaches its economic goals in the Caspian region by economic integration achieved on many levels. One of the principal methods of exerting economic influence is using instruments causing dependence, for example, in the area of sale and transport. Russian foreign policy is also characterized by its use of instruments typical of structural powers – it initiates and controls establishing international organizations. It is worthwhile to mention the functioning of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Customs Union, and the Common Economic Space. Thanks to a number of connections, Russia has the ability of causing economic destabilization in the Caspian region. The level of risk is clearly influenced by both the value of trade exchange and cooperation in strategic sectors, such as the sectors of energy or defence (Heinrich, Pleines, 2015).

The level of economic risk in the region is visible in the Russian-Iranian relations. Both Russia and Iran feel the effects of price fluctuations on the energy resources market; however, the long-standing sanctions against Iran imposed by the USA and the EU member states led to increased economic cooperation between the two states. Iranian demand for Russian goods caused a kind of economic dependency and despite the progress in unfreezing the American-Iranian relations, the ones between Moscow and Tehran still remain very close. The states cooperate mainly in the energy sector; however, their cooperation in trade exchange is also clearly visible (in March 2017 there were talks on establishing a free trade zone between the Eurasian Economic Community and Iran). Moreover, Russia and Iran are allies in the Syrian conflict and show mutual support on the international arena.

### Military factors

Undoubtedly, it is Russia which remains the military hegemonic leader in the region as it has the largest military forces on the Caspian Sea and in the region of the North Caucasus. It is important to say that thanks to its developed net of connections, the state has subdued a part of the region of the South Caucasus: Armenia, which receives Russian support in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which without Russia are unlikely to maintain sovereignty (Jafarova, 2014). Nevertheless, the Caspian Flotilla, which is still partially based on the units that served in the USSR army, is continuously modernized and its combat and defence readiness is strengthened (it has at least 3 Buyan-M missile corvettes). This means that in case of military conflict in the Caspian Sea basin, the Russian navy would have a definite advantage. Moreover, the military port in Kaspisk in Dagestan which is to open in 2020 will be Russia's another chief asset. This important military facility will be the main, the largest, state-of-the-art naval base in the Russian Navy and in the Caspian region.

The second place is occupied by the Iranian Flotilla, which has, however, much lower combat value than the Russian Flotilla. Despite building new destroyers and submarines, Iran is largely equipped with older vessels (Rabiee, GharehBeygi, Mousavi, 2015; Robert, Letouzey, Kavooosi, Sherkati, Müller, Vergés, Aghababaei, 2014). Yet Iran has still much better military position on the sea than Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Their weaponry comes mostly from the USSR times and the states began the process of modernization

relatively late as it has been carried out since 2000. Moreover, Azerbaijan has a modern (opened in 2015) naval base in Puta. The military security architecture of the Caspian Sea basin does not allow ships which are not under the flag of the littoral states to sail. Besides the states take part in joint military exercises. It seems that maintaining military stability is the goal of all the states; however, the asymmetry of power in this respect shows that the occurrence of risk is possible, for example, in case of violation of the borders of internal waters.

### TROUBLE SPOTS: THE GREAT GAME OF SUPERPOWERS IN THE CASPIAN REGION

First of all, it should be emphasized that rivalry between great players leads to consequences for both the Caspian region and individual players. While Russia and the USA compete for their sphere of influence and the EU makes attempts to diversify the energy resources supplies, most of the states in the region follow multi-vector policy (Włodkowska-Bagan, 2013). It is difficult to say explicitly whether the policy of balance and manoeuvring between superpowers and their interests is effective; however, turning into only one direction seems risky (Freizer, 2017).

Both Russia and the USA skilfully manipulate risk factors. Their use of energy policy as a tool for distributing limited goods (energy resources) results in building dependencies, which is a factor contributing to the situation of permanent risk. On the other hand, the USA has used sanctions against Russia or Iran as powerful instruments. Such policy was one of the reasons for isolation of Iran, which in consequence strengthened their cooperation with Russia. One of the important aspects facilitating stability in the region was the strategy of Euro-Atlantic and European integration by using the instruments of strategic partnership (Stent, 2015; Tsygankov, 2014).

The analysis showed that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the trouble spots mainly include 1) strategies of superpowers which treat the Caspian region as a field where they play the game for their sphere of influence, which means instrumental treatment of the states in the region; 2) economic stratification, which may lead to a conflict based on the shortage of goods; 3) insufficient diversification in energy policy as well as conflict-provoking geopolitics, pipelines location and transport corridors; 4) frozen and regularly resumed territorial and ethnic conflicts (mainly the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, but also the lack

of fixed borders and ownership of some of the gas and oil fields on the Caspian Sea); 5) military rivalry on the Caspian Sea, which is reflected in an increasingly intensive arms race. The presented list of factors does not exhaust the issue of risk occurrence in the region, but these factors are the most visible potential threats.

## SUMMARY

The Caspian Sea region is in many respects a unique territory. It is worth noting that most of possible factors contributing to the occurrence of international risk are present there. Risk means a possibility, not a certainty, of danger which leads to damage. The analysis of strategic narratives showed that there is a possibility of the occurrence of risk caused by geopolitical factors, so mainly by the rivalry between superpowers on this territory. The issue of rivalry over the sphere of influence - the region rich in energy resources, has been a current problem in international politics since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. At the beginning, in the first phase, the Caspian region remained in the Russian sphere of influence; however, at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century, Western players such as the USA, the EU, and NATO joined the game (Smith, Twardowski, 2017; Stent, 2015).

In order to find the answer to the research question regarding possible and major reasons for the occurrence of international risk in the Caspian region, it is worthy to find the most frequent factor. In the case discussed here, this factor involves extracting energy resources and the geopolitics of pipelines, which influences and is also directly connected with economic and military factors. The possibility of resuming frozen conflicts constitutes an additional element that constructs the picture of the region. The analysis of narrative shows that for the majority of players the status of "unstable stability" is beneficial so they do not strive to solve the contentious issues at all costs.

The results presented in the article do not exhaust theoretical problems concerning the occurrence of international risk and the analytical issues relating to the Caspian Sea region. It seems, however, that they are a good starting point for solving the issue concerning the factors which determine the occurrence of international risk in general. It is also advisable for future research to compare the results regarding the Caspian region with the ones concerning Central Europe. Moreover, the clearly visible rivalry between superpowers makes the risk factors alternate with frozen as well as new conflicts, and with the influence of the current international situation.

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# SOCIAL-POLITICAL STUDIES

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## POST-NATIONAL REVOLUTION AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

REWOLUCJA POST-NARODOWA  
I JEJ POLITYCZNE KONSEKWENCJE

*Jakub Potulski\**

— ABSTRACT —

Western Europe of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century is going through a process that is sometimes referred to as “the arrival of the Third Wave civilization”, that is the information civilization. The civilizational transformations result in two “revolutions” – *post-national* and *post-industrial*. Just like the 19th-century national and industrial revolutions, they involve deep social changes and consequently provoke resistance and a wave of counter-mobilisation against the upcoming “new order” – global, post-national, and post-industrial. The basic assumption of this article is that the classical theoretical schemes developed by Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset may come as analytical tools useful in explaining contemporary political phenomena. Rokkan’s theory seems to be the analytical model that is still helpful in explaining the election behaviours as well as political conflicts and divisions present within current political systems, and its heuristic power is high.

— ABSTRAKT —

Na przełomie dwudziestego i dwudziestego pierwszego wieku kraje wysoko rozwinięte przechodzą proces, który określany jest niekiedy mianem „nadejścia trzeciej fali cywilizacyjnej”, związanej z rewolucją technologii informacyjnych. Ta transformacja cywilizacyjna skutkuje procesami, które można określić mianem „rewolucji post-industrialnej” oraz „rewolucji post-narodowej”. Podobnie jak miało to miejsce w wypadku nowoczesnej rewolucji narodowej i przemysłowej, tak samo dwie „ponowoczesne” rewolucje wywołują głębokie zmiany w strukturze społecznej, prowokując tym samym opór wobec zmian i nadchodzącego „nowego porządku społecznego”. Podstawowym celem artykułu jest zwrócenie uwagi na heurystyczne możliwości modelu analitycznego zaproponowanego przez Steina Rokkana i Seymoura Lipseta do badania podziałów społecznych politycznie doniosłych. Autor argumentuje, że Rokkanowski model może być przydatny w próbie wyjaśniania współczesnych zjawisk politycznych.

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**Keywords:** post-national revolution, hybridity, multiculturalism, globalization, global governance, social cleavages

**Słowa kluczowe:** rewolucja post-narodowa, hybrydyzacja, multikulturalizm, globalizacja, globalne zarządzanie, podziały społeczne

Noticing and realizing the increasing pace of civilizational development which has taken place in the last few decades due to information revolutions, we face the problem of understanding and describing the changes occurring in our surrounding. These changes are not limited to particular countries or regions but concern the whole globe. Technological revolution and intensification of globalization lead to the questioning of current forms of organization of social life, which implies that the issues related to it need to be reconsidered. At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century our social-political world has undergone fundamental transformations and the processes modifying structures and mechanisms have intensified. There is a common feeling that we are about to face radical transformations of the current social order. A great number of social science works constitute attempts at analysing and comprehending the processes that change our social world and contribute to its profound transformation (cf. Albrow, 1997, 2014; Castells, 2007, 2008, 2009; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton, 1999; Held, McGrew, 2007; Robertson, 1992; Rosenau, 1990; Scholte, 2005; van Dijk, 2012).

We could say, making some simplification, that there are at least three processes defining the framework of the dynamics of social changes: 1) transnationalization of societies – happening slowly as a result of integration processes (abolition of borders and removal of other obstacles to freedom of movement and work, “mixing” of nations, common initiatives and organizations); 2) globalization of societies, that is a comprehensive influence of the globalization processes on the societies, communities and individuals – a process increasing but with a different degree in various regions and countries; 3) networking – which creates a new, extremely dense network of contacts and relations between people and organizations (general access to telecommunication network, transfer rate, interactivity are the essential features). It means that the present organization of our societies is affected by three factors: cross-border (removal of political and administrative barriers), globalism (globalization of the scope of perception and human activity), ability to establish contacts (multi-contacts and multi-interactions) (Zacher, 2006). These three elements cause the erosion of modern

social and political institutions and at the same time a particular vulnerability connected with the fact that we do not know how to replace them.

The greatest research challenge for contemporary humanities and social sciences is the attempt to recognize the effects of civilizational changes connected with information revolution and the creation of global information society. A rapid transformation of our social reality constitutes a particular challenge for social sciences. A complex character of the appearing changes causes the difficulties with an adequate explanation of the changes happening in the sphere of politics. We live in times between two eras: industrial and information. We do not really know what a “mature” information society will be and there are still more questions than rational answers to the appearing doubts. The pace of economic, social and technological changes is too fast. We may observe many manifestations connected with the transition to information society and try to “insert” it in a certain analytical chart so as to give meaning to the surrounding social reality. A predicted arrival of information society is connected with a complex reconstruction of structures and social institutions. One thing seems to be certain – that the present transformation of industrial civilization into information civilization causes deep and comprehensive changes of social existence, similarly as it happened during the transformation from agricultural to industrial civilization. As a result, a society with specific ways of organizing social, political and economic life will be formed.

While trying to introduce order into analyses concerning the changes occurring in the sphere of politics, one may attempt to find such a research chart which would have the greatest heuristic possibilities. The basic assumption of the article is that a useful analytical role may be played by classical theoretical charts developed by Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset.

In his area of academic interests, a Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan focused on the issue of election behaviour. During his academic research he became interested in the issue of historical studies on the processes of creating political framework within which voters make their decisions. He paid attention to the importance of history in the process of understanding the roots of contemporary divisions and political differences formed in post-war European party systems. He studied the sources of economic, social and political cleavages and soon created his comparative studies devoted to the creation of basic social cleavages as well as historical analysis of their formation in particular countries of Western Europe. Rokkan’s theory of social cleavages became popular thanks to a book *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspective*, edited

together with Seymour Lipset (1967). Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset recognized that a fundamental basis of political phenomena are long-term process of evolution of a social structure and undertook an attempt to conceptualize a relation between great historical processes, cleavages in a society and institutionalisation of a party system.

They analysed the processes of democratization and formation of party systems happening in the countries of Western Europe in a historical perspective. They were interested in the issues concerning the formation of a hierarchical system of social cleavages, politically important, mutual connections among them, the occurrence of relations between the system of these divisions and a party system, what, as a result, led to indicate the role of political parties in the process of structuring and stabilizing political behaviours (Herbut, 1993). The notion “cleavage” refers to a specific kind of conflicts occurring within the framework of democratic politics, having its source in the transformation of social structure caused by macro-level processes. At the moment when “social cleavages” are used for political mobilization and when their institutionalisation within the party system happens, they create stronger alliances and political loyalties which are reproduced until the moment when another transformation of social structure happens.

Until today “Rokkan’s” notion of social cleavage is one of the most popular analytical models explaining the changes occurring within party systems. This model has had a central role in the literature devoted to European political systems and contemporary political behaviours for years. The strength of this notion lies between its abilities to logical connections between individual political behaviours (micro-level) and great historical processes (macro-level). Thanks to this, the theory of Rokkan and Lipset has become very popular among researchers. Its popularity is confirmed by many works and articles referring to “Rokkan’s” notion of “cleavages” (cf. Karvonen, Kuhnle, 2001). According to contemporary conceptualisation, a political division must comprise three elements to constitute cleavage: a) A *social-structural* element, such as class, religious denomination, status or education; b) an element of *collective identity* of this social group, and c) an *organizational manifestation* in the form of collective action or a durable organization of the social group concerned (Bartolini, Mair, 1990; Bartolini, 2005). A cleavage is thus necessarily a “compounded divide”, encompassing interest, normative or attitudinal outlooks, and a strong organizational base (Bartolini, 2005; Deegan-Krause, 2006, 2007).

Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset realized that in order to understand the existing political divisions and conflicts, we have to refer to the processes of evolution of social structure. They argued that modern political and party systems in Western Europe have been formed by series of historical conflicts connected with the formation of nation states, religious transformations and formation of new social structures, which were happening in the period between the Reformation and Industrial Revolution. These social changes have caused particular consequences on a political level.

According to the thesis of Rokkan and Lipset, the overlapping of conflicts connected with: 1) reformation and counter-reformation; 2) national revolutions in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, as well as 3) industrial revolution contributed to the creation of distinctive and separate identities, social institutions as well as the patterns of political competitions, which explain both “national variations” of political systems in Western Europe and stability or “freezing” of these systems.

Lipset and Rokkan indicated the key importance of two revolutions connected with European modernity: national and industrial. These revolutions contributed to the formation of four critical lines of social cleavages due to the fact that modernization processes caused by industrial and national revolutions prompted the resistance and counter-mobilization of the groups endangered by the processes of civilizational changes. Two of these cleavages were the products of what was defined as a national revolution: a conflict between *a central culture connected with the formation of a nation state* and an increasing resistance of *the subordinate groups*, different in terms of ethnicity, languages or religion, located in the province and peripheries of the country; a conflict between centralizing, standardising and mobilizing *nation state* and a historically consolidated corporate privileges of *the Church*. Two of these divisions are the products of industrial revolution: a conflict between *the interests of landowners* and a forming class of *industrial entrepreneurs*; a conflict between *owners and employers* on the one hand, and *renters, agricultural workers and workmen* on the other hand. Rokkan and Lipset paid attention to the fact that majority of the history of Europe from the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century can be described in terms of interaction between these two processes of revolution changes (Lipset, Rokkan, 1993).

The analytical chart proposed by Lipset and Rokkan seems a useful tool by means of which one can undertake the attempt to explain the current political processes connected with the transformations on the political scene and changes of the election behaviours which take place all over Europe. On applying this tool, a question arises as to whether information revolution resembles industrial

revolution and whether the two periods can be juxtaposed. Despite all differences, one can find an analogy between Europe at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and Europe of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Europeans faced the civilizational changes connected with the break-up of social and political structures formed during agricultural era and the arrival of modern industrial civilization. National and industrial revolution also reflected these changes. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, citizens of the most developed countries (Europe, USA, Japan) have come to face civilizational transformations resulting from the revolution of information technologies and the related reconstruction of modernity (Freeman, Louçã, 2001; Winston, Edelbach, 2006). What is more, the two revolutions – industrial and information – are stages in the development of a modern society.

While using Rokkan's model of the formation of social cleavages, one may assume that contemporary deep transformation of economic and social life is connected with the second industrial revolution (computerization, automatization, robotization), as well as globalization processes driven by the progress of IT will have its reflection in a social structure, and therefore in political behaviours. Western Europe at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century experiences a process that is often defined as "the arrival of the civilization of the third wave", that is the information civilization. The article assumes a hypothesis that just as it happened in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, we are now experiencing two revolutions that are the result of the occurring civilizational transformations: *post-national* and *post-industrial*. These two revolutions, similarly to previous national and industrial revolutions, are the source of deep social changes, and therefore they provoke resistance and the waves of counter-mobilization against the upcoming "new order": global order, post-national, post-industrial.

Both processes of *post-industrial* and *post-national* revolutions have their interesting manifestations and consequences deserving a deeper analysis. The analysis requires thorough empirical studies that could confirm the assumed hypothesis. The main aim of this article is to draw attention to the heuristic possibilities of Rokkan's analytical model that was created for the purpose of studies on party systems in Western Europe. The model still seems to be a useful tool when trying to comprehend contemporary political phenomena and the creation of new boundaries of social and political divisions. The possibilities offered by Rokkan model may be shown, for example, in the analysis of the processes and phenomena defined as *post-national revolution*, one of the key elements of contemporary civilizational transformation. Many social theorists have suggested that we are currently living in a period in which the identities

of past are becoming increasingly irrelevant and in which new identities, and new identity formation, are being created. The major identity colossus forged in the nineteenth century, and subsequently spread over much of the globe – nation-state identity – has been the subject of particular debate; and theorists have attempted to identify alternative, *post-national* identity construction (cf. Appandurai, 2005; Giddens, 2002, 2008; Turkle, 1997; Werbner, Modood, 1997). The aim of the article is to pay attention to the political process and phenomena accompanying *post-national revolution*, especially to the process of creation new socio-political cleavages.

It seems that it is the *post-national revolution* concerning the two basic pillars of our social existence: political institutions as well as identity sphere have the greatest potential for political mobility. What is *post-national revolution* and what areas of our life does it concern? *Post-national revolution* (denationalization) is connected with the unusual ability for new technologies to break down all the barriers, both physical and social. In the dimension of political barriers, post-national revolution manifests itself as a tendency to create *supranational* political and social groups taking over the competences of a current *nation state*. In a social dimension, *post-national revolution* contributed to the intensification of the intercultural contacts and the processes of cultural diffusion. The facilitations connected with global movement of people, images and ideas caused the mesh of civilization, as well as the formation of hybrid (multicultural) societies and hybrid individual identities drawing from many sources and various cultural practices (cf. Habermas, 2001; Appandurai, 2005; Joppke, 2008; Parekh, 2008).

While emphasizing the political significance of *post-national revolution*, it is worth remembering that it was a national revolution which was one of the most important consequences of economic and social transformations connected with the arrival of modernity. The term “national revolution” refers to two mutually connected processes: the creation of modern state and nation. The creation of a state concerns the processes of forming particular tangible institutions – army, police, bureaucracy, ministers, and so on. However, the creation of nation is the creation of the feeling of national identity, which will replace the feeling of loyalty of individual people towards tribes, villages, regions or ethnic groups (Fukuyama, 2015). Both processes were mutually connected with each other as the creation of a nation had a decisive importance for the success of the creation of the statehood. Despite the fact that a nation state consisted of several sectors, it supported the formation of one dominant language and a superior

national culture, thanks to which the demands of classes and subcultures were moved away and therefore loyalty towards the most universal identity – national identity – was assured. In state nationalism, a state limited by territory assumes loyalty which goes beyond the loyalty towards the family, relatives, culture group or ethnic identity.

The analysts dealing with the research on the processes of modernization and formation of modern nations link the formation of nationalism with modernization emphasizing that in practice the issues of “identity” did not exist in post-modern societies. In hunter-gatherer and rural societies, the social mobility was so low and the work division was so limited that an individual did not have too many choices in terms of their relations with others. It was the tribe, village or caste which decided about important choices in man’s life. As a result, an individual did not have to ask questions concerning their identity – “who am I?”. The situation changed along with the development of Eastern European modernization driven by the invention of a printing press and the increase on the book market. The printing press rapidly decreased the price of written communication and enabled the printing of the books in national languages. Benedict Anderson wrote that the appearance of printed national language enabled the creation of “an imagined community”, that is people who are the participants of the same culture due to common language. Thanks to reading, people who had never gone beyond the borders of their villages, could finally realize the connections between them and other people, in other remote villages (Anderson, 1997). Ernest Gellner paid attention to the fact that nationalism was created as a result of deep social changes connected with the transformation from agricultural economy to industrial economy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The increase in the division of work caused by the process of industrialization created incentives to social unification. It created the foundation for the modern nationalism, when the “national” culture based on common language became a central, unifying source of social unity. In state nationalism, territorially limited “nation” state assumed loyalty which went beyond the loyalty towards family, relatives, cultural group or ethnic identity (Gellner, 1991).

National revolution caused a vast objection and counter-mobilization of social groups which defended the current order. In his analyses of social cleavages which structured political scene of the highly developed countries, Stein Rokkan paid attention to the fact that one of the most important processes which affected the formation of Western party systems was *national revolution*. It was a source of many social and political conflicts as the idea stating that territorial

borders should refer to cultural ones required the formation of new assimilation borders of subpopulation with a dominant culture or physical relocation of all the populations. None of these processes occurred without the use of significant violence. Therefore, it seems that political and social consequences of *post-national revolution* should be analysed with due diligence due to their potential for conflict.

Contemporary *post-national revolution*, being the consequence of technological revolution, concerns one of the most important areas of our existence: it concerns the way of functioning of political institutions – a state and a collective and individual identity. It is connected with two processes concerning the institutional and identity dimension of our social life. First of all, it is connected with the reconstruction of the type of state – *centralised nation state*. Its place is taken by new forms defined as *network-state*, created by a complex network of interactions between nation states, co-national and transnational institutions, regional and local governments, and even non-government organizations (cf. Keohane, Hoffman, 1991; Beck, 2005; Castells, 2008). Secondly, it is connected with the reconstruction of forms of identification defined as *national identity* in favour of the creation of *hybrid identity*. Free movement of goods, people and ideas all over the world causes that human societies become more complex, heterogenic and multicultural (cf. Smith, 1990; Jameson, 1991; Hall, 1992; Back, 1996; Cohen, 1999; Modood, 2007).

The first of these processes is connected with the transformations occurring in the sphere of organization of political institutions, and mostly states. The formation of centralised nation states was one of the effects of European modernity. Centralized and complex nation states, perceived as a unity of three elements: territory, people and sovereign authority, dominated political structure of a modern world. There was a point of reference of a corporate identity of both social groups and particular individuals. They created the framework for the development of modern industrial relations. Nation state was an institutional “giant” of modernity era, constituting mainly a collection of political power and central political institutions defining the institutional framework of political and social behaviours and defining the rights and obligations of the citizens.

In recent years, the changes of social and political life have made a progress; a state limits its power, giving some of its competences to local communities and municipal units (decentralization of management) as well as private entities (privatization of public services). International subjectivity of the state is also subject to limitations. By accepting the obligations resulting from the norms

of international law as well as agreeing to the existence of international and transnational institutions, states, on their own initiative, transfer a part of their sovereignty in their favour. While analysing the transformation of a modern nation state, one may distinguish several elements which affect the current institutional political order to the greatest extent. First of all, economic globalization of the world and neoliberal political thought which is legitimising it contribute to the weakening of the current nation state. New rules of global economy “based on knowledge” forced the state to resign from its current status and commercialization of current “sphere of regulation”, that is agendas, tasks and function of the state. Global economy requires the state institutions to share their authority with other economic actors and limit the possibility of the state to create economic politics. Secondly, technological and telecommunication revolution enables an immediate access to information in every sphere of human activity and the ability to use it multiplies the number of players and decrease the number of those who have the authority. Globalization of media and electronic communication is equivalent to denationalization and denationalization of information, what causes that the humanity enters the era of extra-territorial communication, independent of the state, which loses its ability to control over “symbolic” space. Thirdly, due to the development of transport and telecommunication network, there has been an increase in the movement of people (migrations) and cultural movement (information). Migrations free people from spatial relations and allocations. People who participate in this form of mobility are included in the stream of population circulations coming across new cultural experiences. On the other hand, media create unobstructed, effective, territorial channels of communication which endless stream of information, contents and cultural forms go through. A world which is a “mosaic” of a variety of groups and communities, mutually connected diasporas of people begins to form. Fourthly, the civilizational development of humanity has led to the appearance of issues of global reach encompassing all the continents and societies. Global threats force the state entities to coordinate their activities on a transnational level. The character of global threats caused that individual safety may be assured only by collective, mutual activities and agreement. It creates a totally new situation for a modern nation state.

Transnationalization of social, political and economic processes forces the institutional change as current nation states are not able to deal with the problems of the modern world. The transformation of the state (institutional systems) is a complex phenomenon and will result in global change of configuration of

power and identity. The times of modern state have ended but it is still unknown what will replace it. One can indicate a few tendencies accompanying a current institutional change. First of all, we have to deal with the formation of structures and mechanisms of steering social life on a global scale (Rosenau, 1999; Karns, Mingst, 2009). In contemporary international environment, there is a multi-layer structure of “global management”, encompassing many levels and various actors, connected with one another in global space. Global management may be understood as a gathering of activities, rules and mechanisms, formal and informal, occurring in various and intermingling levels of contemporary world. This notion refers to a vast variety of cooperative agreements between particular actors in order to solve global problems which go beyond the possibilities of individual actors. In that respect, it is rather an attempt to coordinate governance than government. *Global governance* means management and administration of global politics without the participation of centralised government. A system of global governance forms due to acceptance by the elites of the political fact that the number of areas and problems which cannot be effectively solved by the activity of an individual actor increases.

As our societies become more liquid and more complex, it has become necessary to work out new mechanisms and methods of governance which would be based less on the hierarchical state institutions minimizing the difference between the state and society, between what is global and what is local (cf. Rosenau, 2002). *Post-modern* state is characterized by the development of multitude of the structures of authority. Within the framework of *post-modern* political institutions, a model of a multi-level governance encompassing subnational, national and transnational bodies as well as government and non-government actors is realized. It is a new polyarchic system of power, which is characterized by a multitude of sources of the authority and a nation state is only one of these sources.

The second of these processes connected with *post-national* revolution concerns the issues of individual and group identity. Our social identities become more liquid, we move from one to the other easily. While creating “me”, we experience a variety of patterns and stimuli resulting from a more and more complex surrounding. Our social identity has become multi-dimensional and today it is difficult to define the borderline between “we” and “them”. Together with *post-national revolution* we experience the process of reconstructions created in the times of modernity forms of identifications defined as *national identity* in favour of the creation of *hybrid identity* (Kraidy, 1999, 2002, 2005).

Free movement of goods, people and ideas on a global scale causes that human societies become more and more complex, heterogenic and multicultural (cf. Gilroy, 1993). Despite the fact how great the degree of geographical isolation of societies used to be, it ceased to be a reality a long time ago, along with the beginning of long-distance travels and the spread of commerce. Spatial borders between societies have never been stable or impossible to intermingle. Objects, ideas, genes and people have always travelled through these borders. The processes of cultural diffusion have accelerated together with the industrial revolution, and information revolution and globalization processes connected with it have created almost unlimited possibilities for global movement of goods, ideas and people. It results in the situation that, at present, notions such as “society”, “culture” and “nation” turn out not to be too precise – these three notions are neither synonymous nor homogenous. The notion of hybridity is supposed to reflect the essence of contemporary identity: changeable, having a variety of sources, and being constructed.

Taking into consideration a multitude of various identities which a contemporary man encounters, he may create his own “me” in a very peculiar way. A contemporary man faces the issues of constructing his identity having too many choices of patterns, styles and ways of life. We deal with a structural change in the ways of constructing own identity, which more and more often assumes the hybrid forms under the influence of present globalization tendencies. Hybridization is one of the notions by means of which “the spirit” of our times is reflected. The notion of “hybridization” refers to a dynamic process of the mixing of cultures. The state of a contemporary man can be characterized by a multitude of belongings to groups and a multitude of identities, and every man is also a representative of several groups. Globalization is a vast, interactive process of transcultural exchange in which people smoothly move from one identity to another.

The formation of hybrid identities constitutes an essential challenge for the formation of contemporary societies. Telecommunication revolution and, as a result, globalization have created the basis for the formation of a smoother and fragmented “me”, especially in people who spend most of their social-professional activities in transnational space, in which various identities come into contact with one another. In a global world dominated by transnational migrations and cultural movements, further hybridization seems an inevitable process. Individualism and modern reflectiveness support striving for self-realisation, self-improvement and forming own identity, “authenticity” of which becomes

a paramount value. Under the conditions of mutual connections between various cultures, the choices of lifestyles are almost unlimited.

*Post-national revolution* and the reconstruction of our political institutions and identities seem particularly essential as its mobilization power is very great. It was already Lipset and Rokkan who paid attention to the fact that national and industrial revolution affected significantly the structures of social divisions, but it was mostly national revolution which resulted in the deepest and fiercest oppositions as national revolution forced wider circles of people to take a position in conflicts concerning values and cultural identities (Lipset, Rokkan, 1993). It is the same with post-national revolution, which is connected with *the crisis of nation state*, and a nation state defined the institutional frameworks for our activities as well as *the crisis of identity*, and identity is for people the source of sense and experience.

Some researchers predict that we are awaiting the period of *post-nationalism*: nation state will become a thing of the past and other forms of loyalties and identities will take its place. A real multiculturalism will conquer the artificial unity of a nation state (Appandurai, 2005). Regardless of the fact that such statements may be overrated, the consequences of the upcoming changes raise concerns, anxiety and a trial to protect the existing institutions and structures. Rapidly changing reality generates newer and newer spaces for conflicts and social divisions. Along with the wave of changes, there is also a wave of counter-mobilization created by these actors whose position is worse or their conditions are devalued and/or stigmatised by a dominating logics of *post-national* and *post-industrial* revolution. While writing his trilogy *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Manuel Castells emphasized that the observed revolution of information technologies and the restructuring of capitalism created a new form of society – a network society. It is characterized by globalization of key strategic economic activities; cross-linking form of organization; elasticity and instability of employment and individualization of work; culture of “real virtuality” created by ubiquitous, internally connected media system; and finally, a transformation of material foundations of life, space and time due to defining the space of movement and timeless time as the expressions of dominant activities and controlling elites. This new form of social organization in its ubiquitous globality has spread all over the world, as it happened in the 20<sup>th</sup> century due to industrial capitalism. It shakes the institutions, transforms cultures, creates wealth and poverty, stimulates voracity, innovativeness and hope, but at the same time

imposes suffering, stimulates despair and also resistance towards globalization and cosmopolitanism (Castells, 2008).

Post-modern “revolutions” create new lines of social and political cleavages. “Anti-modernising” tendencies are a constant element of political scene in European countries. The wave of counter-mobilisation occurs in the whole of a developed world, which as the first one enters the post-industrial era. It seems that the empirical confirmation of the fact that at present we deal with the formation of new social cleavages caused by *post-national* and *post-industrial* revolution are successes of populist and anti-establishment social and political movements. Their successes are the manifestation of counter-mobilization and resistance against the changes connected with the arrival of information civilization. One question arises: what is the basic subject of the defiance and resistance?

In case of post-national revolution, the subject of dissent is a new political order, which consists of a complex network of interactions between nation states, co-national and transnational institutions, regional and local authorities, and even non-government organizations.

It is very characteristic that all anti-establishment parties in Europe defy present politics of European integration supporting either a deeper reform of European institutions or exit from the EU and return to the idea of sovereign nation state. Anti-Europeanism, understood as an opposition towards transnational social and political integration, is a characteristic feature of political appeal of majority of anti-establishment parties, which think that the creation of the European Union has led to the situation when European nations have been deprived of their sovereignty and gradually it has been given to Brussels technocrats, who were not elected by anyone and who are not held responsible before anyone. For a reason, the leader of French National Front Jean-Marine Le Pen described the British referendum on the exit from the EU, so-called Brexit, as the victory of freedom. Donald Trump said that “the British has regained their country”, and Victor Orban described his victory as “regaining the country”.

In a growing number of cases, the political scene of the most developed countries witnesses the emergence of political parties and movements whose main element of political mobilisation is reference to the defence of “national identity” against globalisation and global elites. The motif of “regaining” the country from the comprador, cosmopolitan elites constitutes one of the key elements of political appeal of contemporary anti-establishment movements. One may point at the opposition between a centralized nation state and its *traditional national elites* connected with the territorial idea of sovereignty and autonomy,

as well as *cosmopolitan elites* of new types functioning in transnational space and separated from a particular territorial location. The subject of the attack is what is global, universal and homogenous, however, what is national, sovereign and diversifying is glorified. The subject of the attack are *cosmopolitan global elites* acting to the detriment of *national interest* and also *union technocrats* imposing their will from a political centre which Brussels has become.

It is worth emphasising that a contemporary post-modern conflict between what is global (unifying, homogenous, European) and what is regional (national, diversifying) is very similar to a modern conflict between what is national (unifying, homogenous) and what is local (particular, diversifying). The forming lines of division are reflected in the election appeal of political parties (in the political sphere we encounter an increasing resistance towards a deepening European integration and anti-union rhetoric). What remains in the sphere of speculation is whether political movements created by “the anti-European” wave will grow and transform into permanent political groups.

Secondly, the subject of dissent is globalization of culture, which results in the hybridization of identity. We may point at the opposition between *post-modern hybrid global culture* and *traditional sources of identities rooted in local culture*. Mass influx of people (migrations) from so-called the South to the developed countries of the North as well as the politics of multiculturalism are criticised. A stable element of the election appeal to a majority of anti-establishment movements is a definite opposition towards anti-establishment movements connected with the formation of hybrid, multicultural societies in which a multitude of identities to which a citizen may refer forming his own “me” and defining his own identity will occur. More and more often political parties and politicians build their political appeal based on the criticism of the politics of multiculturalism and opposition against immigrants. The threat of the influx of culturally alien immigrants who undermine traditional social values and are the source of crimes and the threat of terrorism have a growing mobilising power. A permanent element of an election appeal of most of anti-establishment movements is now so-called “new racism”, or “cultural racism” and a definite opposition towards the processes connected with the formation of hybrid, multicultural societies in which a multitude of identities to a citizen may refer to forming his own “me” and defining his own identity will appear.

A strong wave of counter-mobilization expressing in (re)construction of identities on the basis of nationality, always affirming against the foreigners, may have a key significance for the formation of social cleavages. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century

Europe violence and conflict resulted mainly from the class divisions (which were often connected with other types of cultural identity). However, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century Europe violence and conflict may result from the ethnic and religious divisions connected with the issue of what we define as an identity.

The explanation of a present political success of anti-establishment movements requires the application of a multi-dimensional analytical model. Treating their social popularity as an effect of “rising wave of populism” is not a sufficient explanation as it does not explain the most important issue, namely the sources of a present wave of populism. It must be stressed that the use of the word “populism”, which in a common understanding has a pejorative meaning and is mostly used in political journalism, is a simplification of a limited heuristic value. We do not encounter “a wave of populism” but rather “a wave of counter-mobilization” towards the social transformation, which is towards so-called third civilizational wave. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that anti-establishment political movements formed on the basis of the wave of counter-mobilization have at their disposal a coherent and well-justified political programme whose hard core is the idea of building “a non-liberal state on national foundations”. Due to historical and cultural differences occurring between particular countries, the idea of “a non-liberal state on national foundations” may adopt various shades and put an emphasis on various elements but the common subject of dissent is universalist and cosmopolitan liberalism.

Rokkan’s model of explanation of political divisions by means of macro-level processes seems to be useful for the analysis of the phenomena occurring within the framework of a contemporary party system, at least in highly-developed countries. It seems that in order to explain the current processes connected with the transformations happening in the sphere of politics, it is necessary to locate them in a macro-level context of *post-national revolution* and *post-industrial revolution* and the wave of resistance towards the social cleavages caused by them. “Anti-modernising” tendencies have become a permanent element of a political scene in European countries. The wave of counter-mobilization occurs in the whole of the developed world, which as the first one is entering the post-industrial era. The successes of populist anti-establishment movements are the manifestations of counter-mobilisation and resistance against the changes connected with the arrival of information civilization.

The hypothesis stating that we deal with a political “wave of counter-mobilization”, which is the effect of the reaction towards *post-national* and *post-industrial revolution*, should be confirmed by solid empirical research. The

analysis of the elections in particular countries and the comparison of their results should give empirical basis for further generalisations. There is still no time perspective which could show to what extent the observed trends are stable and to what extent they are just a temporary phenomenon. A present wave of counter-mobilization is a reality *in statu nascendi* and its consequences are unknown. It is an open question whether new borderlines of social cleavages are a temporary phenomenon connected with the process of transition from an industrial civilization to a post-industrial one and whether they will remain in a longer perspective and will constantly structure the political scene of the future information societies.

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## METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON POPULIST POLITICAL COMMUNICATION\*

WYZWANIA METODOLOGICZNE DLA  
MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH BADAŃ EMPIRYCZNYCH  
NAD POPULISTYCZNYM KOMUNIKOWANIEM POLITYCZNYM

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### — ABSTRACT —

The objective of this paper is to analyze two research tools applied in the social sciences for quantitative and qualitative studies respectively, namely codebook, or coding scheme, and individual in-depth interview – in terms of their applicability for studies of populist political communication. To this end, three codebooks serving as the tools of media content analysis in the above-mentioned international studies conducted in Europe in 2012–2017 are critically reviewed, and the structure of a questionnaire for in-depth interviews planned within the COST Action IS1308 *Populist Political Communication in Europe: Comprehending the Challenge of Mediated Political Populism for Democratic Politics* is analyzed.

### — ABSTRAKT —

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przeanalizowane dwóch narzędzi badawczych wykorzystywanych w naukach społecznych w odpowiednio – ilościowych lub jakościowych – badaniach: książki kodowej, zwanej też kluczem klasyfikacyjnym oraz pogłębionego wywiadu indywidualnego pod kątem ich przydatności do badań nad populistycznym komunikowaniem politycznym. Służyć temu będzie krytyczny przegląd książek kodowych stanowiących narzędzia do analizy zawartości mediów w trzech badaniach międzynarodowych prowadzonych w Europie w latach 2012–2017, a także analiza struktury kwestionariusza wywiadu pogłębionego zaplanowanego w ramach projektu realizowanego w ramach Akcji COST IS 1308 *Populist Communication in*

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**Keywords:** populism; political communication; quantitative methods; qualitative methods; codebook; individual in-depth interview

*Europe: Comprehending the Challenge of Mediated Political Populism for Democratic Politics.*

**Słowa kluczowe:** populizm; komunikowanie polityczne; metody ilościowe; metody jakościowe; książka kodowa; pogłębiony wywiad indywidualny

## INTRODUCTION

The recent electoral successes of populist parties in Europe and elsewhere have been accompanied by an increased interest in populism and the reasons for the support populist parties and political leaders have gained. This interest has resulted in a series of studies conducted in order to determine and understand the characteristics of political actors and their views on the one hand, and the voters who support them on the other (cf. Aalberg et al., 2017). Nevertheless, in order to understand their success, it is necessary to account for the process of communication between political actors, the media (journalists) and society (voters).

Adopting the perspective of political communication, populism may be defined as “a set of features or elements of communicative messages that have their roots in – or resonate with – the goals, motives, and attitudes of political actors, the media, or citizens” (Reinemann et al., 2017). In this approach, populism is “a communication style” or “a communication frame that appeals to and identifies with the people and pretends to speak in their name” (Jagers, Walgrave, 2007). According to Jagers and Walgrave (2007), it is “a master frame, a way to wrap up all kinds of issues” Rooduijn (2014) has a similar attitude to populism, which in his opinion is “a characteristic of a specific message rather than a characteristic of an actor sending that message”.

Adopting this research perspective in populism studies makes it possible to focus not only on ideology (expressed through the statements and activities of political agents) but also on the role the media play in disseminating this ideology, as well as the views, stances and expectations of voters (Reinemann et al., 2017). Additionally, it allows an extensive range of entities to be studied without defining them in advance as populist or not. This attitude assumes that a populist

style may to a greater or smaller extent be employed by all political actors, journalists and citizens alike (Akkerman, Mudde, Zaslove, 2014; Rooduijn, 2014).

In order to characterize a populist style it is necessary to refer to other perspectives, in particular those that describe populism as “a thin ideology” (Freeden, 1996; Muddle, 2004), “a discourse practice” (Laclau, 2005), or as a “mental map through which individuals analyse and comprehend political reality” (Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). The starting point is the identification of properties of this ideology and basic populist categories.

Populism assumes a dichotomous division into a positively valued category “us” – the people, and the category “them” – the elite, others – which is negatively valued. A majority of researchers point to such aspects of populism as creating an idealized image of the people, anti-elitism and the exclusion of out-groups, a charismatic leader (Canovan, 1999), a narrative of crisis and threat (Moffit, Tormey, 2014; Taggart, 2004), and a rhetoric employing colloquial language, emotional statements, aggressive forms in addressing political rivals, simplifications and directness (Canovan, 1999; Moffit, Tormey, 2014).

According to Kriesi (2014), as “an expression of the populist ideology, populist communication strategies may be used to identify the populist ideology empirically”. Such empirical research may be conducted on the basis of both quantitative and qualitative studies employed in the social sciences, political science and media studies (Wimmer, Dominick, 2006; Croucher, Cronn-Mills, 2015; Dobek-Ostrowska, Sobera, 2017). Both types of methods have their advantages.

Quantitative studies are conducted on large samples and are about transforming observations into a set of empirically verifiable data which is statistically analyzed later on (Anderson, 2012, after: Dobek-Ostrowska, Sobera, 2017). Therefore their objectivity index is higher and they are more exact. Qualitative studies, in turn, concern a smaller number of examined cases which provide the basis for explaining and generalizing about the relations and links identified. They serve the purpose of obtaining information on the individual properties of the individuals examined, their attitudes, motivations, beliefs, ways of thinking and perceiving reality, and so on (Gibbs, 2011).

The objective of this paper is to analyze two research tools applied in the social sciences for quantitative and qualitative studies respectively, namely the codebook, or coding scheme, and individual in-depth interview – in terms of their applicability for studies of populist political communication. In particular, we address following questions: (1) What are the main benefits of using a code-

book or an individual in-depth interview in the studies on the populist political communication? (2) What are the limits of using a codebook or an individual in-depth interview in the studies on the populist political communication? (3) What are the main challenges of using these research tools in the international comparative studies on the populist political communication?

To this end, three codebooks serving as tools for media content analysis in the above-mentioned international studies conducted in Europe in 2012–2017 are critically reviewed, and the structure of a questionnaire for in-depth interviews planned within the COST Action IS1308 *Populist Political Communication in Europe: Comprehending the Challenge of Mediated Political Populism for Democratic Politics* is analyzed.

Table 1. lists the international projects wholly or partly dedicated to populist political communication that provided materials for this analysis, namely: (1) *The Appeal of Populist Ideas and Messages (NCCRIII – Module 2)*, (2) COST Action IS1308 *Populist Communication in Europe: Comprehending the Challenge of Mediated Political Populism for Democratic Politics* and (3) *Election News in Europe: What is Covered and How?*<sup>1</sup>.

**Table 1.** List of international research projects

	Project	Countries where quantitative studies are conducted	Starting date of studies
1.	The Appeal of Populist Ideas and Messages (NCCRIII – Module 2)	Austria, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, USA	2014
2.	COST Action IS1308 Populist Communication in Europe	Switzerland, France, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Norway, Poland, Serbia	2014
3.	Election News in Europe: What is Covered and How?	Greece, Portugal, Poland, Croatia, Spain, Ireland	2015

Source: own elaboration.

It should be stressed that all these research projects were initiated by scholars collaborating within the NEPOCS network (*Network of European Political*

<sup>1</sup> Each author of this paper took part in at least one of these projects.

*Science Scholars*). The codebooks in projects (1) and (2) were designed by the teams headed by F. Esser (University of Zurich), and in project (3) by S. Salgado (University of Lisbon). The content of the questionnaire was designed by the Working Group 1 appointed under the COST Action IS1308, headed by S. Salgado (University of Lisbon) and J. Stanyer (Loughborough University).

## QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS: CODEBOOK

Content analysis is a research method that “systematically describes, categorizes, and/or makes inferences about communication messages” (Croucher, Cronn-Mills, 2015). Since this method serves the purpose of measuring the amount of something in a representative sampling of some mass-mediated messages, it is employed to study a wide array of theoretical questions, including those related to political communication (Croucher, Cronn-Mills, 2015). A tool this method employs is a codebook.

Codebooks are collections of categories and catalogues of principles which coders should follow. Thereby, they order and specify relevant categories and define the sequence of activities required in an analysis (Saraisky, 2012). Michalczyk adds that “the point is to ensure that different coders qualify texts into the same thematic, formal-and-genre, geographical and other categories. The categories should fulfill a handful of conditions, such as disjointness, completeness, single-aspectedness and explicitness (Michalczyk, 2009). Such elements as exemplifications, definitions and key words provide guidelines for assigning specific content to the right category, thereby becoming a factor supporting both the organizational and research dimension of the content analysis procedure.

Additionally, the presence of certain sections and their sequence in the research tool ensures its readability and clarity for other researchers, which is especially important in the field of research conducted by international teams. Describing the structure of codebooks, Yan Zhang and Barbara M. Wildemuth (2005) distinguish two parts. The first part should include a theoretical section where individual categories are explained, definitions are presented and research goals are operationalized. What is meant here is to describe the stage of “operationalization which is understood as posing a research question (problem), defining notions and forming hypotheses for a given venture. In other words, it is about defining what aspects of the content we want to study and what categories we will employ to describe them” (Michalczyk, 2009).

Questions in the codebook should fulfill the conditions of compliance and completeness, and they have to be adapted to a specific research problem (Hordecki, Piontek, 2012). This means that “every unit of analysis should be assigned only to one sub-item in a given category (...). An appropriately designed coding scheme, which is disjunctive and exhaustive, may turn out incomprehensible for coders, that is for the people who actually code the material. It is the researcher’s task then to present the coding instruction in a clearer manner in the codebook and test the tool once again” (Ścigaj, Bukowski, 2012).

These recommendations become particularly important in the case of international projects, due to the scale of such ventures in terms of the size of research teams, the complexity of samples and political, social, cultural and economic diversification. A precise codebook facilitates the international and cross-cultural unification of categories and allows parallel research to be carried out in different countries.

When analyzing populist political communication, the first challenge pertains to the selection and operationalization of categories. As mentioned above, definitions of populism provide a starting point for distinguishing the main populist categories and strategies. That is why in all the studies analyzed here, coders were expected to identify and record the following: (1) references to “the people”, (2) critical references to the elite and (3) critical references to “the others” (see Table 2).

**Table 2.** Populist strategies

Category	Populist strategy
<b>The people</b>	Approaching the people
	Praising the people’s virtue
	Praising the people’s achievements
	Describing the people as homogeneous
	Demanding popular sovereignty
<b>The elite</b>	Blaming the elite
	Discrediting the elite
	Denying elite sovereignty
<b>The people and the elite</b>	Detaching the elite from the people
<b>The others</b>	Excluding specific groups
	Discrediting specific groups
	Blaming specific groups

Source: COST Action IS1308 Populist Communication in Europe

On account of the different forms of populism (nationalistic, left-wing, agrarian, etc.) in different countries it is necessary to specify each of the above basic categories in order to reflect populism in all countries-members of the project while maintaining a certain neutrality of the document in social, political, cultural and economic terms. The conflict between universalism and the local character of categories is one of the greatest problems of all international comparative studies.

On the one hand, universal categories are indispensable in order to conduct comparative studies, which are the primary objective and essence of international research projects. The requirement of universality, in practice, enforces avoiding local contexts, linguistic calques and referring to research problems typical of a single selected region (country) or those shared by only a few regions represented in the study. On the other hand, a tool needs to be designed to allow researchers to grasp the phenomenon under analysis (in this case – populism or using a populist style of political communication) in a given national, ethnic, social, cultural and economic reality in a specified period<sup>2</sup>.

This problem emerged in the course of studies conducted under the NCCRIII project. One of the structural elements of this study involved the attribution of a unit of measurement (text) to one or several out of a list of 16 themes typical of a populist communication style. Methodological doubts were raised by the fact that populism was linked with specific themes, the more so as the range of topics listed in the codebook did not match up to all the countries participating in the study. “Immigration” was indicated as a priority theme, which was significant in many European countries, but virtually absent from public discourse in Poland prior to 2014. At the same time, the codebook did not take into account issues present in the media discourse in Poland, such as “politics as such” (competition between political parties, political conflict, mutual relations of political actors), which was the subject of a significant proportion of texts collected for the purpose of the project. Such a construction of the research tool had an impact on the criteria of the selection of materials for the research because it resulted in rejecting a large number of texts from the database, which might have affected the research results.

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<sup>2</sup> The study by P. Przyłęcki exemplifies the adaptation of a content analysis tool. He used the method designed by the Manifesto Research Group and added populist indices (categories) present in the discourse in Poland. Cf. P. Przyłęcki (2012). *Populizm w polskiej polityce. Analiza dyskursy polityki*. Warszawa.

The issue of the adequacy of codebook content to the reality being studied was also related to the fact that research material was collected in 2015, the year of presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland. The codebook had been designed by the team much earlier. This resulted in the codebook failing to account for the presence of significant actors on this “new stage”, as well as the offices which some political actors no longer held. This experience revealed another challenge faced by international research teams, namely the fact that all the preparatory procedures are extremely time-consuming, which may translate into the tool becoming invalid in the context of a rapidly changing social reality.

Taking this experience into account, the principles of material selection were modified in the course of the COST Action research: the thematic criterion of immigration was maintained, while an additional independent selection criterion was added – a specific journalistic genre, such as commentary, opinion or column. Consequently, the sample encompasses the materials directly concerning immigration and all the statements made by journalists, politicians and other agents falling into the category of journalistic interpretational genres (irrespective of their theme). A superordinate criterion was also adopted: materials had to concern political parties. The period of the research was set for a non-election period in all participating countries.

Other problems related to designing a research tool may refer to metacommunication and the language used to design this tool. For the codebook to be used appropriately it has to be unitary for all team members (Zhang, Wildemuth, 2005), therefore all coders should be familiar with the language it is written in. This means, in practice, that most teams write codebooks in English, as was the case of all three projects analyzed in this paper. Yet in two of them (project 1 and 2), some of the examples illustrating specific categories were in German.

This generates a handful of threats. First, different levels of the member teams’ language competence may become a problem. Under these circumstances, the teams may resolve to translate the codebook, although this was not required in any of the projects analyzed (some teams resorted to translations, others trained their coders and coded the results on the basis of the English original). The advantage of translation is that all the descriptive definitions are formulated in the respective native languages, but errors may emerge resulting from imprecise translations or from different contexts and cultural aspects which are transmitted through language.

One way to handle these challenges is to develop an explanatory section of the codebooks and present the theoretical foundations of the study to be

conducted. This seems to be justified both in substantive and practical terms – at any time, every team member has the opportunity to refer to the basic concepts and definitions and refer the case under analysis to the general principles of the research. An exceptionally useful part of the codebooks features examples that help identify the categories sought and resolve disputed issues. It is therefore necessary for the examples to match all the assumptions of the definition section, while being explicit enough to make the coding process easier, not more difficult. The same applies to the language used: it is advisable to provide examples in coders' native languages, enabling them to make a direct reference to the material coded.

The level of detail of the individual tools used is determined by the Codebook Depth Index (CDI) calculated by multiplying the number of pages in the codebook and the number of categories coded (including sub-categories that require a separate code unit). Table 3 presents the statistics of the three codebooks under analysis.

**Table 3.** Volume of codebooks analyzed and their level of detail

Project	Page count	Number of categories analyzed	Codebook Depth Index
The Appeal of Populist Ideas and Messages (NCCRIII – Module 2)	199	61	3.26
COST Action IS1308 Populist Communication in Europe	60	67	0.89
Election News in Europe: What is Covered and How?	23	47	0.49

Source: own elaboration.

This data reveals crucial differences between the numbers. While the number of categories analyzed is relatively similar (deviating by under ten units from the arithmetical mean of 52.25), the number of standard pages is much more varied (amounting to nearly 120 units) which has a significant impact on the CDI. The most elaborate codebook was designed for the NCCRIII project (61 categories described on nearly 200 pages) and the simplest one for *Election News in Europe* (47 categories on 23 pages). There is a tendency then to shorten and simplify that part of the codebooks dedicated to the theoretical introduction and category presentation. This generates a number of significant consequences for the data coding process.

In terms of methodology, the level of detail when describing individual categories and the precision of their conceptualization should translate into such elements of the research process as the course and results of coders' reliability tests and the repeatability of results. In the field of media content analysis, these issues should be even more specified, since we often deal (as is the case of social sciences in general) with vague categories which have to be conceptualized in an exhaustive and explicit manner.

Nevertheless, the practice of coding processes demonstrates the necessity of the reasonable development of tools to such a level of detail as will not subsequently trigger a series of undesirable factors at the level of data coding, such as (1) extended duration of the process of tool preparation, (2) the necessity of running numerous and lengthy training sessions, which generates considerable expenses in international research circles, (3) extended average time of text unit coding, where coders are required to repeatedly refer to long and complicated codebooks and (4) the increasing possibility that, as the volume of text grows, so does the lack of precision and potential for error, for instance at the stage of translating the tool into a universal language or into respective national languages.

This leads us to the challenges of the coders' work. The fact that they represent different cultures has an impact on their communication styles and mode of work, thereby potentially influencing the decisions project participants make when coding individual categories. It should be borne in mind that individuals coming from the same culture differ from one another in terms of emotional sensitivity, among other things. Therefore, such elements as precise definitions of categories, training sessions in using codebooks and reliability tests are even more important in an international project. Let us emphasize that in each project analyzed in this paper great importance was attached to these aspects. All coders were trained for several days at least; in the case of the NCCRIII project, the coders spent nearly a week at a training session in Zurich, whereas two three-day training sessions were organized (in Zurich and Paris) under the COST Action. Coder reliability was calculated both for individual national teams and for all coders under the project. For the calculation of reliability in the COST Action, we relied mostly on Fretwurst's *lotus* (see: Fretwurst, 2015a), which is especially suited for comparative research. The unstandardized *lotus* can be directly interpreted and represents the percentage agreement of coders with the category most used by all coders. The standardized *lotus* is a chance-corrected version that also takes the number of categories used by coders into account. The advantage of this is that we can directly compare all coders for each category.

## QUALITATIVE METHODS: INDIVIDUAL IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW

Individual in-depth interview (IDI) approached as a complement of quantitative methods is part of the endeavor of reliable cognition and understanding, which “calls for the combination of different procedures and studies of socio-political phenomena through methods that may be burdened by different kinds of limitations and errors which, however, are mutually compensated for” (Krauz-Mozer, 2009). IDI may be applied as an exploratory method preceding a concrete research procedure, or as a basic, or exclusive method applied. It is interpretational in nature, falling into the tradition of hermeneutic cognition (Sztompka, 2007) which aims not to explain social phenomena, but to describe and interpret them, thereby facilitating better understanding of these phenomena and social processes alike (Krauz-Mozer, 2005).

Individual in-depth interviews are used in order to examine subjective opinions typical of the representatives of different social groups characterized by a distinct and compact group identity (Flick, 2006). IDI takes the form of a direct conversation with a single respondent. The objective of IDI is to obtain information about the current state of affairs from a given respondent, selected on the basis of criteria determined by the researcher. A significant advantage of this method is that it allows the direct influence of other people on the content and range of answers obtained to be excluded, thereby significantly facilitating collecting frank, extensive and thoughtful responses.

Interestingly, IDI has not hitherto been extensively applied in studies on political processes. Thus it should be strongly emphasized that this tool was resorted to in the above-mentioned project conducted under the COST Action IS1308 *Populist Communication in Europe: Comprehending the Challenge of Mediated Political Populism for Democratic Politics*. The objective of the partly structured individual in-depth interviews carried out under this project was to examine how populism is perceived in different countries, how its recent popularity is explained and whether it is perceived as positive or negative for democracy. The initial assumption was that populism and populist political actors are generally perceived as negative by both politicians and the media. The latter frequently present populism and populist politicians as a threat to democracy and pluralism. Populism in the political discourse in Europe and the United States is understood in different manners, therefore, another research objective was to identify these differences in the context of similar phenomena, such as racism, nationalism, civil involvement, as well as the left- or right-wing

provenance of these phenomena. It was also of interest to the researchers to analyze what assumptions, associations and prejudices are most common, and whether there are any observable models of populism in Europe.

From the point of view of researchers of populist political communication, IDI has distinct advantages: it makes it possible to examine the way respondents think and perceive the world, and their motivations, value systems, attitudes, assessments and so on. The results obtained in the interviews provide a starting point for finding out and comprehending the activities of actors who exert the greatest impact on the form of contemporary political communication and on the political process this communication is a part of. Exploratory research intending to seek better cognizance of participants' motivation and activities, seems to be of particular merit and cognitive value in this field of academic investigation (Szymańska, 2017). The primary research procedure of IDI is open questions, which should not contain any elements whatsoever that might suggest the directions of possible answers. The point is to create a situation where respondents spontaneously respond to the research topic, sharing their subjective knowledge and assessment. It is worth emphasizing that IDI is an excellent tool for examining individuals whose professional status and achievements predispose them to take the role of experts and public opinion leaders (Nicpoń, Marzęcki, 2010).

In the above-mentioned project the group of future respondents encompasses politicians and journalists. The assumption is that they have a well-established position in their circles. The most desirable politicians are party leaders, influential political advisors, elected politicians, representatives of different groups: left-wing, right-wing, centrist as well as populist – defined in conformity with the criteria provided by a recently published study that reviews contemporary European populism studies (Aalberg et al., 2017). Another group of respondents is professional journalists who report on political events and enjoy a well-established position, representatives of different media (the press, television, radio, Internet websites), preferably of a national range, different profiles (left-wing, right-wing, centrist) and featuring varied journalistic types (quality and tabloid journalism). It was assumed that a group of at least eight respondents (four politicians and four journalists) from every country participating in the project will suffice the purpose of a comparative study.

The first difficulty that is typical of qualitative studies emerges at the stage of selecting potential respondents. In order to fulfill the objective of the study it is necessary for the respondents selected to agree to take part in the study, and to take into account a number of organizational and temporal limitations.

Earlier experience shows that politicians and journalists differ in terms of their openness to studies and honesty in their contacts with researchers (Krasowski, 2015). It is therefore essential to reach out to desirable respondents, create an appropriate climate by means of clearly specifying the research goal and ensure absolute anonymity to the respondents. Researchers must take into account the agenda of their respondents and frequent collisions of their commitments with the research procedure timeline. For this reason, conversations via Internet communicators and telephones are admissible, although preference is given to direct interviews. In the case of telephone interviews, however, the opportunity to examine nonverbal reactions and the physical setting of the interaction, which is significant for its course, is limited.

In order to facilitate comparative studies, all interviews should be conducted on the basis of a standardized questionnaire with a limited number of open questions that do not suggest or lead to any answers. Giving the respondents complete freedom in responding to questions may adversely influence the achievement of research objectives, therefore additional questions are permitted in order to explain potential ambiguities. Yet it is important for the interviewees to feel that they are not pressed in any manner or that a concrete answer is expected of them. Such interventions are only admissible when the respondents do not address the question in their unstructured responses. Questions should not be constructed so as to test the respondents' knowledge, or appear to do so, because the research objective is not to assess the theoretical knowledge the respondents possess; additionally, the impression that they are being tested may adversely influence the respondents' willingness to be interviewed.

In order to find out how politicians and journalists from different countries define populism and how they perceive its influence on democracy, a list of five open questions was designed. Question one is about the general understanding of what populism is. Answers collected here should help determine what the respondents identify as populism and what examples of parties, politicians and activities defined as populist they indicate. It will be interesting to see whether they use precise definitions or rather intuitive reasoning, and whether they perceive populism as a positive or negative phenomenon; and finally, whether in their opinion the style of populism we are dealing with depends on the political actor using it and the context.

In question two, the respondents are asked to assess the consequences of populism for the countries where they are professionally active and for the condition of democracy in general. On the basis of the answers collected, the

researchers want to determine what types of influence the respondents indicate and whether there are any differences across Europe in terms of the frequency of positive or negative outcomes of populism.

In the next question, the respondents will be asked to present their opinion on the reasons for the popularity of populist leaders and parties. It will be interesting to find out whether the respondents point to international factors (the situation in Europe, functioning of European institutions, particular events, such as the economic crisis, migration crisis and so on) or rather to internal factors (domestic politics, security, culture, political culture, the media, personalities of individual politicians).

The purpose of the fourth open question will be to determine the social issues that are perceived as most associated with populism in a given country. Listening to the answers, the interviewers should take notes of the issues mentioned, individual policies and – when in doubt – they should ask the respondents to specify their answers, especially when they fail to indicate particular examples.

Question five will address the media and their role in populist political communication. The respondents will be asked to express their opinion on whether the media covering political issues favor populism in their respective countries (and, if so – to what extent), or whether they are critical of populism. They will be also requested to indicate which media take a populist course in their opinion. The objective of this question is to determine whether the respondents believe that populism is a broader social phenomenon which may involve the media. It will be interesting to find out what the general assessment of media relations in the context of populism is: do the respondents believe that the media report the activities of political entities deemed to be populist, or that they refuse to cover such agents in their materials, which is an expression of the medium's conscious and purposeful editorial policy which opposes populism.

For the analysis to be exhaustive and effective, it will be necessary to transcribe the interviews in full. In order to compare the results, all interviews or their essential parts will have to be translated into English and the available software ensuring high recording quality and thematic coding will have to be used. The transcripts should indicate contextual variables, such as the physical setting where the interview is carried out, distractors and nonverbal behavior which is significant for the interpretation of verbal utterances. The success of the study will depend equally on the data collected and its interpretation. The objective of the project under analysis is a cohesive analysis of material collected in different countries. It may be effective to use thematic analysis which

“is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Both the advantages and shortcomings of this method have been exhaustively discussed (cf. e.g. Aronson, 1995; Braun, Clarke, 2006), but it is considered a useful and efficient method of the analysis of data collected via IDI.

Quantitative methods employed in social research have certain drawbacks which may be augmented in international research. One such drawback is the above-mentioned readiness of selected respondents, in particular renowned politicians and journalists, to take part in the study. Alongside their individual personalities, of key importance is the type of political culture of a given country, the respondents’ awareness of the significance of academic research, as well as their freedom in specific political systems. Another factor concerns the relatively subjective nature of the interpretation of the results obtained. The researchers come from different academic circles where different research paradigms may prevail. The problem of adequate translation from respective national languages to the language of the project (English) is equally important, and this should also account for semantic nuances. Defining research as qualitative means concentrating on the properties of objects, processes and meanings that are not experimentally verifiable or quantifiable in terms of their number, size and frequency. Emphasis is given to the socially constructed nature of reality, and attention is given to the situational constraints affecting the research (Denzin, Lincoln, 2011). Such situational constraints can be highly diverse, not only inside a given country but also individually, and by nature they are not subjected to operationalization.

## CONCLUSIONS

Studies on populist political communication are focused on the participants of communication processes (political actors, the media and citizens) and the messages they form and disseminate. Content analysis and individual in-depth interviews help find out the views and assessments as well as relations between different participants in communication processes. Nevertheless, each method entails a number of challenges, especially in the case of international studies. This analysis makes it possible to conclude that problems may emerge at every stage of research procedure, starting with defining categories, through the selection

of material for analysis, to organizing team work and the process of coding the content of research material.

Having collected information about three international research initiatives coordinated by the same persons, it has been possible to grasp the evolution of research procedures and tools. The experience gathered in the course of the NCCRIII project, and the influence exerted by participants in the subsequent projects, has resulted in an expansion of the criteria for material selection and the precise determination of the time of research – either during an election period (in the case of the *Election News in Europe* project), or non-election period (in the case of the COST Action IS1308) in all the countries participating in the respective projects. This was accompanied by codebooks getting shorter and simpler. All the projects assigned the same considerable significance to the proper training of coders and achieving appropriate results of inter-coder reliability tests.

The evolution of research initiatives is additionally enhanced by the participating researchers, who represent different perspectives and employ different methods. That is why individual in-depth interviews are planned under the COST Action IS1308 project, alongside the content analysis of political messages disseminated by the media. By this token, it will be possible to acquire deeper knowledge about the perception of populism in different countries and the assessment of this phenomenon by politicians and journalists.

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## QUALITATIVE APPROACHES IN POPULISM RESEARCH\*

PODEJŚCIA JAKOŚCIOWE  
W BADANIACH NAD POPULIZMEM

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— ABSTRACT —

In recent years, the amount of empirical research on populism has increased dramatically. The purpose of this text is to analyze these strands of existing research on populism which employ qualitative methods. Additionally, the paper discusses their basic categories and research design, and highlights the advantages and drawbacks of each of these approaches. The paper presents the three most influential trends in qualitative research on populism: ideology analysis-morphological approach, discourse theory, and historical-discursive analysis.

**Keywords:** populism, qualitative research, morphological analysis of ideology, discourse theory, discourse-historical approach

— ABSTRAKT —

W ostatnich latach lawinowo rośnie liczba empirycznych badań nad populizmem. Celem niniejszego tekstu jest analiza już istniejących badań nad populizmem korzystających z metod jakościowych, omówienie ich podstawowych kategorii oraz struktury badania, a także wskazanie na zalety oraz problemy każdego z omawianych podejść. Artykuł przedstawia trzy najbardziej wpływowe nurty jakościowych badań nad populizmem: analizę ideologii-podejście morfologiczne, teorię dyskursu oraz analizę historyczno-dyskursywną.

**Słowa kluczowe:** populizm, badania jakościowe, morfologiczna analiza ideologii, teoria dyskursu, podejście historyczno-dyskursywne

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An analysis of the literature on populism leads to a significant conclusion that the number of empirical studies on populism is growing (Gidron, Bonikowski, 2013; Mudde, 2016). Until the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, theoretical and descriptive studies lacking a systematic research methodology of populism prevailed. Recently, however, a growing number of empirical studies has emerged, aiming to determine, for instance, the type of populism or the degree of populism present in the language of a given political agent. Characteristically, a number of such studies take a path of quantitative methods (primarily content analysis) which make it possible to move from single case studies to broader comparative studies. Additionally, quantitative methods ensure greater reliability than qualitative ones. On the other hand, Canovan notes that a majority of contemporary populism studies approach it as a discourse (Canovan, 2004). Such an assumption on the ontological status of populism seems to justify the claim that the importance of qualitative methods will continue to grow, since they facilitate systematic analyses which reveal multilayered, complex discursive instruments employed by populists in the public sphere. The importance of qualitative methods in populism studies results from their focus on detailed text analysis and the analysis of meanings produced by social actors aiming at thick description. Bearing in mind that populism does not express any ideology in the traditional sense and is a discursive structure filled with content which depends on the context of a given political culture, qualitative methods gather particular importance. They facilitate an insightful analysis of the merging of ideational content rooted in different political traditions. Indeed, in his proposals concerning future populism studies, C. Mudde stresses the need to examine populist parties more thoroughly, which quantitative studies, frequently based on secondary data (e.g. Manifesto Research Group) and codebooks, are not able to provide, as they sometimes fail to grasp the nuances of political communication (Mudde, 2016). The objective of this paper is to analyze extant populism research using qualitative methods, discuss their basic categories and research design, and indicate the advantages and drawbacks of each approach presented.

#### IDEATIONAL APPROACH – MORPHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Populism is approached here as a “thin-centered ideology”. The starting point for populism studies is the morphological analysis of ideology by M. Freeden. It abandons the conventional macro-approach to ideologies as a series of

grand, exclusive narrations frequently characterized by a single category (e.g. freedom, equality or hierarchy). Traditional approaches applied simplifying generalizations and neglected the complexity of the ideologies produced by the heterogeneity of ideological content they encompassed (Freeden, 1996). If ideas are individual interpretations, ideologies are interpretive frameworks that are rooted in language as a set of categories (Stanley, 2008). Characteristically for Freedен's concept, the basic building blocks of ideologies are the political categories of freedom, power, rights, equality, solidarity, and so on. By analogy to sentences, which are composed of words, ideologies are specific configurations of categories organized in orderly patterns. According to Freedен, analysis of ideologies is morphological in nature as its essential objective is to examine the internal structure of ideology. All political categories are inevitably polysemic and their meanings raise constant disputes. Consequently, ideologies should be perceived as structural arrangements which attribute meanings to the sets of mutually defined concepts. Ideologies attempt to conclude the disputes on meanings by placing them in a specific arrangement of concepts resulting in their decontestation (Freedен, 2003). Characteristically, no ideology has the monopoly to use certain concepts, and the same ones are present in socialism and conservatism; yet placed in different arrangements with other concepts they assume different meanings. Ideologies also differ in terms of their complexity. There are full ideologies, which take into account all the main political categories and try to answer all the fundamental questions, alongside those that Freedен names "thin-centered" ideologies. Their morphological structure is narrowed down to a handful of fundamental core concepts, they do not address all the fundamental political questions and limit themselves to a few issues. Nationalism and feminism can serve as examples here, as they focus solely on one aspect of social and political life (nation and gender respectively).

Although Freedен did not write about populism, his division into thick- and thin-centered ideologies has provided a significant stimulus to populism studies. Freedен's concept made it possible to theoretically explain the chameleon-like nature of populism (Taggart, 2004). Since ideologies are the amalgams of different categories and, additionally, thin-centered ideologies are possible, the under-specified, variable and polymorphic character of populism can be explained by its thin-centered character. Populism is founded on several basic categories which interact with other ideologies, becoming decontested as a result of this diffusion. B. Stanley states that "the thinness of populism ensures that in practice it is a complementary ideology: it does not so much overlap with as diffuse itself

throughout full ideologies” (Stanley, 2008). Such openness and ambiguity of fundamental categories allows them to combine with full ideologies (Mudde, Kaltwasser, 2011).

Freeden’s concept has also made it possible to empirically study concrete expressions of populism in political communication. Applying the morphological attitude to ideology, C. Mudde concluded that populism has a conceptual character. He believes that this thin-centered ideology encompasses several categories: the people, corrupted elites, and politics as the expression of the general will of the people (Mudde, 2004). A very similar stance was proposed by B. Stanley, claiming that populism is founded on several basic ideas: (1) the existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: “the people” and “the elite”; (2) the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite; (3) the idea of popular sovereignty; and (4) the positive valorization of “the people” and denigration of “the elite” (Stanley, 2008). D. Albertazzi and D. McDonnell complemented the above-indicated core concepts of populism with the affirmation of one’s own culture and the exclusion of others, as well as the unity of the leaders with their people (Albertazzi, McDonnell, 2008). Detailed studies on populism take the direction of qualitative text analyses which examine how the basic concepts characteristic of populism are “decontested”. For instance, A.R. Jupskås investigates how the concept of the people is constructed in Scandinavian populisms (Jupskås, 2013), and D. Albertazzi examines how the elites and the enemy of the people are constructed in Italian populisms (Albertazzi, 2007). These studies are founded on the list of properties typical for populism designed on the basis of Freedon’s theory and the definition it provides. Importantly, empirical data comes from political manifestos and publications of political parties, as well as from politicians’ interviews and other public statements (such as speeches and parliamentary statements; Albertazzi, McDonnell, 2015; Pankowski, 2010; Enyedi, 2016, Vossen, 2011). The sample is selected on a theoretical basis in the studies which approach populism as a thin-centered ideology. The scope of research concerns either case studies (e.g. Vossen, 2017; Zaslove, 2011) or comparative studies limited to several countries (e.g. Pauwels, 2014).

A significant advantage of this approach is that it takes into account the heterogeneous character of populism, which combines elements of different ideologies, various ideas and political traditions. Additionally, qualitative analyses closely stick to the texts, demonstrating how concrete aspects of reality are interpreted by populists. Another crucial merit is approaching populism as a set of ideas, focusing on the properties of messages instead of the actors. In this way, the constant

disputes about the status of populism have been concluded, and actor-centered analysis has been abandoned in favor of the analysis of communication modes. Another outcome involves the possibility of measuring the degree of a given agent's populism. Indeed, the morphological approach has triggered quantitative studies that examine to what extent a given subject refers to the people, anti-elitism and the principle of sovereignty of the people (e.g. Rooduijn, Pauwels, 2011). As far as the drawbacks of this approach are concerned, they are typical of all qualitative studies: restricted reliability, stress on interpretational acuity of individual scholars rather than on an orderly, structured research procedure, limited comparative and generalization potential of such studies. Moreover, Freedén's theory does not provide any practical guides that would allow full ideologies to be distinguished from thin-centered ideologies (Aslanidis, 2016).

#### DISCOURSE THEORY

The approach focused on the content of populism raises outright criticism from the Argentine social philosopher, E. Laclau. In his opinion, attempts to define populism have failed because they addressed the content rather than the form of populism. Consequently, every attempt at defining populism ended with a list of exceptions of populist parties and movements that did not fit the proposed definition (Laclau, 2009). Laclau believes that populism is a structural outcome of the inherent logic of politics (Stanley, 2008). He says that "a movement is not populist because in its politics or ideology it presents actual contents identifiable as populist, but because it shows a particular logic of articulation of those contents – whatever those contents are" (Laclau, 2005). The theory of populism by E. Laclau can be presented referring to six stages. First, a series of social claims cannot be fulfilled by the extant institutional channels. Second, unfulfilled claims enter a mutual relationship of solidarity or equivalence. Third, the demands crystallize around shared symbols. Fourth, all these phenomena may be used by leaders who interpellate the frustrated masses, thereby commencing the process of collective identification. Fifth, "the people" emerge as the collective actor confronting the regime. Sixth, the objective of this collective actor is to demand to change the regime (Arditi, 2010). In this approach, a demand, understood also as a request, is the basic analysis unit. If this demand remains unfulfilled, an equivalential chain is created and the border between this chain of demands and the system is drawn (Moffit, 2016).

It should be noted that, according to E. Laclau, populism is a gradable phenomenon, and the greater the number of demands articulated into an equivalential chain across a greater number of social spaces, the greater the degree of populism (Howarth, 2014). The constitution of the political frontier between the powerful and the underdogs – requires that the particularities that make up the signifier “the people” become elements in a chain of equivalences. The only thing that links all these demands into a chain of equivalences is the formal relation of antagonism towards the system (Panizza, 2005). Summing up this approach, F. Panizza observes that populism is an anti-status quo discourse, which simplifies the political sphere by symbolically dividing society into “the people” and “the other” (Panizza, 2005). Both “the people” and “the other” are political constructions with the performative power of making the entities they name real. They are thus symbolically constituted by the relation of antagonism (Laclau, 2005).

The logic of equivalence and the logic of difference are constructed through the rhetorical devices. Among them, metaphors and metonymies are exceptionally significant as they let some elements of the chain substitute other elements (Thomassen, 2016). Since politics is essentially about constructing collective identities based on chains of equivalence, rhetoric is a key dimension of political activity. In the discourse theory, the fundamental research objective is to determine whether a given practice is articulated through an empty signifier “the people”, or through other empty signifiers. Second, it aims to determine to what extent social representation is antagonistic, and divides society into two principal blocs. The empirical data collection does not differ from the methods of historical or ethnographical research. Empirical materials include press articles, speeches, politicians’ statements, official reports, unofficial documents, biographies and visual materials (Howarth, 2008). Samples are selected on a theoretical basis in order to reflect all the elements of discourse by a given actor that are typical of populism (Marttila, 2015). A typical basic sampling unit is the discourse of a given individual or collective actor. The next stage involves linking the data to the theoretical frameworks developed on the basis of the fundamental categories of discourse theory. The objective of this stage is to identify the discursive logics of constructing “the people” and the frontier between the people and those in power. The most typical research design are case studies, for instance the analysis of the discourse of the Governor of Alabama, G. Wallace (Lowndes, 2005), President of Argentina C. Menem (Barros, 2005) or the Greek left-wing Syriza party and its leader A. Tsipras (Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, 2014).

Significant element of Laclau's approach is its stress on the role of populist form and avoids the description of discourse content. Another advantage is that in this approach, populism is understood as a series of discursive measures applicable in a variety of ways (Laclau 2009), and as a gradable phenomenon. Moreover, Laclau's proposal is perceiving populism as a practice, something that emerges in the course of action rather than a certain *status quo*, and emphasizing the role of discursive representation producing performative outcomes. The most frequently indicated drawbacks of Laclau's concept refer to the lack of operationalization of populism indices, which prevents the degree of populism from being assessed. Another criticism concerns the identification of populism with politics as such, which is deemed to be an excessively broadened understanding of populism, leaving scholars unable to distinguish between populism and other political phenomena. Finally, a broader criticism is voiced with respect to discourse theory, rather than the concept of populism alone. Studies by Laclau and the Essex School, which has developed his proposals, do not provide concrete tools that allow discourse to be analyzed in detail.

### DISCOURSE-HISTORICAL APPROACH

The discourse-historical approach as a version of critical discourse analysis is distinguished by having an extensive range of analytical tools rooted in different strands of linguistics which facilitate a thorough discourse analysis, and the intention to take into account a possibly wide range of contextual information provided by the analyzed spoken and written texts (Wodak 2011). The very term discourse points to a highly contextualized analysis. Discourse is understood here as a complex bundle of concurrent and successive linguistic acts present in one or more fields of social life (Wodak, 2008). This definition emphasizes the importance of studies of interdiscursivity and intertextuality – linguistic phenomena that indicate the heterogeneous character of discourse, which draws on numerous topics and texts from different fields of social life.

Generally speaking, discourse analysis encompasses two levels: an entry-level analysis, focused primarily on the thematic organization of texts, and in-depth analysis, driven by research questions, which examines text coherence and cohesion, speech genres, discursive strategies and other linguistic instruments (Wodak, 2015). From the point of view of populism studies, it is of utmost importance that discourse analysis is concerned not only with examining explicit

messages but also the content that is alluded to and deeply encoded (Wodak, 2011). The research procedure in this approach is based on the set of questions and corresponding discursive strategies. First, how are social actors constructed by means of names assigned to them (nominalization strategy)? For the studies of populism, the us – them dichotomy is exceptionally significant in this case, as well as metaphors and synecdoches allowing a part to represent the whole. Second, what positive or negative features are attributed to the linguistically constructed social actors (predicate strategy)? Third, what argumentation schemes are used in order to justify or delegitimize specific nominalization and predication? Fourth, from what point of view are the above three strategies implemented? Fifth, are the texts under analysis intensified, openly articulated, or maybe moderated? Each of these strategies calls for an analysis of specific linguistic instruments (Reisigl, 2011; Wodak, 2008).

The critical character of this approach results in its being primarily interested in right-wing populisms which are deemed to threaten European democracy. Right-wing populism is studied by the discourse-historical approach through the prism of content articulated via discursive strategies. R. Wodak points to nine characteristics shared by all right-wing populist agents, and starts her list with a general statement about the representation of “the people” as a homogeneous entity being based on nativist ideologies. The “rhetoric of exclusion” constitutes an inherent part of this discourse allowing internal (e.g. Jews, political elites, establishment) and external aliens (e.g. the European Union, refugees) to be constructed. Other topics significant for populism include threat scenarios, defending the homeland, conspiracy theories, traditional conservative values and morality, support for simplistic solutions and the need for a charismatic leader/savior. Typical discursive strategies that help articulate the above messages include the Manichean dichotomous division into us – them, argumentation strategies such as *ad hominem* and *ad populum*, hasty generalizations as well as the topoi of anger, democratic participation and burden, designing unrealistic scenarios as well as calculated ambivalence permitting provocation and victim perpetrator role reversal (Reisigl, 2014; Wodak, 2015).

Analysis is eclectic – it is based on a number of theories. The research procedure is based on constant switching between theory and empiricism; the list of categories typical of populism is designed deductively and then specified by analyzing concrete empirical data. Sample selection employs the triangulation method which, in this case, means collecting data on the same macro-topic but in different genres, together with different contextual data, making a thorough

and multi-level analysis possible. The next stage involves data selection and sorting in order to obtain a small corpus to be analyzed. It typically concerns one or several discourses and one or several actors. A study usually concerns a single case, for instance the Freedom Party (Wodak, 2013), or a selected issue, for example islamophobia (Krzyżanowski, 2013). Having a larger number of cases does not automatically entail that a rigorous comparative study is conducted. Taking them into account serves the purpose of the largest possible sample diversification in order to identify and illustrate all the possible expressions of right-wing populism. The selection of concrete discourse fragments is based on such criteria as typicality, influence (intertextual/interdiscursive), significance, exceptionality (extreme cases) and the originality of data (Reisigl, 2011). The basic sampling unit is a discourse on a specific topic (e.g. immigrants) and the discourse of concrete right-wing and populist agents. A significant research stage also involves a pilot analysis of a selected fragment of the discourse conducted in order to specify or complement linguistic analytical tools.

The fundamental advantage of discourse-historical analysis is its focus on contextual data and the development of a range of analytical tools which correspond to the heterogeneous character of contemporary populism. Additionally, the focus on implicit messages and discursive controversies is particularly significant in the context of strongly mediatized politics. Finally, another significant aspect of discourse-historical analysis is its examination of how the enemy is constructed, which corresponds to the dichotomous nature of populism. Speaking about the drawbacks of this approach, it is frequently criticized for its excessively impression-based analysis style and arbitrary sample selection (Breeze, 2011).

## CONCLUSIONS

An analysis of the three most influential qualitative approaches to populism studies indicates a broad area of agreement between them. Each treats populism as a communication phenomenon related to political discourse, i.e. a practice where different themes and linguistic genres are combined. Freedden's concept, as applied to populism by C. Mudde, refers to "ideology" but it is not limited to analyzing messages in manifestos, which are traditionally identified with the ideology *locus*, but reaches out to broadly understood political communication. Ideology as a category is also a significant element of discourse-historical analysis.

**Table 1.** Qualitative research on populism – three approaches

	<b>Ideology analysis –Morphological Approach</b>	<b>Discourse theory</b>	<b>Discourse-historical analysis</b>
Ontological status of populism	“thin-centered” ideology	discursive logic	content characteristics and corresponding discursive strategies
Level of analysis	macro-/meso-	macro-/meso-	micro-
Sample selection	theoretical/purposive	theoretical/purposive	theoretical/purposive
Coding strategy	mainly deductive	mainly deductive	abductive

**Source:** Author’s own analysis.

An indisputable achievement of the analysis of ideologies and discourse theory is their clear tendency to seek the minimal definition of populism and its specific logic, while abandoning the examination of detailed content characteristics, typical of earlier studies, which produced a series of exceptions. The most significant differences between the approaches discussed in this paper concern the level of analysis. It is most general in discourse theory, and most detailed in discourse-historical analysis. It appears that the most fruitful direction of future studies will integrate the minimal/formal definition coined by the analysis of ideologies and discourse-historical analysis with the detailed instruments developed by critical discourse analysis.

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## CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF POLISH STUDIES REGARDING POPULISM – A POLITICAL-LINGUISTIC APPROACH\*

WYZWANIA I PERSPEKTYWY POLSKICH BADAŃ  
NAD POPULIZMEM – UJĘCIE POLITOLINGWISTYCZNE

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— ABSTRACT —

Populism is a multi-disciplinary research issue, especially as politics is concerned, present both in the social sciences and linguistics. Examined from different angles, it exhibits its semantic ambiguity and lack of a single definition. It is essential for cross-disciplinary studies to determine the definition of populism, which will also make it possible to determine the scope of the phenomenon under research. Such a possibility is ensured by the syndromized understanding of populism and by taking into account its manifestations on different levels of political discourse, including linguistic exponents, sender-recipient relations and a specific image of the world created within the framework of this discourse. The application of cognitive methodology in studies offers one of many research perspectives

— ABSTRAKT —

Populizm, zwłaszcza w sferze polityki stanowi poldyscyplinarny problem badawczy, występuje bowiem nie tylko w naukach społecznych, lecz również językoznawstwie. Jego wieloaspektowy ogląd wpływa na niejednoznaczność semantyczną, brak jednej definicji. Jej ustalenie staje się kluczowe dla badań interdyscyplinarnych, gdyż pozwoli określić zakres badanego zjawiska. Taką możliwość daje syndromatyczne rozumienie populizmu oraz zwrócenie uwagi na jego przejawianie się na różnych poziomach dyskursu politycznego, obejmującym zarówno wykładniki językowe, jak i relacje nadawczo-odbiorcze czy kreowaną w obrębie tego dyskursu specyficzną wizję świata. Przyjęcie zatem w badaniach metodologii kognitywnej stanowi jedną z perspektyw badawczych pozwalających na charakterystykę

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allowing populist discourse to be characterized from an interdisciplinary perspective, including a political-linguistic approach.

**Keywords:** populism, populist discourse, linguistic image of the world, political linguistics, methodology of populism studies

dyskursu populistycznego, dającą możliwość spojrzenia interdyscyplinarnego, w tym politolingwistycznego.

**Słowa kluczowe:** populizm, dyskurs populistyczny, językowy obraz świata, politolingwistyka, metodologia badań nad populizmem

## INTRODUCTION

Describing the difficulties encountered when defining populism, Berlin used the metaphor of “searching for Cinderella”: the researcher is like the prince carrying the slipper, in this case it is the term populism, and seeking the foot it fits best. In his quest, he comes across a number of princesses whose little feet almost fit the slipper, but he carries on in his efforts to find an ideal case. He assumes that only then will he be able to discover the very core of populism (Canovan, 2000; Berlin, Hofstadter, MacRae, 1968). To continue Berlin’s metaphor, the authors of this paper suggest that, before setting off in the search of the princess, the slipper and how it was actually made should be examined first.

“Populism” is an exceptionally ambiguous term, which on the one hand results from the semantic fuzziness and negative connotation of this term in modern colloquial language, and on the other – from its non-academic origin, indicating that it operates as an element of self-identification (followed by external identification) by a variety of political movements (Canovan, 1981). Consequently, contemporary populism studies are burdened by a number of ontological, epistemological and methodological problems.

### ONTOLOGICAL, EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN POPULISM STUDIES

A specific group of problems is related to the ontological status of populism. Regardless of the details of how individual researchers conceptualize populism it has the nature of a dependent entity. Being a “product” of human activity, populism is existentially secondary, it is ontologically dependent because it is “rooted” in the subject, whose consciousness generates a certain linguistic image

of the world (Krajewski, 2002; Gumański, 2003). Such ontological dependence is not a unique property of populism, though, as most research objects in the social sciences are dependent. Simultaneously, the ontological nature of populism is complex, since it refers to the numerous levels of social reality examined. Consciously making a completely arbitrary assumption that populism is in essence (1) a socio-political phenomenon, (2) rooted in the state of consciousness of the subject which (3) creates a specific image of the world by means of language and that (4) this image is reflected in a specifically structured discourse, it can be noted that populism understood in this manner spans over as many as three dimensions of reality: the material level (a “place” where populists encounter their recipients and the “dimension” where the outcomes of the populist discourse are absorbed, for instance in the form of the emergence of a populist party), the level of consciousness which is related to the specific image of the world, and the linguistic level where the populist discourse is manifested.

Making an ontological assumption that populism is a complex socio-political phenomenon reflected in a specific discourse construction results in the requirement that researchers who analyze populism take into consideration the properties of social phenomena. The entire set of features that constitute a social phenomenon *per se* is significant in as much as it determines the nature of academic theorems on those social phenomena. These theorems cannot occur as nomologically universal assertions (laws; Włodarczyk, 2009; Topolski, 1968), but rather as historical generalizations (Such, 1973) that are applicable only to a specified area, limited period or a set of conditions. It is clearly easier to identify the nature of such assertions when they contain explicit proper names, descriptions and other temporal and spatial determinants, as well as occasional indicators which unanimously imply their limited range of validity. Such indicators are not directly determined in all assertions (sets of assertions), however, raising a range of doubts about their applicability. Assertions which are frequently encountered in populism studies are showcased i.e. in the works by Weyland (1999), Knight (1998), Walicki (1969) and in publications taking account of the Polish context by Przyłęcki (2012) and Ożóg (2005, 2006, 2013).

Polish studies on populism present in the political realm include analyses of the activities of the *Samoobrona* (Self-defense) and *Liga Polskich Rodzin* (League of Polish Families) political parties (Ożóg, 2006; Burda, n.d.), but none of them pertain to the current political situation. These analyses feature descriptions of the distinctive linguistic features of populism. Researchers themselves point to their non-comprehensive nature, focusing solely on the selected aspects typical of

the phenomena concerned (Bralczyk, 1999; Ożóg, 2006). It should be noted that the studies presented so far have not provided an analysis of a complete corpus of material collected in order to examine populism in Polish politics<sup>1</sup>. They do not differentiate the research material with respect to political entities, the time when the texts were created or the medium employed to reach the audience. It seems justified to take these variables into account, as they have a direct impact on the shape of populism in Poland, and to seek its permanent, canonical properties, as well as for the variables that depend on the political circumstances, personalities of speakers and the nature of the audience. Yet describing linguistic populism as a set of tools employed in political communication seems insufficient. It is worth stressing that one of the characteristics allowing a text to be classified as populist involves the specific way of shaping reality.

The parallel coexistence of different historical generalizations of populism results in the fundamental problem of their different explanatory and anticipatory potential. According to Such, the type of historical generalization which generalizes from factual accounts does not have any anticipator (Ossowski, 1964) potential, being ontologically and epistemologically closed (it concerns a finite class of past events); the remaining cases are assertions that are ontologically closed but epistemologically open, and therefore they may provide reasonable grounds for inferences pertaining to the future (Such, 1972).

Researchers into such a complex phenomenon as populism always face a huge challenge in designing their studies so as to reflect the above-mentioned ontological (*ergo*: epistemological) complexity. At the same time, a threat emerges of falling into the trap of methodological substantialism, which follows from the “thinking in terms of disciplines syndrome” (Woleński, 1981). Methodological substantialism is represented by assuming that “only some determined and appropriately characterized element, or elements [...] are specific for a given discipline, [...] that the determined arrangements of the category of individual objects [...], the properties, relations and sets can be examined only in a defined manner” (Węsierski, 2011). Methodological substantialism would manifest itself in populism studies, for instance, by historians reducing populism to nothing more than how political movements (defining themselves or being defined

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<sup>1</sup> The results presented are not approached as a comprehensive study of populism in Polish politics. They are frequently based on the studies of the language of politics conducted by the above-mentioned scholars. Cf. Ożóg (2004; 2006b; 2008), Bralczyk (2007).

as related to the people) operate, by political scientists approaching it only as a defined type of ideology, and by linguists – as a linguistic style.

Addressing the issue of populism, Bralczyk notes in one of his articles that the categorization of this term is related to such terms as “political tactics, socio-technical method, political movement, ideological trend, relative of demagogy, the doctrine of impatient people, a collection of popular slogans, manipulation, tendency, primitive socialism, political mysticism, idea, social demagogy” (1999). He chooses the term *linguistic populism* (Pl.: *populizm językowy*)<sup>2</sup>, and endeavors to present linguistic indicators leading recipients to recognize a given utterance as populist<sup>3</sup>. The same approach is taken also by Ożóg, who proposes the term *populist language* (Pl.: *język populizmu*) in his studies (2006). In the studies quoted here<sup>4</sup>, populism defined as political populism, or narrowly understood as a political phenomenon, is defined as an ideology which manifests itself in language at the level of rhetorical tools that make it possible to construct a populist vision of the world by means of a peculiar *populist rhetoric* (Ożóg, 2013, 2006).

That populism has been narrowed down to rhetorical categories is exemplified also by the studies on the language of modern politics, where populism functions as one of the eristic tools – *argumentum ad populum*. Polkowska (2015) describes how this eristic instrument operates, rightfully observing that the term

<sup>2</sup> A similar stance is taken by Jadwiga Burda in her doctoral dissertation *Populizm w języku polskiej polityki po roku 1989* [Populism in the language of Polish politics after 1989], defended at the Faculty of Philology of the University of Rzeszów in 2012. The material analyzed in this dissertation comes from the period of the III Republic of Poland.

<sup>3</sup> Jerzy Bralczyk also stresses that the linguistic instruments he is discussing, in particular using typical evaluative measures, are not typical only of populism (1999:).

<sup>4</sup> Ożóg lists three realms of social life where he finds populism to be present: “firstly, the great category of the behavior and awareness of social groups, studied by social psychology. Populism always is a property of a somehow disappointed and socially harmed and marginalized group. Secondly, populism is a linguistic category, since it is manifested primarily in linguistic behavior, in the field of manifestos, slogans, propaganda and texts generated for the purpose of election meetings and political conventions. **Once populists come to power their populism ends, the language of populism cannot withstand the pressure of reality** [highlighted by the authors of this paper]. The official populism of the authorities frequently transforms into a bloody regime, as was the case of the totalitarian regimes on the 20th century. This, however, is the domain of historical research. Interesting properties of linguistic populism are studied by linguists who are curious about how language operates in great social groups. Thirdly, populism is an element of political activity, serving the purpose of winning power or influence and as such it is the object of political science studies” (2006). The author of this quote addresses the different realms where he finds populism, on the one hand, and his perception of the borders delimiting its use, which no longer seem valid, however.

is vague, and its formal as well semantic indicators are not indisputably defined. Additionally, Polkowska, who studies the language of the right wing in Poland, follows Bralczyk, for whom this rhetorical tool is distinguished by “presenting an extremely simplified image of reality”, the simplification of both the form and content, accompanied by a dichotomous structure of the world it presents, and such a self-image of the sender of the message that allows him or her to identify with an audience that is categorized in terms of the nation (Polkowska, 2015). Yet it transpires that such a broadly pictured eristic instrument calls for a categorization that transcends rhetoric.

### COGNITIVISM IN POLISH STUDIES ON POPULISM

The observations made so far define populism as a social phenomenon reflected in a specific manner in language. Therefore, researchers face the fundamental task of determining the theoretical and methodological frameworks which will be appropriate for such a complex object of study. Interesting explanatory results are produced in the Polish context by the concept (Kołodziejczak, Wrześniewska-Pietrzak, 2017a, 2017b) of focusing on populist discourse as understood by Ożóg (2006). The concept of discourse encompasses the text and the attitude of its author (sender of the message) contained in that text, as well as the characteristic sender-recipient relations inscribed in it. Such a discursive approach to populism makes it possible to stress the relation between the attitude of populist senders of messages and the linguistic strategies they use in order to build a specific sender-recipient relation of a populist nature. The following four elements can be deemed constitutive for populist discourse: (1) the central position of the “mythical” people in the image of the world created in this discourse; (2) setting the people always in opposition to “non-people” (for instance elites, or aliens); (3) a simplified linguistic image of the social world combined with a highly understandable message directed at the greatest possible number of recipients; and, finally (4) the presence of the leader playing the role of the (actual or self-appointed) *vox populi*.

In order to overcome the above-mentioned problems in studies on populism and its linguistic manifestations, attempts have been made to apply the instruments of cognitive methodology, which are well-known in Poland, and in particular the *linguistic image of the world* (hereinafter LIW; Pl.: *językowy obraz świata*), defined by Bartmiński, the founder of the Polish school of ethnolin-

guistics, as “different verbalizations of the interpretation of reality, contained in language, that can be expressed in the form of assessments of the world” (2007)<sup>5</sup>.

This structure needs to be sought in colloquial language, which is recognized as the central style of Polish (Bartmiński, 2003). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the language used to create populist messages addressed at a broad range of recipients is described as colloquial, or colloquial style is indicated as one of its characteristic features (Bralczyk, 1999; Ożóg, 2006).

An image of the socio-political reality constructed by populist senders of messages is a proposal sharing certain features of populist discourse. One of them involves a simplified image of the world presented in terms of a dichotomous division, which applies first and foremost to a simplified (black and white) system of values. Another property, which is important from the point of view of political populism, is employing antinomy to describe the world, in particular the *us – them* antinomy. It is a significant element of such an image of the world that the senders of messages place themselves on the side of the recipients (the people, nation). Thereby, it is possible to use the category of *them* to conceptualize the enemy, whether it is the authorities, institutions or any individual or group of people perceived to be aliens, members of the category of *them*, strangers and foes. Senders convince recipients of the image of the reality they present by means of specific persuasive tools, both rational and emotional.

The category of “the people”, which is deemed primary and canonical in many political science studies, turns out to be an element which is not decisive for a statement to be populist without the simplified vision of the world and the above-determined sender-recipient relation (Bralczyk, 1999). Dwelling on the issue of the sender-recipient relation, it should be noted that populist discourse is distinguished by a significant element of a specific relation between populist leaders and their recipients included in the *us* category<sup>6</sup>. On account of the narrow perspective of linguistic studies, this issue has not been discussed in literature so far. Linguists are concerned with identifying the category of the

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<sup>5</sup> Grzegorzczkova notes that the LIW is a “conceptual structure established (fixed) in the system of a given language, that is in the grammatical and lexical properties of this language (the meanings and collocations of words) manifesting itself in the form of texts (statements) as everything else in language” (1990).

<sup>6</sup> We have analyzed the language of Paweł Kukiz and found that the self-image he presents includes dominating roles that are different with respect to the politician-recipient relation, embraced by the “us” category, and different with respect to the relation of politician-other politicians – enemies of Poles, who form an opposition category “them” (Kołodziejczak, Wrześniewska-Pietrzak, 2017b).

enemy, which is significant in terms of persuasion, and is pejoratively assessed in political texts. Hostile political parties and the broadly understood authorities are attributed with negative properties, and their views are additionally described as irrational (Bralczyk, 1999).

The simplification of the image of reality as presented in populist texts primarily concerns seeing the world, values and solutions proposed as black-and-white. The authors of publications emphasize such values as dignity, as well as truth and lies (Burda, 2012, 2013). The matter of truth addressed by populists frequently translates into employing such linguistic instruments that increase the probability of the assessments and solutions proposed. They encompass quasi-evidence, quantifiers and arguments that frequently refer to various statistics (Bralczyk, 1999; Ożóg, 2006).

The simplification of the world created by populist senders of messages is also related to the easily understandable language populists use to communicate with their recipients. The messages should be communicative, in order to reach the broadest range of recipients possible. The simplicity of language which is frequently attributed to populists makes the understandability<sup>7</sup> of messages one of the constitutive properties of populism.

One of the tools which can be used in order to examine the degree of understandability (or readability) of a text and comparing it with its efficiency could be provided by the Gunning fog index (Broda, Maziarz, Piekot, Radziszewski, 2010). The index employs an algorithm to estimate the years of formal education a person needs to understand the text. The level of difficulty of a text is the outcome of such factors as the number of words and sentences in it, as well as the proportion of difficult (multi-syllable) words. Studies on text readability conducted by the Plain Polish Language Laboratory (*Pracownia Prostej Polszczyzny*) in collaboration with engineers of linguistics from Wrocław University of Science and Technology have made it possible to adapt the fog index to test the readability of texts in Polish. As a result, a Polish equivalent of the linguistic standard defined in studies abroad as “plain language” has been developed. The researchers from Wrocław have come up with the name “plain Polish” (Pl.: *prosta polszczyzna*) for their model, which specifies the principles required for texts to be communicative (Piekot, Maziarz 2014; Piekot, Zarzeczny, Moroń, 2015).

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<sup>7</sup> Readability is understood as a property recipients attribute to texts on the basis of their subjective assessment, which is strictly related to their receptive competence.

It is not by accident that the FOG-PL tool is mentioned here. We believe that it may be successfully applied to examine political statements in order to assess their understandability and communicativeness. What is more, it appears that such an analysis could be carried out not only with respect to written (which were the only text type examined in the Plain Polish Language Laboratory) but also spoken texts<sup>8</sup>.

## CONCLUSIONS

The history of the difficult scholarly struggle with the issue of populism leads to the following conclusions. First, populism as a social phenomenon is a focal point of all the properties of social phenomena as such, namely complexity (including ontological complexity), its syndromized nature, various manifestations (multivalency) and development dynamic. Second, these features are complemented by specific properties of populism, exemplified by the specific form of linguistic expression and its inherent property of the dominating sender-recipient structure which make the “transformation” of such a complicated object of study into an adequate object of cognition an extremely difficult task. Third, this challenge is handled in different ways by researchers: they narrow their studies down to idiographic research (for instance case studies) whose results (taking the form of historical generalization in the best case) are limited in terms of applicability and explanatory use; or they “flatten” (simplify) the object of cognition so that it conforms to the methods that are deemed standard in a given field of academia. This methodological substantialism affects both the quality of the results obtained by researchers and the degree of their further applicability, and results in the largely non-cumulative nature of knowledge on populism (which is understood as a “global resource”). Fourth, it appears that the above-mentioned problems faced in studies on populism may be overcome if attention is focused on its discursive manifestations, analyzed with instruments rooted in cognitive methodology (in particular the LIW methodology) which expand the range of rhetorical tools used by populists. Such an approach, developed from the point of view of problem-oriented transdisciplinarity (Meyer, 2007), offers the possibility to present the ontological complexity of populism and

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<sup>8</sup> Parliamentary statements by Paweł Kukiz, the leader of the Kukiz’15 movement, and his posts on Facebook were subjected to such an analysis (Kołodziejczak, Wrześniewska-Pietrzak, 2017a).

grasp the essence of populism via its linguistic form. Yet, on the other hand, the conclusions developed by means of this analytical tool do not (and will not) have the character of general scientific laws but rather that of historical generalizations – as was the case of earlier analyses. Still, the explanatory potential of such conclusions seems significant and the range of their applicability relatively broad. The ultimate decision whether to use these tools is made by the researcher.

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## PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

CZYNNIKI MOTYWUJĄCE POWSTAWANIE I UMACNIANIE  
SPOŁECZEŃSTWA OBYWATELSKIEGO W POLSCE

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### — ABSTRACT —

An integral part of social discourse is discussions concerning the issue of how to motivate citizens to actively build civil society. Scholars search for the factors that develop and promote pro-civic attitudes. The discussions mostly refer to young citizens, as they are the ones that determine the direction of changes. This article presents a study following the trend of searching for psychological determinants of young people's civic engagement. The researchers found that the determinants include two motivational variables: the sense of self-efficacy, and dispositional optimism. They also diagnosed the structure of values of individuals with different levels of civic engagement.

**Keywords:** civil society, psychological determinants, young people

### — ABSTRAKT —

Integralną częścią dyskursu społecznego są dyskusje podejmujące kwestie mobilizacji obywateli do czynnego budowania społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Badacze zadają pytania o czynniki kształtujące postawy proobywatelskie oraz o te, które je umacniają. Dyskusje te w szczególności dotyczą młodych obywateli, bowiem to właśnie oni wyznaczają kierunek zmian. Niniejszy artykuł prezentuje badanie wpisujące się w nurt poszukiwań psychologicznych uwarunkowań zaangażowania obywatelskiego młodych ludzi. Wśród tych uwarunkowań zwrócono uwagę na dwie zmienne motywacyjne – poczucie własnej skuteczności oraz dyspozycyjny optymizm, jak również zdiagnozowano strukturę wartości jednostek o różnym poziomie zaangażowania obywatelskiego.

**Słowa kluczowe:** społeczeństwo obywatelskie, psychologiczne uwarunkowania, młodzi ludzie

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An integral part of social discourse is discussions concerning the issue of how to motivate citizens to actively build civil society. Scholars search for the factors that develop and promote pro-civic attitudes. The discussions mostly refer to young citizens, as they are the ones that determine the direction of changes. This article presents a study following the trend of searching for psychological determinants of young people's civic engagement. The researchers found that the determinants include two motivational variables: the sense of self-efficacy, and dispositional optimism. They also diagnosed the structure of values of individuals with different levels of civic engagement.

Civil society is a broad category defined in a number of ways, which entails theoretical chaos, mostly resulting from the abundance of ideas (Dzwończyk, 2009). Analyzing the phenomenon, we cannot but agree with Piotr Broda-Wysocki that the difficulties in identifying what civil society is do not arise from the lack of proper definition but rather from the excess of definitions (Broda-Wysocki, 2003). Thus, civil society can be defined in the context of intermediary structures between the state and the citizens' private sphere (Calhoun, 1999), or with reference to the pluralism of interests occurring in the society, in the pursuit of which citizens voluntarily form organizations (Pérez-Díaz, 1996), or even in the context of community ("the habitat of habitats"), i.e., different levels of citizens' activities with equal rights, without favoring any of them. Notwithstanding the variety of definitions of civil society, we can identify two traditions that are fundamental for its understanding: the liberal one, and the republican one.

They are commonly regarded as contradictory, but clearly they can also complement each other, since they originate from the same canon of values and they compete for being the best model of an engaged society. Civic competencies and the figure of social leader are significant in both the republican and the liberal paradigm. Yet, their intensity differs between the models of civic participation.

One property constituting both the liberal and the republican civic model is the idea of freedom, as without it there would be no citizens or civil society. Obviously, the category has different meanings for the supporters of liberalism and for republicans. The difference is mainly in the significance attributed to the idea: for liberals, freedom equals the lack of force. We may even have the impression that the supporters of liberalism "flee from politics", because in their opinion any engagement in social life or the activity of the community questions the primacy of freedom over other phenomena, and therefore, it poses a threat to freedom. Hence the suspicious attitude towards activities individuals take for the benefit of other citizens. Still, this view of freedom is not common among

liberals; it is primarily attributed to the supporters of liberalism that Marcin Król calls the liberalism of fear. At the same time, one of its many forms is the view that promote citizens' activity in the public sphere, related to the liberal approach to freedom through its positive dimension (Król, 1996). Its supporters point to the need to "make friends with politics" and "express courage" in influencing it, because the public sphere can only be improved this way, at the same time protecting the freedom of individuals.

It is worth mentioning that such an approach to freedom – stressing its positive dimension – is close to republican concepts. Again, there are two types of republicanism: the "Athenian" and the "Roman" one. The type of republicanism originating from the Roman tradition can be identified with the liberal approach to freedom: it holds that individual freedom has the primacy over community life. As observed by Elżbieta Cizewska, its supporters avoid the answer to the question of what happiness is, but on the other hand, just like the "Athenian" republicans, they emphasize the role of participation for the common good, and individual's freedom is connected with the freedom of the state (Cizewska, 2010). Thus, the interpretation of freedom by the supporters of the "Roman" trend is very similar to the assumptions of "liberalism of courage".

The "Athenian" model of republicanism is the most demanding in terms of civic attitudes that make civil society. Its supporters hold the view that a human is a social creature and can only achieve their goals through public activity for the common good. Currently, this view is promoted by communitarians, recognizing that individual good can only be achieved through activity for the common good. Thus, positive freedom and the common good have the primacy over negative freedom and individualism (Karnowska, 2011).

The different notions of freedom in liberal or republican attitudes also give rise to different perceptions of relationships between an individual and a community. Whereas the "liberalism of fear" recognizes the absolute primacy of an individual – understood as an individual entity – over any expressions of community, in the republican concepts and opinions or the "liberalism of courage" the relationships are more complicated. A rational individual with the right to individual happiness and autonomous decisions is not clearly contrasted to the community lifestyle. It is even believed that without individualism the community would lose the ability to participate in pursuing the common good (Weryński, 2008). Naturally, in "Athenian" republicanism individualism is not equalized with community, since its supporters recognize the need of primacy of the community over individualism.

This way, the problem of different interpretations of civic morality emerges. In this case, the line of division is between citizens' commitment towards one another in republicanism and the value of individual accomplishments in the private sphere in liberalism (Weryński, 2008). This naturally translates into the attitude to the state, because while in the liberal approach civil society is primary to the state and the state is only an instrument to achieve individual interests, for contemporary republicans the state is an emanation of the common good. Therefore, community cannot exist beyond its control. Different liberal and republican attitudes to the state also indirectly influence the concepts of civil society. According to Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński, in communitarian concepts it is civil society that "makes" citizens, and in liberal concepts citizens make civil society, but in order to do so, they must be equipped, first, with appropriate social capital that enables individuals to collaborate, and second, with a minimum measure of civic culture, which enables them to see not only their own particular interest but also the value of the common good (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2005).

Regarding concepts of relationships between the state and the civil society as historical traditions, it must be emphasized that currently it is commonly held that whatever the degree of autonomy, society inevitably assumes the existence of a state (Szacki, 1996). Yet, this does not mean that the relationships between the state and civil society are simple. As Józef Lipiec points out, there are three kinds of relationship on the "state – civil society" axis. First, the mixed model of relationship assumes that the relations between institutions are not constant or inviolable. In this approach, relations are quite dynamic and largely depend on current problems. Hence, they can have the form of strong antagonisms resulting from conflict situations or decisions, but they can also be amicable. Actually, there is no single, constant model of compromise: it is achieved in different ways depending on the situation (Lipiec, 2002).

The other kind of relationships between civil society and the state is a disharmonic model. Its consequence is constant or cyclical occurrence of open conflicts. Usually, they have the form of total opposition, but they may also refer to specific matters. It is worth noting that the disharmony between civil society and the state often leads to weakening both institutions, or at least is not upbuilding and does not foster development. In this model, the state is considered as oppressive by civil society, and civil society is considered as an institution that disturbs and destroys the state (Lipiec, 2002).

Finally, there is the third, optimum model of "harmonious cooperation", following the principle of respecting "separate territories" of activity: the state

does not invade the sphere of activity of civil society, and the other way round, civil society avoids the planes of traditional activities of the state (Lipiec, 2002). This model is accompanied by the belief that the “two worlds” mentioned above understand the difference between each other, are convinced of the need to collaborate and know about their mutual relations and different principles of activity (Szacki, 1996). The combination of the idea of civil society and democracy is especially important in the context of this model, because in a democratic system we must not separate social issues from political ones (Bokajło, 2001). Therefore, there is a clear specific functional correlation of the phenomena, and it must be stressed that at the moment negative relationships between the state and civil society are not standard.

The type of democracy and the degree of development of civil society are another thing<sup>1</sup>. When discussing the problem of deficit or degeneration of democracy, the directions of improvement are often pointed out. On the one hand, the return to sources of democracy is demanded, and on the other hand, “democratic revisionism”. According to Wiesław Bokajło, in both cases it is necessary to work out the form of democracy which: 1) is effective both in terms of exercising power and reaching a compromise and maintaining social balance, and 2) has clearly, precisely and coherently formulated competencies, i.e., rights and obligations of political institutions, authorities and citizens (Bokajło, 2001). Disregarding the institutional problems of democracy, unimportant for this analysis, we need to try and determine the role of civil society for the degree of consolidation of democracy or overcoming crises. What is interesting in this perspective is proposals of “democratic revisionism”, i.e., not the return to the sources of democracy but rather the revision and rationalistic adaptation to the dynamics of the contemporary world (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2005).

“Democratic revisionists” present two different attitudes to the problem, referred to in literature as “elitist” and “participatory” ones. While referring to human rationality and the need of maximizing their interest by the actions taken, “elitists” also emphasize that individual rationalism does not have to add up at the social level (Sartori, 1994). This is mostly connected with the more and

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<sup>1</sup> Generally, theories of democracy include: normative ones (answering the question of what should be) and empirical ones (answering the question of what really is). However, the research problem of this article does not allow us to elaborate on the theories of democracy. Andrzej Antoszewski (2016) described theories of democracy very thoroughly in the book *Współczesne teorie demokracji*, Warszawa.

more complicated reality and the lack of broad civic, political and economic competencies among citizens. Hence the demand that democracy should develop thanks to the activity of so-called political class and the emerging elite of power ensuring formal legitimization of the elite on the part of electorate activating only at elections (Bokajło, 2001). This discussion does not involve the “elitist” concept, but in the context of this analysis it must be stressed that its supporters regard the state to be the carrier of power, and non-state organizations and citizens are only social participants.

The trend of “democratic revisionism”, in turn, involves the approach in which the primary principle is citizens’ equality both in terms of law and in terms of communities and political participation. The “participatory” approach assumes that decisions concerning the public domain must be taken by as broad circles of stakeholders as possible, because the effects of the decisions will affect the whole community. It may be said that this approach is coincident with the concept of polyarchy by Robert Dahl (1971), who pointed out that democracy is characterized by government’s constant positive response to citizens’ preferences, whereas citizens have equal political rights. In the area of citizen’s engagement defined this way it is obviously necessary to expect some political competencies of them (Plecka, Turska-Kawa, Wojtasik, 2013).

Knowledge on politics, the culture of social trust, the need to act and an axiological system are all important for the development of the attitude of an aware and engaged citizen. There is a kind of paradox, however, because the level of political civic competence is influenced by the formation and strengthening of values, especially in the political dimension. This means that the elements of competence such as knowledge on politics or the culture of social trust and political participation are not only the entities that constitute the phenomenon, but also the “civic values”. They affect the quality of civic political competence and the quality of civil society, and – even more important – the degree of consolidation of democracy.

However, two significant problems appear. Firstly, the more and more complicated reality is not very comprehensible for a great number of citizens. Thus, psychological determinants (frustration, dissatisfaction, pessimism) consolidate, limiting the possibility of participating in public and social life. This specific “closing” leads to political, electoral and participatory alienation. We no longer represent attitudes connected with republicanism or liberalism of “courage”, and the reference to liberalism of “fear” is more and more often dominant. It is based on dispositional pessimism, especially with regard to political and social reality.

It strengthens the belief in the low level of self-efficacy, thus discouraging the formation of social capital and improvement of civil society.

The opposite effect can be achieved when dispositional optimism (the way of perceiving the world that in which we expect more positive than negative experiences) or the sense of self-efficacy (individual level of general belief in being able to cope with difficult situations and obstacles) are dominant in the society (Juczyński, 2001). Optimism is largely responsible for motivating to action, endurance in performing projects, and engagement, so it seems understandable that optimists have a higher sense of self-efficacy. Believing in self-efficacy provides the basis for motivation, effects of activity, and personal skills. Self-efficacy influences the choices we make and the related efforts, and determines how long we continue making the effort when we meet obstacles and how we feel about this situation (Bańka, 2005). Besides, people with a higher level of this variable often display a low level of anxiety understood as a personal trait.

Both the sense of self-efficacy and dispositional optimism are dispositional traits which are largely responsible for motivating individuals to act. Optimists employ more effective strategies of coping in difficult situations, such as problem-oriented coping rather than denial, diverting attention, or discontinuing the activity. In stressful situations pessimists tend to concentrate on emotions instead of the problem. For them a failure is not an impulse to give up but to maintain the effort (Scheier, Carver, Bridges, 1994). The sense of self-efficacy implicates higher engagement in activities, because the low level of our motivations, affective states and actions we take are more based on what we believe in and on whether we feel able to do something than on the objective reality (Bańka, 2005). Studies prove that its high level correlates with helplessness, depression, and high susceptibility to stress (Bańka, 2005; Juczyński, 2001). It is found that people who do not believe in their ability to cope with difficult tasks adopt this as a way of life. They dwell upon their personal deficits and failures, complain about their lot in life, and easily give up. Since they have little faith in their own abilities, a little dose of failure is enough to make them lose the faith completely (Bańka, 2005).

Many empirical studies prove the existence of significant relations between the values preferred by a person and the person's behaviors (e.g., Bardi, Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2006; Turska-Kawa, 2016). Most theories assume that values serve the motivational function and involve a great emotional load. Stanisław Jałowiecki (1979), a representative of the sociological approach, identifies a value as any material or ideal item, an idea, an institution, a real or imagined thing towards which individuals or communities have the attitude of respect, con-

sider it to have an important role in their lives and feel the imperative desire to achieve it. In the approach by Milton Rokeach (1973), values are beliefs with an emotional aspect, affecting the choice of goals and ways of achieving them. The approach of Shalom Schwartz (1992) treats values as ideas or beliefs which refer not only to specific situations, but to ultimate final states or behaviors. Values determine the choice or evaluation of behaviors and events and are organized in accordance with their relative importance. Economist Nikolai Nenovsky (1987) points out that values always have the meaning that is attributed to them by people. They reflect the individual's attitude to the external world, and are related to the needs, interests, feelings, and desires.

One theory that makes it possible to analyze the relations between the fundamental values and civic activity is the Theory of Basic Human Values by Shalom Schwartz. According to Schwartz (1992; Schwartz et al., 2012), values are associated with emotions. The author underscores that they are connected with the goals the person prefers and are the motivation to act. Schwartz's concept identifies ten types of basic values: conformity, tradition, benevolence, universalism, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, and security. The core of the theory is two properties of the structure of values: the continuum and circular character. Values make a continuum, which means that each fragmentation of the continuum into separate units is arbitrary. But it is possible to divide the continuum of values in different ways into more detailed or more general units (Cieciuch, 2013). The continuum of values as perceived by Schwartz (1992) is motivational in character, i.e., values located close to each other are motivationally similar and may be pursued together. The continuum of values is circular, which adds an important element to the properties of the structure: values located on the opposite sides of the circle exclude each other. The circular structure of the ten values can also be described using two dimensions: self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus conservation.

## RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY

The goal of the presented empirical study is to analyze psychological determinants of civic attitude. In the light of the information above, this attitude is understood as a citizen's activity and ability to self-organize, collaborate with others, and achieve the set goals without external impulse or pressure.

The study seeks the determinants of civic engagement in psychological variables such as dispositional optimism and the sense of self-efficacy. These variables are responsible for activation and better strategies of coping with difficult situations, which will presumably translate into stronger civic attitude. The aim of the study is also to diagnose the structure of basic values of individuals with different levels of civic engagement.

The study was carried out among 548 students from the University of Silesia in Katowice and Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. The participants were 320 women and 228 men. They were all students of courses such as: Politology, Political and Public Consultancy, Journalism and Social Communication, History, Philosophy and Internal Security.

The respondents individually completed the questionnaire. The instrument diagnosed the variables analyzed in the study: the level of civic engagement and basic values, dispositional optimism and the sense of self-efficacy.

The theoretical basis for the constructed tool for studying civic engagement is the definition of civic engagement formulated in the official document of The Centre for Civil Society of London School of Economics, which describes it as the area of voluntary collaboration for common interests, goals and values. Further, the document points out that civil society is the plane of activity of different organizations, such as formal charities, pro-developmental non-governmental organizations, communities, women's organizations, religious associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, associations of entrepreneurs, coalitions and interest groups. The soft tissue of civil society is social capital, involving groups of broadly understood competencies, attitudes and beliefs, i.e., the civic approach of members of society, social norms supporting common activities and interpersonal trust, as well as citizens' trust in public institutions (Putnam, 1993), and informal values or ethical norms shared by members of a certain group, allowing them to effectively collaborate on the basis of mutual trust (Fukuyama, 1997) and individual contribution into networks of social relationships (Bourdieu, 1986, 1993).

Therefore, civil society is an active, open, democratic, solidary, free and responsible society, organized at the grass-roots level through various horizontal structures (Gliński, 2009). A member of such a community has specific qualities: the optimum level of trust in other people, readiness to collaborate to achieve common interests, taking the initiative, responding to calls to action, and sharing norms and values with the social group. Civic engagement understood this way was operationalized using a scale made up of 6 statements,

which the respondents evaluated on a five-point scale. The scale included the following items:

1. In the community you should only care about your own interest.
2. Common good is important for me.
3. Other people have good intentions.
4. I like to engage in different formalized social groups (associations, unions, etc.).
5. I am interested in what happens around my place of residence.
6. I like to take part in organizing different activities for the people living in my area (festivities, social initiatives, celebrations, etc.).

The reliability of this scale  $\alpha = 0.79$ .

The sense of self-efficacy was diagnosed with the General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSES) by Ralf Schwarzer, Michael Jerusalem and Zygfryd Juczyński. The authors draw on the concept of expectations and the idea of self-efficacy by Albert Bandura. Expectation of self-efficacy is connected with the control of one's actions and may either refer to specific areas of the individual's life or be a general belief concerning new or difficult situations.

Dispositional optimism was diagnosed using the Life Orientation Test (LOT) by Michael F. Scheier, Charles S. Carver and Michael W. Bridges, adapted into Polish by Ryszard Poprawa and Zygfryd Juczyński.

The structure of values was diagnosed using the S-PVQ (Short Portrait Values Questionnaire; Beierlein et al., 2014). It is a shortened version of classic PVQ (Portrait Values Questionnaire) by Schwartz, presented at the 28<sup>th</sup> International Congress of Applied Psychology in Paris. The tool is composed of 13 short descriptions of persons (e.g., "It is important to him to be rich", "It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does", "He believes that people should do what they are told"). The respondent decides to what degree the description matches their personality. Respondents can use a 6-point scale (from "not at all like me" to "exactly like me"). The scale diagnoses four higher-order values: self-transcendence, self-enhancement, conservation, openness.

Since people much more often consider themselves as similar to descriptions, the results were subject to ipsatization. The procedure involves deducting the mean of all the items for the person from the mean for the index obtained by the person in each of the identified values. The positive scores obtained this way mean the location of the value above the mean in the system of values of a person or group. Negative values point to a preference below the mean. Zero values reflect a medium place in the system of values.

## EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

To verify the goals of the study, at the first stage of the analysis the raw scores obtained by the respondents on the civic engagement scale were replaced by a standard ten scale in order to identify three comparative groups: the group with a low (standard tens 1–3), medium (4–7) and high (8–10) level of civic engagement. The first group was made up of 172 persons (101 women, 71 men), the second, 269 persons (187 women, 82 men), and the third one, 107 persons (32 women, 75 men). The mean standard ten value for the first group was 2.3; for the second one, 5.1, and for the third one, 8.6.

Further, the mean levels of dispositional optimism were verified (for the whole group: 21.4) and self-efficacy (for the whole group: 29.1) in the three identified groups with different levels of civic engagement (Table 1).

**Table 1.** Results of analysis of variance and post-hoc Tukey HSD Test for dispositional optimism and the sense of self-efficacy in groups with different levels of civic engagement

Variable	Low level of civic engagement (LLCE)		Medium level of civic engagement (MLCE)		High level of civic engagement (HLCE)		ANOVA		Tukey's HSD
	Value	Standard deviation	Value	Standard deviation	Value	Standard deviation	F	p	
Dispositional optimism	19.4	3.49	20.1	3.87	22.3	3.11	4.323	0.01	LLCE/HLCE p=0.00 MLCE/HLCE P=0.02
Self-efficacy	27.5	4.70	27.9	4.23	30.2	4.99	5.468	0.01	LLCE/HLCE p=0.00 MLCE/HLCE P=0.00

Source: Author's.

The results of the analysis of variance showed that individuals with a high level of civic engagement represent significantly higher levels of dispositional optimism and sense of self-efficacy than do individuals with a low or medium level of civic engagement. There were no significant differences in the scores obtained by groups with the low and medium level of civic engagement in terms of the analyzed variables.

The diagnosis of values carried out with the use of S-PVQ had satisfactory reliability indices. Cronbach's alpha for each scale was between 0.59 (for openness) and 0.71 (for self-transcendence), as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2.** Cronbach's alpha for the higher-order values investigated in the study

Value	Cronbach's alpha
Self-transcendence	0.71
Self-enhancement	0.69
Conservation	0.61
Openness	0.59

Source: Author's.

Then, the structure of basic values was verified for the groups representing different levels of civic engagement, as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3.** Results of analysis of variance and post-hoc Tukey HSD Test for the analyzed basic values in groups with different levels of civic engagement

Value	Mean			ANOVA		Tukey's HSD
	Low level of civic engagement (LLCE)	Medium level of civic engagement (MLCE)	High level of civic engagement (HLCE)	F	p	
Self-transcendence	0.27	0.35	0.51	3.542	0.002	LLCE/HLCE p=0.001 MLCE/HLCE p=0.02
Self-enhancement	-0.91	-1.11	-1.43	3.854	0.006	LLCE/HLCE p=0.000 MLCE/HLCE p=0.011
Conservation	0.59	0.34	0.18	12.122	0.000	LLCE/HLCE p=0.001 LLCE/MLCE P=0.019 MLCE/HLCE p=0.017
Openness	0.26	0.30	0.42	8.946	0.000	LLCE/HLCE p=0.023 MLCE/HLCE p=0.034

Source: Author's.

The higher order value "self-transcendence" was evaluated higher in all the analyzed groups than was "self-enhancement". Such tendencies emerge from many other empirical studies (e.g., Zarzycka, Dawidowicz, Koziatek, 2007;

Cieciuch, 2010; Pilch, 2012; Turska-Kawa, 2016; Ramos, 2006). The post hoc test showed that self-transcendence is assessed significantly higher by people with a high level of civic engagement than by those with the lowest of medium level. The same applies to the meta value of self-enhancement. In the case of value "self-enhancement", the opposite is true: individuals with a higher level of civic engagement evaluate it lower than do people with low or medium engagement. As regards these two meta values, the groups with the medium and low level of civic engagement are homogeneous.

The growth of civic engagement is reversely proportional to the preference for conservation. The post hoc test showed significant differences in all the analyzed groups. It is similar in the case of openness: civic engagement is promoted by preference for openness, which is also clearly shown by the post hoc test, but in this case groups with the low or medium engagement do not display any differences. When dividing the results by groups, we can see that openness is only evaluated higher than conservation in the group with a high level of civic engagement. The other two groups display higher preference for conservation.

## CONCLUSIONS

The presented research tackled the problem of psychological determinants of civic engagement. The determinants were sought in basic values preferred by individuals and in the motivational variables: dispositional optimism and the sense of self-efficacy. The results of the study showed that these variables are significant for civic engagement. Motivational variables occur significantly more in individuals with a high level of civic engagement than in those with low or medium engagement. The more active people display higher levels of dispositional optimism and sense of self-efficacy. With regard to values it was proved that civic engagement is fostered by the preference for self-transcendence and openness. Those for whom conservation and self-enhancement are more important are more often passive.

The results of the study allow an optimistic view on the formation and strengthening of civil society in Poland by young people. First of all, both from the perspective of "liberalism of courage" and "liberalism of fear", i.e., dispositional optimistic attitude that promotes openness and citizen's participation in the development of political, personal and social reality. In this context, it is also worth stressing that in the models which are the starting point for the present

discussion citizenship is both a legal status and a social role. Our respondents demonstrated that they have preferences for civic engagement, which does not have to mean that it is the most important thing in their lives.

As we know, people who represent civic attitudes have a twofold influence on the state: direct and indirect. The aim of the above analyses was to study the direct influence through potential psychological determinants of activity as part of the concept of civil society. According to Jacek Raciborski, two types of civil society can be identified: one is constituted by citizens that communicate and associate in order to induce the state to allocate some goods in a way beneficial for them (which refers to the tradition of “liberalism of courage”) and the other is an autonomous civil society as a sphere of private interests that are naturally egoistic and conflicting. In this sphere, individuals associate and cooperate voluntarily to effectively satisfy their needs (Raciborski, 2010). The results of the analyses lead to the conclusion that the young participants’ preferred attitudes of openness and belief in their abilities may relate to both interpretations of civil society. Besides, it is hard to decide which liberal tradition is dominant, because the types may be considered as facets of civil society. Sometimes one facet is more visible, and sometimes the other. These facets or types are like the obverse and reverse of a coin (Raciborski, 2010). However, the direction of changes among young people and the perspectives of strengthening civil society are the most important both for the quality of social life and for democracy.

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## INTERCULTURALISM IN CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

### MIĘDZYKULTUROWOŚĆ W OPERACJACH REAGOWANIA KRYZYSOWEGO

*Magdalena El Ghamari\**

#### — ABSTRACT —

Deriving from the very concept, *colere* (culture) should indicate a significant, and at the same time, the main factor which is a human society. Culture exists in close proximity to people and their activities. Subsequently, through participation in a particular social group, everyone may create a system which is called culture. The foregoing interaction highlights the impact of culture on human behaviour and the people's ability to model and create "the foundations of culture". Culture forms the human individuality, which over time improves and enriches it, or on the contrary – affects its gradual loss. This means that man exists due to culture – and culture positively coexists or negatively disappears through human actions.

Dynamic trends in the civilizational development of countries, changes in the environment, progress in science, engineering and technology, and in particular information lead to the appearing of

#### — ABSTRAKT —

Pod pojęciem *colere* (kultury) należy wskazywać znaczący i jednocześnie główny czynnik je konstytuujący, jakim jest ludzka społeczność. Kultura istnieje w ścisłym powiązaniu z człowiekiem i jego działalnością. Zaś każdy z nas poprzez przynależność do określonych grup społecznych może kreować system, jakim jest kultura. Zachodząca interakcja podkreśla wpływ kultury na postępowanie człowieka oraz na ludzką umiejętność modelowania i tworzenia „podstaw kulturowych”. Kultura kształtuje ludzkie indywidualności, które z czasem ją wzbogacają i udoskonalają, bądź też odwrotnie – wpływają na jej stopniowe zatracanie. Oznacza to, że człowiek istnieje dzięki kulturze i kultura – pozytywnie – istnieje bądź – negatywnie – zanika poprzez ludzkie działania.

Dynamiczne trendy w rozwoju cywilizacyjnym państw, zmiany w środowisku naturalnym, postęp w nauce, technice i technologii, głównie informacyjnej, sprawiają, że pojawianie się

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new socio-cultural tools for new policy scenarios of military security.

The constant dynamism of these phenomena requires, from our currently formed Armed Forces, mainly bearing the burden of maintaining military security, but also new, unconventional and at the same time resolute response, even to minor regional conflicts which incidentally may become dangerous for Poland over time. Responding to emerging threats will not be unilateral or brief, as the experiences in the former Yugoslavia and in the Middle East indicate.

For a long time, the security of the states was based on military force. Force and sovereignty were the cornerstones of the system of national states. The rest of the military structure was subordinated to the remaining components of the state, e.g., natural resources, geographic location, demographic potential, scientific and technological advancement, etc. Over time, this condition has changed. After the Second World War, two alliances of states centered around the empires of powerful military forces were formed. The rise of military potentials on both sides did not cause the necessity to their use. These potentials have become a great means of deterrence and political influence on their opponents.

**Keywords:** interculturalism, crisis response operations, culture, military

nowych scenariuszy polityki bezpieczeństwa militarnego musi nieść ze sobą nowe narzędzia społeczno-kulturowe.

Ciągła dynamika tych zjawisk wymaga od naszych obecnie tworzonych Sił Zbrojnych, głównego podmiotu dźwigającego ciężar utrzymania bezpieczeństwa militarnego kraju, nowego i niekonwencjonalnego, lecz zdecydowanego reagowania nawet na niewielkie konflikty regionalne, które z czasem mogą stać się niebezpieczne dla Polski. Reagowanie na pojawiające się zagrożenia nie będzie aktem jednostronnym i krótkotrwałym, jak wskazują doświadczenia w byłej Jugosławii i na Bliskim Wschodzie.

Przez długi czas bezpieczeństwo państw oparte było na sile militarnej. Siła i suwerenność stanowiły kamienie węgielne systemu państw narodowych. Budowie siły wojskowej podporządkowane zostały inne komponenty stanowiące o pozycji państwa: zasoby naturalne, położenie geograficzne, potencjał demograficzny, stan zaawansowania naukowego i technologicznego itp. Z czasem stan ten uległ zmianie. Po drugiej wojnie światowej powstały dwa bloki państw skupione wokół mocarstw dysponujących potężną siłą wojskową. Narastanie potencjałów militarnych po obu stronach nie powodowało konieczności ich użycia. Potencjały te stały się doskonałym środkiem odstraszenia i politycznego oddziaływania na swoich przeciwników.

**Słowa kluczowe:** międzykulturowość, operacje reagowania kryzysowego, kultura, wojskowość

## INTRODUCTION: SITUATING THE PROBLEM

One of the important elements in the international order, which was at the turn of the last several years, is the increasing role of the activities undertaken by international organizations and national bodies in forming the global order. Along with changes in the international environment and an increase in the activity of the stabilization of Western countries, their armed forces more often are obliged to face the threats resulting from the culture, customs, traditions, religion or

language of the different operating environment. Intercultural policy for years has been the subject of pride in many European countries. But in recent years it has become a problem that European governments are not able to manage.

In Europe, it has already been made clear that it is time to revise inter-cultural policy, which appears as the famous “multiculti” – a source of the European sense of pride for so many years. The challenge of interculturality in crisis response operations is first to identify, and second to provide, a safe working environment. These actions are necessary to obtain, by coalition forces, information, the possibility of sharing it along with understanding of the situation, synchronization of activities and assessment of progress in the agreement with partners of international organizations and indigenous peoples.

Based on the international experience, it can be concluded that inter-cultural upskilling is an extremely important and legitimate element of the armed forces training course. Moreover, in the perspective of future operations, it is relevant to conduct incisive research of its diverse operating environment.

It is, therefore, appropriate to rely on all possible experiences in this field and to analyse the operations undertaken by the civil and military components. On the other hand, it can be argued that the formation of an international coalition requires not only political decisions but also a respect, trust, patience, a high level of allies knowledge and a cultural sensitivity. In order to be more effective and prevent emerging problems, civil and military organizations should undertake a number of initiatives related to the implementation of cultural awareness. Culture and aspects of interculturality should be systematically included in training, doctrines and planning procedures for operations held outside the country. Cultural experts should be involved in the operation from the beginning so that they can support their participants (Kucharczyk, 1996, p. 51–71).

It should be emphasized that cultural awareness must not only be included in the planning process, but also throughout the whole operation period. Determinants and cultural factors should be prepared and collected to create a common information base of a given conflict region. Due to the emphasis on the understanding of the civilian population, its customs and tradition, the skill of information acquisition through the human factor is of particular importance. The essence of this component is to acquire information. However, in the context of action, attention should be paid to the quality and sources of this information, which are the basis of an unconventional acting in the area of operation. It is necessary to highlight the changing action conditions in which basic cultural information may occur not to be sufficient (Best, Cumming, 2007, p. 4–8).

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGICAL BASES

It is worth highlighting that interculturality is an interdisciplinary area of knowledge. It is therefore justified to argue that, despite numerous studies and experiments in this field, interculturality and intercultural awareness are a challenge for the armed forces as well as for those who provide training in the environment of conducting the operations. Through the systematic approach to the problem of the cultural environment, to the specificity of planning and to the operational capacity, it is necessary to identify knowledge along with understanding and ability to communicate in a foreign situation. The analysis of this general issue will also consider more specific research problems, such as the foundation of modern emergency response operations, the impact of the cultural environment, achieving the purpose of the operation, and also the problem of preparing the operation participants to achieve objectives in terms of interculturalism.

Adaptation of the research problem of multiculturalism in military operations seems to be expedient also due to the lack of Polish scientific literature discussing intercultural issues in terms of achieving the objectives of emergency response operations held by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.

Literature related to the interculturalism and its correlation with the activities of the Armed Forces consists mainly of foreign publications and literature associated with crisis response operations based primarily on research activities, monographs and other academic studies produced in the area of security and international relations.

Accordingly to the foregoing assumption, the purpose of this article is to identify cognitive interculturalism and its role in crisis response operations. While the utilitarian purpose is to determine changes in objectives of a training program designed for participants in emergency response operations in the field of intercultural communication.

The object of the conducted research was to implement environmental emergency response operations and to subject the characteristics of the environment and participants in the multinational forces.

The contribution of International Security Assistance Force in crisis response, despite the results of the politico-military situation and the changing significance of armed violence in achieving political conflict in Europe and the world, continues to play a significant role. The essence of the modification also affects the changes taking place in the armed forces and determines the environmental operations.

Conclusions from the analysis of contemporary actions indicate that the risk of operations in the area is often associated with a lack of understanding or lack of participants' knowledge of cultural backgrounds and social conflict. Therefore, interculturalism is becoming an important part of our lives not only in terms of crisis response operations but also the functioning of an open European society.

The main reason to undertake this study was to identify the problems arising from the perception and the definition of the unknown culture and the problems of security and defence in the field of interculturalism. Social sciences recognize the subject of the study as a real and in the same time abstract.

A real subject defines everything that is able to observe with the senses. By analyzing this approach one can conclude that the senses record, store information and observe phenomena. The result of this study is a scientific statement that can mean a collection of scientific truths or a historically-created system of knowledge, and even a set of ideal arguments.

Assuming the interdisciplinary character of the research, as well as cognitive and utilitarian purpose, object and subject of study (in which the state of development of the theory and pragmatic action can be distinguished) can be specified (Sztumski, 2005, p. 20). The motivator to undertake these studies was the realization of problems arising from the interculturalism in crisis response operations.

The subject of the crisis response to the environment and the object, i.e. its characteristics, the environment and participants in multinational forces, are issues arising from the research subject, analysis of the study and the problem situation (Kamiński, 1998, p. 17–20).

In order to achieve the purpose of the study following main research, the problem was raised: To what extent interculturalism determines achievement for emergency response operations? The research required to develop partial problems for methodological testing:

1. What are the objectives of modern emergency response operations?
2. In which cultural environments did crisis operations take place at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries?
3. How does the cultural environment affect accomplishments of the operation?
4. How to prepare participants of the operation to achieve established intercultural goals?

Responses to the selected problems have allowed finding the main solution to the problem and to achieve research objective. They result in a research material which synthesis constitutes the content of the article.

## HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH PROCEDURE

By creating research hypotheses for inter-cultural considerations in crisis response operations, one of the basic conditions was a clear reference to this consideration, which could provide answers to questions arising from problems. In addition, it was important to have reasoned hypotheses, because this was a reference to the theoretical or empirical knowledge of the problem. It was also reasonable to evaluate conditions of verifiability of hypotheses.

During the research process, the main hypothesis (in a logical sense) was adopted: it was that interculturality is one of the main determinants of achieving the goal of crisis response operations because of its cultural environment, its social attitudes, its value system, intercultural communication, religion, language, traditions and customs.

The general hypothesis is expressed by several detailed hypotheses. The detailed hypotheses stem from detailed research problems related to the assumptions of contemporary crisis response operations.

The basic premise of a crisis response operation is to remove the causes and effects of a crisis and bring about a systemic change in its social environment to a level that does not allow for a recurrence of the crisis under previous circumstances. The purpose of crisis response operations is not to deprive the local population of subjectivity, but to create its conditions for safe development. The effects of crisis response operations do not impose on the local population a specific lifestyle, language, culture, or moral principles. During the operation, inter-cultural communication occurs that results in one of the conditions for achieving its goals.

The environment of modern crisis response operations is multidimensional and multifaceted. Crisis response operations from the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries were carried out on the border of European-Asian civilization and in a homogeneous Arab civilization. Civilization frontiers have a positive influence on inter-cultural communication because of their previous contacts, while a homogeneous environment hampers communication due to their lack of communication. Communication with people from different civilizations is at risk of misunderstanding or error in understanding interactions. The environment of crisis response operations affects interactions between different cultures. This requires participants to learn about the culture, religion, language, and customs of the area. The determined civilizational environment of the operation requires its participants to reject ethnocentric attitudes towards inter-cultural communication.

The multicultural environment of crisis response operations is an important process of information exchange – an act of communication and understanding between representatives of different cultures, influencing the achievement of the purpose of crisis response operations. Adequate preparation of participants to achieve its goal should take into account civilizational and cultural aspects in order to achieve the expected level of intercultural communication. The civilization and cultural environment of the operation, in a view of its location, will manifest its cohesion as an instrument for defending its identity, therefore it is necessary to convince the local people of the intentions and objectives of the operation to gain them to build their future.

In conclusion, it is reasonable to put a probationary hypothesis that interculturality significantly influences the achievement of the purpose of crisis response operations in a diverse cultural environment. Hence, participants in crisis response operations should be properly prepared in terms of knowledge of similarities and cultural differences to have the capacity to establish inter-cultural communication. The result of inter-cultural preparation should be the ability to communicate, tolerate, and understand other civilizations in terms of their expectations, aspirations, and values.

In order to achieve objective results, a specific test procedure was used. The process of conducting the study has been divided into stages, which constitute the scientific method. In the conducted research, the procedure was organized and carried out according to phases and stages of scientific work. In general, this research paper has adopted the overall research procedure (Table 1):

1. the stage of preliminary research,
2. the stage of applied research,
3. the stage of finalization of the research.

The first stage of scientific research (theoretical stage) consisted of formulating a problematic situation and developing a research procedure. Then the research methods, techniques and tools were selected and the working hypotheses (main and detailed) were developed. The research was subjected to the process of conceptualization through which a precise conceptual apparatus was created. The exemplification method enabled access to study with hypotheses, and the research material was used as illustration and hypothesis verification.

In the next stage, theoretical and practical research was taken into consideration to allow achieving the final goal. Accounting the typology of social research, it should be emphasized that research was conducted within a Muslim society from the border of various civilizational circles. This undertaking involved

research that ultimately established research methods which then allowed verifying the accepted objectives. The implementation of applied research was possible due to use of the monographic method, observation method and questionnaire. The utilized qualitative analysis, along with the classification of issues and dependencies, completed the statistical analysis, what enabled to point out all dependencies between elements of the studied system or environment.

As a result of the implemented methods, a comprehensive picture of the problem was obtained. Theoretical and empirical studies were organized and conducted. Moreover, the hypotheses were tested.

In the final stage of the study, the material was verified and the results were tested in a synthetic form. This procedure enabled the summary of the study as a whole, as well as the final editing of the doctoral dissertation.

**Table 1.** Course of the research procedure

Stages	Actions	
<b>Stage I Preliminary research</b>	step 1.	formulating a problematic situation
	step 2.	preliminary defining and identifying the research problem
	step 3.	collecting of source materials
	step 4.	developing a research procedure
	step 5.	selection of research methods, techniques and tools
	step 6.	formulation of working hypotheses: main and detailed
	step 7.	conceptualization of research
	step 8.	creation of a precise conceptual apparatus
	step 9.	exemplification, which led to the study with some hypotheses
	step 10.	verification of pre-applied methods, techniques and research tools
<b>Stage II Applied Research</b>	step 11.	selection of research sample
	step 12.	preparation of research tools – questionnaire survey and interview
	step 13.	application of qualitative and quantitative analysis
	step 14.	classification of issues
	step 15.	formulation of dependencies
	step 16.	organizing and implementing theoretical and empirical research
	step 17.	statistical analysis of data collected from survey questionnaires and interviews
	step 18.	pointing all dependencies between elements of the studied system or environment

Stages	Actions	
<b>Stage III Finalization of research</b>	step 19.	preparation of empirical data for statistical analysis and calculation
	step 20.	qualitative and quantitative analysis
	step 21.	preliminary verification of hypotheses
	step 22.	interpretation of the results of theoretical research, survey research and focus group interview, in the context of research problems
	step 23.	publishing the research results
	step 24.	verification of hypotheses
	step 25.	development of assumptions and guidelines for planning the training in the field of cross-cultural interventions in crisis response operations
	step 26.	preparation of final conclusions and results of research in the form of a doctoral dissertation

**Source:** Own elaboration.

The use of the given methods is justified due to the interdisciplinary character of the conducted research. Into research, methods tools and research techniques were applied accordingly to the process of the research and its objectives.

Due to the interdisciplinary character of the research in the field of social sciences, the essence and nature of this science should be emphasized in the context of its dissertation. Inter-cultural issues in crisis response operations are closely linked to the field of social sciences, the discipline of defence science, security, politics and sociology. In addition, the research area refers to the humanities in cultural and anthropological fields.

The probability of the reliability of the test results was based on statistical inference. Within the statistical inference, one of the two potential coefficients was distinguished. It is verification that tests statistical hypotheses by checking certain assumptions about the type of theoretical distribution, parameters of this distribution and the interdependence of features.

The probability of the test results was verified by means of the verification index and through the severity test group. They are constructed to make it as unlikely as possible to commit a second kind of error with a predetermined and accepted probability of making the first kind of error. This probability  $\alpha$  is defined as the level of significance. Significantly small positive numbers were considered as significant:

- $\alpha = 0.1$  (level of high significance),
- $\alpha = 0.05$  (level of medium significance),
- $\alpha = 0.01$  (level of low significance).

In fact, only one of the two possible choices is tested. Rejected hypothesis or stated at this level of significance for the results obtained in the sample have no grounds for rejection.

During field research, 423 people were tested in different cultural areas. After the verification, 123 questionnaires were rejected. The basis for the rejection of the questionnaire was the impossibility to read the data. As a result of the research and verification, 300 questionnaires were filled-in correctly. During the focus group interview, 48 respondents were surveyed. Based on the received responses, 8 of them were rejected as not meeting the criterion for further study.

The survey imposed an age restriction on respondents – minimum 18 years old with writing and reading skills.

The population surveyed during the focus group interview was not chosen due to the position or military rank but to the length of staying in the Republic of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The research was based on the experience of Polish officers serving in Afghanistan and among other participants, a component of multinational forces from Canada, Germany and France.

Although the gender criterion was not a major determinant of the selection of population, gender-based discrepancies in the survey and focus study were demonstrated.

During field research, 59% of the respondents were male and 41% were female. This almost equal division is insignificant with regard to the research problem among Muslim women, to which research results will show the general problem of the study. For comparison, during the focus study, only three women participated in the study of crisis response operations. It should be underlined that gender does not play a significant role in the importance of research issues.

Intentionally, the selection of the population was associated with the choice of conducting research in the Middle East and North Africa. This was due to the need to demonstrate the effect and impact of religious aspects on all spheres of life in the area of operation.

The age of the respondents can be determined in the range from 25 to over 45 years. The largest group of respondents were between 25 and 35 years old – 227 people. Subsequently, 36 respondents were between 18 and 25 years old. In addition, 20 respondents were between 35 and 45 years. The smallest group of respondents are those over 45 years of age.

Intercultural research in crisis response operations has been carried out in several parts of the world. The main motivating factor for research in different regions was the cultural, social and religious criterion and multinational forces

in this area. The focus was primarily on the potential for research in single and multicultural areas. The result of this assumption was to conduct research in countries with different ethnic, religious and geographical structures.

## MODERN CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS – RESEARCH FINDINGS

Socio-cultural understanding is a result of a series of actions that over time lead to the building of intercultural awareness: starting with respect, building a fundamental relationship between multinational forces and local society, trust and creating a team that will have all the features of multiculturalism.

To illustrate these considerations, the structure of the factor scale was used. The data used in the study come from an interview questionnaire conducted among participants in the mission and operations in Afghanistan.

The random sample consisted of 40 members of coalition forces. Only those who spent a minimum of three months in Afghanistan were included in the analysis.

Analyses assessed the essence of cultural awareness during operations against other needs related to the level of knowledge of participants in the operation, according to V. Schrab (Schrab, 1943, p. 16–25). Selected needs have been based on obligatory courses performed during the preparatory training of soldiers qualified for the Polish Military Contingent.

Respondents' assessment of the need for understanding cultural differences, in comparison to other competencies, were identified by the variables of responses to the questions in the questionnaire (Appendix I). Is cross-cultural understanding – cultural awareness – less important, as important as, or more important than:

- V 1 – Military discipline,
- V 2 – Psychology,
- V 3 – Situation of civilian environment,
- V 4 – International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflicts,
- V 5 – Legal training,
- V 6 – Improvised Explosive Device countermeasures.

Respondents assessed the importance of understanding the cultural difference with respect to others (Table 2) using the Stapel's scale, from -5 to +5, where these values were:

- -5 was definitely less important,
- 0 – equally important,
- +5 – definitely important.

Furthermore, 2% of respondents chose “*hard to say*” category for at least one pair of needs without revealing their preferences, but they did not refuse to answer. On the one hand, the omission of missing answers in the analyses distort their results and, on the other hand, as G. King, J. Honaker, A. Josephi, and K. Scheve has rightly pointed out, it does not make sense to imply values that do not exist (G King, J Honaker, A Joseph, K Scheve, 2001, p. 49–69).

Imputation is justified only when the respondent has an attitude but does not disclose it. In practice, it is difficult to determine unequivocally whether a respondent actually has no opinion on a given topic or just does not want to disclose it, masking this fact by saying “*hard to say*”. Therefore, the answers *hard to say* were not assigned to the rating scale.

Structural equation modelling, i.e., the factorial analysis, was used to construct a factorial scale to measure the substance of cultural awareness during operations in Afghanistan and evaluate its validity.

Calculations were made (Table 2, 3) in SPSS (Amos). Variables, used as indicators in the measurement model of the essence of intercultural awareness, were measured on the order scale. In this situation, one can treat the scale as a compartmental.

The results of a statistical analysis based on factorial scale indicate the validity of the thesis that participants in operations in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan positively identify the importance of knowledge in terms of cultural diversity. Researchers pointed out that military discipline is fundamental, but this material is not new and the time spent on improving it is more important to spend on something more important. Certainly, more important than the problem of cultural diversity is training against counterfeit explosive charges. Respondents had trouble deciding on variable V3, namely, the situation of the civilian environment. This is due to the fact that the subject should be included in interculturality, as well as the cultural studies that are present in the training before going on a mission. Variables V4 and V5, these are the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflicts and Legal Training – Rule of Engagement, were defined at a similar level of significance as intercultural awareness.

**Table 2.** The assessment of the suitability of obligatory courses implemented during the preparatory training of soldiers classified as PKW Iraq in relation to cultural awareness

CATEGORIES	Respondents																			
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	IX	XII	XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	XVII	XVIII	XIX	XX
variable																				
V1	-5	-5	+5	0	+5	+5	0	+5	+5	+5	+5	?	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	0	0
V2	0	-5	+5	?	0	0	0	+5	0	?	0	0	0	0	+5	+5	+5	?	+5	-5
V3	-5	-5	0	0	+5	+5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+5	+5	+5	+5
V4	0	-5	-5	+5	0	-5	+5	+5	+5	+5	+5	0	+5	+5	0	+5	0	0	+5	+5
V5	0	-5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-5	0	-5	-5	0	-5	0	-5	-5	-5	0
V6	-5	-5	-5	0	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5

Source: Own elaboration.

**Table 3.** Assessment of the suitability of compulsory subjects performed during the preparatory training of participants in operations held in Afghanistan in respect of relation to cultural awareness

CATEGORIES	Respondents																			
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	IX	XII	XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	XVII	XVIII	XIX	XX
variable																				
V1	+5	-5	0	0	+5	+5	+5	-5	+5	+5	+5	+5	?	-5	+5	+5	+5	+5	0	0
V2	0	-5	0	?	0	0	0	+5	+5	0	0	0	0	0	?	+5	?	?	+5	-5
V3	0	-5	0	0	+5	+5	0	0	0	0	-5	0	0	-5	0	0	+5	+5	+5	+5
V4	+5	-5	+5	+5	0	-5	-5	+5	+5	+5	0	0	+5	0	+5	+5	+5	0	+5	+5
V5	0	-5	+5	+5	0	-5	-5	+5	+5	-5	0	-5	-5	0	-5	0	+5	-5	-5	0
V6	-5	-5	-5	0	-5	-5	-5	0	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	+5

Source: Own elaboration.

It appears, therefore, that the results of this study, in connection with intercultural awareness and understanding of cultural differences, give grounds to assert that they have a multidimensional and interdisciplinary character. In addition, it can also be suggested that this substitution is a hidden variable. This creates a conceptual measurement model based on assuming the existence of a hidden variable. In addition, there are several hidden variables, so there is a chance to explain the correlation observable variables.

As a result of the analysis and cultural experience of participants in multinational forces, it is necessary to conclude that intercultural awareness is shaped throughout life, in principle influenced by experience and situations, where there was a chance of contact with the local population in Afghanistan.

Participation in crisis response operations under the aegis of NATO and the significant role of the United States in the presented examples is a testament to the determinants of international environmental impact in certain parts of the world. The dynamically changing environment creates new challenges for international security. It can be argued that the actions of coalition members are based on the view that instability in different parts of the world, especially where terrorist organizations, extremist movements, fundamentalists can spread to other areas, thereby affecting the level of national and international security. It is then reasonable to argue that there is a need for intervention in these regions of the world and help the international community. First of all with a focus on the highly developed the European Union Member States and the North Atlantic Alliance, organizations that support pro-state mechanisms and democratic processes in crisis regions. This obliges all intervening parties to make the necessary adaptation effort within the state to meet these challenges. It also highlights the need for economic, social and military engagement in addressing global security issues. Hence the participation of participants in the international coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan.

#### MULTICULTURALISM FOR PEOPLE AND THE ROLE OF INTERCULTURALISM – RESEARCH FINDINGS

In Western culture, it is very popular to use words like ‘all’, ‘every’, ‘always’, ‘everywhere’, ‘often’, or ‘usually’. People often assume that their beliefs and their understanding of phenomena are the most sensible, true, important, universal for everyone and everywhere. This also applies to culture and art. Perception

changes when people leave the country or civilization. It suddenly turns out that their values and behaviours are inappropriate or even incomprehensible to the local population. The multiplicity of cultures meant that they were still in the process of developing and systematizing so-called cultural variables. In this context, the most important are the relations between the different cultures that realize international transactions. Therefore, we can distinguish eight different types of cultures, due to trade or negotiation, namely cultural, transactional, solemn and hierarchical, not solemn, egalitarian, polychromatic, reserved and expressive (Michałowska, 1997, p. 42–43).

In turn, the types of cultures could be replaced by the continent in which they are located, or the culture: European, Asian, Arab, African, American, South African.

It is also possible to distinguish the typology of religious cultures. Religion is a system of beliefs and practices adopted in society, and therefore elements that form the notion of “culture”. This is a very important aspect in the context of research into interculturalism. It can be distinguished by the culture of Christian Orthodox, Muslims, Buddhists, Judaic, Chinese, Protestants (Lizak, 1997, p. 71–73).

It is thus possible to distinguish the types of cultures that occur in each country due to the relationship. On this basis, it is possible to identify the symbolic, social, national, folk, mass media, niche and any other counterculture. There are three zones of categories of the cultural diversity of interdependence: ideology, political practice and description of social reality. Ideology is primarily a doctrine, an idea, a philosophy and a basic social activity. For example, it is a curriculum that teaches the content of schools at the lowest level of education. Children on every continent have been shocked by the rules of the cultural circle. They live and grow up according to the philosophy of life, which has the right to be different in other cultures and societies. The political practice involves the implementation of the principles of social ideology. Its subject groups and people with cultural characteristics differ from the dominant culture. The last sphere, the description of social reality, is an objective fact of the coexistence of different cultures in society and the related consequences and problems.

Very strong tendencies are increasing interest in national and international organizations with national and cultural problems. They affect the direction and intensity of interaction in the international community – equally at the global, regional and national level. Defining functioning of international entities is particularly the process of defining their interests and decision-making.

A sign of the growing importance of cultural issues is the increasing number of ethnic-religious and social conflicts. Society feels rising threats by the influx of migrants, the flood of foreign cultural patterns, loss of national identity and respect for tradition. In the meantime, the possibility for States to provide safety culture for its citizens is decreasing. This fact is increasingly becoming a source of danger for the cultural identity of ethnic and religious groups (Golka, 1997, p. 54).

The growing importance of the cultural factor does not, however, mean the loss of importance of the traditional dimension of security. It should be noted that all its components are related and the artificial isolation of one element is justified for analytical and purely scientific purposes. This in particular concerns the relationship between political, cultural and military security. Safety culture is political, because of the risks and the definition of the protected entities as a political act. In addition, specific security phenomena of the dimension of cultural legitimacy give a specific government policy. Despite the increased political importance of non-state actors, it should be borne in mind that they are still important actors on the international scene.

## INTERCULTURALISM IN THE MILITARY OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT – RESEARCH FINDINGS

Providing security is certainly a viable way to improve intercultural communication. Otherwise, people behave in a situation of guaranteed peace and security as the basic existential necessity of man as in eternal crisis and state of instability, like in Afghanistan or Iraq. It is important to have an empathy, mutual understanding and compassion, and above all, to have respect for cultural and religious diversity. These elements are intercultural. It is important to be able to feel the needs of the other person and understand her or his way of thinking along with her or his life situation. Without it, no matter what the reasons, it will be a fight where two sides will lose. Therefore, one should:

- learn about another culture, religion and customs,
- try to understand it,
- demonstrate understanding and patience in getting to know each other.

In this connection, what role the multicultural context of participants in crisis response operations should have to play? A multicultural and intercultural context fulfils not only a cognitive role but can also initiate an element of

dialogue in mutual contacts. In addition, it makes it easier to arrange contacts with local communities through the knowledge of their culture, religion or social relationships. Much greater acceptance in intercultural relationships bring people who do not try to impose their own way of thinking or behaviour. In Muslim communities, it will be hard to find the conviction that something new will mean better and more useful. The Muslim *umamah* is quite homogeneous and has traditional societies, which rather suspiciously refer to people coming from abroad. That is why it is all more important for the Armed Forces to be stationed in a specific area.

There are prejudices that manifest themselves in a general unwillingness to other different groups. Found on both sides – a strange dress and behaviour. The attitude of the local population with an additional military contingent come to the forefront of nationalism: let them go back where they came from, we do not want them here, they speak a different language, which we do not understand, we can fool them, etc. Typical allegations against the different communities which are accused of receiving the work, the use of the social system, the dominance of foreign customs of the natives.

A multicultural context is the unification of society through the ability to know and understand local people and their culture. In this regard, these are knowledge, learning, support, activation of the local population, positive relationships, knowledge of cultures, confidence and knowledge transfer.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that interculturality is a network of interaction that aims to improve and influence the relationship between participants in crisis response operations and the civilian population and between participants in the operation.

#### PREPARING THE POLISH MILITARY QUOTA IN TERMS OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION – RESEARCH FINDINGS

The conclusions of the study conditions of the cultural achievement of the operation indicate that their nature requires extensive cultural knowledge. Religion and culture are a powerful force, which simultaneously connects and divides society. Lack of skills of agreement among societies causes the phenomenon of troublemaking.

The study shows the low socio-cultural awareness and lack of knowledge in the area of operations. There have also been no published materials that will

move the whole intercultural issue into crisis response operations. Only a few are available, but generally, there is no proposal for a direct security culture in a given area. Participants of the Armed Forces did not have the possibility of finding didactic material created specifically for their needs. An interesting material would also cover the experience of CIMIC undertaken activities. An increase of knowledge about interculturality should be put at the very beginning of education (Elak, 2010, p. 45).

There are not too extensive databases and applications on the activities of the Armed Forces actions in a multicultural environment. This is closely related to SI participants in the Multinational Forces taking part in the conflict. It turns out that cultural training does not meet needs or is too extensive. On this basis, there appeared a need for a comprehensive cross-cultural and intercultural communication training for crisis response operations.

Education in the field of multicultural communication and interculturalism should be carried out continuously throughout the period of training of the Armed Forces. Therefore, it is reasonable to undertake educational activities such as:

- introduce the subject of intercultural education in the Armed Forces, which is a separate part of socio-cultural or civilizational security implemented in academies and colleges for officers,
- intensify the cultural training for future participants in emergency response operations,
- expand knowledge of intercultural postgraduate studies.

The subject including teaching intercultural issues should be conducted on the first stage of education of future officers, and as an introduction to the further exploration of the issue providing on military academies, also for the composition of the educational and training curriculum should cover the following social issues:

- culture,
- cultural identity,
- education in multiculturalism,
- importance of religion in the culture,
- civilizations of the world,
- faces of multiculturalism,
- collision and socio-cultural dialogue,
- interculturalism (intercultural nature, intercultural determinants),
- opportunities, threats and challenges of interculturalism.

Continuing studies on the second degree for officers should be the safety of the socio-cultural, moving subjects crisis response operations and space factor of socio-cultural. Conclusions from the analysis of the knowledge of the cultural awareness factors can be presented through the mandatory topics that will broaden knowledge of the issues:

- international safety (place of safety socio-cultural),
- nowadays crisis response operations,
- operational aspects of emergency response operations (NATO, the EU, the UN),
- the militarization of culture,
- cultural strategy,
- Iraq (interculturalism Iraq, actions, cultural experiences of soldiers PKW Iraq),
- Afghanistan (interculturalism Afghanistan, the role of interculturalism in the ISAF operation, cultural experiences PKW Afghanistan),
- Balkans (cultural identification in the Balkans),
- multicultural international environment,
- intercultural communication,
- negotiation.

Another aspect of the training can be active cultural training for future participants in crisis response operations (Roman, Bassarab, 2008, p. 3–5). Without focusing on these issues during the training of the Armed Forces there will be no positive reinforcement. The culture of the region comprises only one of several aspects of the training of soldiers. Moreover, it is essential that the aim of this training is to deepen knowledge and understanding of useful principles of intercultural communication, not the creation of experts in the field. It is hard to understand the mentality of another community and its values and principles in just several hours. However, it is important to be aware of them and to try to understand them. The real challenge is to use acquired rules in the area of operations, to not break them.

Training of Polish military contingents in a cultural context requires a detailed analysis of the area and cultural conditions in the region. The teaching process must be adapted to the continuous changes in social conditions in the field of activities. Training programs should be constantly updated and tailored to the needs of the participants in the operation. It is important to respond to training for future functions and tasks that will have to fulfil the additional learning needs.

The basis of the training system of cultural or intercultural competence should be held through cultural analysis, which will include answers to the following questions:

1. What are the similarities between us (PMC) and the local people?
2. What makes us different and can it cause conflicts?
3. What elements of everyday life are not seen, namely, what area of life will be available for us?

The next step is to prepare an extensive SWOT analysis on the basis of which all these elements will be developed:

- asset, advantage, analyzed the advantage of society and the environment,
- weaknesses, considering a weakness as a barrier analyzed in society and the environment,
- chance of positive change,
- threats, an example of everything that would cause a change at the expense of society and the environment.

A tool that allows an increase of the accuracy and effectiveness of planned activities is the method of PEST, differently called as a general segmentation of the environment. On the basis of the environment, it is divided into:

- political and legal,
- economic,
- social,
- technology.

This method is used to study the macro-environment, and in this aspect – a different cultural environment conducts emergency response operations. The essence of this tool is to identify the key areas of the environment, meaning those areas that may have a crucial impact on the functioning of society and its further actions.

On the basis of the gathered information, it is possible to collect basic socio-cultural information. This will be done by revisiting the approach of the local population to name, identity, ethnicity, language, territory, and the approach to weapons, violence, culture, traditional beliefs, legends, symbols, and taboos (Roman, Bassarab, 2008, p. 3–5).

The essence of cultural analysis, in order to achieve the effectiveness of the activities conducted by emergency response operations, will also be getting answers to the following questions:

- What makes the group creating a structure, the mutual network connections?

- How to describe social groups, their history, and determine whether its origin?
- How organized are groups of different social relations (class, ethnicity, tribalism)?
- What are the motivations of the ruling groups?
- Who has the most popular support?

To sum up, it should be highlighted that the participants of multinational contingents should be properly prepared in terms of cultural similarities and differences, to have the ability to establish communication. The effect of the intercultural preparation should be the ability to establish communication, tolerance and understanding of other civilizations in terms of their expectations, aspirations and values.

## CONCLUSIONS

To conclude from each part of this dissertation it was required to identify challenges and prospects of interculturalism in crisis response operations. Based on the survey, it was specified that the challenge for coalition forces will be primarily the implementation of interculturalism and intercultural awareness in the process of military planning. In this context, the important knowledge to gain would consider:

- culture and values of the society in the area of operations,
- perception and communication of the society to the intervention forces,
- emotional needs of the local population.

The challenge facing interculturality is cultural relativism, which in the contemporary world becomes increasingly difficult to manage. A proposition that assumes that every culture has some value is self-evident. Still, culture in crisis response becomes a challenge in the context of different civilizations and their cultures.

The another challenge of interculturality is to build one common, cohesive, multicultural society. The media, which inoculate the social attitudes and values in people living in different corners of the world, play an important role here. The media form human view and values of the world, namely what we consider good or bad, positive, negative, or moral. It turns out media can as well hinder influence on the vision of creating an intercultural society.

The challenge of interculturality is presenting cross-cultural information in an attractive way to the media in writing and speech and that it would be marked by negative narration.

The challenge for the Polish army is to properly present itself on the international forum. This is the key to strengthening Polish position as one of the guarantors of the modern international security system. It is also important to include socio-cultural aspects in the training programs. Thus, the flexible adaptation of the training program to the dynamically changing tactics of the opponent so that the soldiers are as versatile as possible in what they may encounter in the area of operations. It is fundamental to replace the overloaded theoretical material by other that can be applied in the activities (Collett, 2012, p. 4).

However, this does not change the fact that the closest perspective for interculturality can have a two-fold scenario. On the one hand, in a military context, the development of intercultural issues should be developed through effective and substantive training and courses, and, on the other hand, it may provoke hostility. It turns out that people are no longer so optimistic about interculturality and the idea of *multiculti*. The rise of nationalist movements in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Poland is noticeable. The negative phenomenon is also hostility of economic migrants, seeking better living or social wellbeing in some European countries (mainly in Great Britain, Germany, France and the Scandinavian countries), towards citizens of different civilizations.

In a military context, it should be anticipated that the improving of preparation of contingents for crisis response operations will be made. What is more, the skill and experience of the soldiers should occur in combination with speed and efficiency. International experience shows that the military is also largely based on a non-military system that supports action in a variety of situations. That is the reason why, over time, the value of people with specialist knowledge of areas affected by crisis response will increase.

Taking into account the need to verify the hypothesis, a monographic method of analysis and criticism of literature research was used as the research method – a diagnostic method that was sufficient to achieve the research objective.

It is worth to emphasize that in the long-term perspective, intercultural research must consider other aspects of interculturality, such as the methodology of training in this field or the negotiation of culturally diverse environments.

The conclusions of the study confirmed the hypothesis that interculturalism is one of the main determinants of achieving the objectives of emergency

response operations, due to the cultural environment in which it is conducted, social attitudes, value system, intercultural communication, religion, language, traditions and customs.

The chance of the armed forces to successfully achieve the goal of the operation is to integrate the activities of specialists and intercultural experts beginning in the field of land recognition and the preparation of operations. Therefore, knowledge of interculturality is a resource enabling the greatest possible civil-military cooperation to avoid conflict or its spread.

Apparent of the fact that interculturalism is not only feasible, results in an immediate dialogue and compromise. Soldiers–anthropologists cannot solve all the problems, but their presence reduces the number of military operations by up to 60%, accordingly to the American experience. Equally important, for the participants of abroad operations, are language skills, and the particular role played by interpreters of foreign languages, including Arabic, Farsi, Dari, and Pashtu. In addition, the essence of anthropologists and translators in the area of operations is increasingly emphasized by the fact that the negotiations can often be ineffective without them.

While making conclusions about generalizations related to interculturality in response to the crisis, it should be highlighted that it is a dualistic way of checking reality. Soldier - social and cultural participant of the operation, by studying the reality will use interculturalism for military purposes (going beyond the scientific vision of the basic theory of intercultural anthropology). Interculturality is a practical field of learning and can be fully tested in empirical field research that was presented in this thesis. The implementation of intercultural knowledge can bring many positive events in the activities of participants in the operation. The empirical character of the foregoing image of the intercultural community allows for better relations with the local population, faster access to compromise, rebuilding the destroyed country, and improving the lives of the people in the data area.

The essence of intercultural problems due to the necessity of the participation of international forces in forming global security and the experience of Afghanistan and Iraq should be the basis for reformation of soldiers' training before participation in multinational operations.

Conclusions from the analysis also show that knowledge of the cultural area of conflict may be useful to effectively and efficiently achieve the purpose of the operation. The legitimacy of further research in this field also highlights the fact that the area is closely related to the social sciences, which are a part of the security and

defence. This is confirmed by the purpose of the social sciences, which is to identify the areas of social sciences and scientific disciplines, including their political, security, defence, communication or sociological aspects. In addition, used methods, techniques and tools indicate the ability to use components of social research, which include observations (observation of fact), facts, laws.

It also agrees with the form of accepted studies, according to which the traditional – classic image of the issues is being passed from theory to observation, through the phenomenon of operationalization in the conducted research methods, which are interpenetrating and complementing each other. Whereas the author of the work tried to generalize the conclusions to prioritize the objectivity, openness and logic.

## APPENDIX I

### QUESTIONNAIRE

#### Cross-cultural awareness

1. How do you understand “culture”?
2. What belongs to Arabian culture?
3. What do you think is good in Arabian culture?
4. What is wrong or bad in Arabian culture?
5. Are you interested in another culture?

• Yes
• No
• I have no opinion

6. Is something as interesting in an Arabian culture that you want it to cross over to your country?
7. What should be changed in Arabian culture and why?
8. Which Arabian tradition is interesting for you?

9. Are Libyan people interested in another culture?

• High
• Medium
• Low
• No respect for other cultures

10. Do Libyans read not-Arabic press?

• Yes
• No
• I have no opinion

11. What is the “multiculturalism” and how do you understand it?

12. Do you think the dialogue between cultures is possible and real?

• Yes
• No
• I have no opinion

13. What do Libyans think about people from another culture?

• Yes
• No
• I have no opinion

14. Do you think that multiculturalism is possible in Libya?

• Yes
• No
• I have no opinion

*Thank You for Your time*

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# REVIEWS

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Agnieszka Turska-Kawa, *Determinanty chwiejności wyborczej*,  
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2015, pp. 326

*Joanna Marszałek-Kawa\**

In 2015, the University of Silesia Press published Agnieszka Turska-Kawa's book entitled *Determinanty chwiejności wyborczej* [*The Determinants of Electoral Volatility*]. This young researcher, who is a recognised scholar in the circles of political science and aims to submit her post-doctoral thesis, focuses on the issues of political parties and electoral systems. Among A. Turska-Kawa's scientific achievements are theoretical and empirical works, including three monographs, several dozen publications in high impact Polish and foreign journals, several dozen chapters in monographs, and research reports. Agnieszka Turska-Kawa has a graduate degree in political science from the Institute of Political Science at the University of Silesia in Katowice. She has also completed psychology studies. For years, she has developed as a scholar, at the same time undertaking

a number of promotional and organisational activities. For example, she was one of the initiators of the Society of Scientific Initiatives, which she headed for many years. At present, she is the Director of the Electoral Research Section. She has organised two panels on election issues at Political Science Congresses.

There is no doubt that studies conducted by this ambitious scholar from the University of Silesia have a high empirical value. A. Turska-Kawa's latest monograph is an innovative work. It addresses issues that have not been the subject of a broad and in-depth discussion in the body of Polish literature yet. The author presents the results of her research and compares them to the findings of Western scholars. She also designs research processes and tools of her own, and draws up their results with the use of a data analysis programme.

What must be emphasised, Agnieszka Turska-Kawa deals with a problem of high cognitive value. She presents issues that are

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very important also from the practical point of view.

The book, which is a valuable and genuine work, is an in-depth, competent and precise study, in which the author conducts an analysis of the phenomenon of electoral volatility. She does it on the basis of the existing body of literature and her own research findings.

What should be stressed is the fact that not only does Agnieszka Turska-Kawa critically examine particular problems, but she has also grasped an extremely important skill of synthesising multi-aspect relations and phenomena, particularly in the political science, social and psychological dimension. The author's conclusions show her as an erudite and an objective researcher.

The work under review has an exceptionally clear, well thought out and logically cohesive structure. The layout of the monograph is correct from the perspective of the construction of a scientific dissertation. The title of the book accurately reflects the subject of deliberations.

The elaborate introduction includes all necessary components. The author provides definitions of key concepts. She also indicates research methods applied in her work and identifies the goal of her deliberations, i.e., the analysis of the phenomenon of electoral volatility.

Agnieszka Turska-Kawa reflects on the influence of the determinants of electoral volatility, identifies relations between system, social, psychological and economic factors. She also asks questions about mo-

tives belonging to particular groups of determinants.

The elaboration of four research hypotheses formulated in the monograph under review: 1. Electoral volatility is generated by system factors; 2. Electoral volatility is generated by social factors; 3. Electoral volatility is generated by sociological factors; 4. Electoral volatility is generated by economic factors, is carried out by articulating five detailed research questions: 1) What are the relations between the indicated groups of factors?, 2. How relevant are they for the level of electoral volatility?, 3. To what degree are motives belonging to particular groups of subject stable in time?

The book under discussion consists of the *Introduction*, five chapters and the *Conclusion*. At the end, there is a large list of bibliographic references and a personal index.

The first chapter, which is entitled *Electoral Volatility from the Theoretical Perspective*, constitutes theoretical and methodological framework for the monograph. The author provides definitions and indicates causes and effects of the phenomenon of electoral volatility. She notes that "not in every case should the system tend to develop the low level of electoral volatility, which may pose a threat to democracy. This usually occurs when this stability remains at the low level after each successive election, not leaving room for the activity of specific social groups (p. 25)".

The following four parts of the monograph refer to the research hypotheses that

the author posed in the *Introducion*. In chapters two-five, she analyses the determinants of the phenomenon of volatility from the scientific point of view.

The second chapter is entitled *The System Determinants of Electoral Volatility*. The author discusses here issues defining the scope of citizens' electoral participation, such as: the political regime, the electoral system, actions to increase voter turnout, or the party system, the polarisation of the political scene, and election manipulations. This part of the book includes valuable deliberations on the issue addressed in the title, but it lacks a summary in which the author would recapitulate her conclusions concerning every factor she discusses.

In the third chapter, entitled *The Social Determinants of Electoral Volatility*, the young scholar provides a scientific argument on the stability and instability of electoral behaviours. The analysis concerns the issue of belonging to social groups and its consequences. As the author indicates, the fact of being a member of a social group and all interactions connected with it determine an individual's civil competences. What is more, shared values, priorities or attitudes towards socio-political phenomena determine the content of an electoral decision (p. 111). What I find particularly important and justifiable in this part of the book are the conclusions included in subchapter 3.3 (*Actions Aimed at Increasing Voter Turnout*). The author notes that there is an urgent need of taking efforts to increase a poll. As a result, the youngest ci-

tizens would become politically socialised. Agnieszka Turska-Kawa accurately remarks that the adoption of responsibility for the state as the common good and the conviction that citizens have a real influence on the decision-making process will lead to greater electoral stability (p. 135).

In subchapter 3.4 (*Pre-election Polls*), the author looks into an interesting issue of relations between pre-election polls and electoral volatility. She notes that polls reflect real electoral behaviours, based on specific estimates. The researcher also indicates that these special calculations would not be made by voters if the results of the polls were not published (p. 135). In subchapter 3.5, entitled *Democracy 2.0*, the author seeks the causes of the crisis of traditional democracy. She also points out that traditionally defined democracy "does not lose social support, but the occurring processes make it adapt its form to «new» citizens – less interested, less involved, less mediatised, who put emphasis on the indirectness and incidental nature of relations rather than on building permanent bonds" (p. 142).

Chapter four, entitled *The Psychological Determinants of Electoral Volatility*, is of very high cognitive value. The author explains why the analysis of psychological factors is important from the point of view of studies of electoral volatility. What is more, it must be emphasised that she accurately identifies groups of determinants, indicating that people's internal predispositions, such as needs, values, expectations

or personality, define their electoral behaviours (p. 163).

In the last, fifth, chapter of the book, entitled *The Economic Determinants of Electoral Volatility*, Agnieszka Turska-Kawa presents the spheres in which politics and economics merge. She notes that a rational individual is naturally profit-oriented, “thus, the economisation of individual efforts takes place not only in the field of economy, but in every area of people’s life”. The author also points out that economic factors undoubtedly affect voters’ decisions. In her deliberations, she refers to rational choice theory, public choice theory and to retrospective and prospective voting. She also addresses the issue of New Politics, which involves placing more emphasis on environmental problems.

In the final part of the book, the author presents interesting conclusions concerning relations between particular groups

of factors, which refer to the research hypotheses posed in the introductory part.

The book under review deserves attention particularly due to the author’s mature research skills. As I mentioned before, what is an undeniable value of the publication is its solid and diverse source base, which is supplemented by a broad body of foreign literature. Agnieszka Turska-Kawa polemically and thoroughly uses the available theoretical and practical works. In doing so, she makes use of her scientific competence and follows methodological guidelines in the field of political science. Another merit of the book is its highly erudite language. It was written in a very interesting and accessible way, with the use of professional terminology.

To sum up, Agnieszka Turska-Kawa’s book is an original and mature work. It should become an obligatory read for all those who deal with studies of electoral systems.



Piotr Litka, Bogdan Michalec, Mariusz Nowak, *Polskie Archiwum X [The Polish X-Files]*, WAM Publishing House, Kraków 2016, pp. 277

*Natalia Gburzyńska\**

“We acted in this matter outside the box” (after: Litka, Michalec, Nowak, 2016, p. 256) – says Bogdan Michalec, a police officer working in this investigation group, talking about one of the investigations of Krakow’s “the X-Files”. I think that these words are a great illustration of the actions taken when solving each case. “The X-Files” (official name: Operational and Investigative Police Group KWP in Krakow for undetected murders, called “the X-Files”) is a police unit that deals with the detection and solving cases related to the so-called dark figures of crime<sup>1</sup>. Officially the group was founded on January 23rd, 2004, but its activity dates back many years before.

The reviewed publication is a collection of 10 stories in which – sometimes for years

– it was impossible to determine the perpetrators of the crime, and the main characters are two police officers – Bogdan Michalec, the current head of the “X-Files”, and Mariusz Nowak, one of the founders of this unit. Readers have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with their work, with particular phases of each action and specifics of investigations. Each chapter tells a story of one of the victims; however, the reader can indicate many common elements between these stories. One of them is the fact that the perpetrators very often “misrepresent reality” and “enjoy illusion” which aims to confuse the investigators. Another common feature linking many of the crimes is the fact that the missing person is usually reported by someone from their immediate surroundings.

A huge plus of this publication is the terminology used, which sometimes gives the impression that the reader is acquainted with the case files and immediately is able to get to know the fate of the victim

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<sup>1</sup> This term is used to describe deaths considered to be caused by going missing without a trace, drowning, suicide or accidents, in which the perpetrator could not be determined.

before their death. The modern methods of investigation, already mentioned unconventional working methods and knowledge of the recesses of human psyche cause that the Krakow unit has a lot of success in this field. Certainly, the book is also a kind of a work that fights stereotypes and unfair judgments about the helplessness of police officers and their ineffectual actions.

The stories described absorb the reader. They are presented in a clear way without excessive, unnecessary digressions. Interesting additions are the photographs of, e.g., press articles relating to the described crime, or photographs showing where corpse was hidden or where the evidence was discovered. At this point, however, the reader can point to a flaw – some photographs are small in size, giving the impression that they are quite blurry and it is difficult to read from them anything (especially since they are black and white). However, their use has also some advantages, as it helps to further delve into the psyche of the perpetrator and into the presented situation.

The reader can also learn that the actual work on a specific case and theoretical knowledge that a policeman acquired at school, are two completely different notions, and in everyday life facts are not always arranged according to the rules described in course books. This principle is certainly very valuable not only in the work of police investigators. One of the characters comments on this phenomenon: “Every case is different. No scheme can be ap-

plied to the specific case; you cannot take pieces of evidence, transfer them to a computer, apply some patterns and get a result. Such things only happen in movies” (Litka, Michalec, Nowak, p. 16).

Furthermore, extremely important is a fact, which the authors draw attention to – namely, comparing the crimes that happened many years ago with the current ones. It can be said that the only thing that has changed is the technique of committing a crime, while the motivations of the perpetrators still remain the same, e.g., “greed, fear, lust for domination and impunity” (Litka, Michalec, Nowak, p. 18). These phenomena are called “bad emotions” by investigators and in most cases they are the main cause of tragic events.

At this point I would like to draw attention to one of the chapters – *Specyfika Podhala* [*The Specifics of the Highlands*]. It refers directly to the previous chapter – *Bez śladu* [*Without a Trace*], which presents the history of Zakopane. In that part, the police pointed out to the characteristics of the region, i.e., the residents who are clinging to traditional values, such as family and the Catholic faith. Furthermore, the police also present the difficulties arising from the mentality of the people and how to conduct investigations in this area. The entire chapter gives the impression of a “theoretical introduction” into consideration, which – in my opinion – should be included, e.g., at the beginning of the book, preceded by a report of crime in Zakopane. Placing this

chapter in the middle of the publication gives the impression of a chaotic and poorly thought out structure.

*Polskie Archiwum X* [*The Polish X-Files*] is a book which may not appeal to everyone. The crimes' descriptions are sometimes very literal, and outlining the socio-moral situation and perpetrator's psyche infiltration can be a daunting experience, especially for more sensitive readers. How-

ever, I am convinced that this book will appeal to anyone interested in forensics, conducting investigations, and searching for killers, as well as among those who are interested in police work. I recommend it also for students of criminology, forensics, homeland security, as well as psychology or sociology. Certainly, time spent reading will not be lost!