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INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

ALLIANCES, CONFLICT ESCALATION, AND THE OUTBREAK OF INTERSTATE WAR, 1816–2000

SOJUSZE, ESKALACJA KONFLIKTÓW I WYBUCH MIĘDZYPAŃSTWOWYCH WOJEN, 1816–2000

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

In international relations theory alliances are often regarded as factors influencing the incidence of interstate war. This study statistically examines this claim on a population of cases taken from the Correlates of War project data sets, consisting of 3216 instances of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) that occurred in the period 1816–2000, 307 of which were wars. In the test, this initial data set has been divided into three sub-sets comprising: (1) originator dyads, (2) originators-as-initiators-and-joiners-as-targets dyads, and (3) joiners-as-initiators-and-originators-as-targets dyads; and ten variables were used to determine the impact of alliances on whether MIDs will become wars. These variables included unit-, dyad-, and system-level indicators of the presence of alliances, their capabilities and tightness. Combined, this enabled the analysis to test hypotheses related to the capability-aggregation and war-diffusion functions of alliances as

—— **ABSTRAKT** ——

W teorii stosunków międzynarodowych sojusze są często postrzegane jako czynniki wpływające na częstość występowania międzypaństwowej wojny. Niniejsze badanie w sposób statystyczny sprawdza powyższe twierdzenie na populacji zaczerpniętej z baz danych projektu Correlates of War, obejmujących 3216 przypadków zmilitaryzowanych dysput międzypaństwowych, do których doszło w okresie od 1816 do 2000 r., przy czym 307 stanowiły wojny. W ramach tego testu pierwotny zbiór danych podzielono na trzy podzbiory obejmujące: (1) diady pierwotnych uczestników konfliktów, (2) diady, w których pierwotny uczestnik występował jako inicjator, a państwo, które przyłączyło się do konfliktu – jako cel, oraz (3) diady, w których państwo, które przyłączyło się do konfliktu, występowało jako inicjator, a pierwotny uczestnik konfliktu jako cel. Do określenia wpływu sojuszy na to, czy zmilitaryzowane dysputy międzypaństwowe staną się wojnami, wykorzystano natomiast dziesięć zmiennych. Zmienne te obejmowały

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well as arguments on the relationship between polarity and war.

Keywords: alliances, international security, interstate conflicts, theory of war, quantitative methods

jednostkowe, diadyczne i systemowe wskaźniki obecności sojuszy, ich potencjałów i zwartości. Wszystko to pozwoliło na testowanie hipotez odnoszących się do funkcji sojuszy polegających na agregacji potencjałów i rozprzestrzenianiu wojny, a także twierdzeń o związku między biegunowością i wojną.

Słowa kluczowe: sojusze, bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, konflikty międzypaństwowe, teoria wojny, metody ilościowe

A considerable amount of literature in international politics has been focused on the issue of why interstate conflicts occur, and among efforts aimed to answer this question a certain pride was always given to the ultimate type of interstate conflict, i.e. war. These efforts have led scholars to various explanations and pointed to a plethora of unit-, dyad-, and system-level factors that influence the incidence of war (Bennett, Stam, 2007, p. 70–106; Geller, Singer, 1998, p. 46–139), one of the most often regarded as such a factor being alliances (Bennett, Stam, 2007, p. 38–43), either as an independent cause or a feature that effects other causes: conventional deterrence, balance of power/power preponderance, power transition, or system polarity.

The present study aims to statistically examine in what way, if any, alliances influenced the incidence of war in the period 1816–2000. There are several aspects to this problem. First, a distinction has to be made between the outbreak of war between the two initial warring states (originators) and its spreading to other states who enter the fight along these originators (joiners). The latter is a case of war diffusion, so by separating the two events one is able to test the war-diffusion explanation, one of several claims that illustrate how alliances affect the incidence of war. Second, arguments related to various levels of analysis may be utilized to solve the problem. These include distinct properties of the initiators and targets, and their respective alliances (provided there are any), properties of the dyads, and – finally – properties of the international system to which these dyads belong. The present study is intended to employ all three levels. Given this, and third, various unit-, dyad-, and system-level parameters may be applied. At minimum, these should include parameters that indicate whether there are any alliances on each side, in the system, etc., and – if one

intends to test the capability-aggregation explanation, another claim about the relationship between alliances and war – parameters that specify the capabilities of these alliances. Both groups of these variables have been applied in this study as well as measures of tightness (cohesiveness) of alliances. Fourth, there is the question of what to put wars up against. Typically, in cases like this, war is opposed simply to no war (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, 1978, p. 253; Garnham, 1976, p. 239; Houweling, Siccama, 1988, p. 97; Levy, 1981, p. 586–587; Siverson, King, 1980, p. 6). Some scholars, however, have employed a different approach, based on a distinction between conflicts of varying degrees of hostility. Randolph M. Siverson and Michael R. Tennefoss, for example, used a three-point scale of conflicts comprising threat, unreciprocated military action, and reciprocated military action, with the last category including also wars (1984, p. 1059). Similarly, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam constructed their analysis around a five-point scale in which the highest level corresponded to war (2007, p. 63). The following investigation of the relationship between alliances and war is based on a modified version of the latter approach. The reason for this stems from a loose understanding of Kenneth N. Waltz's theory of the causes of war, in which he argued that wars are often a result of special, and sometimes trivial, circumstances that act as immediate (or efficient) causes, as well as of the structure of the international system being the permissive cause (1954, p. 232–238). These special circumstances might lead to war as well as to other conflicts of lesser intensity or scale. However, given that war is the most serious type of conflictual event, and its outbreak is – in many cases – preceded by a series of events that turn minor at first hostilities into full-fledged fighting, it is reasonable to say that a decision to go to war requires at least some nontrivial factors (not necessarily structure) to come into play. Minor conflicts, on the other hand, may develop solely for trivial reasons. Hence, by opposing war to other types of conflict, one is able to – to at least some degree – diminish the impact of special circumstances, which – by definition – are difficult to study and do not form any consistent relationship with anything.

The following text has been divided into six sections. Section one lists the hypotheses that have been tested. Section two consist of a review of previous statistical analyses on the relationship between alliances and war that formed the basis for the problem raised in the previous paragraph and the hypotheses and impacted methodological choices regarding the execution of the present analysis. Section three describes the method employed to identify particular alliances that consists in the use of Kendall's τ_b rank correlation coefficient scores and typal

analysis. Section four illustrates the methodological design of the analysis: data sources, the population of cases, and the variables. Section five contains results of the analysis and their interpretation. Finally, section six comprises more general conclusions and confronts the results of this study with the hypotheses and the results of previous studies.

HYPOTHESES

A total of ten hypotheses and their alternatives have been tested to analyze the relationship between alliances and the outbreak of war. They included:

- unit-level hypotheses:
  - H_1: Having allies by the initiator state increased/decreased the probability of war.
  - H_2: Having allies by the target state increased/decreased the probability of war.
  - H_3: The tighter the alliance bonds in the initiator state's alliance, the higher/lower the probability of war.
  - H_4: The tighter the alliance bonds in the target state's alliance, the higher/lower the probability of war.
  - H_5: The greater the capabilities of the initiator state's alliance, the higher/lower the probability of war.
  - H_6: The greater the capabilities of the target state's alliance, the higher/lower the probability of war.
- dyadic-level hypotheses:
  - H_7: Having an alliance signed by the initiator and target states increased/decreased the probability of war.
  - H_8: The greater the difference between the capabilities of the initiator's and target's alliances, the higher/lower the probability of war.
- system-level hypotheses:
  - H_9: The greater the number of alliance clusters (poles) in the system, the higher/lower the probability of war.
  - H_{10}: The more evenly distributed the capabilities among alliance clusters (poles) in the system, the higher/lower the probability of war.

ALLIANCES AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

As pointed out by Ido Oren, analyses of the relationship between alliances and the incidence of war conducted in the past often did not test any particular theoretical perspective but were attempts to determine the overall impact of alliances (1990, p. 210). In one of the early efforts of this sort, J. David Singer and Melvin Small estimated the correlation between the number of states in alliances each year and the frequency of war (number of wars per year) in the period 1815–1945. The results they obtained were somewhat contradictory, as they observed a negative correlation between the two variables for the nineteenth century and a positive correlation for the twentieth century and the whole period (1967, p. 258–280). A similar research, conducted by Charles W. Ostrom Jr. and Francis W. Hoole, failed to confirm these findings. The authors used Singer and Small's database but found no convincing relationship between the annual number of defense alliance dyads per nation and the annual number of interstate war dyads per nation (1978, p. 219, 233–234).

In a different study of the same sort, Jack S. Levy focused his attention on the great powers in the period 1495–1975 and attempted to determine whether any coherent relationship exists between the formation of alliances involving such states and the outbreak of wars with great power participants. He contended that for the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the formation of alliances within a 5-year period was followed by an average of one-third more war than would be expected by chance. The results were also the opposite for the nineteenth century – about 40% less war than anticipated on the basis of a random distribution of both variables – and mixed (either more or less war, depending on the type of alliances and/or wars), but again pointing rather to a positive correlation between alliance formation and war outbreak for the twentieth century. These findings were also generally supported after switching attention to the proportion of wars preceded by alliance formation (1981, p. 585, 587–590, 601–602).

The atheoretical perspective was employed also by Bennett and Stam, who conducted the probably most comprehensive to date statistical analysis of causes of interstate conflict. The authors tested hypotheses related to all of the most popular causes of war and, with respect to the influence of alliances, found that – in the period 1816–1992 – having a defense pact signed by two states decreased the probability of war between them by 39% in the case of all dyads and by 50% in the case of politically relevant dyads (2007, p. 120–122).

Other studies on alliances and war have been based on international relations theory that tells us alliances may serve several functions. The probably most common view is that they are capability-aggregation mechanisms (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 137–145; Osgood, Tucker, 1967, p. 86; Waltz, 1979, p. 164–170, 181–182) designed either to deter potential foes and, thus, prevent war from happening, or to enable states forming a coalition to win offensive wars which would have been lost if they had acted single-handedly. Dyadic-level explanations of war that stem from this argument include modified versions of: conventional deterrence, balance of power/power preponderance, and power transition theories. The argument, however, is also cited by system-level theorists advocating for the influence of systemic power transition or system polarity (cluster polarity) on war.

The conventional deterrence explanation was tested by Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, who analyzed 54 instances of attempted deterrence that took place between 1900 and 1980. These included cases in which one state (the attacker) was considering attacking another state (a protégé) that was allied or deemed important to a third state (a defender). They found that having a formal alliance signed by the protégé with the defender decreased chances of successful deterrence (from 77% to 39%) and – trying to explain the seemingly odd result – hypothesized that the attacker, knowing about the existence of a formal alliance between the protégé and the defender, takes into account the fact that he might have to fight both states before issuing any threats. Therefore, he will not be surprised by the defenders involvement and back down at some point (1984, p. 504–508, 515–517).

In a series of articles, Woosang Kim and Kim and James D. Morrow used several variables related to alliances to examine the balance of power/power preponderance and power transition models. The research provided substantial evidence for a positive correlation between the equality of power of the great powers adjusted for the influence of their allies' capabilities and the probability of war among them for both the 1648–1815 (with some exceptions) and the 1816–1975 periods as well as for no coherent relationship between war and other adjusted variables based on material capabilities: power transition, relative power growth rates, and interactives terms of the three power-based variables (Kim, 1989, p. 257–271; Kim, 1991, p. 838–848; Kim, 1992, p. 158–171; Kim, Morrow, 1992, p. 908–911, 913–917). What is more, Kim and Morrow expanded their models to include – besides the mentioned variables – indicators of attitudes of the great powers towards entering alliance commitments (risk attitudes). They found that war is more likely when the rising power pursues greater autonomy

and, thus, refrains from signing alliances or when the declining power strives for greater security and does the opposite (1992, p. 911–917).

The probably first empirical evaluation based on the system polarity hypothesis was conducted by Michael D. Wallace. The author examined the link between the amount of war measured in nation-months and two other variables: (1) systemic polarization, calculated – among other things – on the basis of alliance commitments of states and (2) cross-cutting pressures stemming from the differences between these commitments and other patterns of allegiance. By doing so, he found support for a curvilinear relationship between both predictor variables and war in the period 1815–1964, i.e. war seemed more likely when their values were both low and high rather than when they were moderate (1973, p. 578–593, 597–599).

Tests of the same explanation were performed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, who analyzed the relationships between the likelihood of war occurring in the international system in a given year between 1816 and 1965 and a set of variables referring to the system's polarity that were computed on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity of alliance portfolios of states. These variables included: the number of poles, systemic tightness (cohesiveness), and systemic discreteness (distance between the poles) as well as interactive combinations between these variables and their change in time. The results of these studies provided evidence for a positive relationship between systemic tightness and its change over time and the probability of war as well as for no influence of the other variables (Bueno de Mesquita, 1978, p. 253–262; Bueno de Mesquita, Lalman, 1988, p. 8–13).

A second popular view on the function of alliances that stems from theory is that they serve as war-diffusion mechanisms, as a war with one allied state is likely to spread to all or some of its allies. In an attempt to validate this view, Siverson and Joel King used discriminant analysis to investigate a set of 290 cases that occurred between 1815 and 1965 in which allied states did and did not join their alliance partners in war. Their goal was to examine the relative performance of six attributes of alliances as predictors of the option these states will choose. This enabled them to compile a list of these attributes, ordered from best to worst predictor, according to which states are more willing to join in when: many of their allies are engaged in fighting, the allies they support are minor powers, they have relatively few allies, the alliance is a defensive one, the alliance is relatively new, and they have a large number of alliances (1980, p. 5–11, 13).

Additional evidence in support of the war-diffusion explanation was given by Huth and Russett in their already mentioned analysis of deterrence. Their results

showed that a formal alliance between the protégé and the defender increased
the probability that the defender will fight along its protégé if deterrence fails
from 69% to 97% (1984, p. 521).

Finally, Oren tested the same explanation by investigating the influence of
the size of alliances (number of allied states) and their magnitude (state-years)
on the war proneness of these alliances, measured in terms of the number of
nation-wars fought by each of them in the period 1816–1980. He found that the
two independent variables displayed a positive correlation with the outcome
variable for both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as for the whole
period (1990, p. 215–217, 221–228).

IDENTIFYING THE SCOPE OF ALLIANCES: SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Testing hypotheses related to the influence of alliances on war in most cases
requires devising a method of determining the scope of each alliance, i.e.
identifying which states are its members. The issue might seem trivial at first,
however, it may cause problems for conducting certain types of analyses as states
sometimes make conflicting commitments or belong to several alliances that
overlap or oppose each other. Approaches to identifying the scope of alliances
that were developed in the past are essentially twofold. Both of them have their
advantages and weaknesses, but the decision as to which one to choose depends
primarily on what type of relationships are to be scrutinized.

The first approach is that members of an alliance correspond with states that
have signed some formal alliance agreement (Bennett, Stam, 2007, p. 74–75;
Levy, 1981, p. 587–589; Oren, 1990, p. 216–220; Ostrom Jr., Hoole, 1978, p. 219;
Singer, Small, 1967, p. 258–280; Siverson, King, 1980, p. 4; Small, Singer, 1969,
p. 261–271). Hence, in the case of two-party agreements, both states are being
treated as parts of one alliance and, if the agreement was signed by multiple states,
either all those signatories or particular dyads are counted as a single alliance.
The method is simple and has several merits, however, it also has a downside to
it – it enables one state to belong to several alliances – which makes it inappropri-
ate for certain types of studies, dyadic analyses, in which the impact of alliances
on each side is taken into account being one of them.

The second approach, and one that has also been applied in the present study,
is to cluster states into alliances on the basis of the similarity and – in some

cases – also dissimilarity of their alliance portfolios so that they belong either to none or just one alliance. The method requires an index of similarity of those portfolios to be computed and the values of the index used to cluster these states together. A handful of such indexes were employed in the past: coefficient α introduced by Wallace (1973, p. 580–581), Kendall's τ_b rank correlation coefficient proposed by Bueno de Mesquita (1975, p. 196–200), or S developed by Curtis S. Signorino and Jeffrey M. Ritter (1999, p. 125–130). As it is the second of these that has been used for the purpose of this study, it is the one that should be explained in more detail.

Kendall's τ_b (or tau-b) rank correlation coefficient is a measure that enables to compare and, thus, asses the similarity (and dissimilarity) of two sets of elements. Its calculation follows a procedure comprising several steps. Step one is to use the values for elements in each set to assign ranks to them, step two is to combine elements within both sets into all possible pairs, step three is to determine how the ranks change in these pairs, step four is to compare these changes in both sets to calculate the number of the so-called concordant, disconcordant, and tied pairs. Finally, a formula is used to calculate τ_b scores on the basis of the numbers of these pairs.

To cluster states into alliances, τ_b scores are computed independently for each dyad of states and usually Correlates of War (COW) Formal Alliance data is used to code each relationships on a scale from 0 to 3, where 0 = no alliance, 1 = entente, 2 = neutrality or nonaggression pact, 3 = mutual defense pact (Singer, Small, 1966, p. 5). In this case, if there are two states i and j that maintain relationships (a) with all states of the given system indexed $k, l = 1, 2, …, N$; $k \neq l$, then their respective alliance portfolios are $A^i = [a^i_k, a^i_l,…, a^i_N]$ and $A^j = [a^j_k, a^j_l,…, a^j_N]$ where $a^i_k, a^i_{k,l} \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$. The relationships are then paired into joint rankings $(a^i_k, a^j_k), (a^i_l, a^j_l), (a^i_k, a^j_l), …, (a^i_N, a^j_N)$ and:
- if $a^i_k > a^i_l$ and $a^j_k > a^j_l$ or $a^i_k < a^i_l$ and $a^j_k < a^j_l$, the pairs are concordant,
- if $a^i_k > a^i_l$ and $a^j_k < a^j_l$ or $a^i_k < a^i_l$ and $a^j_k > a^j_l$, the pairs are disconcordant,
- if $a^i_k = a^i_l$ and $a^j_k = a^j_l$, the pairs are tied (Signorino, Ritter, 1999, p. 117–120).

There are several ways to calculate τ_b scores, one (Signorino, Ritter, 1999, p. 120) is to define two matrixes x and y for A^i and A^j respectively:

$$x_{kl} = \begin{cases} +1 \ if \ a^i_k < a^i_l \\ \ \ 0 \ if \ a^i_k = a^i_l \\ -1 \ if \ a^i_k > a^i_l \end{cases} \qquad (1)$$

$$y_{kl} = \begin{cases} +1 \ if \ a_k^j < a_l^j \\ 0 \ if \ a_k^j = a_l^j \\ -1 \ if \ a_k^j > a_l^j \end{cases} \qquad (2)$$

Then, the following formula may be used:

$$\tau_b = \frac{\sum_{k,l} x_{kl} y_{kl}}{\sqrt{\sum_{k,l} x_{kl}^2 \ \sum_{k,l} y_{kl}^2}} \quad k,l = 1, 2, \ldots, N; k \neq l \qquad (3)$$

Calculated with COW Formal Alliance data, τ_b scores range from *–1* to *1*, where *–1* represents perfect disconcordance (dissimilarity) of alliance portfolios and *1* indicates their perfect concordance (similarity). What is more, to make these portfolios comprise relationships with the same set of states, it is assumed that each state has a relationship, namely a defense pact, with itself. Therefore, a τ_b score for a dyad can equal *1* only if the two states have a defense pact signed with one another (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 195).

Having τ_b scores calculated, the next step to determine the scope of alliances is to cluster states together on the basis of these scores. There are several ways to do that, and the one that has been applied in the present study is typal analysis (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 199). Using typal analysis, states are clustered together only with those other states that have the most similar alliance portfolios. Hence, if there are two states *i* and *j*, they will form a two-state alliance only when *i* has the highest τ_b score with *j* and *j* has the highest τ_b score with *i*. However, if for example *i* has the highest τ_b score with *j*, *j* has the highest τ_b score with *k*, and *k* has the highest τ_b score with *i*, *j* or both, all three will constitute a single alliance.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND THE MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES

The data used for the analysis was taken from the COW project data sets on states' system membership, formal alliances, states' material capabilities, and militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) that are available in EUGene (the Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program), a data management tool

developed by Bennett and Stam (2000, p. 179–224)[1]. The initial population of cases created by combining these data sets comprised 3496 observations – one per each dyad participating in MIDs that occurred between 1816 and 2000. To account for the various circumstances that led to the engagement of particular states in these MIDs, as well as to test the war-diffusion explanation, three sub-sets have been extracted from the initial data set: the first (n = 2631) included only dyad-years of MIDs between their originators, i.e. states that were sides of particular MIDs from the first day; the second (n = 288) comprised cases in which MID originators drew other, previously uninvolved states (joiners) into an MID they were a side of at that moment; the third (n = 297) encompassed instances of previously uninvolved states joining an MID that was already taking place, as a side acting against one of the MID's originators. Dyad-years of MIDs between two joiners (n = 280) have been left out.

The outcome variable was a dummy indicating whether the MID taking place between two states was a war. Wars, as defined by Singer and Small (1982, p. 56), have been coded as 1s, and level 2 through 4 MIDs (Jones, Bremer, Singer, 1996, p. 167–174) have been coded as 0s.

The set of independent variables included a total of ten parameters. The first six were unit-level variables that consisted of two groups of three of the same variables calculated independently for both the initiator of the conflict and the target. These comprised a dummy representing whether the given side belonged to an alliance (*Is/Isn't in an Alliance*) as well as two continuous variables determining the tightness (*Alliance Tightness*) and capabilities (*Alliance Capabilities*) of each side's alliance. To distinguish alliances from one another, τ_b scores have been calculated for each dyad of the system and typal analysis has been applied to cluster together all states that had at least one alliance signed. *Alliance Tightness* has been computed as a mean value of all τ_b scores within a given alliance (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 200), and the capabilities of each alliance have been determined by adding the COW Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores (Singer, Bremer, Stuckey, 1972, p. 26–27; Singer, 1987, p. 115–132) of all its members except the state involved in the particular MID.

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[1]   The data that is currently uploaded into EUGene is not necessarily the newest available Correlates of War data. The original Correlates of War data sets can be found at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/folder_listing. EUGene is available for free download at http://www.eugenesoftware.org/.

Another two variables represented dyadic-level factors. These comprised a dummy showing whether both states of the dyad were parts of the same alliance cluster (*Alliance of Both States*) and a measure indicating the difference between the capabilities of the initiator's alliance and those of the target's alliance (*Capability Difference*). The relationship between both alliances' capabilities has been represented using a difference instead of a ratio since, in many cases, one or both sides of the dyad were not parts of an alliance making the value of the *Alliance Capabilities* variable for them equal 0 which, in turn, made calculating a ratio impossible or caused it to equal 0.

The last two variables related to system-level causes and included indicators of the number of alliance clusters in the whole international system (*Polarity*) and of the distribution of capabilities among them (*Capability Distribution*). The latter variable has been calculated using a modified version of Bueno de Mesquita's (1975, p. 203–204) alteration of a method of determining capability concentration among states initially proposed by Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey (1972, p. 25–26). In its original form the method required computing a Concentration index (*Con*) equal to the square root of the quotient of the standard deviation of the system's states' CINC scores divided by the maximum possible deviation for a system in *N* states. The formula for computing *Con* was as follows:

$$Con = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(S_i)^2 - \frac{1}{N}}{1 - \frac{1}{N}}} \qquad (4)$$

where S_i was the value of particular states' share (or CINC scores) of the whole system's capabilities and *N* was the number of states in the system (Singer, Bremer, Stuckey, 1972, p. 26–27). Bueno de Mesquita's alteration of the method consisted in calculating *Con* with the use of alliance clusters' CINC scores rather than states' CINC scores, using the number of alliances in the system as a basis for *N*, and subtracting the result of *Con* from 1 so that higher values indicate more evenly distributed capabilities (1975, p. 203–204). The modification introduced here was that rather than computing the share of clusters' capabilities in the system's capabilities, the shares have been calculated in relation to the capabilities of all alliances in the system. In this case, capabilities of the whole alliances, i.e. including also MID participants, have been used. The final formulation, therefore, is as follows:

$$Capability\ Distribution = 1 - \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(S_i)^2 - \frac{1}{N}}{1 - \frac{1}{N}}} \qquad (5)$$

where S_i is the value of particular clusters' share of the aggregated capabilities of all alliance clusters and N is the number of clusters in the system.

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Since the outcome variable is a dummy, polynomial logit analysis has been used to determine the influence of alliances on the probability of war. The results of this analysis are shown in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 displays results of estimations performed separately on the three sub-sets of data from which the *Alliance Capabilities* of the target variable has been excluded. This is due to the fact that the inclusion of both this and the *Capability Difference* variables in the estimations caused one or the other to suffer from exact collinearity and, thus, the correlation coefficients could not be calculated. Therefore, as shown in table 2, the models presented in table 1 have been recalculated without the *Capability Difference* variable to include *Alliance Capabilities* of the target.

The results for each of the six models prove their statistical significance at the 0,01 level, however, they also indicate that the estimations do not perform much better in predicting the value of the outcome variable than models including only the constant. One way to interpret this is that alliances did affect the probability of war, although their influence was not substantial.

Models 1 and 4, which include only dyads that started each MID, suggest no statistical significance of dyadic-level variables and provide evidence for a positive correlation between the probability that the MID escalated into war and the fact that the target was in an alliance as well as for a negative correlation between the outcome variable and the tightness of the target's alliance and *Polarity*. Hence, states that belonged to loose alliances seem more likely to have faced war than those that were not members of alliances or were parts of tightly knit alliances. This may imply that conflict initiators had to use more drastic measures to try to enforce their will when opposed by adversaries that had allies and, on the other hand, that the tighter the alliance of those adversaries, the more able they were to deter potential foes. What is more, the models indicate that war was more likely in systems with a lesser number of alliances which provides backing to advocates

of multipolarity, who argue that states are risk-averse actors that become more cautious as polarity and, thus, uncertainty in the system rises (e.g. Morgenthau, 1948, p. 272; Deutsch, Singer, 1964, p. 390–406).

Table 1. Polynomial logit analysis of the effects of alliances on the escalation of interstate conflicts into war, 1816–2000

Variables:	Model 1: originators versus originators	Model 2: originators versus joiners	Model 3: joiners versus originators
constant	−1,74556 (0,33445)***	−0,52016 (0,59233)	1,55494 (0,66956)**
Unit Level			
Initiator			
Is/Isn't in an Alliance	0,03428 (0,50912)	1,16563 (0,90417)	0,84927 (0,80830)
Alliance Tightness	0,22679 (0,57477)	−0,34877 (0,97102)	−0,45837 (0,84962)
Alliance Capabilities	−1,34548 (1,60175)	1,62851 (2,33028)	−8,29907 (3,33128)**
Target			
Is/Isn't in an Alliance	1,15558 (0,56737)**	−0,69377 (0,83678)	3,59435 (1,11365)***
Alliance Tightness	−1,41519 (0,66465)**	0,67345 (0,87279)	−4,31851 (1,21705)***
Alliance Capabilities	–	–	–
Dyadic Level			
Alliance of Both States	−0,11056 (0,33666)	−0,57100 (0,45635)	0,32482 (0,48465)
Capability Difference	1,13797 (1,32250)	−5,44337 (1,79579)***	3,87167 (2,98810)
System Level			
Polarity	−0,13406 (0,02188)***	−0,08676 (0,02955)***	−0,05904 (0,03443)*
Capability Distribution	−0,17394 (0,59598)	0,54298 (1,00248)	−3,27812 (1,28543)**
n	2631	288	297
Chi-square [p for chi-square]	75,392 [0,0000]	28,6514 [0,0007]	51,6274 [0,0000]
Proportionate reduction in error	0%	3,9%	7,3%

Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; * p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01.

Table 2: Revised polynomial logit analysis of the effects of alliances on the escalation of interstate conflicts into war, 1816–2000

Variables:	Model 4: originators versus originators	Model 5: originators versus joiners	Model 6: joiners versus originators
constant	−1,74556 (0,33446)***	−0,52016 (0,59233)	1,55494 (0,66956)**
Unit Level			
Initiator			
Is/Isn't in an Alliance	0,03428 (0,50912)	1,16563 (0,90417)	0,84927 (0,80830)
Alliance Tightness	0,22679 (0,57477)	−0,34877 (0,97102)	−0,45837 (0,84962)
Alliance Capabilities	−0,20751 (1,05408)	−3,81486 (1,56604)**	−4,42740 (1,79801)**
Target			
Is/Isn't in an Alliance	1,15558 (0,56737)**	−0,69377 (0,83678)	3,59435 (1,11365)***
Alliance Tightness	−1,41519 (0,66465)**	0,67345 (0,87279)	−4,31851 (1,21705)***
Alliance Capabilities	−1,13797 (1,32250)	5,44337 (1,79579)***	−3,87167 (2,98810)
Dyadic Level			
Alliance of Both States	−0,11056 (0,33666)	−0,57100 (0,45635)	0,32482 (0,48465)
Capability Difference	–	–	–
System Level			
Polarity	−0,13406 (0,02188)***	−0,08676 (0,02955)***	−0,05904 (0,03443)*
Capability Distribution	−0,17394 (0,59598)	0,54298 (1,00248)	−3,27812 (1,28543)**
n	2631	288	297
Chi-square [p for chi-square]	75,392 [0,0000]	28,6514 [0,0007]	51,6274 [0,0000]
Proportionate reduction in error	0%	3,9%	7,3%

Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; * $p < 0{,}1$; ** $p < 0{,}05$; *** $p < 0{,}01$.

Models 2 and 5, which deal with cases in which conflict originators drew previously uninvolved states into those conflicts, give somewhat different results. Still, both models confirm the argument that the higher the number of alliances in the system, the lesser the probability of war. Model 2 shows no statistical significance of unit-level factors and a negative correlation between *Capability Difference* and the likelihood of war. This might suggest that it was easier for the initiators to achieve their goals without resorting to war when their alliance was

much stronger than the target's alliance. Additional support for this claim is given when *Capability Difference* is substituted with the target's *Alliance Capabilities*, as is in the case of model 5. Now, capabilities of both sides' alliances become statistically significant. The coefficients for the two variables have different signs and indicate a negative correlation between the initiator's *Alliance Capabilities* and war as well as a positive correlation between the target's *Alliance Capabilities* and war, which again would suggest that it is easier for initiators to impose their will without resorting to arms when being backed by a strong alliance or when opposed by targets with weak allies.

Finally, models 3 and 6, which show instances of uninvolved states joining conflicts ongoing between their originators, in the same way as models 1 and 4, indicate no statistical significance of dyadic-level factors. Both of them, however, point to a positive correlation between the fact that the target was part of an alliance and war as well as a negative correlation between three other variables and war: the initiator's alliance capabilities, the target's alliance tightness, and *Capability Distribution*. The results with respect to the two variables related to the target confirm earlier findings that states that were members of loose alliances were more likely to fall victims of an attack than those that did not belong to alliances or had close allies. Additionally, the negative sign of the coefficient for the initiator's *Alliance Capabilities* variable may, similarly to model 5, suggest that states with strong allies were able to achieve their goals more easily than others. *Polarity*, this time, fails to reach the statistical significance level of 0,05, nevertheless its influence on war should not entirely be rejected as the *p-value* for the variable in both models 3 and 6 equals 0,0864. Therefore, provided it is to prove significant, it would confirm earlier results that the more alliances in the system, the lesser was the probability of war. On the other hand, the negative impact of *Capability Distribution* on war implies something utterly different than all other findings – that systems with alliances of roughly equal capabilities were more peaceful than others.

CONCLUSIONS

The primary conclusion of the analysis is that alliances provide some but, it seems, limited insight into the occurrence of interstate war. The way in which they exerted their impact, however miniscule it might have been, was influenced by their "personal" traits, whether the conflicts they were to affect were ongoing or not, as well as whether they were used offensively or defensively.

Confronted with the hypotheses listed in section two, the results provide no support for any of the two alternatives in three cases: H_1, H_3, and H_7. They also indicate that the probability of war increased:
–   if the target state has allies (H_2), in the case of originator versus originator and joiner versus originator dyads;
–   the greater the capabilities of the target state's alliance (H_6), in the case of originator versus joiner dyads;
and that the probability of war decreased:
–   the tighter the alliance bonds in the target state's alliance (H_4), in the case of originator versus originator and joiner versus originator dyads;
–   the greater the capabilities of the initiator state's alliance (H_5), in the case of originator versus joiner and joiner versus originator dyads;
–   the greater the difference between the capabilities of the initiator's and target's alliances (H_8), in the case of originator versus joiner dyads;
–   the greater the number of alliance clusters in the system (H_9), in the case of originator versus originator and originator versus joiner dyads;
–   the more evenly distributed the capabilities among alliance clusters in the system (H_{10}), in the case of joiner versus originator dyads.
When compared with earlier studies, models 1 and 4 seem to confirm conclusions drawn by Huth and Russett that having a formal alliance signed by target states increases the probability that a conflict between its initial participants becomes a war, whereas models 3 and 6 support their claim that an alliance of this sort makes targets' allies also more likely to join the war (1984, p. 515–517, 521). Models 2 and 5, in turn, provide some support to Kim and Kim and Morrow who, in their investigation of great power behavior, found that the more even the capabilities of both sides, the greater the likelihood of war (Kim, 1989, p. 265–271; Kim, 1991, p. 845–848; Kim, 1992, p. 169–171; Kim, Morrow, 1992, p. 913–917). The results of the present analysis, however, conducted on a different population including all states, suggest this holds true only for originators versus joiners dyads. The estimations might also provide some insight into why the examinations conducted by Levy and Singer and Small pointed to a negative correlation between alliances and war for the nineteenth century and a positive correlation for the twentieth century (Levy, 1981, p. 601–602; Singer, Small, 1967, p. 258–280). This is because, given the results of particular models, alliances might act both a war-generating and war-preventing measures, depending on their personal characteristics such as tightness or capabilities. On the other hand, models 1, 2, 4, and 5 contradict findings of the analyses by Bueno de Mesquita

and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman that polarity does not influence war (Bueno de Mesquita, 1978, p. 255–258; Bueno de Mesquita, Lalman, 1988, p. 10–13). Similarly, all six models failed to support Bennett and Stam's assertion that having a defense pact signed by two states decreases the probability of war between them (2007, p. 120–122), however, in this and Bennett and Stam's analyses different types of alliances were taken into account (ententes, neutrality or nonaggression pacts, and defense pacts as opposed to defense pacts only).

The estimations presented in tables 1 and 2 support arguments for both offensive and defensive functions of alliances. Offensively it was their capabilities that mattered, which would suggest that, when faced with the risk of being attacked, states did not calculate whether the alliance they would have to oppose was tight and, thus, how likely it was to support the state issuing threats. Conversely, as defensive measures, only tight alliances seem to have effectively fulfilled their functions as deterrents while alliances that were loose and/or strong made conflicts escalate into wars more often. For those reasons, the results provide some backing to both the capability-aggregation and war-diffusion arguments. What is more, the outcome of the system-level analysis suggests that, globally, alliances performed their functions rather well both as offensive and defensive measures.

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THE CONCEPT OF "INTERNATIONAL ROLE" IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE "PIPP" ANALYTICAL MODEL AND ROLES ACTORS PLAY IN WORLD POLITICS*

ZAGADNIENIE „MIĘDZYNARODOWEJ ROLI" W TEORII I PRAKTYCE STOSUNKÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH. MODEL ANALITYCZNY PIPP A ROLE ODGRYWANE PRZEZ AKTORÓW W POLITYCE ŚWIATOWEJ

*Andriy Tyushka***

——— **ABSTRACT** ———

Although a current and marketable term in the literature and political discourses, the notion of 'international role' still lacks a clear and succinct, let alone consensually applicable, definition. This article posits that, from the actorness perspective as a point of departure, the concept of "international role" may well be assessed through the lenses of the quad-element "PIPP" analytical model, which is herewith developed. Thereby, the analysis of actor's international role has to make a long conceptual sojourn from power, influence presence to performance (PIPP). These four embedded concepts (PIPP model) help assess the explanandum, i.e. "actor's international role", in a theoretically-informed, systematic and holistic way, thus avoiding the pitfalls of sporadic (mis) usage found in common parlance.

——— **ABSTRAKT** ———

Choć jest atrakcyjnym i nader aktualnym terminem w dyskursie politycznym i literaturze przedmiotu, pojęciu „międzynarodowej roli" wciąż brakuje jasnej i zwięzłej, a przynajmniej uzgodnionej co do właściwości definicji. W artykule przyjęto założenie, że obierając za punkt wyjścia perspektywę „aktorstwa" na scenie polityki, zagadnienie „międzynarodowej roli" można z powodzeniem wartościować z wykorzystaniem czteroelementowego modelu analitycznego PIPP, rozwijanego w niniejszym tekście. Tym samym analiza międzynarodowej roli aktora musi przebyć długą konceptualną drogę od potęgi (*Power*), wpływu (*Influence*) przez obecność (*Presence*) po działalność (*Performance*). Osadzenie rozważań w obrębie tych czterech pojęć (model PIPP) jest pomocne w wyjaśnieniu *explanandum*, tj. „międzynarodowej

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INTRODUCTION: SITUATING THE PROBLEM

In social sciences, conceptual analysis usually starts with establishing the meaning of concepts in question. This becomes a problem when the conceptual analysis also ends here. Thereby, many marketable terms and notions travel across disciplines and discourses and are in principle "recognizable" but not always fully comprehensible phenomena. This especially holds true in the domain of political science and IR, where the concepts like "anarchy", "actor", or even "system", just to name a few, bear different connotations and channel distinct ideas than in other science fields, let alone political and public discourses. In his recent work on concepts and reason in political theory, Hampsher-Monk (2015, p. xv) contends that once current linguistic-conceptual analysis "often revealed the 'exhaustion' of the meaning of a word through the accumulation of a range of 'standard' uses so wide as to make quite impossible the identification of any core – or 'family' – of meanings, or even criteria by which to identify blatant misuses of it", thus leading to "their overly-adventurous rhetorical deployment". When it comes to the overly-adventurous rhetorical deployment and even misuses of the term, the concept of "international role" and "role" as such is the one that definitely needs to be addressed. Although a current and marketable term in the literature and political discourses, the notion of "international role" still lacks a clear and succinct, let alone consensually applicable, definition. A semantic conceptual analysis would lend not much help in disentangling what a "role" means under specific political constellations. Hence, the notion needs to be articulated within a given context and applicable area. This article seeks to develop an analytical model of the "international role" concept in IR that is applicable to the realm of international cooperation, in particular – strategic partnerships between distinct international actors (states and international organizations). There are over 200 states in the world, and nearly double as much International Organizations (not to mention thousands of NGOs) – they all are

international actors, but only a handful of them enter in strategic relationships of one or another sort. Conventional wisdom holds that it is the actor's international *role* that informs the choice of partner by another actor.

This paper posits that, from the actorness perspective as a point of departure, the concept of "international role" may well be assessed through the lenses of the quad-element *"PIPP"* analytical model, which is herewith developed. Thereby, the analysis of actor's international role has to make a long conceptual sojourn from *presence* to *influence* to *power* to *performance (PIPP)*. These four embedded concepts (*PIPP model*) help assess the explanandum, i.e. *"actor's international role"*, in a theoretically-informed, systematic and holistic way, thus avoiding the pitfalls of sporadic (mis)usage found in common parlance.

THE "ROLE THEORY" IN IR LITERATURE
AND THE "PIPP" ANALYTICAL MODEL

"International role" is a current and marketable term overwhelmingly used with reference to international affairs, with commonly mixed connotation of various features (care, presence, appearance, guise; potential, mission, tour of duty, task; act, involvement, behaviour, function, enterprise, undertaking, pursuit, work, operation; contribution, influence, impact, power, utility, service, performance) swiftly implied, thus not always reasonably justified.

Commonsensically, "role" can be defined as (a) *duty*, i.e. "the position or purpose that someone or something has in a situation, organization, society, or relationship", and as (b) *acting*, i.e. "an actor's part in a film or play"[1].

Scientifically, there is however a much longer and winding road to go in order to arrive at the conception of an "international role" from actorness perspective as a point of departure. The analysis of actor's international role has to make a long conceptual sojourn from *presence* to *influence* to *power* to *performance*. These four embedded concepts (*PIPP*) help assess our explanandum, *"actor's international role"*, in a theoretically-informed systematic and holistic way, thus avoiding the pitfalls of sporadic (mis)usage found in common parlance.

Normative approach to the idea of an "international role" would frame it as a conception and expectation of a state's international actorness rationale – its

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[1] "Role". *Cambridge Dictionary Online.* Available at: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/role.

purpose and orientation of external action. Aggestam (2004, p. 8) posits that "a role reflects norms and ideas about the purpose and orientation of the state as an entity and as an actor in the international system". Hence, for a "role", execution ideas and beliefs are said to matter no less than capabilities and rational calculations – a frequent point of reference for structural-functionalist students. Attempting to conceptualize "Europe's international role", as put it in the title of the field-introductory *JCMS* article, Hill (1993) adopts a *structural-functional approach* to capture the EU's image as a powerful and progressive force in the reshaping of the international system, the functions it actually might be fulfilling in the international system and its capabilities necessary to perform these tasks. The so-called "capability-expectations gap", which describes the contending conceptions of the EU's international role, appears in the article and the subsequent scholarship as an opportunity and challenge for charting the Union's international actorness. Trying to identify a distinctive "role" for Europe in the world, Hill (1993, p. 307) acknowledges once again, in addition to his 1979 writings, that "[t]he idea of a role as the basis for any foreign policy has severe limitations". In its simplest understanding, *the idea of a role* assumes that: "an actor can and should find for itself something approximating to a part played on a stage, namely a distinctive, high-profile and coherent identity. But if all were to seek this in international relations, then nationalism inexorably would follow, whereas, when the most powerful do so they are likely to be deluded into looking for 'a place in the sun', 'the leadership of the free world' and other apparent panaceas, instead of concentrating on the more tedious work of crafting the endless necessary compromises between national interests and the long-run requirements of a working international system" (Hill, 1993, p. 307). In Hill's (1993, p. 307) understanding, conceptualizing actor's international role involves, accordingly, using concepts to understand actor's various activities in the world, whereas not presupposing to outline a single "role" which an actor does or might follow, but necessarily includes deliberations on the identity and image (status) of the actor in question.

Remarkably, in practice of international relations and governance, the "role" of both states and IOs has been observed and recognized especially in public discourses. Some of the recent scholar attempts have also aimed at disentangling, in a comparative perspective, of a "role" states and IOs play in distinct policy areas, for instance: in reconciling sustainable development, public governance and globalization (French, 2002)[2].

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[2] French (2002, p. 136) maintains that all the controversies surrounding the role of states and IOs notwithstanding, "[w]hat is certain, however, is that for there to be any possibility of reconciliation,

As indicated beforehand, the current conception of actor's "international role" envisages a holistic and systemic perspective on *four embedded actorness features* – power, influence, presence, and performance (*PIPP*). Such a quad-element conception allows to better analytically grasp the appearance and performing of actors as would-be or actual strategic partners. It also allows to better (more inclusively) capture the practice of strategic partnerships, and international cooperation between states and IOs, considering potentials and exercises of both passive and active leverages, just as much as ability to hold credible commitments, that is crucial in the assertion of a strategic actor and, eventually, of a strategic partner. The below table offers an overview of "international role" as a compound concept consisting of four core elements:

Table 1. PIPP – analytical model of the 'international role' concept (PIPP-metrics)

PIPP metrics	Conceptualization	Operation alization and measurement	
Power	*Particular influence relationship,* generated from the ability to alter others behaviour and capability to maintainowncourseofaction, [*power = influence capability vs influenceability (liability to influence) correlation*]	levels of power demonstrated by actor: a) globalpower [incaseof IOs – also important whether supranational or international], b) major regional actor/power, c) minor regional actor/power	any combination, n/a
Influence	*Normative or material means/ constructs of leverage [= influence capability]*	One of the existing influence indices, or a distinct set of relevant influence indicators, including: 1) human resources, or size of population (for IOs – a compound size of member states' population numbers), 2) sizeofsovereign territory (for IOs – territorial scope of jurisdiction), 3) economic strength, orwealth [GNP], 4) technology and development trend, 5) tradeindex, 6) military strength.	any combination, n/a

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the role of public governance – as developed by *both* nation States and international organizations – will be pivotal in attempting to maintain a necessary balance between the numerous competing interests that such paradigms inevitably generate".

PIPP metrics	Conceptualization	Operation alization and measurement			
Presence	*Visibility and feasibility in either geographical and/or policy terms, which may be both a result of purposive external action and an unintended consequence of domestic policy-making processes*	+	+	+	-
Performance	*The process and the outcome of exercise of powers and conduct of international practices* Core elements of 'performance': *relevance* (= assessment/perception as astrategic actor); *effectiveness* (= goal achievement); *financial/ resource viability* (= ability of the performing actor to raise/allocate the funds required); *efficiency* (= ratio between outputs accomplished and costsincurred)	Performance can be: a) *satisfactory or successful*, i.e. combination of the first group's positive and second group's negative (RE^+FE^-) or both positive (RE^+FE^-), b) *negative* value of the first group indicators results in non-satisfactory or unsuccessful performance level in either possible combination with the second group indicators(RE^-FE^+ or RE^-FE^-)			
Actor's INTERNATIONAL ROLE		(0,80–1,00) key strategic actor (superpower)	(0,50–0,80) strong strategic actor (great power)	(0,10–0,50) moderate strategic actor (middle power)	(0–0,10) non-strategic actor (ordinary power)

Source: Author's own compilation.

In what follows, the four core elements of the "international role" concept (*PIPP*) will be dismantled in a more detailed way.

The PIPP's "Power" Element and "International Role" Concept

"Power" is, without any exaggeration, a currency of international relations[3]: it is a determinant of international behaviour just as it is apparently the most frequently used concept in the study of political and social sciences as well, especially in international relations. Hans J. Morgenthau (1948) even defined

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[3]   For the first time, Lieber (1972, p. 93) has drawn an analogy between power and money which were both seen as "currencies" of respective systems: power is a "currency of the political system in the way that money is the currency of the economy".

international (and indeed all) politics as a "struggle for power". General understanding of power in social sciences is that power is *A's* ability to get *B* do what it otherwise would not do. Such a perspective on power presupposes *active engagement* or *leverage* exercised in order to get the outcomes one wants to achieve. Arnold Wolfers has, however, gone further in this context as to more broadly stipulate that power, in international relations, can be exercised in a passive way, too, wielding a sort of *passive leverage*. In his words, power is "the ability to move others or to get them to do what one wants them to do and not to do what one does not want them to do" (Wolfers, 1962, p. 103). Thus, these are not only carrots and sticks that work as mechanisms of power exercise, but also attraction or socialization may channel the patterns of power and bring about necessarily expected change. Moreover, power is detectable not only in proactive efforts of one actor in international relations as to cause the expected behaviour of another actor or actors, but also in leverage of deterring latter ones from doing anything the former one would deem unwanted.

Viewing *power as an influence relationship*, Kalevi J. Holsti (1967, p. 160) treats power as a multidimensional concept consisting of (a) the acts by which one actor influences another actor, (b) the capabilities utilized for this purpose, and (c) the response elicited.

Given the many blurred factors implied, *measuring power* is rather a formidable task, an equation with (too) many unknowns. And this is not only due to the necessary therefor (but not necessarily correct) oversimplification that would deem observable units, states and international organisations, the 'same' (or isomorphic) properties, attributable to cardinal numbers, and thus neglecting the "psychological" element – behaviour (or *mis*behaviour) of actors driven by respective – human – decision-makers[4]. To no small account, this is a problem also because of the lack of theories of international relations based (exclusively) upon quantification, save the game theory, as widely accepted as, for instance, the theories of economic behaviour and econometrics. Hence, measuring power relates more to the deficiencies inherent in existing theory rather than in the measurement techniques themselves.

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[4] This "human decisional behaviour" presents a palpable opportunity to study decision-makers' preferences, habits and sequences of decisions made to predict the ones that can be made in foreign policy, and, at the same time, a challenge to determinist (quantification-based) conception of international relations, and cooperation in particular.

Even just a couple of years ago, Nye (2011, p. 9) denied any possibility of measuring power and doing it as right as one could measure energy in physics or money in economics. While acknowledging the many efforts which have been made by scholars over the years "to provide formulas that can quantify power international affairs", the concept of power, although widely used, still is "surprisingly elusive and difficult to measure" (Nye, 2011, p. 9). To illustrate the case, he refers to the formula distilled in 1977 by Ray Cline, a high-ranking official in the CIA, who was tasked by the U.S. leadership to present with numbers what was the balance of American and Soviet power during the Cold War. This formula encompassed six variables in two correlating groups (population, territory, economy, military, strategy, will):

$$\text{Perceived Power} = (\text{Population} + \text{Territory} + \text{Economy} + \text{Military}) \times (\text{Strategy} + \text{Will})$$

Figure 1. Power measurement formula by Ray Cline, 1977

Source: Nye (2011, p. 10).

Nye (2011, p. 10) laments that, back in 1977, with all the numbers inserted into the formula, Ray Cline concluded that "the Soviet Union was twice as powerful as the United States", but "as we now know, this formula was not a very good predictor of outcomes". While reflecting on several other power indices developed by now, that in one or another way heavily rely on military force as main indicator in whatever combination, Nye (2011, p. 10) decisively argues that "[a]ny attempt to develop a single index of power is doomed to fail because power depends upon human relationships that vary in different contexts".

Consequently, any particular study would certainly benefit from a coherent and study-specific determination of "power" deployed by international (individual and collective) actors as derived from – conditional – *influence capability* vs *influenceability (liability to influence)* "metrics". In this way, this article rather tends to lean on Holsti's (1967, p. 160) original understanding of power as an influence relationship. Conceived that way, power can be assessed against the evaluation of actors' capacity to either play big or small, i.e. against the backdrop of the – conditionally assumed – power scope, the ability to alter behaviour of regional or global players. In his recent extensive elaborations on world power indices, Morales Ruvalcaba (2015, p. 18) divides world powers, indeed

in a neo-Marxist fashion, into three clusters – centre states, semi-peripheries, and peripheries, based on their capability to exert influence and be influenced (*Figure 2*):

Figure 2. Tripartite Structure of World Powers (Morales Ruvalcaba, 2015)

Acknowledging, in principle, the usefulness of such a tripartite treatment of wold powers, the necessity to make a model more flexible and applicable within different theoretical approaches informs the suggestion of the current article to basically distinguish between the following *three levels (conditional indicators)* of actors' power, that can be seminally deployed for empirical analyses of actors' "international roles": global or global-in-the-making power, major regional and minor regional power.

The PIPP's "Influence" Element
and "International Role" Concept

Arnold Wolfers deemed it important "to distinguish between power and influence, the first to mean the ability to move others by the threat or infliction of deprivations, the latter to mean the ability to do so through promises of grants and benefits" (Wolfers, 1962, p. 103). In fact, Wolfers termed "power" in "hard power" terms, whereas "influence", in his understanding, is what is currently known as a "soft power". One can also draw analogy between Kindleberger's "strength" and "prestige" as power instances in its intertwined economic and political contexts: power is a "strength capable of being exercised", that is, "strength *plus* the capacity to use it effectively", just as it is "prestige", that is, "the respect which is paid to power" (Kindleberger, 1970, p. 56, 65). Power and influence are certainly inextricably linked, and as a rule, to completely agree with Wolfers (1962, p. 103–104), "they will be found to go hand in hand" in practice. One may distinguish between them, however, when the context is duly considered. It is power that becomes important in conflictual situations, and it is influence that is central both in circumstances of conflict and in cooperative relations.

It is deemed crucial herewith to "extract" influence from the conception of power and consider it separately as, in principle, quantifiable and measurable unit of analysis. In contrast to nearly impossible measuring of "power", measurement of "influence" is, in principle, doable task, although not absolutely quantifiable – one has to admit. This is due to the twofold nature of influence, where one facet of impact may complement the other. That being said, influence can be not only *material* or *materially conceivable* (economic, technological, political, military), but also *normative* or *ideational* (social-cultural, ideological). Trade and economic, geoeconomic, geopolitical or military might (strength), just as the size of actor's (sovereign) territory and population (all of them termed herewith as "*material constructs*") is, on the one hand, keen on altering the preferences, strategies, status and behaviour of other actors. On the other hand, rules, norms, principles, values that are promoted by a certain international actor (termed herewith as "*normative constructs*") may wield substantive influence upon the preferences, status and behaviour of other actors, too. It shall be argued, however, that there hardly can be found cases, where "normative constructs" would have wielded influence without relying on the power of "material constructs", which is why we may assume that measuring – assessable – influence in terms of 'material constructs' entails a necessary and sufficient degree of reliability.

Techniques and indices vary across the field. For instance, Saaty and Khouja (1976) developed, in their *Measure of World Influence*, a multidimensional conception of influence, seen as perceived power of states. To measure influence of states in international politics, they devised a five-attributes matrix (Saaty and Khouja, 1976, p. 44–45), according to which influence consisted of: (1) human resources, (2) economic strength, or wealth, (3) technology, (4) trade, and (5) military strength. Then, expert judgment was used to determine attachable numeric value of particular attributes, which, on the whole, was meant to provide a diversified measure for ranking of states' influence potential. Certainly, these measures are only indicative and genuinely relative markers of states' influence potentials, even if, nowadays, extensive quantitative data will be used, along with expert judgments and qualitative assessments. It shall give, however, a very necessary in our case understanding of relative rankings and relationships between international actors, both states and international organisations, and thus allows one assume respective power capabilities.

For the purpose of our research, consideration of *"Politiczeskiy Atlas Sovremennosti"* [Contemporary Political Atlas][5] index, *"ECFR's Foreign Policy Scorecards"*[6], other *compound indices* (often titled as "power index" or "influence index") may be very helpful, in addition to individual efforts at establishing, via separate calculation of each value in every particular case, of the very essential *[specific] potential influence indicators* (recalling the Saaty and Khouja's 1976 index conception):

(1) human resources, or size of population (for IOs – a compound size of member states population numbers),
(2) size of territory (for IOs – scope of territorial jurisdiction),
(3) economic strength, or wealth,
(4) technology and development trend,
(5) trade index,
(6) military strength.

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[5]　Мельвиль, А.Ю. (ред.). (2007). Политический атлас современности: Опыт многомерного статистического анализа политических систем современных государств. Москва: МГИМО-Университет. Available online at: http://mgimo.ru/files2/y04_2011/186294/politatlas.pdf. Updated index and correlations also available online at: http://worldpolities.org.

[6]　European Foreign Policy Scorecards are developed annually by the ECFR. The most recent version (ECFR Scorecard 2016) is available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2016.

Again, as in case with the model's "power" element, the "influence" element needs to be tailored to correspond with respective context and area of IR studies, and operationalized consequently in one of the aforementioned ways to convey a proper rationale of the studied "international role".

The PIPP's "Presence" Element and "International Role" Concept

Power and influence alone are indicators of *potential actorness* that, moreover, cast an individualistic perspective and develop a particularistic understanding of relative (but not relational!) actor's status. In other words, power and influence indicators lack causality as far as cooperation between actors is concerned. Two considerably powerful and influential international actors will not necessarily cooperate if they lack substantial linkage – either interests or space shared. For instance, Australia will hardly choose the Andean Community as a partner for strategic cooperation for the simple reason of its "absence" in Latin America and the regional politics, and vice versa. Therefore, a "presence" is required which links actors either spatially or politically (including cultural and language politics).

Conventionally, "being *present* equals at least a symbolic form of existence or recognition" (Jørgensen, 2013, p. 91). Semantically, "presence" is a composite idea denoting: (a) the fact that someone or something is in a place, (b) a feeling that someone is still in a place although they are not there or are dead, (c) a group of police or soldiers that are watching or controlling a situation, and (d) a quality that makes people notice or admire you even when you are not speaking[7]. When "translated" from commonsensical into an academic language, the notion of presence may well denote a state of explicit and implicit existence in a given spatial area or issue domain, including the effect of some sort of existential resonance – a tolerated (recognized!) ability to wield both active and passive leverage via the exercise of normative authority, influence and controlling mechanisms. Hence, presence shall mean a lot more than mere existence.

In case with the *role-oriented perspective on actors' presence*, as developed within the current hypothesis, it is certainly not the existence of an actor as such which comes into question, but indeed its "existence" (visibility and feasibility) in either issue/policy or geographical areas, or in both. In this sense, "presence"

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[7] "Presence". *Cambridge Dictionary Online*. Available at: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/presence.

connotes both (1) a purposive external or international action[8], and (2) an unintended consequence of domestic policy-making processes[9].

In literature, the concept of "presence" was – just like the concepts of "actor" and "actorness" – developed for denoting IOs' growing salience and scope in international affairs. The analysis of the EU's presence was one of the first widely resonant conceptualisations of the Western Europe's international appearance (cf. e.g.: Allen and Smith, 1990). Allen and Smith (1990) introduced the concept of "presence" to explain the growing international salience of what was then EU-in-the-making, whereas avoiding pitfalls of defining the international activity of an actor that is not a state.

"Presence" can be traced in two ways – either (a) *geographically*, through physically shared spaces (*spatial presence*), or (b) *politically*, through detectable issue or policy linkages (*political presence*). In geographical terms, presence implies, therefore, actor's policy outreach to the (neighbouring) spatial area concerned. In policy/issue realm, actor's presence means its articulate and recognized position as a shaper of respective policies/issues in international (be it regional or global) dimension. In both cases it is indispensable for an actor to maintain a visible and feasible position to be considered as "present" in an issue or spatial area politics.

In *geographical terms*, "presence" can be assessed through various perspectives, including regional and area studies, or analytical approaches like shared spaces, (geographical) neighbourhood or cross-border politics.

For assessing "presence" in *issue/policy terms*, a concept of *"international practices"* may be seminally deployed. A burgeoning idea in the study of international relations, the concept of "international practices" pioneered in Adler and Pouliot's (2011a) piece in *International Theory* journal and got consolidated the same year in their edited book (Adler and Pouliot, 2011b). They contend that: "World politics can be conceived as structured by practices, which give meaning to international action, make possible strategic interaction, and are

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[8]　In this context, presence as "purposive action" connotes what is similar to *active leverage* in international relations (an impact wielded by actor's activity in a given geographical or policy/issue area; mechanisms include: *socialization, persuasion, coercion*). For a more detailed analysis of active and passive leverage concepts, cf. Vachudova (2005).

[9]　In this context, presence as "unintended consequence" connotes what is similar to *passive leverage* in international relations (an impact wielded by simple virtue of actor's existence, and the way it appears on the international stage; mechanisms include *emulation, mimicry,* and *learning*). For a more detailed analysis of active and passive leverage concepts, cf. Vachudova (2005).

reproduced, changed, and reinforced by international action and interaction" (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a, p. 1).

Explicitly differentiating between behaviour, action, and practice, Adler and Pouliot's (2011a, p. 4) define international practices as "competent performances", or more precisely, "socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world".

As "socially organized activities that pertain to world politics, broadly construed" (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a, p. 6), international practices can feature, according to the authors (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a, p. 6–8), the following five essential dimensions and qualities:

- in some way, "practice is a *performance*", that is action;
- "practice tends to be *patterned*, in that it generally exhibits certain regularities over time and space";
- "practice is more or less *competent* in a socially meaningful and recognizable way";
- "practice rests on *background knowledge*, which it embodies, enacts, and reifies all at once";
- "practice weaves together the *discursive and material* worlds".

The concept of presence, as assessed through the notion of "international practices", allows one to also emphasize outside perceptions of actors in question as well as the significant effects they have on both psychological (normative) and operational (strategic-material) environments of counterparts or partners.

To fully agree with Jørgensen (1993, p. 221), the concept of presence is, in general, analytically beneficial for its deftness in "avoid[ing] both state-centric approaches and traditional concepts of power". It also gets one off the hook of analysing IOs' international performance in terms of sovereignty or supranationalism, as considered by Hill (1993, p. 309).

Accordingly, one may reasonably assume that *"presence" is a dichotomic variable*, which is either given or missing (true/false variable). To use the exemplary here, Smith's (2014, p. 21) appeal for recognizing what is actually obvious in case of the EU's considerable "presence" in international affairs, it would be reasonably to maintain that "other international actors cannot fail to notice its resources, and its internal policies (such as its agricultural or monetary policies) affect other international actors". Consequently, it is not about recognizing but rather about noticing or failing to notice actor's presence which results in either confirmation or denial of the concept. Confirmation of either manifestation

of "presence" (geographical *or* political) results into the indicator "true". With geographical "presence" not given, political "presence" should be established by using the method of *strategic* (issue *and* actor-system) *narrative analysis*.

The PIPP's "Performance" Element and "International Role" Concept

"Performance" is a multi-level concept and paradigm of actorness. Performance perspective on an actor is interested in what the actor *does* rather than deliberating on what it *is*. In choosing a strategic partner, it is not only important to select a powerful and influential actor, but also vital to target a credible one – the one which creates the effect of its "presence" in a policy or geographical area through the actions, the performance, in fact.

Just like in case with the concepts of "actor" and "actorness", or "presence", the term "performance" has been invented to conceptualize and assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the IOs' functioning. Back in 2010, *The Review of International Organizations* (Springer) published a special issue on the politics of international organisations' performance (*IOP*) (cf. Gutner and Thompson, 2010b). In this special issue, Gutner and Thompson (2010a) presented an analytical framework for studying performance of international organisations, which they understand as both outcomes and process that, in turn, help one think of different ways to measure it. "Performance" shall be regarded thus as an ability to fulfil an obligation or task, including the manner in which a task is completed. In Gutner and Thompson's (2010a, p. 231) wording, "to address the issue of performance, as applied to the social world, is to address both the *outcomes* produced and the *process* – the effort, efficiency and skill – by which goals are pursued by an individual or organization" (emphasis added). They see the *sources of performance* in the interplay of internal and external, and social and material factors as follows:

Table 2. The Sources of Performance

	Internal	External
Social	– Organizational culture – Leadership deficyt	– Competing norms – lack of consensus on problem
Material	– Inadequate, staffing, resource – Bureaucratic/career self–interest	– Power politics among member states – Incoherent mandates – On-the-ground constraints

Source: Gutner and Thompson (2010a, p. 239).

Another step in the development of the "performance" concept was taken quite recently, with the Jørgensen and Laatikainen's (2013) edited volume on the EU *and* international institutions from a tripartite perspective of performance, policy and power, with seminal contributions made by Gutner and Thompson (2013) on the framework of analysis of performance of IOs. Concurrently, Oberthür, Jørgensen, and Shahin (2013) went a step further in their same-year published volume and examined the performance of the EU *in* international institutions. Although the idea emerged some decade earlier, in 1998 (Jørgensen, 1998), these were namely these two analytical attempts, made in 2010 and 2013, respectively, that have pioneered the development and marked the rise of the "performance" concept. Therefore, the latter ones will be substantially drawn as an authoritative source for the construction of the notion within our research project.

The concept is indeed deployed in many instances of social life and interaction, but is hardly well developed in the social sciences, perhaps with the exception of organizational and business studies, where it is one of the core concepts. Not surprisingly, therefore, that Jørgensen, Oberthür, and Shahin (2013, p. 4) suggested building the conceptualization of "performance" particularly on two literatures – that on international regimes (IR), and organizational performance (Economics, particularly Organizational and Business Studies, as well as Public Administration). Jørgensen (2013, p. 88) admits that while "[t]here is a casual use of the concept everywhere", the research on the notion of "performance" is rather "characterized by severe limits". Moreover, much of the literature referring to the idea of performance analyses it in a general fashion, often without an explicit elaboration on the concept and its apparatus. Born in 1998 (Jørgensen, 1998), the concept is still widely misunderstood and misused. It is, *first*, misunderstood as a dichotomic indicator of either success or failure, which is "measured" by observance. *Second*, it is sometimes mixed up with the notion of influence, which is a related – but different – concept. *Third*, the concept of "'performance' is (like 'role') frequently used in the passing" (Jørgensen 2013, p. 89), i.e. without a substantial conceptualization or reference to an established strand of theorizing the notion.

Jørgensen (2013, p. 89) offers to unpack the concept of "performance" by: *first*, clearly delineating the concepts and measures of performance, influence, and impact; *second*, specifying the exact meaning attributed to the concept (i.e. major dimensions, key characteristics); and, *third*, developing a measurement matrix. Drawing on Lusthaus, Adrien, Anderson, Carden, and Montalván

(2002), Jørgensen (2013, p. 90) also offers to assess the concept of performance as a composite notion and approach, which is seen in the literature as a sort of "pragmatic consensus position" on an indeed very contested concept. Accordingly, performance is "unpacked" as a composite notion consisting of *four core elements* (effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, financial viability), each of which is, in turn, further differentiated into a range of dimensions, with their respective indicators, as presented by a tree-structure of the concept below:

Figure 3. Analytical framework of performance

Source: Jørgensen (2013, p. 90).

Apparently, the compositing concepts are contested ideas themselves, and it is necessary to take a rationally-reduced-scope stance on all of them to make assessment and measurement as easy and productive as possible.

Jørgensen (2013, p. 91) offers to assess ***effectiveness*** as an actor's ability to achieve the declared objectives. In another study, Jørgensen et al. (2013, p. 6) admit that assessing "goal achievement itself is likely to raise important challenges", not least because "objectives can be so broad as to render nearly meaningless for an assessment".

Efficiency is to be understood as "the achievement-cost ratio, relative to other performing organisations" (Jørgensen, 2013, p. 92).

Relevance can be defined as "the degree to which key stake-holders consider the [actor in question] a relevant performing organisation, no matter how [this international organisation] is represented" (Jørgensen, 2013, p. 93). In this vein,

relevance correlates with what is assumed by capacity for strategic interaction as a composite element of the "strategic actor" notion. Jørgensen et al. (2013, p. 4) consider relevance against the interplay of such actor-related features as (a) unity, (b) representation and delegation mode, and (c) coordination model. In fact, they treat relevance as actorness as such. In our context, relevance has to be rather seen as an impact an actor is able to generate or actually generates against the backdrop of its goal-oriented international activity. In this vein, relevance is an attribute of strategic actorness capacity [in contrast to Jørgensen's (2013, p. 93) and Jørgensen et al.'s (2013, p. 4) more simplistic understanding of relevance as an – ordinary or conventional – actorness capacity]. Actor's *ability* to (1) extract and (2) mobilise resources, (3) to relate them to (4) its objectives and to (5) a general strategic narrative, and (6) to adapt its strategy in light of changes in the global arena is to be regarded herewith as a relevance feature (indicator). *Inability* to (1) extract and (2) mobilise resources, (3) to relate them to (4) its objectives and to (5) a general strategic narrative, and (6) to adapt its strategy in light of changes in the global arena implies a reason to assess an actor as strategically irrelevant, a non-strategic actor. That being said, a relevance perspective on an actor derives from our inherent interest in actor's further qualities, not in its primary characterization as an actor (or not). Consequently, the relevance indicator is dichotomic: actor either is a strategic (strategically relevant) performer on the international stage, i.e. an interested and capable player, or it is an impotent actor, i.e. a non-performer, laggard, free-rider or "passive actor" in a given geographical or issue area (strategically irrelevant).

Finally, the concept of ***financial/resource viability*** regards the balance between budgets available and assigned tasks (declared goals).

These are indeed IOs that are primarily targeted with the idea of performance. Many problems modern states and societies are confronted with have an interdependent and transnational character, which makes states increasingly rely on international organisations for policy solutions. As Gutner and Thompson (2010a, p. 228) reasonably argue, for most IOs, "performance is the path to legitimacy, and thus our ability to understand performance – what it is and where it comes from – is crucial". Performance indicators are also relevant for assessing states' actorness and "deliverability" on domestic problem-solving, especially in view of incrementally stronger public audit and external pressures. Performance is therefore a path to both IOs and states legitimacy.

Obviously, performance of states and IOs varies extensively, as does the performance within the actors' own environments. While some actors are highly

successful in developing, adopting and enforcing policy whereas achieving the goals set, others are less successful. *Measuring performance* of states and IOs is not an easy, but doable task indeed. Sometimes performance is assessed in terms of impact, which is also extremely difficult to measure. Gutner and Thompson (2010a, p. 234–237) offered a two-tiered continuum of metrics for evaluating performance of international actors, i.e. international organisations in their case, with macro outcomes at one end and more process-based indicators at the other.

PROCESS-BASED   OUTCOME-BASED

← ── →

Micro   Intermediate   Macro
Narrow functions   Political impacts   Problem resolution
Highly contingent   Behavior/Compliance   Welfare enhancement
                               Policy agendas

Figure 4. Performance metrics

Source: Gutner and Thompson (2010a, p. 234).

At the right end of this continuum, one can look at macro outcomes, assessed in terms of *effectiveness* (ability to achieve goals declared). In the continuum's midst, a look at *relevance* (strategic or non-strategic actorness) indicator can help bridge outcome- and process-oriented perspectives. Finally, at the left end of the continuum, both *efficiency* and *financial/resource viability* elements can be evaluated to provide a more process-oriented assessment of actor's internal "drive", i.e. its action capacity stemming from institutional design, resources allocation basis, decision-making and implementing powers.

Notably, the issue of IOs performance is a contested and complex notion in both theory and practice of international organization. In this plea for the reform of IOs, Bouwhuis (2014, p. 1309–1313) condemns a general lack of well-defined performance measures and their measurement. Although he admits that IOs "today are often involved in measurable services", existing performance measures nonetheless "often lack rigor and are not linked to resource allocation" (Bouwhuis, 2014, p. 1310).

Within the framework of SPaSIO research project[10], it was offered to assess "performance" as a balance between two-pair indicators that are closely related.

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[10] "Strategic Partnership between a State and an International Organization: An Ideal Model" (SPaSIO). *"Sonata 6" NCN-funded collaborative research project*. Toruń: Nicolaus Copernicus Uni-

For performance to be deemed satisfactory or successful, a combination of the first group's positive and second group's negative (*RE⁺FE⁻*) or both positive (*RE⁺FE⁺*) indicators is presupposed. Negative value of the first group indicators results in non-satisfactory performance level in either possible combination with the second group indicators (*RE⁻FE⁺* or *RE⁻FE⁻*).

On the one hand, *relevance* (strategic actorness) and *effectiveness* (strategic goals attainment) can be qualitatively assessed through strategic (both issue and actor-system) narratives analysis. The confirmatory or true value of both indicators (*RE⁺*) is to be axiomatically presupposed, yet these are mutually determining – strategic goals attainment can hardly proceed without the activation of strategic actorness, just as the latter one is "destined" to pursue the former one. In turn, the false value of both indicators (*RE⁻*) is to be presumed even when only one indicator has been established to be negative – yet, in this case, it neglects the relevance of the other: what is then strategic actorness worth, if the quintessential goals cannot be attained (to a greater or lesser degree of success)? Sources to be used for assessing the *RE*-indicators are, among others, agendas, manifestos, annual reports, public surveys regarding institutional trust and other performance-related indicators, expert assessments, opinionnaires, etc.

On the other hand, *financial/resource viability* (general and specific budgets, public debts, human, material and immaterial resources) and *efficiency* (cost-benefit ratio) can also be assessed jointly, since these criteria apparently very closely connected. Quantitative data pertaining to budgetary allowances, just as the audit data and expert assessments, provide a useful source for measuring these indicators. *ECFR Scorecards* (e.g. 2016 edition: http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2016) or other metrics systems may offer additional source of data on major states' and some IOs' performance (limitation: Europe, Middle East, North Africa, China). The visualization may be deployed in a form of "spider performance charts", as commonly used in the field and specifically recommended by Jørgensen (2013, p. 88–89) for the case of performance analysis. Positive evaluation of both indicators (*FE⁺*) is to be asserted even in case if at least one is positive. In turn, two negative indicators result in a false compound value (*FE⁻*).

"PIPP" ANALYTICAL MODEL: SAMPLE APPLICATION

Unlike some earlier approaches that tend to absolutize the measurement of power [see e.g. Nye's (2011, p. 10) example, as aforementioned] and nearly escape measurement of international role, the PIPP-analytical model departs from relative (ratio) assessments of each of four of "international role" constitutive elements in its attempt to measure the latter one. As a sample application case in this article has been selected the *Ukraine–United States* dyad to exemplify whether and why political platitudes of power vs powerlessness may be quite justified in these *two country cases* with the *reference year 2014*. One of them, i.e. the US, has been consistently called, since the collapse of the bipolar world system, "the lonely superpower" (Huntington, 1999), the other one, i.e. Ukraine, has been recently termed "a cusp state" in the 2014 collective study on the role, position and agency of this-type states in international relations (Herzog and Robins, 2014). The theoretically-informed analysis of collected actual data on both states, as shown in *Table 3* below, appears to perfectly confirm such terming, for all U.S.' PIPP-indicators considerably outweigh those of Ukraine, the latter epitomizing only one-seventh of the international role capacity shown by the former. Based on the strategic actorness scale as presented in *Table 1* above, Ukraine's international role with its PIPP-score 0,13 barely managed to fall within the scope of moderate strategic actors (middle powers, range 0,10–0,50), whereas the U.S.' international role pioneers the PIPP-scale with its near-max 0,88 score[11], thus profiling itself as a key strategic actor (superpower, range 0,80–1,00).

　　Both actors' comparative performance in international affairs, i.e. their roles, can be illustrated with the help of *SPSS* statistical analysis and visualization tools, as follows (cf. *Figures 5* and *6*). Thereby, the means of each PIPP-element are weighted and cumulated into the compound area of Ukraine's and U.S.' international actorness.

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[11]　Given that the current comparison is between two states only, the bigger indicator becomes the MAX indicator by default, accounting for the integral number (1). With three or more comparative cases, the same logic applies – the maximum among indicators becomes the reference point equalling one (1) on the 0–1 scale.

Table 3. PIPP-metrical data and Ukraine's vs U.S.' international role measurement

ACTOR	Ukraine	US	Ukraine : US ratio
POWER [a]	0,34	1	
power_status	2	3	0,67
power_type	2	4	0,5
INFLUENCE [b]	0,13	1	
inf_population	45362900	318857056	0,14
inf_territory	603,55	9857,31	0,06
inf_GDP	131805	17419000	0,008
inf_GDPshare	0,17	22,38	0,008
inf_GDPgrowth	0	2,4	0
inf_hitech	2189	147833	0,015
inf_milexpend	4033	609914	0,007
inf_milGDP	3,1	3,5	0,87
inf_IPI	0,59	10	0,059
PRESENCE [c]	0,02	0,5	
pres_geo	0	0	0
pres_pol	1	1	1
pres_GPI	45,51	1099,63	0,041
PERFORMANCE [d]	0,02	1	
perf_strategic	384	11901	0,032
perf_effect	2	3	0,67
INT_ROLE [e]	0,13	0,88	0,15 (1 : 7)

Legend: PIPP index calculation formulas:
a) POWER = (power_status/MAX(power_status)) x (power_type/MAX(power_type))
b) INFLUENCE = SUM(i1-i9/MAX(i1-i9))/9, where: i1 = inf_population and so forth to i9 = inf_IPI
c) PRESENCE = SUM(pres_geo + pres_pol) x (pres_GPI/MAX(pres_GPI))
d) PERFORMANCE = (perf_strategic/MAX(perf_strategic)) x (perf_effect/MAX(pef_effect))
e) INT_ROLE = SUM(POWER,INFLUENCE,PRESENCE,PERFORMANCE)/4

Source: Author's own compilation.

The extension of the sample on further case studies (countries), as well as temporal extension (both up to the year 2014, and trend-based forecast data beyond that year), can help contextualise dynamics in states' international actorness, especially in view of more dynamic indicators of influence and performance, as compared to more stable and predictable power and presence indices. It goes without saying that the model can be extrapolated to non-state actors, such as international organizations, the collection of data on which, however, may present a bigger challenge in view of information available.

Figures 5 and 6. SPSS-based PIPP-metrical analysis of Ukraine's vs U.S.' international role
Source: Author's own compilation.

CONCLUSIONS

As revealed, the notion of "international role" is one of the frequently used and misused concepts in IR/political theory as well as in public and political discourses. The linguistic-semantic conceptual analysis proves to be failing to address the complex phenomenon of "role" actors play in world politics. "Role conceptions" and "role expectations", part of the normative analytical apparatus, show their short-livedness and insufficiency in disentangling the concept, especially when put into the real-life politics environment. The latter one, as evidenced from the herewith selected context of strategic partnerships studies between the states and international organizations, shows that actors look inasmuch for status of their would-be partners (role conceptions, role perceptions), as they pursue a scrupulous selection of reliable cooperative links (role expectations, role performance). Thus, a whole array of defining elements feeds into the sometimes simplistically deployed term and idea of an international role. This explains why not power alone is considered when selecting a potential partner from the variety of actors in international relations. One may detect strategic partnerships between NATO or the US and Serbia, the EU or NATO with Russia and China, along with the EU-Chilean or EU-Azerbaijani partnership platforms, etc. Incremental interdependence and rise of non-state actors as world shapers do indeed complicate the picture and broaden the *"menu" of actors for choice*, to paraphrase Russett and Starr (1992). Not all of them are super-powerful, but even the seemingly least powerful dare to duly play their "international role". Nye Jr. (2010) succinctly put it in this regard: "Conventional wisdom holds that the state with the largest army prevails, but in the information age, the state (or the non-state actor) with the best story may sometimes win".

To capture such a complexity of the "international role" phenomenon, this article suggested a PIPP-analytical model to both close the gap in the "role theory" in IR and suggest methodological approaches for empirical analysis of the notion. Such a quad-element conception should allow to better analytically grasp the appearance and performing of actors as would-be or actual strategic partners, as well as assess "international role" in other instances of international interactions. It also allows to better (more inclusively) capture the practice of strategic partnerships, and international cooperation between states and IOs, considering potentials and exercises of both passive and active leverages, just as much as ability to hold credible commitments, that is crucial in the assertion of a strategic actor and, eventually, of a strategic partner.

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THE GROWING ROLE OF CITIES AND THEIR NETWORKS IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY*

ROSNĄCA ROLA MIAST I ICH SIECI W STOSUNKACH MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH ORAZ DLA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO

Agnieszka Szpak*

— **ABSTRACT** —

The author analyses the manifestations of cities' growing role for ensuring the national/international as well as environmental and human security. Cities of today increasingly participate in international relations – they internalize, implement and enforce international law, sometimes independently of their States' international legal obligations, for example when they pledge to implement human rights conventions or environmental law obligations that their own States did not pledge to fulfill. In this way they contribute to international peace and security. On the basis of those manifestations, the author attempts to explain the possible position of cities on the international plane and according to international law – whether they should be accorded greater autonomy or international legal personality. The

— **ABSTRAKT** —

Autorka analizuje przejawy rosnącej roli miast dla zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa narodowego, międzynarodowego, a także ekologicznego i ludzkiego. Dzisiejsze miasta w coraz wyższym stopniu biorą udział w stosunkach międzynarodowych – internalizują, wdrażają i egzekwują przestrzeganie prawa międzynarodowego, czasami niezależnie od międzynarodowych zobowiązań prawnych własnych państw, na przykład gdy zobowiązują się do wdrożenia konwencji z zakresu praw człowieka lub obowiązków z zakresu prawa ochrony środowiska, co do których ich własne państwa nie przyjęły zobowiązań. W ten sposób miasta przyczyniają się do pokoju i bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego. Na podstawie tych przejawów aktywności miast autorka próbuje wyjaśnić ich pozycję na płaszczyźnie międzynarodowej

author also indicates that the role of cities in the area of different aspects of security is growing.

Keywords: cities, cities' networks, security, human security, environmental security

i w świetle prawa międzynarodowego. Rozważa, czy miastom należy przyznać większą autonomię lub międzynarodową osobowość prawną. Autorka wskazuje również na rosnącą rolę miast w zakresie różnych aspektów bezpieczeństwa.

Słowa kluczowe: miasta, sieci miast, bezpieczeństwo, bezpieczeństwo ludzkie, bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne

INTRODUCTION

The *Charter of European Cities and Towns: Towards Sustainability* of 1994 begins with significant words: "We, European cities & towns, signatories of this Charter, state that in the course of history, our towns have existed within and outlasted empires, nation states, and regimes and have survived as centres of social life, carriers of our economies, and guardians of culture, heritage and tradition. Along with families and neighbourhoods, towns have been the basic elements of our societies and states. Towns have been the centres of industry, craft, trade, education and government. We understand that our present urban lifestyle, in particular our patterns of division of labour and functions, land-use, transport, industrial production, agriculture, consumption, and leisure activities, and hence our standard of living, make us essentially responsible for many environmental problems humankind is facing" (para. I.1).

Cities have always been the centres of political, social, cultural and organizational innovations. City is the most important and probably the most innovative creation that emerged in the last ten thousand years (Bendyk, 2014a, p. 8). It is thanks to cities that the division of labour became possible. The latter increased its efficiency and contributed to the economic growth. Development of cities made it necessary to facilitate the transport, culminating in the current level of massive passenger air transport (Bendyk, 2014a, p. 9). Global cities or megacities, as they are sometimes called, "are places where a lot of wealth and power are concentrated, and which are in a position to take part in very influential global networks in a state of limited but real independence *vis-á-vis* their states and national governments" (Auby, 2011, p. 205). As stated in the *UN Declaration on Cities and Other Human Settlements in the New Millennium*, "[…] cities and towns are engines of growth contributing to the development of both rural and urban human settlements […]" (point 2), and further, "[c]ities and towns hold

the potential to maximize the benefits and to offset the negative consequences of globalization. Well-managed cities can provide an economic environment capable of generating employment opportunities, as well as offering a diversity of goods and services" (point 11).

On the other hand, States are too weak to handle the challenges of a global character such as climate change or economic globalization. In both of those cases, cities and their networks are better prepared to deal with such challenges. Cities possess intellectual, cultural and economic resources sufficient for those tasks. Big cities have almost everything that States have, except for such attributes as sovereignty and monopoly on the use of force (Bendyk, 2014a, p. 7). As D.A. French (2004, p. 61–62) points out, "[t]he nation State is changing; it is losing its inherent superiority amongst global entities and becoming just another actor on the international stage […]. For many, the breakdown of artificial notions of sovereignty and the creation of new associations and networks – governmental, corporate and private – are a sign of significant and real developments in international relations. It signifies the end of the centralisation of political, socio-economic and, in some cases, military power by governments and the dispersion more widely of this authority. Others see the changing nature of the State as a positive step towards the creation of a global civil society, where the individual as the ultimate unit of law is more likely to find active expression and, equally important, protection".

F. Fukuyama (2005) indicates that today weak and failing States are the dominant ones. This is the result of a growing role of new social actors and new groups and of globalization that contributes to elimination of the barriers in the flow of people, goods and ideas. As such it also facilitates the proliferation of such dangerous and harmful phenomena as organized crime, international terrorism, or drug trafficking. In this context, one may affirm that States will not disappear but they will gradually cease to be the only structure of power. States are not omnipresent on the inside as well as outside. They cease to fulfill all of the social expectations that are carried with it by progress and internationalization of different spheres of social life (Bieleń, 2009, p. 47). Taking the processes of globalization into account it should be noted that every historical era influenced the shape of a State. In the ancient times there was no nation nor State at all, thus it is possible that they will disappear in the future (Bieleń, 2009, p. 47–48). But as K. Nowrot (1998–1999, p. 644) states, "[d]espite the variety of challenges to the predominant role of States in the international realm, the institution of the State as such will probably not become obsolete and wither away in the foresee-

able future. The challenges by non-State actors to the position of nation-states, although obviously influential in some areas, can in general be regarded as being only sectoral ones, each in itself limited to a specific interest or segment of the society".

What is important, States are capable of self-transformation. Accordingly, the State does not die out but preserves its capacity to transform and adapt, for example adjusting to global market through privatizing public services such as medical service or telecommunications, or through deregulation in the meaning of eliminating barriers in the flow of financial resources (Bieleń, 2009, s. 49). Polish scholar and advisor to the Polish president on international affairs Roman Kuźniar (2003, p. 211) indicates that we can observe a far reaching weakening of the power of States over their territories and populations. The function of protecting the borders has also weakened as borders became more porous with regard to people, information and capital. It means that the room for maneuver for States in the face of new challenges has been narrowed down significantly. Governments are limited by the nets of different regulations, obligations and interdependencies. However, those nets should not be regarded as something negative that weakens States as these are simply State obligations, voluntarily contracted for the pursuance of common objectives and in the cooperation with other participants of the same network of obligations.

Still some classic functions of States such as in the spheres of military and national security are being strengthened. It is taking place especially after the September 11 attacks in the context of terrorist threat. As a result, the border control has increased, banking secrecy has been restricted, the possibilities of legal wiretapping have been broadened and international cooperation between internal security agencies of different States has been intensified (Anioł, 2002, p. 19).

Cities have been researched mostly in terms of its economic, technological, and social value and significance. Until about 2006 they had not been analyzed as legal entities with possibilities of taking actions on the international stage[1]. This state of affairs has changed today but still there is a need to research and wrote about cities as a fascinating phenomenon in many respects, also from the

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[1] In 2006 there were published such articles as: Y. Blank (2006). The City and the World. *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 44* (3), 868–931; G.E. Frug, D.J. Barron, International Local Government Law. *The Urban Lawyer, 38* (1), 1–63.

point of view of different aspects of security, including national/international, environmental, social, and human security.

Section 2 of this article will deal with the manifestations of the activity of cities on the international stage such as internalizing and implementing international law (especially human rights law and environmental law), setting up offices of international relations or creating its own intelligence services. In Section 3, I will attempt to briefly outline the reasons for the growing role of cities in international relations. Section 4 will be devoted to explaining the legal status of cities in international law and their position in international relations – are they the subjects of international law, more and more powerful non-State actors? should they have such status, or greater autonomy? Finally, Section 5 will contain some concluding remarks.

CITIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE

References to cities in the legal texts or in the international law and international relations literature are extremely rare. But taking into account the fact that States are composed *inter alia* of cities and their significant role in many spheres, international law had to – in a way – deal with the challenges presented by cities. As G.E. Frug and D.J. Barron (2006, p. 13) indicate, "[a]longside the predominant focus on states, one finds two basic approaches to the city within international law. The first treats cities as being largely independent from any sovereign state and thus under the direct jurisdiction of the international community. The second treats cities as if they were indistinguishable components of their host countries, and thus without any meaningfully separate legal status".

One of the very rare examples of international law interest in cities is the status of the Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk) or the International City of Tangiers. The former was under the control of the League of Nations and the latter subjected to the control of multilateral body comprised of officials from various States. What is important is that those cities were not regarded as fully independent separate entities with legal personality (Blank, 2006, p. 886). G.E. Frug and D.J. Barron (2006, p. 14) conclude that "[t]he purpose of calling Tangiers an 'international' city and of designating Danzig a 'free' city was to highlight their independence from Morocco and Poland, respectively. They were not governed by a state in the way that cities usually are. The international community itself assumed that supervisory function. By recognizing these cities as legal entities,

therefore, international law was not claiming jurisdiction over the domestic legal relationship between states and their cities. Instead, it was attempting to resolve territorial disputes between states by designating certain territory to be under the trusteeship of the international community. For that reason, these international cities paradoxically reinforced the invisibility of the city in international law. The city became visible so that it could be excised from its state". Y. Blank (2006, p. 886) adds that "[…] although Danzig was not a city in the contemporary sense of the word but rather a *sui generis*, free-standing city, the lesson that can be drawn from it is remarkable: If cities are to assume, once again, legal personhood in international law, they could very possibly resemble the Free City of Danzig".

Cities have been attempting to reach greater autonomy from the State. Accordingly, they have sought to become active players on the international arena. One of the strategies adopted includes forming international NGOs such as United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), the most renown of such cities networks. This strategy aims at gaining visibility in international relations (Porras, 2008, p. 538–539). I.M. Porras (2008, p. 539) states that: "Basing their arguments on the democratic potential of cities and on the claim that city government is the level of government closest to the people and therefore most responsive to their needs, such groups have advocated for greater decentralization and autonomy for cities. The cities' assertion of the desirability of greater autonomy has been well received by the international community, which has embraced the city as an alternative interlocutor to the state. […] Because cities, unlike traditional non-governmental organizations ('NGOs'), are able to lay claim to representative legitimacy, they have emerged as a favored actor within the umbrella of international civil society representatives".

As cities are becoming more and more active players on the international stage, there are more opportunities for their contacts with other cities across the border but also with international organizations of a governmental character. J. Nijman is of the opinion that direct and institutionalized relations between the city and global institutions will intensify. To illustrate this trend the Author focuses on *Agenda 21* adopted by the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Nijman, 2011, p. 219). Chapter 28 of the *Agenda 21*, *Local Authorities' Initiatives in Support of Agenda 21*, states that "[b]ecause so many of the problems and solutions being addressed by Agenda 21 have their roots in local activities, the participation and cooperation of local authorities will be a determining factor in fulfilling its objectives. Local authorities construct, operate and maintain economic, social and environmental infra-

structure, oversee planning processes, establish local environmental policies and regulations, and assist in implementing national and subnational environmental policies. As the level of governance closest to the people, they play a vital role in educating, mobilizing and responding to the public to promote sustainable development" (para. 28.1; Nijman, 2011, p. 219).

Since 1990s the interaction and cooperation between cities and international organizations in the sphere of sustainable development, and consequently in the sphere of environmental security, has developed significantly (Nijman, 2011, p. 219–220). For example, UN Environment Programme (UNEP) cooperates with ICLEI (Local Governments for Sustainability) and C40 (C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group). UN-Habitat, ICLEI, IUCN's (International Union for Conservation of Nature) project Countdown 2010 (project completed), UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training and Research), UNESCO, a Steering Group of Mayors, Secretariat of the *Convention on Biological Diversity* and UNEP engaged in the Global Partnership on the Cities and Biodiversity aimed at restricting the loss of biodiversity by 2010 (Nijman, 2011, p. 220; https://www.cbd.int/idb/2009/about/celebration/global-partnership.shtml). According to the Partnership idea: "[w]hile cities are today part of the problem of the current unprecedented loss of biodiversity, they are also part of the solution. Indeed, they have a major role to play, as global change starts at the local level. Several leading cities and local authorities are actively involved in this battle for life on Earth and one of the ways they have chosen to spread the word about biodiversity loss is to celebrate the International Day for Biological Diversity, and to take this opportunity to inform their citizens about Invasive Alien Species" (https://www.cbd.int/idb/2009/about/celebration/global-partnership.shtml).

Other examples of cooperation or participation of cities in the sphere of environmental security or them enforcing international law include: in 2010, during the World Mayors Summit on Climate in Mexico, 207 mayors of cities adopted the *Global Cities Covenant on Climate – the Mexico City Pact* (http://www.iclei.org/climate-roadmap/advocacy/global-lg-events/2010-world-mayors-summit-on-climate-mexico-city.html). Organization C40 acts against the climate change by way of programmes promoting the use of bikes in cities and pedestrian streets (Barber, 2014, p. 22). As J. Nijman (2011, p. 214) indicates, "[c]ities are part of the problem of climate change, but also part of the solution". 75% of the global CO_2 emissions is caused by cities. But as part of the solution cities have undertaken many programmes and actions to counteract environmental pollution, also in cooperation with other cities (Nijman, 2011, p. 214).

For example, the *Charter of European Cities and Towns: Towards Sustainability* states that cities "shall give priority to ecologically sound means of transport (in particular walking, cycling, public transport) and make a combination of these means the centre of our planning efforts. Motorised individual means of urban transport ought to have the subsidiary function of facilitating access to local services and maintaining the economic activity of the city" (para. I.9). Similarly, the *European Urban Charter II* of 2008 provides that "[i]t is for us, European local elected representatives, to promote sustainable mobility policies which favour 'soft' means of travel such as walking and cycling as well as all forms of public transport" (http://www.coe.int/t/congress/texts/conventions/conventions_en.asp?mytabsmenu=6). All of those activities definitely contribute to environmental security.

States are also losing functions and prerogatives that traditionally were performed by them at the central level, such as waging wars or country defence. It includes so called privatization of war and security, where many State prerogatives are assigned to private military and security companies/contractors (Joras, Schuster, 2008; Cameron, 2006). With regard to national/international security (as the two are inseparable today) more and more cities convene its own intelligence services. Mayor of New York, R. Giuliani started this trend when – after the September 11, 2001 attacks – he noticed that American State intelligence agencies did not work well. As a consequence, New York city removed its intelligence branch from Washington after the September 11 and redeployed it to twelve cities around the whole world. Today as well for example FBI does not cooperate with CIA and CIA does not cooperate with Interpol. Next New York mayor, M. Bloomberg sent his agents to Hong Kong, Jakarta, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo, Moscow, and London. Police of those cities are also searching for terrorists and are in the possession of information that may be valuable and useful in New York. Since New York intelligence began to cooperate with cities from all over the world, no terrorist attack succeeded. And it did in Boston. According to B. Barber, Boston was relying on Washington. Moscow police warned FBI of attacks but Boston police never received those warnings. They were simply not transmitted to the Boston police (*Zapędziliśmy się w ślepą uliczkę* [interview with B. Barber], p. 110). If they had been participating in the antiterrorist network of cities they would have known about the threat of attack and could have prevented it. The above example demonstrates that national security becomes more and more the security/safety of cities (*Zapędziliśmy się w ślepą uliczkę* [interview with B. Barber], p. 110). This is the reason for the growing

role of cities in the ensuring national and international security as those two are interconnected today.

In the context of international security one may mention the role of cities in "failed States". Taking into account all the characteristic features of the failed States, it must be concluded that they constitute a central security issue, especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks. As Y. Blank (2006, p. 918) put it, "[w]here states fail, localities might succeed". Blank (2006, p. 918–919) claims that "[l]ocally initiated adoption of international norms is often easier to achieve due to various reasons. First, homogeneity of values and preferences of the citizenry is more common in localities than it is in states. Second, it is often easier to mobilize residents in localities in order to achieve such reforms than it is to mobilize citizens nationwide. Third, local governments often allow for better participation and involvement of the public in government and thus enhance political passion and care for politics. Fourth, patriotism and nationalism are perhaps of lesser importance in localities and international influence is less threatening than it is for national entities". However, States are reluctant to accord cities such far reaching rights as they are afraid that it would amount to granting them some kind of a right to secede (Blank, 2006, p. 921). Nonetheless, in the context of "failed States" well-functioning cities may be the beginning of rebuilding of an equally well functioning State. Cities and States should cooperate in order to bring peace and stability in States or whole regions in crisis.

M. Byrne (2012, p. 113) suggests an alternative approach to a discourse on failed States. He indicates that whereas public order is absent in Somalia (as the most common example of a "failed State"), a social order is present, including in cities. Accordingly, even Somalia should not be regarded as a "failed State" as its society still exists and one might even say that it is functioning and still vibrant. And it is this society that can start rebuilding the State's infrastructure and public order. This process must be initiated and conducted from within the State of Somalia, whereas the international community may and should assist in this process, but definitely not take possession of it (Szpak, 2014, p. 255). Especially taking into account the society in "failed States" that is very often vibrant and able to organize itself and provide services, cities may be the nucleus from which States may begin to rebuild themselves. Cities may be the foundations for building a well-functioning State.

Cities also should cooperate in the sphere of cybersecurity and protect themselves against terrorist attacks on their critical infrastructure. For example, Los Angeles Cyber Intrusion Command Center is operated by the Los Angeles Police

Department. It operates 24-hour-a-day and monitors online threats against the city (Goodwin, Nicolas, 2014, p. 16). "By creating a structured approach, thinking holistically about threats and vulnerabilities, and deploying strong practices to detect, mitigate, and communicate threats, a city can protect its citizens and safeguard its resources" (Goodwin, Nicolas, 2014, p. 21). By sharing their experience in this sphere cities may contribute to greater national security of their States. Naturally States will still be needed *inter alia* for securing the borders and currencies and ensuring respect for international treaties (*Zapędziliśmy się w ślepą uliczkę* [interview with B. Barber], p. 110). But acting together, cities may become partners for States.

A great majority of cities have offices of international relations or international cooperation, for example Seattle, Atlanta, Goteborg, Kyoto (Frug, Barron, 2006, p. 29; Nijman, 2011, p. 214), New York (NY Mayor's Office for International Affairs) and many others. Another relevant instrument in the sphere of participation of cities in international relations *sensu largo* is the institution of twin towns or sister cities. It takes a form of legal and social agreement between cities from different States to promote cultural and commercial ties. The concept of town twinning was intended to foster friendship and understanding between different cultures and to encourage trade and tourism. Currently, the concept of sister towns has increasingly been used to form strategic international business links between member cities. Even the term "city diplomacy" was coined. It embraces direct contacts and mutual assistance between cities across the borders. For example Polish town Toruń (that happens to be my town) cooperates with the following twin cities: Philadelphia (USA, since 1977), Göttingen (Germany, since 1978), Leiden (the Netherlands, since 1988), Hämeenlinnan (Finland, since 1989), Kaliningrad (Russia, since 1995), Čadca (Slovakia, since 1996), Swindon (UK, since 2003), Łuck (Ukraine, since 2008), Novo Mesto (Slovenia, since 2009) and Guilin (China, since 2010) (http://www.tmpt.torun.pl/twincities.html and http://www.torun.pl/pl/miasto/samorzad/kontakty-partnerskie-i-miedzynarodowe/miasta-blizniacze-torunia).

As has been indicated, cities form global networks. The most important city networks include: United Cities and Local Governments (http://www.uclg.org/), International Union of Local Authorities (http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/upgrading/resources/organizations/iula.html), World Association of Major Metropolises (http://www.metropolis.org/), National League of Cities (http://www.nlc.org/), ICLEI (Local Governments for Sustainability, founded in 1990 as the *International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives*) (http://www.iclei.

org/), C40 Cities (http://www.c40.org/), Eurocities (http://www.eurocities.eu/), U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (http://www.usmayors.org/climate-protection/agreement.htm), Megacities Foundation (http://www.megacitiesproject.org/), CityNet (http://citynet-ap.org/), and City Protocol (http://cityprotocol.org/). One should also mention Cities Alliance convened in 1999 by the World Bank and United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) which "is a global partnership for urban poverty reduction and the promotion of the role of cities in sustainable development" (http://www.citiesalliance.org/). The most important of them is UCLG. The primary goal of the UCLG is "[t]o be the united voice and world advocate of democratic local self-government, promoting its values, objectives and interests, through cooperation between local governments, and within the wider international community" (http://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/about). Its activities aim at increasing the role and influence of local government and its representative organizations in global governance and at becoming the main source of support for democratic, effective, innovative local government, close to the citizen (http://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/about). In its Constitution of 2004 UCLG states that it is aware "that the traditional role of the State is profoundly affected by the above trends and that States cannot centrally manage and control the complex integrated cities and towns of today and tomorrow" (http://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/structure/constitution-rules). The significance of global networks of cities is in the strengthening the position and influence of cities. It also "marks a break from the competitive order of the nation-states, as localities from all over the world manage to cooperate" (Blank, 2006, p. 923).

ROOTS OF THE GROWING ROLE OF CITIES

According to B. Barber, mayors are democratic, they act efficiently and they must be pragmatic. They are able to solve global problems just as they deal with local ones. The latter are caused by the growing helplessness of States and international system (*Zapędziliśmy się w ślepą uliczkę* [interview with B. Barber], p. 108). He is of the opinion that mayors – to a great extent – already rule the world. Mayors, alone or in cooperation with other mayors or entities, solve local and global problems. Cities can act more efficiently by associating into networks which they already do (*Zapędziliśmy się w ślepą uliczkę* [interview with B. Barber], p. 108). J.M. Coll (2015) points to five advantages for more efficient model of dealing

with relevant global problems, namely by increasing the role of cities: 1. Cities are more practical than ideological, 2. Cities are more emotionally intelligent than nation-states, 3. Cities bypass national sovereignty, 4. Cities democratize the learning curve, and 5. Cities are global brands that attract the creative class. Those advantages clearly explain why the role of cities is growing.

J. Nijman (2011, p. 214) rightly claims that "[t]he self-conception of cities as global entities is not only caused by the impact of economic globalisation on the city, but also by the fact that the major global problems of our time (variations of human-political and ecological injustices) are often felt most urgently by the inhabitants of the world's cities". For example, global warming is global (as the name demonstrates), illnesses are global (such as AIDS, Ebola, bird flu, etc.), and corporations are also global. Very often those challenges must be met at the local level, in cities that are the gatherings of natural and legal persons as well as necessary infrastructure.

As I.M. Porras (2008, p. 553) claims, "[t]he cities' ambitions have been met by an almost universal approval among international organizations. Indeed, it is possible to identify a convergence of interests between cities and international organizations and the forging of a common agenda. The main tenets of the common agenda are the promotion of greater local autonomy, decentralization, subsidiarity, and good governance. International organizations have endorsed localist claims and their agenda of increasing relative power *vis-à-vis* the state, but they have done so in large measure because they were already bent on a similar path under the aegis of «good governance»". International organizations became disappointed with States being often bureaucratic and corrupt. Many States are not democratic despite all the programmes and funds destined for this goal. This caused the shift in the attitude on the good governance and decentralization. Concentration of power in the hands of the State was regarded as a part of the problem, thus international organizations decided to invest in local governments that were perceived as offering "the greatest potential for democratic empowerment, accountability, flexibility, responsiveness to major stakeholders (including international organizations, public and private investors) and local knowledge. Furthermore, properly managed, it was thought, cities could deliver economic efficiencies to develop projects" (Porras, 2008, p. 553, 555). World Bank and other international organizations or agencies began to fund projects conducted at a local level. For example, the World Bank funding of urban projects is based on four conditions identified in its report *Cities in Transition. World Bank Urban and Local Government Strategy*: 1. Livability; 2. Competitive-

ness; 3. Good governance and management; 4. Bankability (*Cities in Transition*, p. 8–12; Porras, 2008, p. 555). As I.M. Porras (2008, p. 559) indicates, "[p]erhaps because international organizations must always contend against states' criticism of their own democratic illegitimacy, or because states sometimes stand in the way of development agendas crafted for them by international organizations, many international organizations have adopted as their own the decentralization strategy of the cities". These are definitely root causes for the currently growing role of cities in international relations.

GREATER AUTONOMY OR LEGAL PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW?

The commonly accepted subjects of international law include States, international organizations, the Holly See, the Sovereign Order of Malta, insurgents, national liberation movements and, according to some scholars, individuals (Cassese, 2005, p. 71–150). As Y. Blank (2006, p. 871) points out, "[…] much has been written on the extension of international law over non-state actors such as individuals, minority groups, multinational corporations, and other civil society elements, localities have been overlooked. Hence, the role of international law in regulating one of the most important aspects of globalization – the changes that localities undergo as part of it and their role in bringing it about – was almost entirely ignored". Recently, however, much has been changed. As the above considerations indicate, the role of cities on the international stage is growing, also in the sphere traditionally and still reserved for States, namely national/international security. As G.E. Frug and D.J. Barron (2006, p. 10) state, "[c]ities have entered into a new phase in history. Their orientation has become external rather than internal. Their associations have become global rather than domestic".

From the perspective of international law as well as internal law of every State, the city has been constructed from within a national legal order; it has been regarded as a part of the State. As I.M. Porras (2008, p. 546) notices, "[t]he general consensus regarding the purely domestic character of the city-state relationship has been recently put into question by a series of developments that collectively have led to what we may call the internationalization of cities". One possibility to recognize some status of cities and their growing role with respect to international relations would be to give them broad autonomy. The UN *Declaration on Cities and Other Human Settlements in the New Millennium* clearly

directs States to accord cities more autonomy in order for the latter to fully meet the expectations of its citizens and ensure their prosperity. This also refers to security. In point 40 the Declaration encourages "authorities within metropolitan areas to develop mechanisms and to foster, where appropriate, legal, financial, administrative, planning and coordination instruments, in order to achieve more equitable, ordered and functional cities", and in point 41 it further resolves "to build capacities and networks to enable all partners to play an effective role in shelter and human settlements development. The management of urbanization processes requires strong and accountable public institutions able to provide an effective framework in which everybody has access to basic services. Capacity-building needs to be directed towards, *inter alia*, supporting decentralization and participatory urban management processes. We also pledge to strengthen the institutions and legal frameworks that assist and allow broad-based participation in decision-making and in the implementation of human settlements strategies, policies and programmes" (*The Local Rule: Decentralisation and Human Rights*, p. 8).

The Local Rule: Decentralisation and Human Rights states that according to the proponents of decentralization, it "will improve the efficient provision of services, the quality of governance, economic development and efforts to alleviate poverty" (p. 8).

Some form of autonomy for localities was recognized for the first time in 1953 at the first General Assembly of the Council of European Municipalities in Versailles. At that time the *European Charter of Municipal Liberties* was adopted. It "reflected its proponents' commitment to rebuilding post-war Europe on the basis of strong local institutions enjoying a high degree of democratic autonomy" (*Towards a World Charter of Local Self-Government*, para. 7). Then in 1985, *the European Charter of Local Self-Government* was drafted (*Towards a World Charter of Local Self-Government*, para. 7). The Charter in its preamble states that self-government "entails the existence of local authorities endowed with democratically constituted decision-making bodies and possessing a wide degree of autonomy with regard to their responsibilities, the ways and means by which those responsibilities are exercised and the resources required for their fulfillment" (*Towards a World Charter of Local Self-Government*, para. 7). In the *Draft World Charter of Local Self-Government* of 1998 we read in Article 13 that "[l]ocal authorities shall have the right of recourse to judicial remedy in order to safeguard their autonomy and to ensure compliance with the laws which determine their functions and protect their interests" (*Towards a World Charter*

of Local Self-Government, para. 7). As Y. Blank (2006, p. 905) sums up, "the vision in the Draft is of a minimal state, a back-up state that intervenes with local autonomy and local decision-making only in relatively rare cases, while the rule is local autonomy and subsidiarity".

When talking about international legal personality of cities one must admit that cities cannot conclude treaties and they do not have *locus standi* before International Court of Justice. They may not be members of international governmental organizations such as the UN but they surely may create and participate in NGOs. City networks could be regarded as NGOs. Cities do not maintain diplomatic relations with States or international organizations but – on the other hand – they conduct so called "city diplomacy" through their offices of international relations. As Y. Blank (2006, p. 885–886) indicates, there are "[…] several reasons for this tradition that lies at the heart of international law, some theoretical, others more pragmatic. The first, and perhaps the most obvious one is the traditional linkage between international law and the principle of sovereignty. The founding principle of international law is that states are sovereign within their territory and that international law is a self-imposed legal system to which states have to consent. Hence, only states should be the full subjects of international law, and they should be given the liberty to internally organize themselves, and be treated by external powers as unitary. […] Second, the establishment of an efficient international regime depends on a limited and finite number of legally recognized international persons. […] granting some localities full legal person would not only destabilize the UN structure and unbearably complicate international relations, but it would also encourage many localities to secede from their states in an attempt to acquire full international legal person. […] Fourth, local governments are simply seen as integral parts of their states and it would therefore seem odd to even mention them as separate entities. Much like it would be redundant to mention explicitly the existence of the legislature, the executive, or any other state organ – let alone discuss the absurd idea of granting these state actors international legal personality – there is no need to mention localities, or debate their candidacy for an independent international personality".

Still, according to J. Nijman (2011, p. 221), in the future cities will increasingly implement and enforce international law and they will be doing that on their own initiative independent of State obligations. This trend or prognosis is already visible in the field of international human rights law and environmental law. In this way cities contribute to greater environmental, social and human security.

Very often cities implement human rights conventions that their host States did not even ratify. For example, "the *Child Friendly Cities Initiative* (CFCI) is a global city network established to implement the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child directly in the participating cities. The *UNESCO International Coalition of Cities against Racism and Discrimination* aims to give direct effect to antiracism and anti-discrimination norms as included in international treaties, customary law (the prohibition of racial discrimination is *ius cogens*), and resolutions and declarations of IOs and their organs in the cities involved" (Nijman, 2011, p. 221–222). One of the initiatives undertaken independent of States obligations was that of Greg Nickels, the Mayor of Seattle, who in 2005 appealed to other cities to give effect to the Kyoto Protocol and reduce locally the level of greenhouse gases emissions. As the reaction was positive, it gave rise to a city network called the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement that comprises more than 1000 member-cities (Nijman, 2011, p. 222). "These cities give effect to the Kyoto norm through their local policies while the US as a state had not wished to be bound by the protocol. International law here plays a role in the self-identification of the city as a global actor which takes account of its responsibility with respect to climate change and takes the lead in the governance of one of the most urgent global challenges" (Nijman, 2011, p. 222). As is clear from the above remarks, cities often attempt to internalize international law – to include it in its local law, adopt its standards and enforce it. One may say that in a way international law is transposed into local law. Another example may be found in the sphere of human rights law. San Francisco (via *Ordinance 1998 on the Local Implementation of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women*) and Los Angeles have adopted the *UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women* (the U.S. did not ratify the Convention) and Salt Lake City and Seattle decided to fulfill the obligations flowing from the Kyoto Protocol that commits State Parties to reduce greenhouse gases emissions and in this way fights global warming (here again the U.S. did not ratify the Protocol) (Frug, Barron, 2006, p. 28; Nijman, 2011, p. 222–223). J. Nijman (2011, p. 224) also predicts that in the future cities will informally more strongly participate in international law-making. Cities are places where people live, work and spend their free time. For that reason it is important that human rights of the citizens as well as their security and safety are ensured. As the *European Urban Charter II* provides, cities and towns are "multigenerational, multicultural and multireligious places where people from all social backgrounds mingle on a daily basis. For urban society to develop

fairly, mutual assistance between citizens, dialogue between groups, including inter-religious dialogue, and voluntary activity need to be promoted. We will continue our fight against financial and employment insecurity, exclusion and all forms of discrimination on grounds of social status, age, culture, religion, gender and disability" (*European Urban Charter II*). As is clearly visible, cities attempt to enforce human rights law on the local scale.

Cities also enter into agreements with other cities. For example, cities reached international (transnational) agreements over water resources even when no treaties between their states existed and without the consent of their states. For instance, in 1996 an agreement was signed between two municipalities, the Regional Council of Emek–Hefer, located on the coastal plain of Israel, and the municipality of Tul-Karem, in the Palestinian-controlled area of the West Bank. The agreement outlined the conditions of cooperation with reference to a polluted water basin that the two cities shared (Benvenisti, 2004, p. 140; Blank, 2006, p. 897–898). This activity may very well be placed in the area of environmental and social security.

Despite all those activities of cities in the realm of internalizing and enforcing international law which contribute to social, environmental and human security, one may argue that those actions and programmes are part of fulfilling obligations of States. As J. Nijman (2011, p. 222) rightly notes, "[t]he city is under an obligation to protect its urban population against violations of human rights as well as under an obligation to respect these rights. This is not an obligation independent from the state – it is an obligation stemming from international human rights obligations of states, of which cities are a part".

Apart from the above activities cities may, and actively do, oppose their States going to wars as for example did 165 cities when they passed a resolution opposing the U.S. war against Iraq (Frug, Barron, 2006, p. 28; *Cities for Peace*). In this way cities and also their networks may influence the foreign policy of its States. This protest was certainly aimed at preserving peace which is necessary for security; they are interconnected.

When talking about international legal personality J. Nijman (2011, p. 220) points to *the Agreement of Cooperation between the United Nations Human Settlements Programme and United Cities and Local Governments* from 2004 as an argument for some kind of legal personality of cities in international law. This agreement "aims to promote local autonomy and self-governance through decentralization played via UN-Habitat". The Agreement – between a UN agency and an NGO – clearly proves that international organizations such as the UN

or its specialized organizations recognize the cities network such as UCLG as an important partner. *The Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations* (so called Cardoso Report) of 2004 stated that the UN should regard UCLG "as an advisory body on governance matters" (*We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance. Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations*, p. 20). Talking about UCLG, it has such prerogatives as nominating 50% of the members of the UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities (Nijman, 2011, p. 221). The latter was established in 2000 to enable local authorities to influence the work program of the UN-Habitat. It comprises of "selected mayors and representatives of local authority associations especially chosen on the basis of their local, national and international commitment to engage in the implementation of the Habitat Agenda" (Website of ICLEI). UCLG has also been accorded UN ECOSOC general consultative status since 1947. Other examples include Organization of Islamic Capitals and Cities (http://www.oicc.org/; general consultative status since 1995) and Academy for Mobilizing Rural-Urban Action Through Education (special consultative status since 2005) (http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=34). Consultative status definitely legitimizes such organizations and is a tool of their influencing decision-making and law-making at the UN.

The role and status of cities may be compared to the role of NGOs. The latter attempt to lobby for regulations that they approve. Cities similarly may try to influence States during their bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Naturally the position of cities and their clout will be strengthened if they cooperate within the framework of city networks (Nijman, 2011, p. 224). For example, during the 2009 Conference of Parties (COP) to the *UN Framework Convention on Climate Change* the ICLEI – network that had a formal observer status at the COP – pressured States "for a strong post-Kyoto climate deal which would guarantee the involvement of cities as partners in the post-2012 regime" (Nijman, 2011, p. 224). Although the negotiations ended with a fiasco, at the next COP the States-parties "recognised the key role of cities and local governments – the city as 'governmental stakeholder' – play in global climate change governance" (Nijman, 2011, p. 224). Analogously to NGOs and individuals one may state that cities may be regarded as partial subjects of international law and their legal personality is highly restricted or even only emerging. It would be limited to activities undertaken within the city competence necessary to fulfill its functions and meet the social expectations of its citizens, including their security needs. For example, cities should be able to maintain international relations with

subjects that recognize them and, for example, agree to conclude an international agreement. There is no doubt that such agreements would have to comply with the host State obligations. In order to accord cities some form of international legal personality, some form of a supervision of State organs would be necessary (Blank, 2006, p. 892). With reference to supervision, the *European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities* provides that "any Contracting Party may, when signing the present Convention or in a later communication to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, specify the authorities competent under its domestic law to exercise control or supervision with regard to the territorial communities and authorities concerned" (Art. 3 [5]).

Cities could also enter into agreements with other cities across the borders, which agreements after being authorized by their States could be recognized as part of international law (Blank, 2006, p. 898). On the other hand, cities already function vigorously on the international stage and are able to conclude informal agreements with other cities or enforce international legal obligations independent of States, sometimes even when their host State is not a party to a convention that the city wants to include in its internal law and implement. According to J. Nijman (2011, p. 228), cities will possess "soft international legal personality" similar to other non-State actors.

Whether one argues for international legal personality or greater autonomy for cities, one must notice a very interesting proposition to increase the role of cities on the international stage. B. Barber proposes to create a global parliament of mayors and city councilors (Barber, 2014, p. 391–400). In his opinion, the United Cities and Local Governments – the biggest and most influential organization that represents more than half of the world population – is a half way to the parliament (Barber, 2014, p. 21, 134). One might imagine such an organ being convened within international organizations such as the Council of Europe or the European Union (EU). Within the Council of Europe there already exists Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (http://www.coe.int/T/Congress/Default_en.asp) and the EU includes as its organ the Committee of the Regions (http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/cor/index_en.htm). But it would be a little bit more difficult to imagine creating such an organ within the United Nations. Alternatively, such a parliament could take the form on a nongovernmental organization (NGO). The EU Committee of the Regions "gives regions and cities a formal say in EU law-making ensuring that the position and needs of regional and local authorities are respected. The European Commission,

the Council of the EU and the European Parliament must consult the Committee when drawing up legislation on matters concerning local and regional government such as health, education, employment, social policy, economic and social cohesion, transport, energy and climate change. If this is not done, the Committee can bring a case before the Court of Justice" (http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/cor/index_en.htm), which definitely strengthens its position and influence, despite its advisory role.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Cities are energetic laboratories of social, political and cultural innovations. This is exemplified by participatory budgets, local currencies, barter exchange, time banks, consumer cooperatives, breakfast markets, media labs, or city bike systems (Bendyk, 2014b, p. 115). For example, Brazilian Porto Allegre in the beginning of 90ˢ of the 20th century introduced a participatory budget to include citizens into deciding about the budget's spending (Bendyk, 2014a, p. 8).

Cities may also be regarded as specific administrative entities and centres of making political decisions (Parysek, 2015, p. 29). Interdependency of cities makes them the appropriate building material to real order in the world (Barber, 2014, p. 176). According to B. Barber (2014, p. 183), the scale of the contemporary problems overwhelms States. Radical interdependency of globalised world in the 21st century overwhelms States and pushes cities to the forefront. Decentralized planet, connected by the networks of cities and regions, already exists even though it is dominated by States. It includes a great variety of regional and non-State actors such as multinational corporations, global finance institutions, NGOs, and global social movements. Each of them is dealing in its own way with such relevant problems as climate change, social justice, public health, immigration, or child labour, traditionally falling under the State jurisdiction. It is impossible to ensure peace and security without the cooperation between States, international organizations, business community, and civil society (Barber, 2014, p. 360).

States are reluctant to accord cities international legal personality as this would threaten their sovereignty and potentially could lead to disintegration of States. As Y. Blank (2006, p. 890) claims, "[a]s long as there are states, and as long as states are the basic 'building blocks' of the international legal order, recognizing localities as legal persons threatens the sovereignty and supremacy

of states and cannot happen without radically reshaping the current global order". Nevertheless, cities are subject to international law regulations, they internalize international law by including its standards in its local law, they finally implement and enforce it, sometimes independently of their States. Cities also form global networks that clearly strengthen their position on international stage (Blank, 2006, p. 892). Examples of cities implementing and enforcing international law referenced in this Article "point to an important development for the future: the city proceeds to implement international law directly and independently from the state" (Nijman, 2011, p. 223). Y. Blank (2006, p. 882–883) adds that "[…] the emergence of localities on the global stage marks a return to the age of independent and sovereign cities, albeit in a radically different global configuration. […] Yet, […] the current 'return' of cities should not be mistaken for going back in time to the European city-states of the Middle Ages or to the ancient Greek city-states. This re-emergence of cities is happening in a particular historical configuration in which states still possess huge legal, economic, social, and political power over localities. And the world, previously a highly abstract and vague concept, is becoming more tangible, supported by a community of internationalized human subjects, international norms, and institutions that claim to represent it". Based on that, States and cities should cooperate, support and in a way complement each other, especially taking into account the fact that national and international security are more and more the security of cities.

The problem of cities on the international stage, their growing role in many spheres of international cooperation, including human security (human rights law), environmental security and the national/international security as well as their status in international law, is indeed fascinating as fascinating are cities themselves. They are dynamic, energetic, innovative and constantly evolving. Various international or transboundary activities of cities are on the increase and they contribute to closer ties between people and nations and as a result to international peace and understanding. Among those activities one may list concluding agreements with other cities across the borders, internalizing and implementing human rights conventions and environmental law obligations that aim at sustainable devolvement. Cities also attempt to influence foreign policy of their States. By creating global networks their impact is becoming more and more visible. This article attempted to prove that, despite all the contrary views, cities do have some status in international law, that they are more and more powerful non-State actor on the international plane and their role and contribution to national/international as well as environmental and human security is growing.

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SOCIAL DIMENSION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN BORDER CONTROL: AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE

SPOŁECZNY WYMIAR ZASTOSOWANIA NOWOCZESNYCH TECHNOLOGII KONTROLI OSÓB NA GRANICACH PAŃSTW Z PERSPEKTYWY STOSUNKÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH

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— **ABSTRACT** —

The contemporary border crossing is said to have become progressively more automated and faster. Automated devices and surveillance systems in border control generally are to enhance security of the state. However, this perception of innovations in border control represents more of a developed countries' perspective than a universal rule. An acceleration of technological development maintains or deepens inequalities between countries, regions, societies or generations and the change (progress) does not occur worldwide and does not apply to all societies. This paper presents different systems of border control using new technologies and their consequences in social and human dimension. A transition of state's border from a physical line to territorially dispersed points, linked with international information and data sharing, is analysed. The impact of the automated border control of travellers

— **ABSTRAKT** —

Kontrola na współczesnych przejściach granicznych jest coraz bardziej zautomatyzowana, a tym samym sprawniejsza. Polega na weryfikowaniu danych obecnych w systemach informacyjnych i pozwalających na zakwalifikowanie podróżującej osoby do grupy ludzi otrzymujących prawo wjazdu lub jego zakaz. Dla państw wysoko rozwiniętych są instrumentem zwiększania bezpieczeństwa swojego terytorium i obywateli oraz ich mobilności. Z punktu widzenia imigrantów napływających z obszarów ekonomicznie zapóźnionych czy politycznie niestabilnych wykorzystywanie elektronicznych baz danych do ich weryfikowania, poprzedzone koniecznością rejestracji przybyszów, a w przypadku jej braku – koniecznością pozostawienia przez nich swoich danych biometrycznych, staje się dużą barierą lub utrudnieniem. Autorka przedstawia zmianę istoty funkcjonowania współczesnej granicy państwa

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on interactions between developed and less or developing countries is on the main interests of the author in this paper.

Keywords: automated border control, social effects, digital divide, stratification

w wyniku digitalizacji danych alfanumerycznych i biometrycznych osób przemieszczających się przez nią oraz skutki tego zjawiska dla społeczeństw w wymiarze międzynarodowym.

Słowa kluczowe: zautomatyzowana kontrola graniczna, skutki społeczne, cyfrowy podział, stratyfikacja

Biometrics are turning the human body into a passport or a password
Emilio Mordini, Sonia Massari (2008)

The contemporary border crossing is said to have become progressively more automated and faster. Automated devices and surveillance systems in border control generally are to enhance security of the state. However, this perception of innovations in border control represents more of a developed countries' perspective than a universal rule. On the other hand, all travellers who wish to enter the Western world are subject to automated screening. Developed states link the act of crossing a border with databases recording each individual border crossing. Travelling through many states and their borders is still mostly a human-to-human interaction – or, more precisely, an encounter between an officer and a traveller. Despite the continuing presence of human relations during most border crossings, an inter-operable system and electronic up-inking 'travel with the traveller' and define his/her interaction with the border service or an automated gate. Many times, an individual's first contact with the border occurs via an electronic visa application form – a process with widely varying degrees of complexity depending on the country of origin and destination. Entities that are engaged in technology production and usage include states, constructors/innovators, industries/manufacturers, and, involuntarily, also travellers. Usually, technology creators hope to elicit interest in their innovations among governments and get a licence or patent; manufacturers strive for exclusivity and lucrative contracts; states strive to make border control more effective, and travellers hope to ease and accelerate their mobility across borders. The same technologies can play varying roles and be used for varying purposes by different entities. At the same time, disparate technologies can be applied with very similar aims in mind in different countries. Since the reality of the

international environment is fast becoming increasingly complex and entangled, some states have started to use tighter border control as a means to manage this state of affairs. A multi-tool approach to border control compared to 'the Swiss Army Knife approach' by Chris Hurrey (2013, p. 285–288) sounds very rational and practical from its owner's side (the developed and innovative countries), but much less attractive from the point of view of immigrant groups from less developed countries.

An analysis of interactions between technology and society requires a broad knowledge based on new scientific concepts, theories and empirical investigations (Zacher, 2006, p. 123–148). It is relevant to observe and analyze these correlations in order to avoid or minimize their negative effects. The socio-technology interactions can be investigated in transformations of civilization, creating new dimensions of quality of life and level of their advancement; in economic development of states and corporations investing capital in R+D and facilitating man's every-day life; in trade-offs between manufacture of high-tech equipment, its innovation and then waste production, and ecological problems finally hitting human beings. From international relations perspective, an acceleration of technological development maintains or deepens inequalities between countries, regions, societies, or generations and the change (progress) does not occur worldwide and does not apply to all societies.

There are a number of methodological approaches to the phenomenon of technology and its social impacts. Due to the combination of two: humanistic and pure sciences, the investigated issue requires an interdisciplinary approach. Evaluation study, with technology assessment approach, serves to analyze (mainly negative) effects of technological advances, and is used in this article. The indirect, unintentional, or postponed social effects of technology can be examined using this approach. The sociological perspective concentrates on broad aspects of interactions between society and technology analysing different social subsystems in a macro and micro scales. Ulrich Beck (2002) based his idea of the 'society of risk' on uncertain consequences of human's modernisation through technological development. The effects, also recognized as consequences and influence, are results of interactions between a particular technology and its social context. They can be analysed within different disciplines: e.g. medicine (influence on human's health), psychology (consequences for social mentality and emotions), or economics (effects in the standard of living and development), and with various scope: referring to a small or big group of people, a group separated by a particular traits, local or international

society, etc. In this article, the international relations perspective was chosen to indicate effects of new technologies, used during border crossing, to travellers migrating from developing and less developed countries to the developed one. Evaluation analysis applied in the paper consists of social impact assessment and international relations impact assessment in the context of the border crossing procedure and process.

In the context of territoriality of a boundary James Anderson, Liam O'Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson (2003, p. 7) affirmed that borders were meeting sites of different systems, most direct interactions and visible contradictions and hence they constituted a central component of the contradictory world system. Departing from the territorial context of boundary and referring to its electronic-virtual dimension, this statement is still valid. Therefore the main aim of this paper is to present different systems of border control using new technologies and their consequences in social and human dimension. Research problems concern: how the state border itself is transformed and shaped by new technologies and how technologies used in border crossing influence states' and social relation in international scope.

A BORDER REVAMPED

The term 'smart border', or 'intelligent border', is given many meanings, all of them derived from its technological dimension. To some extent, they are both self-managed and jointly managed by a system. This hints at their dynamic nature, consisting in permanently adapting to continually arising challenges posed by new threats and/or the rise of competing new technologies. The concept of the smart border also includes international agreements on rules of border crossing between countries which enable to optimise the usage of technological innovations and create linkages between countries.

Regarding new technologies, a contemporary border is said to be: a virtual fence, a spatially mobile border, a filter of risk. The first of these indicates that in a place of a permeable border, an additional obstacle is established that exists beyond the traveller's control but determines whether or not he or she enters the territory of a state. It also means that the border exists immaterially in cyberspace as a reservoir of digital information which makes it possible to assess security threats before they cross the border. Spatially mobile border suggests a dispersion of borders in the transnational and internal space through the creation of a trans-

national network of information that 'journeys' together with traveller. (There is much more information in the system than in the passport or ID). Moreover, the utilisation of new technologies allows governments to export border control to the most desirable location – e.g. inland, to airports, or to space, thanks to the exchange of information between countries.

Risk analysis has become a crucial element of border security for most of the developed countries. It is based on data and information collection and calculation. The greater number of data, the more advanced data processing system. Its aim is to assess a situation picture at the border, some trends, by identification of possible threats and negative situations, determination of casual relationships between level of probability and severity of outcomes and evaluation of these results to apply instruments and strategies to reduce the risk or/and control it (Haimes, 2004, p. 54–55). Experts create possible scenarios for the future, (if they use a scenario method), by computer assistance in calculations and selection among millions of combinations. Risk analysis of the border situation picture increases prediction of threats and prevention against their diffusion inside the state. Detection of smuggling and illegal border crossing reduces hazards within the territory of the country. Some actions are taken directly at border crossings and another far from the border. The border becomes a filter of possible threats (risks) as a result of direct intervention at the border and information sharing between countries about their sources.

The de-territorialisation of the border in the context of new technologies refers to the experience of a first contact with border control that does not need to take place at an official state border, but within the online registration system, which decides the 'to be or not to be' of an individual entering a given country. De-territorialisation also implies the use of 'intelligent gates' at airports situated far from the territorial border, which can symbolise a departure from one country and entry into the territory of another when in fact the individual remains within the territory of the same state. On the other hand, de-territorialisation also takes place due to the transmission of digital information among states. Didier Bigo (2007, p. 9–14) uses an appellation – de-localised forms of border control which comprise remote control checks, sharing huge quantity of data, policing at a distance, etc., and transform 'focus of control, from territory to population'. These are arguments for the assumption that the dynamic development of new technologies has expanded and revamped the border, taking it from a demarcated territorial line to an often dispersed system of control based on data collection, processing and transmission.

ELECTRONIC CONTROL SYSTEM FOR BORDER CROSSING

Biometric and alphanumeric data are collected in an integrated database – a system collecting data on persons and objects (e.g. works of art) before they cross the border. These databases include, e.g., the Schengen Information System II (SIS II), the Visa Information System (VIS) in the European Union, and NEXUS and SENTRI in the USA. SIS II is a second-generation, large-scale information system, constructed after the EU enlargement (which expanded the Union by several post-Soviet countries, plus Malta and Cyprus) and replacing SIS I. It consists of one central system (situated in Strasbourg, France) and the national systems of each member state, as well as the relevant communication infrastructure between them transferring virtually encrypted data between the authorities responsible for these systems. The data include the following information on individuals: first name(s), surname(s), name(s) at birth, nationality(ies), aliases, date and place of birth, specific physical characteristics, sex, photographs, fingerprints, whether the person concerned is armed, violent or has escaped from a correctional facility, the reason for the alert, the authority issuing the alert, and a reference to the decision that gave rise to the alert (Reg. (EC) No 1987/2006). The amount of information in SIS II is so huge that the system has been in construction for several years, and is still expanding. The Visa Information System further builds on SIS with the exchange of visa data, thus facilitating checks at the external borders of the member states of the EU, fighting against fraud, preventing "visa shopping", and helping in the identification of persons who do not meet the requirements for entering the EU (Reg. (EC) No 767/2008).

A modernised European system of border management named the 'Smart Borders' package, proposed by the European Commission in 2013, is a step forward, but still in a tentative stage of existence. It consists of an Entry/Exit System (EES) (COM (2013) 95 final) and a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) (COM (2013) 97 final). Its idea is to join both facilitations for third-country travellers and security for the European Union by using state-of-the-art technology. This is a defensive security strategy against illegal border crossing and overstay based on an automated border control system with alphanumeric data and fingerprints, which are stored in a central repository. It is addressed to a select group of people, namely frequent travellers from third countries, including businessmen, students, researchers, and/or some workers. Before using RTP, hopefuls must apply and justify their intention of travelling, and the system decides if they can be defined as frequent or regular travellers. He/she receives

a token with a technical specification made by the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT (eu-LISA).

The 'Smart Borders' package is reflected in the concept of Automated Border Control (ABC) – "an automated system which authenticates the electronic machine readable travel document or token, […] relies on facial recognition as the basis for biometric verification" (Best Practice Operational Guidelines for Automated Border Control (ABC) Systems 2015). The system uses single or double automatic barriers – e-Gates and biographic and biometric readers as detection mechanisms. Its effectiveness is based on electronic systems of data and information collecting, storing and sharing between the EU Member States and non-members as SIS II, VIS, Eurodac, Eurosur. The European Union perceives the ABC as a system of facilitation, securitisation and cost-effectiveness for travellers. On the other side, since it is in the stage of implementation and evaluation, a risk assessment is recommended in order to assess how the automation has influenced on existing risks or risen new ones.

Similar systems that are also in widespread operation include SENTRI and NEXUS – registered-traveller programmes in which frequent travellers enrol by submitting information for criminal and terrorist background checks (Koslovski, 2011, p. 13). SENTRI is used along the U.S.-Mexico border at American ports of entry while NEXUS operates at the U.S.-Canadian border. When a person is enrolled in the NEXUS verification programme, he or she is given a radio frequency-enabled proximity card and the chip on this card is read when the person approaches the U.S.-Canadian border, automatically showing the inspector alphanumeric information as well as photographic identification. Another example of a database-reliant system featuring automated devices is the Global Entry programme, applied in the United States in the case of pre-approved, low-risk individuals, usually frequent international travellers. After the person in question completes the online application (which costs 100 USD), a detailed background interview and check take place in a Global Entry Enrolment Center indicated by the system. A photo and biometric information are collected during the interview. When the person is approved, he or she may enter the U.S. by using an automated kiosk situated at some airports. In the kiosk, the traveller presents his/her machine-readable passport, scans his/her fingerprints for data verification, and fills in a customs declaration (US Customs and Border Protection website). There is also the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) for passengers travelling to the USA under the Visa Waiver Programme (VWP), which uses an online application and payment process.

Almost every year a great number of new initiatives and pilot projects can be found among the current and future plans of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. One of them is the "Behavior Assessor pilot programs built on the current Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) by employing specialized behavioral analysis techniques to determine if a traveller should be referred for additional screening at the checkpoint" (Privacy Impact Assessment 2015). A comparable program called the Smart Entry Service operates in South Korea. It allows low-risk travellers to use e-Gates after collecting almost the same information as the Global Entry programme before the journey. Amsterdam Airport Schiphol operates a "Security Scan provided with a screening technology that safeguards personal privacy. A computer analyses images instead of a human operator by means of harmless millimetre wave technology" (Security Scan at Schiphol Airport 2015). The Security Scan does not use X-rays that pass through the body, as in most popular body scans. At Australia's international airports, one may go through self-processed and self-administered passport control instead of personal verification by border officers using SmartGate, which processes a passenger through data in the ePassport and face recognition technology. There is a two-step procedure: first, checking the eligibility of the traveller to self-process his/her passport; and second, to perform the identity check. A passenger may also watch a film on the Internet to learn how this works.

When the old 'physiognomic' methods of classification of immigrants entering the New World at the beginning of 20th century is compared with contemporary electronic-based instruments, the perception of the human being as a social unit prevails in the latter over the close human-to-human contact of the former [Picture 1]. However, the one on the top gives an impression of objectification of a man.

A.   B.

Picture 1. The human factor at border checkpoints in the past (A) and today (B).

A. Inspection of immigrants at Ellis Island, USA, 1920. [www.daily.co.uk – April 12th, 2013]; B. SmartGate in Australian international airports, 2015 [www.border.gov.au Arrivals SmartGate]

A DIGITAL DIVIDE

The divide between developed and less developed countries (LDC) is one of the most common criteria used when analysing the various factors underlying contemporary international relations. Neo-technology theories of trade are based on the existing differences between states in the level of innovative services or products offered, pointing to mutual benefits for countries that produce and export them as well as countries that do not have sufficient amounts of capital and know-how and import them. To a large extent, this is true. But steadily accelerating technological advances (also resulting from increasing competition between the enterprises producing them) deepen an already large development gap between developed and less developed countries.

The Measuring Information Society Report, published by the International Telecommunication Union every year, presents information and communication technology developments in regions and countries across the world. The 2014 edition states that "4.3 billion people are not online and 90 per cent of them live in developing world" (Measuring Information Society Report 2014, p. 21). Instead of a continuing surge in the number of Internet users in all countries under examination (166), the gap between developed and developing states persistently refuses to close. If the average fixed broadband penetration is 9.8 percent in the world, Europe's one is almost three times higher (27.7), while in the Arab States penetration is more than three times lower (3.1%). For Africa, this indicator is 0.4 percent, which is 24 times smaller than the world average and 70 times smaller than Europe's. The pattern repeats itself when the percentage of households with Internet access is considered. 78 percent of European households have access to the Internet while 11 percent of households across Africa enjoy the same. Another survey conducted by the United Nations based on the E-Government Development Index (EGDI) indicates an increase of e-government and e-participation services in most regions, but also high disparities between a group of high-achieving countries in Europe and the Americas, and a group comprising Africa and Oceania, which remain below the world average (United Nations E-Government Development Index 2014) These last two indicators represent the possibilities and effectiveness of, e.g., obtaining the documents required to apply for a visa. The skills gained in the process of regular use of computer and the Internet determine human abilities and effectiveness in coping with contemporary requirements for free and legal crossing of the borders of the developed world.

Among a group of countries ranked by Information and Communication Technology Development Index (IDI), the rift between the top ten and the bottom ten is, on average, seven points (with 10 as the highest and 0 as the lowest). Eight of the top ten countries are in Europe, with Denmark as a front-runner. This country earned 8.86 points, while Luxembourg, with 8.26, placed tenth. On the opposite extreme, the Central African Republic scored 0.96, placing last. The states that preceded it in the list, in ascending order, were: Niger, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Malawi, Congo, and Burkina Faso, with 1.56 as the highest score among this bottom ten – all from the African continent.

The progress of new technologies generates profits, nourishes economic booms, and actuates socio-economic development. On the other hand, its speed is inversely proportional to the process of reduction of disparities between highly-developed and less developed countries. As a consequence, technology-driven economies double their benefits by enhancing security and increasing profits, and the electronic control systems in border crossings perpetuate the growing digital divide between developed and less developed countries.

THE SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRONIC BORDER IMPLEMENTATION

The social effects of employing high-tech devices and electronic control systems are usually presented favourably as facilitator and rationalisation of inspections at ports of entry. A self-check in a smart gate is easy when preceded by a pre-registration in a state's visa application or leaving one's biometric and alphanumeric data in the system beforehand. Moreover, electronic systems of border control carry benefits in the form of augmented safety for travellers and an increased flow of people. In a broader sense, another advantage is the collection and analysis of personal data before the person enters the port, because border inspectors can focus on more high-risk travellers and carriers, e.g. smugglers, and strengthen border security. As a consequence, automated border control is perceived as a facilitator and mobility accelerator for societies in technology-driven countries.

Many people in poor or less developed countries do not have access to the Internet or have not even used computers in all their lives. On the other hand, many of them would like to change their living conditions and cross a border

into the developed world. In 2013 UNICEF (2013) calculated that 230 million of births worldwide were unregistered, hence those children lacked any form of identification. Most newborns come from South Asia (103 million), Sub-Saharan Africa (85 million). This is why some of the more determined prefer to risk illegal human trafficking rather than a long administrative journey with bureaucrats and automated machines situated sometimes hundreds of kilometres away from their villages. Another barrier could be the use of overly complex language in an application, usually based on cultural patterns of communication. As an example, the three alternatives in the choice of an applicant's gender (Female, Male, Other) in some applications might be controversial for some nations or cultures, while the lack of such options may be perceived as discriminatory in others. In addition, oftentimes there is a limited selection of languages in which one can fill out the application, as in the U.S. visa application form (though there is an electronic translator assistant). Above all, however, what is required are computer skills, which may not be so common in many LDC, and Internet connection speeds will also determine the time their citizens spend on this process. As a result, automated border control is perceived as an intricate system and an intangible barrier restricting the free flow of people for societies living in the least connected countries.

Certain determinants that create human perceptions of new technologies when crossing the border can be distinguished. First among them is the level of economic, scientific, and innovation development. The second is the level of education and technical culture (intellectual and techno-knowledge development), while the last is the prevailing political and institutional system (Zacher, 2012, p. 391–397). On this basis, three types of countries according to the social dimension of new technology can be distinguished:

- states with socially effective techniques;
- states with socially ineffective techniques;
- states with socially ambiguous effectiveness of techniques.

The first group includes the most developed, innovative states, where technologies fulfil most of society's expectations while the state itself represents innovators, producers, and consumers at the same time. Within this group are the U.S., Canada, most members of the EU, and some associated countries, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Japan, Israel, Singapore, and South Korea.

The second group consists of less developed countries whose situation is opposite to the first group and where new technologies greatly reduce the effectiveness of the objectives on a societal and governance level. These are countries with

a low GDP, less connected with the world, and the lowest scored in the Measuring Information Society Report (Measuring Information Society Report 2014).

The third group is more heterogeneous and consists of developing countries that are effective in one dimension. Among them are states which are not innovators or constructors of new technologies, but use them effectively on both individual and national level. These are the new member states of the EU, Russia, Iran, Brazil, and some others. Meanwhile China can be described much less as an innovator than as a producer and consumer of new technologies, focused on effectiveness of the objectives mainly on state level rather than the small-scale social level.

This classification with reference to the issue of automated and electronic systems in border crossing is adequate and expressive. A state with socially effective techniques spends a lot of money and invests in high-tech electronic devices that aid with border control as well as interoperable systems of data transmission to enhance its security, boost its economy, and ensure progress and influence on other states. In effect, this group of states, to some extent, becomes a regulator of international migrations. Analogously, a society draws advantages through offering fast and easy border crossing, facilitating measures to ensure common access to electronic documents without leaving home, and the possibility to travel to one's desired destination.

Another group of states is isolated from the benefits of technological advance and financial profits. Their societies cannot fully incorporate electronic devices of communication or maintain limited use of them in the face of myriad formal and technical obstacles in applying for visa or crossing the border of a state from the first group. This society becomes subject to verification and authentication, mainly determined by the state of origin.

The last group represents states which are connected to electronic data systems involving travellers on various levels. These states apply elements of automated border control. Most of them adapt their border control systems to their inventor and constructor, enabling their societies to benefit from freedom of movement between countries and thereby generate indirect benefits for themselves. On the other hand, some political regimes, with many conflicts on the borders, prefer to spend money on new weapon technologies to shoot 'illegal aliens' crossing the border than on new registration and control technologies that are to facilitate human mobility.

Nancy Wonders (2006, p. 64) notes that even though globalisation had the great potential to reduce inequality, 'electronic surveillance' at border crossings

has boosted global stratification. (She indicates the U.S.-Mexico border as the most evident instance of inequality in the human, economic, and power dimensions). The issue of relations between technology and society becomes more important due to the continuous rapid technological progress, the development of the information society, but also the increased risk posed by coupling between these issues. Investments of the developed countries in technology and know-how bring them benefits on the world market, increase security and progress for their societies. A kind of techno-network is emerging that creates cohesive and conflicting interactions. There are the entities that produce and use technologies, assist them financially and politically, achieve advantages on the market and use them to monitor and eliminate hazardous factors. On the other hand, there are those whose freedom is limited by technologies, who are afraid of them or are excluded in one way or another.

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRONIC BORDER CONTROL

Comparing a group of states with high rankings in the Information Society Report (ISR) and IDI to the group of least connected states with the lowest ISR rank, using net migration criteria, the first group has a long-lasting negative migration rate while most countries from the last group are characterised by a positive migration rate. This results in a feedback loop between net migration and the technological development of states, where the usual immigration countries try to control this tendency by increasing quality and technological advancement among their instruments of border control. From the international relations perspective, this kind of behaviour leads to the establishing of some rules used between entities that in effect create a system of specific interactions. A systemic approach allows us to holistically present these relations between the two groups and their social effects [Picture 2].

The actions of states that own new technologies for border control and capital to develop and advance them catalyse two asymmetric social effects within their external and internal environment. Inside their system, whose degree of complexity may vary, they invent, produce, and use new technologies to facilitate border crossing and enhance mobility for their citizens. As a result, they extend the possibilities of travel and bring conditions of border crossing closer to the needs of this society. Moreover, bilateral or multilateral agreements in intelligence or/

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

- backwardness and dis tance growing
- stratification
- limitation of possibilities meeting social needs
- de-humanisation
- criminalisation

EXTERNAL SOCIAL EFFECTS

INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
- acceleration of the movement of people
- facilitation of border crossing
- extension of possibilities meeting the citizens' needs
- de-humanisation
- criminalisation

Picture 2. Asymmetry in social effects of new technologies in border control between developed and less developed economies.

Source: Author's elaboration.

and data sharing among these states build a framework that extends a range of possibilities for the society of technologically advanced countries, and a range of limitations for the societies of LDC. The effects of this for a society are the de-humanisation and 'criminalisation' of travellers. The first consists of limiting human-to-human contact, which, depending on individual know-how and cultural patterns, can be assessed positively or negatively by people. 'Criminalisation' refers to the collection and storing of biometric data for all travellers – raising suspicions and feelings of hostility from all of them. However, most of them accept this procedure in exchange for a sense of greater security.

The same automated border control systems and electronic data processing used by developed countries cause quite different social effects in the external environment beyond these states. These include economic backwardness and growing divides in relation to other countries, stratification, and limited possibilities of meeting social needs. In their first interaction with electronic devices

at border crossings, the societies of many LDC often feel a mental barrier and skills barrier. A kind of formal barrier can appear when a citizen does not have all the required documents to apply for a visa. The effects that occur for both societies – in developed and less developed countries – are not the same for individual groups. While procedures resulting in 'criminalisation' at border checkpoints are seen through the lens of individual security by societies from developed countries, travellers from poor countries feel more suspicious than secure. In addition, some immigrants' personal situation can be very complicated – culturally or politically determined, and the electronic system for recording and smart-gates may not include such options in the system.

While Didier Bigo (2007, p. 9–14) has not made any distinction between elements of an electronic system of border control in the global context, he used a pertinent term – 'trace' – which had a crucial role in sorting out and giving a specific profile for groups and individuals in border crossing. This process consists in 'tracing' someone's movement, analysing it and giving a precise trajectory. These who execute it are mostly states with socially effective techniques and several with ambiguous effectiveness of techniques, and those who are 'traced' belong usually to states with socially ineffective techniques. On the other hand, every citizen from developed countries should be 'traced' if he/she wants to be given a trajectory complement with his/her own.

CONCLUSIONS

The securitisation of the border through its *technologisation* is a comprehensive process based on high-tech equipment, state policy, and market demand. The social factor is one of several others considered by states who can afford expenditures for new technologies in their policy of securitisation. It is much less important for countries that are 'technologically challenged'.

Societies from technology-driven economies are able to benefit the most from the opportunities offered by the innovation process. Automated border control enables them to go through fast and easy border control and gives them the notion of being safer. On the other hand, the least connected, low-income countries invest neither in comprehensive technology for border checks nor in electronic databases and documents to facilitate and enhance international mobility for their citizens as well as for foreigners visiting their countries. I conclude that there is a continuing expansion in the range of choices for people who

are able to travel freely – and a continuing narrowing of the field of choices for those who have limited or no conditions to travel abroad.

The efficiency of the contemporary border, in most developed countries, relies on filtering and analysing of big data in order to prevent those countries from highly or less probable threats which may appear at the physical border line. A great part of the decision on border crossing is taken away from the physical border line, by the group of experts analysing big data, using computer systems and without being in any contact with the real border-crosser. The pre-border control, based on intelligence gathering and risk assessment, has been defined as a border management in national policies of developed states. The European Union's exemplification of this policy Didier Bigo (2014) names "the management of flows of people through figures at EU-LISA" (p. 217). On the other side, border guards or 'border experts in data analysis' can have an impression that the decision is taken by a huge electronic data processing system and they just implement it, or even are replaced by machines in that.

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THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE PROCESSES OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION – THE CASE OF POST-REVOLUTIONARY TUNISIA*

ROLA CZYNNIKÓW EKONOMICZNYCH W PROCESACH KONSOLIDACJI DEMOKRACJI NA PRZYKŁADZIE POREWOLUCYJNEJ TUNEZJI

*Rachela Tonta***

— **ABSTRACT** —

In the last five years Tunisia has been presented mostly as a success story of political transition. It managed to adopt a new constitution and to conduct the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2014. Finally, civil society groups, which helped to end the political crisis in 2013, won the Nobel peace prize. If we look from the institutional perspective and the ability of political groups to compromise, indeed we can say that Tunisia is a success story. The picture is more bleak, however, if we try to assess the influence of economic factors on the development of Tunisian democracy, especially in light of recent terrorist attacks and social protests. The aim of the article

— **ABSTRAKT** —

W ciągu ostatnich pięciu lat Tunezja była przedstawiana głównie jako przykład udanej transformacji politycznej. W 2014 roku została przyjęta nowa konstytucja, w oparciu o którą przeprowadzono wybory prezydenckie i parlamentarne. Co więcej, Kwartet na rzecz Dialogu Narodowego, który pomógł zakończyć kryzys polityczny w 2013 roku, został laureatem Pokojowej Nagrody Nobla. Patrząc z perspektywy reform instytucjonalnych oraz zdolności różnych grup do zawierania kompromisu, możemy niewątpliwie skonkludować, że transformacja polityczna w Tunezji okazała się sukcesem. Obraz ten staje się jednak mniej jednoznaczny, jeśli weźmie się pod uwagę wpływ

is to answer the questions, to what extent eco-
nomic crisis can inhibit democratic consolidation
in Tunisia and what Tunisia can learn from the
Spanish experience of political transition.

Keywords: political transition, Tunisia, economic
factors, democratization

czynników ekonomicznych na rozwój demokracji,
szczególnie w kontekście zamachów terrorystycz-
nych oraz społecznych protestów, do których
dochodziło w porewolucyjnej Tunezji. Celem
artykułu jest udzielenie odpowiedzi na pytania,
w jakim stopniu kryzysy ekonomiczne mogą
zablokować procesy demokratycznej konsolidacji
i czego Tunezja może się nauczyć z doświadczeń
Hiszpanii okresu transformacji politycznej.

Słowa kluczowe: transformacja polityczna,
Tunezja, czynniki ekonomiczne, demokratyzacja

The events of the Arab Spring have deemed it necessary to raise questions, not for
the first time, about the direction of changes that have been initiated and if the
building of a consolidated democracy is possible in this part of the world. So far,
only Tunisia has managed to successfully complete the first stage of the transition
processes, which includes the adoption of a new constitution and the conducting
of parliamentary and presidential elections at the end of 2014. However, even
if the country has made tremendous progress in terms of political reform, it is
not yet determined whether Tunisia will become a consolidated democracy[1].
If we take into account the experiences of many other countries, which were
seemingly stuck between authoritarian and democratic systems, momentary
success proved ephemeral and does not mean that the whole process will be
realized satisfactorily. This is also one of the points of criticism made against the
theories of democratization and political transition, especially those developed in
the 1980ˢ and 1990s. In these theories this process was seen as linear with a need
to pass through successive phases, and the final stage was seen as the consolida-

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[1] For a number of researchers, such as O'Donnell, Schmitter, or Valenzuela, the consolidation of
democracy is linked to the 'effective functioning of a democratic regime', which requires breaking
with the old style politics, which means that undemocratic principles of action and cooperation or
rules concerning the functioning of State institutions need to be changed. According to Linz and
Stepan, democracy can be considered as consolidated only if it has become 'the only game in town'.
The closest to the concept of a consolidated democracy is the category of 'full democracy', according
to a democracy index developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit. According to the EIU in 2015,
only 20 countries were among this group. Tunisia as a 'flawed democracy' is located in 57th
position.

tion of democracy, as if the outcome was pre-determined (Przeworski, 1991). As it turned out, however, the reality in a growing number of democratizing countries was completely different, because the process of democratization was accompanied by the development of different kinds of pathologies. As a result, it is difficult to name the political systems that developed in these counties as a democracy. Moreover, as Carothers noted (2002), even if we take into account only those examples of political transitions that can be considered 'successful' or 'promising', it is difficult to detect in them any regularity.

Regardless of the validity of this and other reservations, it can be assumed that even in a large number of countries having suffered transitional defeat, their aims, at least at a declarative level, were towards democracies limited not only to electoral processes, but above all guaranteeing broad civil rights, respect for rules of law, and the protection of human rights and economic freedom. When we talk about Tunisia in terms of a post-revolutionary society and elite classes, the developed democracies of the West were a more significant point of reference than the states whose regimes are closer to an authoritarian model. Therefore, bearing in mind the shortcomings of the theories of democratic transitions, we can still successfully take advantage of their elements, in order not only to understand the causes, nature and context of changes, but more importantly – to characterize in which direction they are moving. It is important to take these issues into account since in the majority of analyses of post-revolutionary changes in Tunisia, researchers have paid more attention to the institutional context of democratizing processes, the role of Islamism in the context of social and political pluralism, and have underestimated at the same time the role of (primarily) economic factors in the processes of consolidation of democracy. Hence, after the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2014, we could hear countless voices suggesting that Tunisian democratic transition was a complete success. In point of fact, in a number of scientific articles, reports and expert analysis, reference has been made to the economic problems that are regarded as one of the most important challenges facing Tunisia, but there was no comprehensive attempt to diagnose the problem in light of the theories of democratic transition and consolidation. What is more, most researchers treated economic issues as distinct from security problems, which makes the assessment of the influence of these problems on the development of the Tunisian democracy insofar as insufficient. Therefore, the article aims to fill this gap and to draw attention to the important link between economic factors and processes of democratic consolidation in this country.

ECONOMY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY – THEORETICAL ASPECTS

Currently, researchers in their analysis dealing with the impact of economic factors on the processes of democratization/political transition, focus primarily on the quantitative study of the relationship between social inequalities, the wealth of the country counted *per capita*, the size of the middle class and the likelihood of introducing democratic changes (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Houle, 2009).

Less attention has been paid to the role of economic factors in the processes of consolidation of democracy, which is mostly analysed in terms of the impact of inequality on the likelihood of a return to an authoritarian regime. According to Acemoglu and Robinson, this dependence should be understood as follows whereby, "greater inequality is likely to destabilize democracy because […] the burden of democracy on the elites is increasing in the income gap between them and the citizens", and that, "higher levels of inequality still lead to democratization, but democracy is not consolidated because coups are attractive" (2006, p. 37). However, as Haggard and Kaufman have indicated, research in the area of 'distributive conflicts' is usually conducted by quantitative methods based on various economic indicators, and depending on what kind of indicators are used, we may get different results in our research. Specifically, the scientific tools which are used to analyse these inequalities have many limitations. Furthermore, the quality of available data may leave a lot to be desired, so the result may be a distortion of the actual socio-economic situation in any given country. As these researchers have demonstrated, only changing research methodology allowed them to challenge Acemoglu and Robinson, as well as the findings of Boix and Przeworski (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, 2000) which indicate a significant relationship between distributional conflict and a return to an authoritarian system (Haggard, Kaufman, 2012). Therefore I agree with the approach of Hibou, who accordingly stated that statistical data "reflects the state-controlled knowledge" and should therefore be treated as belonging to a "mechanism of domination and control". Of course, this does not mean that we should completely reject them. However, they should be used to "understand the political and sociological significance of economic behaviour" (2011, p. 17).

To understand the impact of economic conditions on democratic consolidation, it is more useful to refer to the older literature on democratic transition. For example, in *The Third Wave*, written by Huntington (1991), of eight so called

contextual problems which were selected as the most important challenges for countries undergoing democratic transitions, four problems are economic and refer to extreme poverty, large socio-economic inequality, inflation and substantial foreign debt. For Linz and Stepan, the survival of a young democracy depends on three vital issues, one of which is related to economics: the effectiveness of the state in addressing socio-economic problems. So the following question has arisen: does the state, which is struggling with economic problems, have a chance to successfully complete the process of democratic transition? Huntington argues that the 'weight' of such problems is not so important, but rather the way in which successive governments are trying to address these problems[2]. Stepan and Linz share similar views. According to them, the example of Spain, a country that after the death of Gen. Franco was struggling with rising unemployment and low economic growth, shows that the consolidation of democracy is still possible. The economic problems could not undermine democracy in Spain because for the majority of citizens, who still remembered very well the conduct of undemocratic governments, the rule of law and human rights protection were much more important factors. As a result, for Spanish society and the political elites, democracy was the only option to be taken into consideration. As Linz and Stepan stated: "[…] the political perception of desired alternatives has a greater impact on the survival of democratic regimes than economic and social problems per se" (2001, p. 140–150).

Huntington's insights, as well as Linz and Stephan's, were confirmed later on by a Swedish researcher of government 'quality', Bo Rothstein. He draws attention to the link between the consolidation of democracy and its quality. In his article on this subject, he took as examples the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 90s. According to him, in both cases the failure of democratic consolidation was the result of governmental incompetence that was unable to control corruption and in a broader aspect to guarantee the rule of law, both of which resulted in the declining legitimacy of Spanish and Yugoslavian regimes. Rothstein in his text also refers to the study of Dhalmberg and Holmberg, according to whom the effectiveness of governments in solving different kinds of problems is even more important for voters than whether their interests are reflected at the level of structures of power (Rothstein, 2014).

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[2] "It is the way in which political leaders respond to their inability to solve the problems confronting their country" (Huntington, 1991, p. 259).

The challenges that Tunisia is currently facing do not seem to be particularly unique. From the perspective of macro-economic indicators, weak economic growth, rising inflation and high unemployment, especially among young people, can be compared to the situation in democratizing Spain, experiences of which can be considered as proof that economic problems do not have to directly translate into an inhibition of the consolidation processes. The official macro-economic data, however, gives us only a limited picture of the situation in Tunisia, and therefore does not give us the possibility to make a realistic assessment about the direction of changes in the future. I am going to demonstrate that the Spanish model of dealing with economic problems during democratic transition may prove unattainable for Tunisia, since economic problems could become a much larger obstacle for democratic consolidation than Huntington, Stepan and Linz had anticipated.

BEN ALI'S ECONOMIC MIRACLE

The story of the Tunisian 'economic miracle' is already well known. Over the years, Tunisia has been presented as the fastest growing country in Africa, tightening an economic partnership with the European Union, with a thriving middle class and a well-educated population. For international financial institutions Tunisia has become the model state in the first decade of the twenty-first century: with a growing economy, a tight monetary policy, inflation kept in check, a decreasing percentage of the population living below the poverty threshold and a consistent implementation of the provisions of a free trade agreement with the EU. The events of the Arab Spring, however, allowed for an effective deconstruction of the 'economic miracle' discourse created by the Ben Ali regime; a discourse which tried to hide, under a surface of statistical tables and graphs, the scale of poverty, social inequality, and social and economic pathologies. If we look from the perspective of democratization processes in Tunisia, the refutation of the 'economic miracle' myth has not only symbolic value, but it also allows us to characterize the economic legacy of the authoritarian regime. It is important because "the economic legacy of authoritarian rule determines the policy agenda of its democratic successors" (Haggard, Kaufman, 1997, p. 277).

When Zine El Abidine Ben Ali gained power in 1987, the Tunisian economy was in stagnation. At that time the Tunisian government had to deal with the issues of under-development in different sectors of the economy, low economic

growth, unemployment and an increasing dependence on foreign loans with regards to internal development. In just one decade foreign debt increased sevenfold, reaching 4.9 billion dollars in 1985, and long-term debt alone comprised of 61% of GDP (Murphy, 1999). Even before the removal of president Habib Bourguiba from power, efforts were undertaken to liberalize the economy under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in return for which Tunisia had received further tranches of foreign loans. The new president, Ben Ali, in his economic policy did not intend to deviate from the policy of liberalization initiated by his predecessor and further plans for economic development in Tunisia were based on the assumption that only an intensification of liberalization policies could provide rapid economic development. So other reform plans, approved by international institutions, were primarily aimed at reducing the budget deficit, accelerating privatization and a deeper integration with foreign markets, mainly European. One of the results of the new reforms was the lowering of unemployment rate, which since the days of Bourguiba had presented a serious social problem (King, 2003). Economic analyses published during the years of Ben Ali's rule seemed to confirm the effectiveness of implemented reforms both in terms of macro-economic indicators and social development (Cavatorta, Haugbølle, 2012). The economic achievements of the Ben Ali government, however, look quite different if we take into account the price which had been paid – the price of increased dependence on loans received from international organizations. Between 1987 and 2010, foreign debt increased from 6.8 to 21.7 billion US dollars (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2012; Kempf, 2012).

However, taking into account that for the Bretton Woods institutions the only thing that mattered was that the rates were paid back regularly and the macroeconomic indicators were sound, the government had considerable freedom in disposing of the acquired funds (Hibou, Meddeb, Hamdi, 2011). According to Hibou, loans from international financial organizations were used primarily to strengthen the power of Ben Ali and his family, through economic mechanisms, which had been created for years and facilitated the control and discipline of society. As Tunisia's economic development had become increasingly dependent on external loans, any economic activity within the country that was actually dependent on loans granted by internal financial institutions, was done so on the basis of political and personal as opposed to economic criteria. The growing corruption, and problems of 'bad debts', meant that the survival and functioning of any business became increasingly dependent on the 'good

will' of the banks, and more specifically – the state (Hibou, 2011). Contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption during Ben Ali's rule was not limited to the circle of people belonging to the so-called 'clans', which comprised of members of the family of the president and his wife, but also significant sections of the society became entangled. Corruption took many different forms, both financial and nonfinancial, ranging from using personal relationships to obtain certain benefits, through to the necessity of giving money for obtaining and securing specific permission, jobs, places in college or bank loans (Hibou, Meddeb, Hamdi, 2011). It is difficult at this point 'to calculate' what was the financial cost of maintaining the whole socio-economic mechanism, but there is no doubt that in this system the middle class was in a more privileged economic position, while the biggest social costs were paid by the lower classes (Ayeb, 2011; Gause, 2011). Of course the problems of unemployment, unequal development of the various regions of the country, and hence unequal access to health services, clean water, and education were also problematic during the Bourguiba rule. However, contrary to the official Ben Ali discourse of the so-called 'economic miracle', liberalization policies did not bring about the reduction of social inequalities and poverty, but rather the opposite.

Undoubtedly one of the reasons why this happened was the aforementioned corruption, which resulted in the misuse of part of the funds that Tunisia received from international financial organizations and from privatization of state enterprises (Kempf, 2012). However, persistent unemployment and poverty were associated largely not only with the rising disparities in development of different regions of the country, where resources from the poorer South were allocated to the development of the more attractive (for tourism) North (Ayeb, 2011), but also with the high level of population growth. Between 1980 and 2010 the Tunisian population increased by four million, from about 6.3 million to 10.4 million. Another problem was that the privatization and restructuring of local enterprises, which could not successfully compete with European companies, resulted in a growing number of redundancies (Zaafrane, Mahjoub, 2000). Moreover, internal and foreign investments focused primarily in the fields where unskilled and cheap labor was required, so the new jobs do not in any way reflect the changes in the structure of Tunisian society, which became increasingly more educated than was the case in the 1980s (The World Bank, 2014).

ECONOMIC POLICY IN TUNISIA: CONTINUATION OR CHANGE?

The removal of Ben Ali from power gave hope to the people that there would be a chance for change, especially in the economic sphere. The authoritarian regime left behind, primarily, a corrupt economic system, high foreign debt, a liberalized economy, a connection with the European Union regarding free trade agreement, huge disparities in development between regions, and a high level of unemployment. The group that was most affected by unemployment were young, educated people. Between 1999 and 2009, unemployment of young graduates increased from 8.6% to 44.9%. Given that a significant proportion of young people emigrated abroad or found employment in the 'gray zone', the level of unemployment in this period may even have been higher (Paciello, 2011). A similar situation took place in terms of levels of poverty, which jumped after the revolution from the 'official' level of 3.8% to 11.8%, and in the poorest regions poverty was as high as 30% (Hibou, Meddeb, Hamdi, 2011).

These problems were further exacerbated after the revolution, because its direct consequence was a slowdown in the economy, rising unemployment, inflation and a crisis in the tourism sector, which constitutes 15% of GDP. Since the transitional governments did not enjoy popular support, as well as lacking time and resources to initiate any significant changes, in post-revolutionary Tunisia there were expectations that Ennahda, an Islamist party that won the elections to the Constituent Assembly in October 2011, would become the key actor in post-revolutionary economic reforms.

Ennahda, from the beginning of its post-revolutionary activities, presented itself as a party whose goal was to conduct economic policies based on the principles of social justice, and in its first electoral program proposed reforms aimed at reducing the level of unemployment and poverty, development of the poorest regions and bringing economic growth of around 7% of GDP (*Le programme du Mouvement Ennahdha*, 2011). From the perspective of less than three years of Ennahda rule, and then the short period of technocratic government headed by Mehdi Jomaa, results in the economic sphere would be far cry from the pre-election assumptions. Economic growth, with the exception of 2012, during this period amounted to little more than 2%; it is also difficult to talk about any success in employment, as unemployment continues to be maintained at the level of 15% (with the exception of the short post-revolutionary period when unemployment rose to 18%). If Ennahda has managed to create new jobs it has primarily been in the public sector, which means that the activation policy for

the private sector in terms of employment did not yield the expected results. Ennahda's policies also brought no tangible results in the development of the poorest regions, where the situation has not changed for decades (Jones, 2013).

The lack of economic improvement is due to several factors. Firstly, Ennahda became drawn into ideological disputes leading to mounting conflict between secular and religious sections of society and conflicts over the constitutional text; as opposed to initiating a serious debate between the various policy centers regarding the model of economic reforms in the country. Secondly, Ennahda wanted to pursue more just social policies, whilst at the same time, accepting a continuation of neoliberal policies, which would include the privatization of state-owned enterprises, a prioritization of foreign investment and increasing flexibility of labor laws (Paciello, 2013). Thirdly, Ennahda politicians themselves repeatedly admitted that the party was unprepared for government, so outside the empty slogans it did not have a clear vision of how to repair the Tunisian economy. However, it is difficult to shoulder Ennahda with the blame for the economic situation in the country. It is necessary to note that after the revolution, Tunisia was in a terrible financial condition. Ben Ali and his family stole 13 billion US dollars' worth of assets, representing more than one-quarter of Tunisian GDP in 2011, and subsequent Tunisian governments have been unsuccessful in recovering this money (Blioua, 2015; Rijkers, Freund, Nucifora, 2014). Moreover, it became problematic for Ennahda that business circles and financial institutions refused to cooperate with its government, which to some extent blocked any change in economic policy (Paciello, 2013). Therefore, the easiest way for Ennahda to bridge the financial gap in the budget became securing more loans granted by international financial organizations, notably the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. However, Ennahda can be accused of a lack of involvement in efforts towards cancelling the foreign debt left by the previous regime, or at least in its restructuring. Members of the current ruling Nidaa Tounes party also have not protested against further indebtedness. The proposals of the left-wing politicians to demand that international organizations cancel the debts incurred by the Ben Ali regime were rejected, because, as it was argued, the previous regime had used these funds for the development of Tunisia, and therefore, the debt has to be fully repaid (Reidy, 2014).

For its growing debts, however, Tunisia will have to pay a price. Hanieh (2015) analyzed the content of the agreements concluded between Tunisia, the World Bank and the IMF and clearly points out that during the last few years the language used in official statements has become more pro-social but in fact

both organizations require the same neoliberal reforms from a debtor country as was the case before the Arab Spring. Even if subsequent post-revolutionary governments were so far unable to meet all the requirements set by the Bretton Woods institutions, as those requirements met with considerable opposition from society, the fact remains that these loans are paid in installments in response to the 'progress of reforms', which makes it a convenient tool for exerting pressure on the Tunisian government (Marzouki, Meddeb, 2015). Another problem is that these loans were allocated only to a minimal extent to finance development projects, which would gradually help to pull the economy out of the crisis. Therefore, debt repayment became a serious burden on the budget, which meant that less and less money was spent on public services.

An interesting analysis of the relationship between the level of external debt and economic growth is presented by Mimoun (2013), who based his arguments on research that was conducted, amongst others, by Patillo, Poirson, Ricci and Clemens, Bhattacharya, Nguyen who established the limit for a 'safe' debt at the level of 35–40% of GDP for developed countries, and 35% of GDP for low income and developing countries. According to Mimoun, with regards to Tunisia, the safe limit is set at the level of 30% in relation to GDP. The consequences of going beyond this limit would result in increased spending from the budget for debt repayment, which would in turn translate into reduced GDP growth. As Mimoun calculated for Tunisian external debt, interest rates from 1970 to 2010 grew faster than the debt itself, which means that for every $100 borrowed Tunisia would now have to pay back $195. According to data from International Monetary Fund (2015) projections, Tunisian external debt at the end of 2015 was to reach a level of 29.8 billion dollars, which accounts for 60.6% of GDP. The necessity for the repayment of earlier loans means that Tunisian external debt has increased significantly after the revolution, without establishing foundations for future economic growth, which is necessary for the creation of new jobs and economic recovery.

Another aspect, according to Mimoun (2013), that should be taken into account in assessing the real impact of external debt on growth is corruption, because the higher the corruption index, the greater the risk that some of the funds coming from external lenders would be embezzled. This assumption was confirmed in the World Bank report *Unfinished Revolution* (2014), in which the financial costs associated with corruption were estimated at the level of 2% of Tunisian GDP, which shows that the problem of corruption has not been solved by the ouster of Ben Ali from power. From such a corrupt system benefited not

only private companies that were controlled by persons directly linked with power, but also large areas of the public and private sectors can be regarded as involved in corruption, which has changed little even since the revolution. In a survey conducted by Transparency International for a Global Corruption Barometer between September 2012 and March 2013, which takes into account public perceptions of corruption, over 80% of respondents said that corruption is a problem in the public sector, and 67% perceive anti-corruption measures taken by the government as insufficient. For the majority of respondents, the most corrupted sectors include the judicial system, the police, the media and various political parties. Most respondents also admitted that they gave bribes to tax office employees (Tunisia 2013 – World's largest opinion survey on corruption - Transparency International). According to the aforementioned report, the numerous regulatory barriers and restrictions in the private sector create ideal conditions for corruption, because a bribe becomes the most common way to bypass existing procedures or to facilitate and speed up formalities. More than a quarter of companies admitted to passing bribes to employees of public administration, and according to estimates, approximately 13% of corporate income is spent on bribes. An even more common form of corruption is the use of mediation of friends or family members to obtain certain benefits (Nucifora, Churchill, 2014). A similar situation exists in the public sector, which is dominated by people from the former regime, who try to undermine any attempts of change. In an interview with the Tunisian daily *La Presse*, Samir Annabi, chairman of INLCC (l'Instance nationale de lutte contre la corruption) presented a list of problems that INLCC had to face since its establishment in November 2011. These included the lack of a separate budget, hostility from the part of the judicial system and the administration, and rivalry over funds and responsibilities between INLCC and the Secretary of State for Corruption, appointed by the "Trojka", Ennahda coalition government (Boughdiri, 2014). Nidaa Tounes in turn proposed the controversial Economic Reconciliation Law, which according to critics will weaken the Truth and Dignity Commission, established after the revolution, and will grant amnesty for people responsible for corruption during the Ben Ali regime. This proposal put in question the commitment of the governing Nidaa Tounes towards fighting against corruption (Dahmani, 2015).

ECONOMIC POLICY, RULE OF LAW AND THE PROCESS OF CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

The question still needs to be asked however, to what extent can the aforementioned analyzed problems affect the processes of democratic consolidation in Tunisia? And what can Tunisia learn, if anything, from the Spanish experience?

First of all, it is necessary to state that all analogies in social sciences carry the risk of oversimplification, misinterpretation and other fallacies, especially when we try to compare cases with different historical and cultural backgrounds, from different times and places. Trying to find similarities between Tunisian and Spanish experiences of political transition, we have to keep in mind that both countries had different levels of economic development before the start of the transition process, different types of political cleavages, and since the beginning of the democratizing processes, both countries had adopted different approaches to the issues of transitional justice and so on. Being aware of all these problems, however, it is still possible to identify certain political strategies that could help us to understand why the Spanish political transition was successful and why it has become so problematic in Tunisia.

As mentioned in the initial part of the article, according to Linz and Stepan, Spain's economic problems have not hampered the consolidation processes, as citizens continued to remember the crimes of the authoritarian regime and the only alternative for them was the democratic system that guarantees respect for human rights and the rule of law. A somewhat different argument was put forward by Bresser-Pereira, Maraval and Przeworski (1994). They consider that the most important reason why the economic crisis did not negatively affect consolidation processes in Spain, was the adoption of more just social policies by the respective governments. Although unemployment in Spain rose from 4% in the early 70ˢ to 16% after the transition began, and then to 22% in 1985, it did not result in a reduction of support for the ruling party mainly because it promoted pro-welfare policies by increasing expenditure from the budget for social purposes in order to minimize the social consequences of unemployment. However, the policy of the Spanish government was not solely limited to social benefits, but was also aimed at stimulating employment and securing free access to health care and education. As Bresser-Pereira et al. described, the policy of Spain, which focused on social citizenship, accelerated the consolidation processes, because the public "learned that democracy brings also different social rights" (1994, p. 193).

Tunisia, like Spain during democratic transition, is struggling with the problem of unemployment, which in 2015 held firm at 15,3% (Statistical Data Bank – Key Indicators, 2015). The difference is, however, that in contrast to Spain, the problem of unemployment did not appear suddenly after major political changes in Tunisia, but had existed long before the removal of Ben Ali from power. Demands raised by protesters at the end of December 2010 had a strong economic and social component. External debt is another important issue that differentiates Spain from Tunisia. While it was not a problem for Spain during democratic transition (Bresser-Pereira et al., 1994), it is a significant burden for Tunisia. Tunisian economic problems should therefore be regarded not as temporary, but as a symptom of a more serious disease resulting from the adoption of a specific model of economic policy during the period of authoritarian rule which can determine to a large extent the future of this young democracy. Moreover, the promises given by democratically elected politicians that have not materialized, only serve to reduce the trust of citizens, especially the young people in democratically elected authorities, as it is increasingly difficult for them to differentiate between the period 'before' and 'after' the revolution.

The previous undemocratic and corrupt government was seen as incapable of addressing social and economic problems, which led to protests and resulted in regime change. Obviously, one cannot forget that this revolution was not just about the economy. It was also about freedom, which in almost all respects was restricted by the authoritarian government. However, this does not change the fact that economic issues continue to occupy a prominent place on the list of social priorities. For example, in a study conducted in October 2014 by Pew Research, 96% percent of the respondents believed that an improvement of the economic situation is the most important issue for the Tunisian future (*Tunisian Confidence in Democracy Wanes*, 2014). Hence, democratically elected authorities will be judged through the prism of effectiveness of their governments in solving the most important economic and social problems, which are connected to another one – exclusion, both political and economic.

Exclusion primarily affects young Tunisians and its source is not only poverty but also a high level of unemployment. The largest percentage of unemployment is among young people – in some areas of the country up to 85% of young people remain without a job (*Investing in Youth*, 2015). Successive governments hoped that the implementation of numerous governmental programs would reduce levels of unemployment. However, as shown in the report prepared by the Tunisian researchers under the auspices of the European Training Foundation, the

results of these programs are far from expected, as the decisions of the companies regarding hiring new employees had nothing to do with candidates' participation in governmental programs (Zouari, 2014). The ineffectiveness of these programs also stems from the fact that in a large part they are aimed at stimulating employment in areas where there is already considerable market saturation (*Investing in Youth*, 2015). Despite its ineffectiveness, the same strategy was adopted by Nidaa Tounes, which won the parliamentary elections in October 2014. One of the most important elements of its electoral program was to reduce as soon as possible the level of unemployment. They proposed to establish the "Young Corps" serving as a platform for education and training for the young unemployed, cooperating with local schools, and community centers. According to the electoral program, the activities of the "Young Corps" should result in thousands of new jobs in 2015 and 2016. Nidaa Tounes also planned to launch new programs for the unemployed and promote employment in the framework of family business projects (Notre programme pour un développement ambitieux au service de tous les Tunisiens, 2014). However, more than one year after the appointment of the new government, none of the planned programs had been implemented.

The lack of vision for lowering the level of unemployment, however, is a reflection of a broader problem. After the revolution, successive governments have failed to invest greater efforts into preparations with different social groups for comprehensive plans of economic reform, allowing for a break with the economic policies of the previous regime. This discrepancy between election promises and the subsequent activities of the ruling parties has meant that the gap between the older and younger generations appears to be growing. As Marks (2013) noted, in post-revolutionary Tunisia generational divisions are increasing, because young people have limited opportunities to fulfil life stability and they do not view the politicians as their representatives, in that they are perceived as belonging mainly to the old generation and in fact represent the prosperous middle-class. The elite political class is seen by most of Tunisian society as corrupt and concerned only with realizing their narrow interests rather than the interests of the general public. The most disappointed sections of society are the young people who took part in the protests, and in a regime change they perceived as an opportunity to improve the economic and political situation. Meanwhile, a large part of the political classes, consists of people from the old regime, who benefited most from the corrupt system created by Ben Ali and tend to have little interest in change. Regarding the religious middle class represented by Ennahda, even if its ideology highlights the importance of pro-social policy, in

practice it is primarily guided by the logic of the market, which makes Ennahda not much different from its 'secular' counterpart, Nidaa Tounes.

Therefore, economic problems in Tunisia will have a different meaning if we look at them also from the perspective of class conflicts and the policy of exclusion of different social groups – the issue which was analyzed by Merone (2015). In his article, he proposes that the current ideological and economic conflicts and growing extremism should be analyzed from the perspective of class conflict, the roots of which can be tracked back to the early days of independence and the struggles between different social groups for equal participation in the processes of nation building. The former division between president Habib Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef continues to feed the political divisions in the country. But during the rule of Bourguiba and at the beginning of the Ben Ali regime it was the religious middle class belonging to the Salah Ben Youssef faction which had fought for inclusion into the decision-making structures, then in the post-revolutionary period those excluded from the political process are the masses comprising of those excluded both economically and politically. The so-called 'new excluded' live primarily in the poorest regions of the country with the highest levels of unemployment and since the late 1990s their representatives became different Salafi groups, both apolitical and those using violent means. Obviously it should be stressed at this point that the problem with religious radicalism is much broader, and one cannot narrow it down solely to everyday, bread and butter issues. Tunisia, however, is an example of a country where economic issues are closely linked to problems of security and without addressing the former it is not possible to address the issue of terrorist organizations and their activities. Such activities, especially in the poorest regions, are possible because of help from the local population, for which the provision of 'services' to the jihadists is often the only way to make money. Kasserine city, located near Mount Chaambi and close to the border with Algeria, where members of jihadi group Ansar al-Sharia are hiding, is one of many such examples. Local people make a living from smuggling or cooperating with jihadists (Khatib, 2014). This situation applies to border areas with Algeria as well as with Libya, and the cooperation between the jihadists and smugglers is profitable for both, which makes it all the more difficult to combat such armed groups (Boukhars, 2015). Smuggling in turn has reached such epic proportions after the revolution that its value has been estimated as approximately equivalent to around 38% of GDP, according to 'optimistic' data, or even as much as 53% of GDP or 40 billion Tunisian dinars per year. The so-called 'informal' employment sector accounts for an estimated

54% of the Tunisian workforce and the prospects of work are unpredictable, often seasonal and without any legal protection (*L'économie informelle en Tunisie*, 2015). Many young people in the poorest regions therefore often find themselves on the horns of a dilemma – contemplating involvement in trafficking or in the activities of jihadists operating locally. According to estimates, Tunisia is the country that has provided the highest number of people to join the Islamic State (approx. 3,000). Sayida Ounissi, a parliamentarian from Ennahda, commented on this phenomenon as follows: "It happens when you are not giving perspectives to young people inside the country. What does it mean to go to Daesh, is it not a form of suicide, a form of leaving everything behind you, when you have nothing else to lose? We have to also look at this problem from a very social perspective, not only religious, because it doesn't explain everything…"[3].

But as Linz and Stepan mentioned above, support for democracy is not only about the economy but it is also about the rule of law and respect for human rights. In Tunisia, in contrast to the experiences of Spain, in the area of human rights, things have not changed that much, despite the adoption of many new regulations. The use of torture against detainees is still prevalent in detention centers and prisons, and the police act with impunity with officers violating their powers and as such are rarely accountable for their actions (Strickland, 2014); basically the justice system is corrupt and still functions as it did during the Ben Ali rule (Achouri, 2013; Mersch, 2015). Because of this, for the average citizen the concepts of 'human rights' and 'rule of law' do not constitute arguments in favor of democracy. Another issue is the activities of terrorist groups, whose attacks only encourage an expansion of the powers of the security apparatus at the expense of respect for human rights, as has happened with the new counterterrorism laws (Amnesty International, 2015, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2015). The consequence of this state of affairs, however, is growing frustration and a shrinking belief in citizens that the democratic system is advantageous compared to other regime types. In the previously cited study of public opinion conducted by Pew Research in October 2014, less than four years after the start of the protests, only 48% of respondents recognized democracy as a preferred system of government (in 2012, this response was provided by 63% of respondents), and 24% answered that the form of government does not really matter (in comparison to 2012 when this response accounted for 11% of respondents).

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[3] Unpublished interview held by Konrad Pędziwiatr with Sayida Ounissi in Tunis, December 2014.

What is more, 26% said that sometimes non-democratic form of power may be more favorable (*Tunisian Confidence in Democracy Wanes*, 2014). For comparison, in Spain during its transition period, support for democracy remained at the level of 69–81%, and the number of opponents of democracy never exceeded 20% (Linz, Stepan, 1996, p. 108).

CONCLUSIONS

Tunisia's experience of more than five years of political transformation confirms the assumptions of researchers treating economic factors as crucial to the processes of democratization. According to Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi (1996), economic factors not only have a significant impact on the survival of democracy; they also tried to calculate for how long young democracies can survive in conditions of economic crisis. As they point out, the level of development and accumulated wealth is not the most important factor. Much more important is what kind of policies the state is conducting in order to stimulate economic growth and reduce social inequalities, and in this way contribute to improvements in the standard of living for society as a whole, and not just a small part of it. Otherwise, democracy has little chance not only to successfully complete processes of consolidation, but also to survive. Przeworski and Fernardo Limongi (Linz, Stepan, 1996, p. 72), on the basis of the experiences of South American states during the years 1944–1988, have come to the conclusion that the probability of survival for a democratic regime having endured five consecutive years of negative growth is only 50%, and for each subsequent year this probability is decreasing.

Tunisia is an example of a country where economic policy does not contribute to minimizing socio-economic exclusion, because in the period after the Arab Spring successive governments were unable to break free from the economic development model which had been promoted by the authoritarian state. This economic model, based on economic liberalization, privatization, an unequal development of different regions of the country and growing external debt, contributed to an emergence of extreme differences in the development of various regions of the country, and hence to the co-existence of areas of prosperity and relative wealth on the one hand, and high unemployment and poverty on the other. This is a key issue, since the extent to which different groups of citizens

will be included in economic and consequent political processes depends on the economic policies of the state, which in turn have a great impact on the stability of the young democracy.

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THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA IN THE FACE OF A CRISIS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES

REPUBLIKA GRUZJI W OBLICZU KRYZYSU. SKUTECZNOŚĆ DZIAŁAŃ ZEWNĘTRZNYCH

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The problem of effectiveness of reaction to external crisis expressed by participants of the international system is very much a live issue. In view of growing military conflicts in many parts of the world, the question how effective the relations between the players are in the international arena is a category worth analysing. This article concerns the Russian-Georgian crisis, whose most important manifestation was the military conflict in August 2008 and most significant result – the loss of Georgia's territorial integrity and the strengthening of Russia's position in the post-Soviet area. The analysis, conducted according to the presented scheme, focused on the effectiveness of external activities undertaken by the Republic of Georgia in the face of the Moscow-Tbilisi crisis.

Keywords: international crisis, effectiveness of external activities, Georgia, Russia, Russian-Georgian relations, 2008 August war

—— **ABSTRAKT** ——

Problem skuteczności reakcji uczestników systemu międzynarodowego na kryzys zewnętrzny jest kwestią bardzo aktualną. Z uwagi na pogłębiające się konflikty zbrojne w wielu rejonach świata kwestia skuteczności powiązań istniejących pomiędzy graczami na arenie międzynarodowej jest wartą analizy kategorią. Artykuł ten dotyczy kryzysu rosyjsko-gruzińskiego, którego najważniejszą emanacją był konflikt militarny w sierpniu 2008 roku, a najistotniejszym skutkiem – utrata integralności terytorialnej przez Gruzję oraz wzmocnienie pozycji Rosji na obszarze poradzieckim. Analizie przeprowadzonej według zaprezentowanego schematu podlegała skuteczność działań zewnętrznych Republiki Gruzji w obliczu kryzysu na linii Moskwa–Tbilisi.

Słowa kluczowe: kryzys międzynarodowy, skuteczność działań zewnętrznych, Gruzja, Rosja, stosunki rosyjsko-gruzińskie, wojna sierpniowa 2008

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INTRODUCTION.
CAN STRATEGY PREPARE WELL FOR A CRISIS?

In the 21st century, crisis seems to be a phenomenon omnipresent in the international sphere. The analysis which targets the overall emergence of crises in the world may lead to surprising conclusions: the world is tormented by serious problems which, in a short time, can turn into a crisis, that is, a turning point that endangers the international order. However, states, as principal actors of the international stage, have lost monopoly on crisis (see Kącka, 2012, p. 131–145). The increasing importance and institutionalisation of some international organizations, such as NATO, the EU, or ASEAN, made their internal and external problems more substantial.

The category of international crisis has undergone a significant redefinition. At present, crisis is not perceived solely as a situation so serious that there is a high probability of war or military conflict (vide Brecher, 1977, p. 39–74), but also as a set of various threats: political, social, economic (vide Walter, 2016, p. 289–312; du Plessis, Freytag, Boshoff, 2015, p. 17–36), migratory (vide Odutayo, 2016, p. 365–379), religious, cultural, and civilisational, which may result in another radical solution. Perhaps crisis is defined even too broadly since every case of destabilisation can now be called a crisis (vide Cohen, 1979; North, 1963; Lebow, 1984; McClelland, 1961, p. 182–204; Burton, 1984). The examples of crises which have been getting a lot of publicity are the economic crisis caused by the instability of financial markets, the migration crisis provoked by the uncontrolled influx of refugees to Europe mostly from Syria and Afghanistan, the conflict in Ukraine, which resulted in Russia's annexation of Crimea, or the Russian-Georgian conflict, after which two separatist provinces – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – declared independence from Georgia. It seems that it is not even possible to name and summarize the crises which have taken place only in the last decade.

It should be emphasized that the article focuses on the analysis of only one type of crisis, that is, an international crisis, which results from a conflict between two sovereign states. The case study analysed here concerns the narrowly understood Russian-Georgian crisis[1], which in August 2008 turned into a con-

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[1] The Russian-Georgian crisis, whose result was the military conflict in August 2008, could be analysed also broadly as a set of historical, political, geostrategic, economic and social causes that

flict of military character, and whose most important consequences included Georgia's loss of its territorial integrity (vide Rondeli, 2014, p. 35–48; Tsereteli, 2014, p. 74–93; Piechowiak-Lamparska, 2013, p. 419–436; Boesen, Larsen, 2012, p. 102–121; Materski, 2010, p. 362–375; Bryc, 2009, p. 65–76). The analysis shall consider the effectiveness of external activities undertaken by Georgia in order to handle the crisis. Therefore, the foreign policy activities (and their results) discussed here shall encompass those that happened in the period lasting from the beginning of the Immediate Response-2008 military manoeuvres which took place on the Georgian territory as a part of the Partnership for Peace Programme and the Russian Caucasus Frontier 2008 manoeuvres in North Ossetia until the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) commenced its operations.

It is not easy to assess the effectiveness of the foreign policy of a state. For this reason, it seems that such effectiveness can be relatively most thoroughly analysed and assessed at a specific level of such policy. For instance, strategic goals declared in the long-term perspective can be compared with results achieved over an analogous time span. This article addresses the question of effectiveness of state's external reaction to a crisis and therefore it analyses the external effectiveness of attaining *ad hoc* goals.

The process of assessing the effectiveness of external activities during a crisis is multistage (Fig. 1). In order to perform an effectiveness analysis, it is necessary to define the stage of establishing foreign policy goals of a state; in other words, to analyse the strategy of foreign policy and security in the context of predicting sudden threats along with the existing possible crisis areas. The following stage includes defining a crisis, establishing its scope and time frames. Next, it is important to determine available methods and means of reaction as well as to assess if the principles of a strategy have been fulfilled. The last stage is focused on evaluating the effectiveness of the undertaken external activities. To sum up, it needs to be assessed if a state has achieved its goals when attempting to handle a crisis, that is, to say whether it has been effective.

In order to analyse and assess the effectiveness of external activities in the face of a crisis, two types of analytical scheme can be applied: 1) the analysis of a crisis based on the assessment of every single event, its results, possibilities

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could be researched back to the beginning of the 20th century (for instance, it could begin with the causes of the Georgian-Ossetian war in 1918–1920).

Fig. 1. The process of assessing the effectiveness of external activities during a crisis
Source: Own work.

to counteract or respond, and the goals achieved by external actions, or 2) the status quo analysis of the situation after a crisis based on establishing the actual state and collecting data on the set goals, available means and their effects. In the research on the effectiveness of Georgia's external activities in the face of a crisis, the scheme which does not require a detailed analysis of events has been applied.

THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CRISIS IN 2008. A LITTLE CRISIS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD[2]

The Russian-Georgian crisis has its roots in the beginnings of the Georgian state. However, nowadays, in order to understand clearly the geopolitical situation, it is sufficient to look at the map of the South Caucasus. From the ethnical point of view, Georgia is inhabited by 12 nations and ethnic groups, which in itself may serve as a background for a conflict at any time. The largest group are Georgians (86.8%), followed by Azerbaijanis (6.3%), Armenians (4.5%), Russians (0.7%), Ossetians (0.4%), Yezidis (0.3%), Kists (0.2%), Greeks (0.1%), and Assyrians

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2   It is a paraphrase of a book title by Ronald D. Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World* (2010).

(0.1%) (GEOSTAT, 2016). Among Georgians there are also Svans, Megrelians, Abkhazians, and Adjarians, which only intensifies internal divisions. Therefore, the reasons for the August war are not limited only to the issues concerning the relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi, but they also include the frozen internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Separatist aspirations of both provinces supported by the activities of the Russian Federation as well as the none too flexible policy of Mikheil Saakashvili's administration led to a gradually increasing conflict.

The August war shook the international order in the post-Soviet territory. In the region of the South Caucasus, there are a lot of players with different interests who invest their reserves and resources to varying degrees. Agnieszka Bryc (2011, p. 108) thinks that "the states which determine the balance of power in the post-Soviet space are the Russian Federation, the United States, China, and Iran. While for Russia the post-Soviet territory constitutes 'the near abroad', or their sphere of influence, for the USA, China, and Iran the republics of the former Soviet Union are the sphere of interest. This difference means that Moscow is capable of taking military actions to defend its sphere of influence against the growing engagement of third countries". However, despite the fact that the main participants of the crisis were Georgia, Russia, separatist Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, the conflict also engaged intergovernmental organizations of international character (IGO), such as the EU and NATO, as well as certain states – particularly the USA, France, Turkey, Poland, and the Baltic countries.

Yet, the analysis of who gained the most will not give a simple answer. Here, Strobe Talbott's dissent seems to be particularly appropriate as he said that "the big conclusion that Ron [Asmus] draws from the 'little war' of his title is that it had no winners and multiple losers" (Asmus, 2010, p. vii). Consequently, it is difficult to name the one player who gained the most from the crisis. Georgia appears to have lost the most since its territorial integrity was violated and as a result the state delayed, or even ruined, its accession process to the EU or NATO. And what did Georgia gain? One might venture an opinion that the country gained a reputation of a reckless state as well as it gained knowledge of its allies and their loyalty in the face of a real danger, whereas president Mikheil Saakashvili partly lost his credibility as a leader of the Georgian nation. Abkhazia and South Ossetia also gained not too much as they are not sovereign countries, and thus are not recognized by the majority of states and international organizations, but they are elements of Russia's game and they depend on Russia in many respects. What the final balance of gains and losses for Russia was is not clear either. It should be

noted that although the Russian Federation kept its buffer zone, it achieved that at the expense of a military conflict, the EU sanctions, and worsening its relations with NATO. The organizations – NATO and the EU – also lost Georgia, their relatively most reliable ally in the region of the South Caucasus, since the state's aspirations to deepen the process of integration were questioned, which resulted from the fact that Georgia's role in the conflict was not explicit – the state was not just a passive victim attacked by immensely stronger Russia.

But why did the relatively small crisis shake the world? Ronald D. Asmus (2010, p. 215) assesses the outcome of the Russian-Georgian crisis as a certain kind of test failed by all participants of the conflict. "The Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 was a little war that shook the world. It shocked a West that had become complacent in its belief that war in Europe had become a thing of the past and thus ignored the warning signs that conflict was brewing between Moscow and Tbilisi. […] Perhaps most importantly, this war violated several core principles of what was supposed to be a new European security order, thus raising questions about its future. As a result, this little war shook the belief that a democratic and cooperative peace had triumphed in Europe twenty years after the Iron Curtain fell and that the kind of geopolitical competition and spheres of influence thinking that had produced so much conflict and bloodshed in the continent's past had been banished". In the light of the events present in the international arena (for example, the conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea), it seems that Asmus might have been right.

EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES AS A RESPONSE TO THE CONFLICT: TEST OF PARTNERSHIP, TEST OF INTERESTS

Was Georgia effective in handling the conflict, which on the one hand affected the country, but on the other hand was provoked by the state itself? More precisely – was the recklessness profitable? In order to assess the effectiveness of Georgia's foreign policy during the period in question, it is necessary to analyse the key goals and verify whether they were reached. The goals of Georgian foreign policy were taken from documents of strategic character and were verified with the method of content analysis (the analysed texts included international law documents, security and foreign policy strategies, declarations issued by states and international organizations; moreover, the analysis involved the course of events). Intuitively, both in life and in international politics, we initially check

if our alliances function in the face of a real crisis. This is a kind of test whether a strategic partnership or any other unique relationship is valuable or merely a theatre of empty words and gestures.

Main Principles in Strategic Documents

The first document on security and foreign policy in the Republic of Georgia was *the National Security Concept of Georgia*. It was the first act of such importance passed by the Parliament of Georgia since the Rose Revolution and the longest binding strategy of such a broad scope. The document was published in 2005 and was in effect until 2012, when it was substituted by a new version.

The strategy assumed already in its introduction that the primary goal of the state's activity is its survival and security; therefore, it determined the national interest in the understanding suggested by neoliberal concepts. It was emphasized that Georgia would defend its most important interests using all the means and methods allowed by the law. The main values which governed the state's activities in the following years were: 1) independence (understood as respecting their own as well as other states' sovereignty), 2) freedom (understood as rights and freedoms provided for in international conventions), 3) democracy and the rule of law (understood as establishing and maintaining a system of democratic governance and the separation of powers), 4) prosperity (understood as a balanced and prosperous economic development of a country and its citizens), 5) peace (understood as a continuation of friendly relations in the international system), 6) security (understood as providing security and territorial integrity).

There are several goals which could be connected with the crisis in August 2008. First of all, these were the goals of promoting the national interest, such as: guaranteeing territorial integrity and national unity, ensuring stability in the region of the South Caucasus, enhancing democracy and peace in the neighbouring countries and providing energy security. The strategy also defined the most important threats, such as: violating territorial integrity by separatist movements, side effects of conflicts with the neighbouring countries, a foreign military intervention and the military presence of the Russian Federation on the Georgian territory. The foreign policy goals included mostly: strategic partnership with the USA, Ukraine, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; partnership with the Russian Federation; accession to the EU and NATO and cooperation in the region of the Black Sea (as a part of GUAM, BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR).

Moreover, the document *The Georgian Foreign Policy Strategy for the Years 2006–2009* was the first official regulation on the foreign policy strategy of the Georgian state prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the Rose Revolution. Its author was Gela Bezhuashvili, Minister of Foreign Affairs. It includes *strategic objectives*, *medium term tasks* and *actions*. It means that less than three years after regaining sovereignty, the state presented a comprehensively well-thought-out scheme and established a hierarchy of goals.

The strategy perfectly shows the system of elements which are essential for the realization of the national interest, short-term and long-term goals, as well as the state's activity in the international arena. The order in which the elements are placed in the document represents a structure organized – according to their importance, from the highest to the lowest.

The aim of the strategy was to unify the vision of the main trends and detailed priorities of Georgian foreign policy in order to increase the work efficiency of the foreign service and the effectiveness of the state's foreign policy. The adopted mission refers to such tasks as promoting the interests of the Republic of Georgia in the international arena, protecting the rights of Georgian citizens outside the state's borders and improving relations among international communities. Significantly, the mission was to be carried out according to democratic values and respect for the idea of common aspiration to security and prosperity. The consolidation of democracy and enhancement of further social and economic changes were to be consistent with the foreign policy.

The strategic goals were divided into four groups: 1) *Independent, Secure and Stable Country*, 2) *Prosperity and Democracy*, 3) *Georgia's Role in the International System*, and 4) *Georgian Citizens Abroad*.

The first group of goals, which can be associated with the Russian-Georgian crisis, includes above all: 1) maintaining territorial integrity (inviolability of Georgian borders which are recognized by the international law) together with the implementation of the peace programme in South Ossetia (multilateral cooperation with OSCE and the EU and bilateral cooperation with the USA and the Russian Federation) as well as developing a common peace programme for Abkhazia (cooperation on the UN forum); 2) strengthening the national security system (increasing the state's ability to defend) together with creating favourable conditions for the state's development (active contacts on bilateral and multilateral levels in order to receive external support for sovereignty); 3) strengthening stability in the region of the South Caucasus, together with active use of existing mechanisms of regional cooperation (activity in CDC,

GUAM, and BSEC) and enhancing cooperation in the Black Sea region (developing a regional programme for cooperation); 4) integration with the European countries and NATO together with sustaining the dynamicity of actions aiming at accession to NATO (the 26 plus 1 discussions), supporting the mechanisms of integration with NATO (aspirations to the Membership Action Plan, MAP), increasing awareness of the issue of integration with NATO among the Georgian society (gaining social support), deepening the relationship with the EU (working towards greater involvement of the EU in Georgia and in the region of the South Caucasus within three years), accepting and implementing the European Neighbourhood Policy (realization of the ENP AP), increasing mutual benefits in relations with the EU (development in the sphere of security, trade, transport, energy, infrastructure, education, and culture).

A great attention was given to defining and setting goals as a part of military relations. In the global scale, the goals were mainly connected with accession to NATO and the EU, but also with increasing the cooperation with the Council of Europe and the OSCE. In the sphere of bilateral relations, the main focus was put on the issue of relations with neighbours, more specifically, on the strategic partnership with Turkey, the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia and the intensification of relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The second aspect of bilateral relations concentrated on relations with the European countries, including closer relations with Germany, France, Great Britain, Holland and Greece along with closer relations with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as strategic partnership with Ukraine. Moreover, in the field of relations with more distant countries, Georgia assumed that it was good to develop strategic partnership with the USA (the most important direction), but also to build closer relations with China, India, Japan and South Korea as well as to enhance economic cooperation with the Middle Asian countries, especially with Kazakhstan. Additionally, Georgia actively participated in solving problems in the Near East (joined the peacekeeping mission in Iraq).

The *ad hoc* goals resulting from the crisis caused by the Russian-Georgian military conflict in August 2008, distinguished on the basis of conclusions drawn from the above documents:

1. Winning the conflict with the Russian Federation in August 2008;
2. Regaining territorial integrity.

Implementation of Principles During a Crisis

The analysis shall not include a detailed account of the Five-Day War and its direct results. This issue was broadly covered in the source literature (vide Fawn, Nalbandov, 2012, p. 57–89; Allison, 2009, p. 173–200; Trenin, 2012, p. 257–269; Mouritzen, Wivel, 2012; King, 2008, p. 2–11). It is important to present the direct result of the conflict and the means of external influence at the disposal of the Georgian diplomacy in the time of the Moscow-Tbilisi crisis. The most important issue was the military conflict, i.e., the Russian troops entering the Georgian territory, and in consequence, separating the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – making them the *de facto* Russian satellites (dependent on the military, economic and political help from Moscow). These issues should be treated separately, despite the fact that one is the consequence of the other.

The main strategic principle of Georgia in August 2008 was to keep its territorial integrity and restore constitutional order. President Mikheil Saakashvili believed that such tools as strategic partnership with NATO, the EU and the USA, as well as good relations with the states from their region, Armenia and Azerbaijan, would serve as sufficient protection against a Russian military attack. However, perhaps as a result of provocation or wrongly-calculated actions, it was Georgia who started the artillery assault on Tskhinvali. In consequence, "the Russian peacekeeping forces" took a series of military actions after which, within a few days, the Russian troops had taken control over South Ossetia and started supporting the military operation in Abkhazia. None of the Georgian strategic partners provided Georgia with military or logistic support (the media only informed that the Georgian army got access to American intelligence data; however, the information was not confirmed).

The European Union acted as a mediator between Russia and Georgia and initiated peace negotiations which were conducted with the presence of the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Nicolas Sarkozy, who acted as the President-in-Office of the European Union. The 6-point plan, known as the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement, was also signed by the South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity and the Abkhaz President Sergei Bagapsh, as well as by Mikheil Saakashvili. Georgia claimed, however, that the Russians had not withdrawn their troops and that they were still conducting the military operation (vide Whitman, Wolff, 2010, p. 87–107; Parmentier, 2009, p. 49–61). In order to express the support for Georgia, the presidents of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, and the prime minister of Latvia (Lech Kaczyński, Valdas Adamkus, Toomas

Hendrik Ilves, Viktor Yushchenko, and Ivars Godmanis respectively) made an important gesture. Despite the ongoing military actions, they arrived in Tbilisi and took part in the rally against the conflict and the Russian aggression. It was probably the most significant gesture of support received by Georgia from its allies (vide Halbach, 2012, p. 295–312; Antonenko, 2012, p. 271–293).

The reaction of international organizations mostly involved encouraging the parties to enter into peace talks and stop military actions. NATO, the EU, the UN and the SCO believed that the solution to the crisis should be found during peace negotiations. They also did not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and still treated them as the integral territory of Georgia. Despite those assurances, the status quo was different since the Russian troops were still stationed on the territory of the separatist provinces. The NATO member states together with the EU either called for withdrawal of the Russian military forces or did not comment on the situation in the South Caucasus (vide Tarkhan-Mouravi, 2014, p. 49–73). It is worth noting that the Polish diplomacy got deeply involved in the discourse on the Russian-Georgian conflict, which resulted in the initiative for the Eastern Partnership.

When it comes to the recognition of the status quo, or *de facto* the permanent separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, the states which recognize independence of these provinces are Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru. It does not change, however, the real situation of their independence. Despite their strong dependence on Russia, these republics were constituted. Also in this respect, the international community, allies and partners of Georgia have not taken any steps which could bring the autonomous territories back to Georgia. Therefore, the lack of any initiatives and passivity in the face of this problem is clearly visible.

SUMMARY

It is important to notice that the means available for Georgia during the Russian-Georgian crisis included several important agreements on strategic partnership signed with NATO, the EU, and the USA. Perhaps those partnerships were not just empty diplomatic gestures; however, the allies did not do more than standard diplomatic actions. Diplomatic notes or calling for peace talks are not too engaging. The biggest results were achieved by the EU activities. The European Union engaged most actively in the peacekeeping process and facilitated the

Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement. However, the Georgian diplomatic activities were probably not effective enough to make the state's partners take real actions – the allies did not regard keeping the territorial integrity of Georgia as their vital interest (vide Libaridian, 2012, p. 237–256).

The most spectacular gestures included the arrival of the presidents of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, and the prime minister of Latvia in Tbilisi. Despite the ongoing military activities, they supported Georgians with their presence, and at the same time, made the world's public opinion aware of the conflict on the territory of the seemingly distant South Caucasus.

The effectiveness of Georgia's external activities cannot be assessed highly. The state did not achieve any of its goals as it both lost the August war and has not regained its territorial integrity until today. It does not seem that the international community intended to do anything to restore the situation from before 2008, and Georgia itself does not have enough means to regain Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Probably, this would mean another military conflict with Russia, and maybe even a large-scale crisis. In a sense, we can now observe the consequences of the acceptance of the situation in the South Caucasus in Ukraine or Moldova.

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OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
WITH A COST CHANNEL

OPTYMALNA POLITYKA PIENIĘŻNA W SYTUACJI ISTNIENIA KANAŁU KOSZTÓW

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

More and more research confirms the influence of monetary policy over supply through the costs level (especially in reference to the working capital costs) and over the marginal costs of a given enterprise which influences their pricing policy and manufacturing decisions. Thus, it has become a necessity in the monetary policy's effectiveness to take into account cost channels of transmitting monetary policy into economy, along with identification of factors determining its effectiveness. It may point out to the stronger reaction of the central bank in order to repress costly inflationary pressure; it may as well point out to a lower interest increase in order to not increase inflation expectations. It depends on the specificity of a given economy – to be precise, the role of a cost channel and market expectations, as well as the strength of an interest rate channel. The central bank should analyze the effects of its actions in order to neutralize negative consequences and increase its effectiveness. Thus, when it comes to the cost channel, it comes as

—— **ABSTRAKT** ——

Coraz większa ilość badań dowodzi wpływu polityki pieniężnej na podażową stronę gospodarki poprzez oddziaływanie na poziom kosztów finansowych (w szczególności kosztu kapitału pracującego), a tym samym na wysokość kosztów marginalnych przedsiębiorstwa, co wpływa na ich politykę cenową i decyzje o wielkości produkcji. Z tego względu kluczowe dla skuteczności polityki pieniężnej jest uwzględnienie kanału kosztów w transmisji polityki pieniężnej do gospodarki wraz z identyfikacją czynników determinujących jego drożność. Może ono wskazywać na silniejszą reakcję banku centralnego, by tłumić kosztową presję inflacyjną, albo na słabszy wzrost oprocentowania, by nie wzmagać oczekiwań inflacyjnych. Zależy to od specyfiki danej gospodarki – od roli, jaką odgrywają w niej kanał kosztów oraz oczekiwania rynkowe, ale także od siły działania kanału stopy procentowej. Bank centralny powinien więc zgłębiać skutki swych działań, by neutralizować ich negatywne efekty, a tym samym podnieść swą skuteczność. Dlatego też w sytuacji

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more effective for the central bank to focus on the inflation goal and to base the monetary policy on the aim of achieving this goal. To strengthen the effectiveness and credibility, it is necessary to create a realistic strategy should economical crisis occur.

Keywords: monetary policy, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, channels of monetary transmission, cost channel, the cost of working capital

działania kanału kosztów właściwe wydaje się skupienie banku centralnego na celu inflacyjnym i oparcie polityki pieniężnej na zobowiązaniu do jego osiągnięcia. Dla wzmocnienia skuteczności i wiarygodności niezbędne jest również wypracowanie realistycznej strategii działania na wypadek załamania się płynności w gospodarce.

Słowa kluczowe: polityka pieniężna, mechanizm transmisji polityki pieniężnej, kanały transmisji pieniężnej, kanał kosztów, koszt kapitału pracującego

INTRODUCTION

An extensive body of literature confirming empirical activity of a cost channel and its varying strength in different economies, trade types or time indicates that ignoring its presence (and differences in its potency) distorts a true image of the mechanism of transmitting monetary policy into economy; thus, it distorts the quality of recommendations for optimization of the central bank's policy (Michaelis, Palek, 2014). More and more research confirms the influence of monetary policy over supply through the costs level (especially in reference to the working capital costs) and over the marginal costs of a given enterprise which influences their pricing policy and manufacturing decisions (i.a., Barth, Ramey, 2000; Gaiotti, Secchi, 2004; Dedola, Lippi, 2005; Ravenna, Walsh, 2006; Henzel, Hülsewig, Mayer, Wollmershäuser, 2007; Hülsewig, Mayer, Wollmershäuser, 2009; Della Chang, Jansen, 2014; Tillmann, 2006; Tillmann, 2008; Chowdhury, Hoffmann, Schabert, 2006; Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans, 2005; Silva, Paes, 2015). Tightening of monetary policy may contribute to the inflation increase (*price puzzle*) and production reduction. Thus, the central bank should take into account the presence of the cost channel and adjust its reaction and instruments to the scope and strength of its activity. In order to do that, it is necessary to have a continuous monitoring of changes of this mechanism's importance on transmitting impulses of monetary policy into economy alongside undergoing changes in the national financial market, international financial markets, the financial flow in the financial and capital market, the quantity, cost and availability of capital in the internal and external markets, the structure, strength and the financial-capital situation of the banking sector, the tendency of banks to give loans for changes of interest

rates in the central bank, the course of economic situation, the level of market interest and its diversity when it comes to strength, speed, completeness and the asymmetry of the *pass-through* effect of monetary policy in reference to internal credit market, the financial-capital condition of enterprises and their dependency on external financial sources, the need of working capital, dependency on bank credit, availability of alternative financing sources (especially short-term sources), specificity of monetary policy of enterprises, their prices and asymmetry of prices, the exchange-rate regime and its stability, legal regulations and means used by economic policy which may strengthen or weaken the activity of the cost channel and monetary policy and all other factors that may increase (or decrease) difficulties when it comes to availability of financing sources with, at the same time, causing the strength of monetary policy impulses to increase or decrease. Due to complexity of economic mechanisms, it is impossible to list all factors determining the strength of the cost channel. It is certain that further research will provide more information on factors contributing to the importance of a cost channel. The art is to correctly evaluate the importance of some of the factors in the activity of the cost channel and the negative effect of the other factors on the effectiveness of the central bank in terms of economic changes, financial markets, regulations or other means of economic policy. The last step is to take that into consideration while defining monetary policy.

The main aim of the present work is to create a set of recommendations for the central bank that will optimize monetary policy in terms of the cost channel with, at the same time, increasing the effectiveness of monetary policy in strengthening economic stability. Using the induction method, an evaluation was made. The evaluation concerned results of international econometric studies and the current state of knowledge in terms of influence of the cost channel in transmitting monetary policy into economy over effectiveness of monetary policy of the central bank. The evaluation also pointed out certain implications which are generated by this mechanism in terms of optimizing monetary policy. Polish scientific literature lacks research analyzing the activity of the cost channel, while the current position of the banking sector and dependency of enterprises on a bank credit seem to predestine towards the activity of the cost channel in Poland (Redo, 2016b).

The analysis of study results on the cost mechanism in transmitting monetary policy into economy indicates that becoming familiar with the specificity of its action and factors determining its effectiveness is essential for the effectiveness of monetary policy. It may confirm the stronger reaction of the central bank in

order to suppress the inflation pressure when it comes to cost; it also may suggest lower increase of interest rates, in order to suppress inflation expectations. It all depends on the specificity of a given economy – the role of the cost channel and market expectations, as well as the strength of an interest-rate channel. The central bank should analyze the effects of its actions in order to neutralize negative effects and increase its effectiveness. In the context of the cost channel, it occurs as necessary to focus on the inflation goal and to base the monetary policy on achieving this goal. In order to strengthen the effectiveness and credibility, it is also necessary to create a realistic strategy should an economic crisis take place.

MONETARY POLICY SHOULD REACT STRONGER

As the activity of the cost channel weakens the anti-inflation activity of monetary policy, it may be argued that the reaction of the central bank towards inflation should be stronger (Michaelis, Palek, 2014). This opinion is supported by Castelnuovo, Surico (2006), who refer to the role of inflation expectations in shaping inflation and the necessity of their effective stabilization because, as they suggest, those may be in part responsible for the price increase after tightening of monetary policy (*price puzzle*). Over the decades, the growing importance of inflation expectations in the construction of monetary policy may be identified in many countries in the growing dependency between the strength of the central bank's reaction and the level of inflation in Taylor's rule (monetary policy in the USA reacts nowadays much stronger towards inflation expectations than a few decades ago; Bernanke, 2004). As Bernanke (2004) underlines, a reaction of monetary policy towards inflation that is not enough aggressive may in fact increase inflation expectations and speed the inflation, which is consistent with the results obtained by Castelnuovo, Surico (2006). Castelnuovo and Surico indicated that the *price puzzle* phenomenon is present in the times of decreased reaction of central banks on inflation (for example, before Volcker's presidency in the USA – until 1979, or in Great Britain before introducing the inflation strategy in the Bank of England in 1992). Another important factor for a stronger reaction of the central bank is mentioned by Kobayashi (2008). Kobayashi points out that, in the case of an incomplete *pass-through* effect, monetary policy should react stronger to changes occurring on the average level of credit interests, as the average is not representative and a weaker reaction of the central bank will only deepen discrepancies within the credit cost level between enterprises which

will consequently lead to the growth of disproportion in the marginal costs of enterprises and to overpricing. It is especially related to the economies in which enterprises establish their own prices partly on the basis of competition, as visible in the case of most Eurozone countries (Fabiani et al., 2005). However, as Michaelis, Palek (2014) indicated, the higher the diversity when it comes to strength of the cost channel between economies of the monetary union, the weaker the increase of aggression levels of monetary policy. The higher diversity in the strength of the cost channel between economies of the monetary union leads to lower effectiveness of the central bank in stabilizing inflation and, consequently, to lesser number of advantages of being in the Eurozone, especially for countries with the strongest and the weakest cost channel activity.

Finally, it has to be noted that significant reduction of interest rates at the time of the financial crisis of 2008 greatly weakened the possibility of impacting economy by the use of this tool. Hence, Čihák, Harjes, Stavrev (2009), who indicated that the *pass-through* effect within the Eurozone functions weaker after the crisis, pointed out that monetary policy should act stronger nowadays in order to achieve the same effect as the one before the crisis. These conclusions are consistent with the results of Apergis, Cooray (2015), who point out that limitation with zero interest rates contributed to deactivation of the pass-through effect also in the USA and Great Britain.

MONETARY POLICY SHOULD HAVE A SLOWER AND WEAKER REACTION

On the other hand, one must remember that more aggressive reaction of the central bank (greater increase of interest rates) may cause higher inflation expectations and encourage price increase. Thus, as Brückner, Schabert (2003) and Christiano, Trabandt, Walentin (2010) point out, when it comes to cost channel activity, one cannot rely exclusively on the Taylor's rule as it may bring opposite effects to those that were expected. It is especially related to central banks that are focused exclusively on inflation and that are associated with bigger risk of making decisions. It is wise to agree with Smith (2015) who points out that not only is there lower but also upper limit when it comes to the strength of reaction of the central bank towards the inflation growth in order to eliminate the effect of self-fulfilling inflation expectations and anchoring them on an appropriate level. Of course, the upper limit of reaction of monetary policy towards the

inflation increase, according to the Taylor's rule, should be adjusted to the current activity of the cost channel in a given economy, which means taking into consideration not only quantity and importance of enterprises that are greatly dependant on external financial sources, but also current situation of the credit market which determines availability and credit costs, which means the power of the cost mechanism in transmitting monetary policy on price levels (Christiano, Trabandt, Walentin, 2010; Surico, 2008).

Tillmann (2009) also points to an important argument against excessive aggressive reaction of the central bank. It indicates that because the studies show strong differences between the activity of the cost channel not only in different countries, but also in time and a growing number of factors strengthening or weakening its effectiveness, the central bank is not able to foresee the scale of tightening (or easing) of credit conditions as a result of changes in interest rates. The uncertainty of the power of the cost channel reflects the uncertainty related to the nature of financial markets and their role in transmitting monetary policy into the supply part of economy. Tillmann (2009) suggests that in the context of uncertainty in terms of power of the cost channel, monetary policy should estimate its power and pursue a less aggressive monetary policy based on the min-max rule (minimizing the risk of the worst scenario) and act according to the Brainard's cautious politics rule (1967). Tillmann (2009) showed that the higher the uncertainty when it comes to the cost channel activity, the reaction of interest rates of the central bank towards inflation should be weaker, especially when it comes to tensions on financial markets which strengthen the activity of the cost channel. Aysun, Brady, Honig (2013) are also against the strong reaction of monetary policy. They stated that financial tensions multiply in the times of crisis and they strengthen monetary policy's power. Thus, Gaiotti, Secchi (2004) insist that the cost channel should be taken into account while creating optimum monetary policy as it is responsible for short-term price increase resulting from tightening of monetary policy; following that, the central bank should gradually increase interest rates. Westermeier (2010) supports the idea of defining interest rates on a level lower than then optimum one due to the activity of the cost channel. Also Ravenna, Walsh (2006) suggest that monetary policy should gradually stabilize inflation. Finally, it is worth to mention Tillmann's (2007) theory that the activity of the cost channel neutralizes the argument mentioned by, for example, Giannoni (2007) or Onatski, Stock (2002), in which, with relation to uncertainty of econometric modeling, monetary policy should react stronger to shock. Tillmann (2007) indicates that the presence of the cost channel reduces

effectiveness of monetary policy in confrontation with inflation; thus, there is no reason for monetary policy to react stronger to shocks. Therefore, he confirms Brainard's (1967) opinion that monetary policy should not be aggressive as it may excessively strengthen the cost channel activity and, as a result, cause a too weak reaction of the central bank towards inflation.

CENTRAL BANK SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE COST CHANNEL ACTIVITIY TO NEUTRALIZE NEGATIVE EFFECTS

The presence of the cost channel increases inflation fluctuations, because monetary policy focuses more on stabilizing the scope of production. On the other hand, when the central bank is focused mainly on stabilizing inflation, the cost channel strengthens fluctuations of the demand gap (strengthens *trade-off* between the inflation level and the scope of production – Kilponen, Milne, 2007; Mallik, Chowdhury, 2001). Thus, optimum monetary policy should neutralize potential negative effects (Ravenna, Walsh, 2006); it is necessary to get to know the mechanism of the cost channel activity in a given economy and to take into account its influence on the effects of the use of monetary policy's tools. It is necessary to identify the widest possible range of factors strengthening and weakening the activity of the cost channel to monitor potential occurrences that may disrupt its previous effectiveness. It is a necessary condition in order to maintaining effective realization of monetary policy (not only due to the *price puzzle* phenomenon caused by the cost channel). It also implies correct defining of the interest level of the central bank – the level which ensures creating a proper inflation path and/ or economic growth, which results in economic stabilization. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Surico (2008) suggested that monetary policy, in the case of the cost channel activity, should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation and limiting the importance of demand gap fluctuations in the reaction function.

CENTRAL BANK SHOULD CONDUCT ITS MONETARY POLICY IN A LESS TRANSPARENT MANNER

It is worth to note here the study results of Dai, Zhang (2013), who indicated that in the case of activity of the cost channel, decreased transparency of monetary policy decreases the inflation fluctuations and increases production change-

ability; it suggests that, when the main goal of the monetary policy is to stabilize price levels (or inflation) and the society devotes less attention to stabilization of production, the monetary policy should not be too transparent. This thesis, however, requires further analysis.

CENTRAL BANK SHOULD BASE MONETARY POLICY ON OBLIGATIONS

As the strong cost channel activity limits effectiveness of monetary policy and may deepen economic instability, monetary policy should be, according to Llosa, Tuesta (2009), based on the obligation to define optimum monetary policy in the case of the cost channel activity. As a result, the effects coming from the cost channel activity would be less severe. They point out that taking into consideration the cost channel while modeling optimum monetary policy greatly changes previous conclusions. In the situation when the cost channel is present, discretional monetary policy or the one based on Taylor's rule may bring counter results (deepen instability). These conclusions are confirmed by Michaelis, Palek (2014), who also indicate that in the context of the cost channel activity, the most effective monetary policy is the one that is based on obligations. They indicated that monetary policy based on obligations is more effective than the one based on the Taylor's rule, which, consequently, is more effective than the strategy of direct inflation goal and the discretional monetary policy. The advantages of turning towards monetary policy based on obligations are significantly greater when the cost channel activity increases as well as the diversity in its power between economies of currency union. The superiority of monetary policy based on obligation was also identified by Bask, Proaño (2012).

The above mentioned conclusions are consistent with the study of Demirel (2013), who indicated the importance of obligations of the central bank is significantly higher than it was expected, especially when it comes to the economies in which the cost channel is active. He indicated a strong positive relationship between the activity of the cost channel and benefits from obligations of the central banks; he also indicated that omitting the cost channel activity causes underestimation of benefits of the future character of monetary policy that come from the central bank's obligation. He indicated that not taking into consideration the cost channel in the US economy while estimating benefits coming from the central bank results in underestimation of the quarterly inflation of 0.48 per-

centage point. When interest changes greatly influence the level of marginal costs, monetary policy based on obligations allows to create inflation expectations in a more effective manner, in order to balance between inflation stabilization and production. Benefits coming from obligations of monetary policy result from higher effectiveness of the central bank in steering market expectations and from reaching stability despite stronger *trade-off* effect between stabilizing inflation and production. The importance of obligations in the context of maintaining low inflation (low inflation target) increases along with the power of the cost channel activity. This statement is supported by Lam (2010), who indicated the significant growth of importance of credible obligations of the central bank for sustaining low inflation in the event of strong activity of the cost channel.

IT IS CRUCIAL TO WORK ON DEVELOPMENT AND QUALITY OF ECONOMETRIC MODELING

Despite significant amount of knowledge on the mechanism of the cost channel, further study is needed in order to recognize determinants of power and changes in its effectiveness, which will further allow for greater effectiveness of monetary policy. Thus, the central bank should continuously develop its econometric models, open its assumptions to possible changes, take into account the amount of economic interdependencies, assign a bigger role to the banking sector – especially in economies with the banking financial model (Tamborini, 2009; Kopecky, Van Hoose, 2012; Karagiannis, Panagopoulos, Vlamis, 2010; Silva, Paes, 2015) – by testing the activity of channel cost in isolation and in relation with other channels present in the monetary policy transmission in order to correctly reflect economic reality, to evaluate the cost channel's activity in a given country, to identify main determinants of its effectiveness and to define effective monetary policy (Malikane, 2012).

THE CENTRAL BANK SHOULD CREATE A STRATEGY IN CASE OF LIQUIDITY BREAKDOWN

This information is crucial not only to ease the negative effects of the cost channel activity and to manage effective monetary policy despite its activity, but also to correctly identify potential disruptions in the channel's effectiveness which

may threaten the economy's stability limit abilities of monetary policy as well as the entire economic policy. Thus, one shall agree with Karagiannis, Panagopoulos, Vlamis (2010) who point out to the necessity of creating a strategy for the central bank in case of radical decrease of liquidity in the financial sector and, consequently, decrease of the *pass-through* effect (as it took place during the crisis of 2008 in the USA and in the Eurozone); such strategy should be created in order to restore the effectiveness of the mechanism of monetary policy transmission, effectiveness of which conditions the central bank's ability to ease the effects of the liquidity crisis. Fast reaction, proper action and correct instruments (to reduce liquidity problem within the highest number of enterprises possible) are key factors; however, it is necessary to also think about the golden mean principle. These actions should not lead to excessive dependency of the market on the central bank or increase the issue of *moral hazard*. It is necessary to re-regulate financial markets to prevent excessive *risk-taking* (Borio, Zhu, 2008; Redo, 2013; Redo, 2015), and work on strengthening of cooperation and communication between central banks and between the central bank and the market – to increase the effectiveness and stability of those markets. Finally, in case of liquidity crisis, cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy is essential to create an effective *policy-mix* which will restore economy to the balanced economic growth (with low inflation) (Redo, 2016a).

CONCLUSIONS

The cost channel activity decreases the central bank's effectiveness in stabilizing inflation; thus, as some economists argue, monetary policy should be more aggressive in order to stabilize market expectations more effectively. It is especially related to the economies with incomplete pass-through effect when it comes to interest rates; that generates high diversity when it comes to capital costs between enterprises. Additionally, another argument may be found in significant decrease in activity (or even deactivation) of the interest rates channel in monetary policy transmission due to extremely low interest rates stemming from the crisis of 2008. Opponents of this solution argue that, in order to eliminate the effect of self-made inflation expectations and set them on a desired level, it is necessary to have a weaker reaction of the central bank, especially in the situation of insufficient knowledge of the cost channel mechanism and uncertainty of credit conditions stemming from changes in interest rates of the

central bank. It is especially related to periods of tension on financial markets, which strengthen the activity of the cost channel. Considering the above counter arguments, it is necessary to proceed with research which will help in exploring the cost mechanism in monetary policy transmission, exploring its changeability through time to predict effects of the decisions of the central bank, neutralizing its potential negative effects and increasing the effectiveness of the monetary policy, identifying factors contributing to its effectiveness in a given economy and factors that may cause disruption in its activity. In order to achieve that, econometric models which support decision-making processes of the central bank need to be developed. As the cost channel activity increases the trade-off phenomenon between inflation and production, it occurs as necessary to have the monetary policy focus exclusively on the inflation target and to base it on the condition of maintaining the established level of inflation. Then, inflation expectations can be created in a much more effective way and economic stability can be built despite disruptions caused by the cost channel and uncertainty of its functioning. Development of a strategy in case of liquidity breakdown, taking into account specific features of a given economy, activity of the cost channel as well as amount and importance of enterprises depending on external financing, seems to be a key factor for effectiveness of the central bank in creating market expectations and building stability.

The above will help in preventing a radical strengthening of the cost channel in the context of new economic shocks. To achieve that, it is necessary to explore the cost channel mechanism in a given economy in order to estimate if, due to the cost channel activity and weaker effectiveness of the interest rates channel, a stronger reaction of the central bank is needed or, due to higher sensitivity of market expectations towards interest rates, it is necessary to have a weaker reaction of the central bank to not only prevent self-fulfilling inflation expectations, but also to maintain the activity of the cost channel in the context of economic tensions which additionally increase its effectiveness.

Understanding the role of the cost channel is essential to maintain stability of enterprises, their development, creating workplaces – socio-economic development. Although it corresponds to all economies, especially those with lower wealth and credibility level (and also limited capital availability) should recognize the importance of improving effectiveness of using means of economic policy which enable development and stability. Good knowledge of the cost channel activity is also significant in terms of Poland's potential entering the Eurozone and submitting to monetary policy of the European Central Bank, which defines

lower level of interest rates and is characterized by weaker and varied power of reaction when contrasted with NBP (*National Bank of Poland* – translator's annotation). Adoption of the euro currency will undoubtedly change the *pass-through* effect on interest rates and the cost channel in Poland. The above mentioned aspects shall be taken into consideration while conducting an analysis of advantages and disadvantages of adopting euro by Poland.

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EUROPEAN STUDIES

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COALITIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIENCES OF THE EP OF THE SEVENTH TERM

KOALICJE MIĘDZY GRUPAMI POLITYCZNYMI W PARLAMENCIE EUROPEJSKIM. ANALIZA DOŚWIADCZEŃ PE SIÓDMEJ KADENCJI

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—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The article presents the problem of the functioning of factions within the European Parliament and the formation of coalitions between individual political groups basing on the Rules of Procedure and data from the seventh term of the EP. The article involves an analysis of the principles for forming factions as specified in the Rules of Procedure of the EP and the consequences for the cooperation of national parties in the Parliament arising from these regulations. In the second part of the article, matters concerning coalition formation between political groups within the EP are discussed together with the phenomenon of 'grand coalitions', related definitional problems and the functioning of the entire political system of the EU in this context.

Keywords: European Parliament, coalitions, great coalition, political groups (factions) in the European Parliament, European Union

—— **ABSTRAKT** ——

Artykuł przedstawia problem funkcjonowania frakcji w Parlamencie Europejskim i tworzenia koalicji między poszczególnymi grupami politycznymi na podstawie Regulaminu i danych z siódmej kadencji PE. W artykule analizie zostały poddane zasady tworzenia frakcji określone w Regulaminie PE oraz wynikające z tych przepisów konsekwencje dla współpracy partii narodowych na forum Parlamentu. W drugiej części artykułu przedstawione zostały kwestie związane z tworzeniem koalicji między grupami politycznymi w PE, fenomen „wielkich koalicji" oraz problemy definicyjne związane zarówno z tym zagadnieniem, jak i funkcjonowaniem całego systemu politycznego UE w tym kontekście.

Słowa kluczowe: Parlament Europejski, koalicje, wielka koalicja, grupy polityczne (frakcje) w PE, Unia Europejska

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INTRODUCTION

In the formal-legal aspect, the European Union remains an international organisation with certain transnational traits, however, one can still indicate some of its *quasi* national traits. Most of the hundreds of currently operating international organisations have bodies of parliamentary character, yet those in which deputies exercise direct mandate are rare.

Contemporary democracy operates on the basis of political parties that are seedbeds for political elites and a source of programmes for the ruling party. As early as from the 19th century, political parties have been undertaking the labour of international cooperation, thus giving birth to the currently operating international organisations for political parties. Following World War Two, regional cooperation proved more effective, allowing political parties to exchange their experiences regarding solving problems of similar nature. The emerging European integration marked the beginning of a close collaboration of political parties, first in the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), followed by Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

In the Parliamentary Assembly, the present-day European Parliament (EP), the represented parties were mainly parties operating at that time in individual states. Due to the manner of electing national representations to the EP, that is, delegating deputies proportionally to the strength of individual political groups in national parliaments, smaller parties or non-attached members had no chance to participate in the work of the EP. What is more, from the very beginning of the EP, it was not national groups that the work of the EP focused on, but transnational factions. This resulted from the fact that an agreement was easier to achieve within the same families of political parties, even despite certain differences in national interests, than between parties from the very same country, yet representing often a thoroughly different vision of economic and social development, as well as different views on the European integration.

It is also important to realise that collaboration of parties from different countries within political groups, which in itself entails the risk and the necessity to continuously align varying interests, is one thing, whereas creating alliances between political groups in a situation where neither faction has a sufficient number of votes to carry out a specific project on its own is yet another challenge. In the first part of this article, general principles for creating political groups in the EU shall be presented, followed by theoretical considerations on

the construction and the functioning of grand coalitions. Lastly, programmes of major factions will be compared in order to determine the ideological cohesion of the formed grand coalitions.

1. FORMATION OF POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE EP OF THE SEVENTH TERM

In terms of the regulatory provisions concerning the internal functioning of individual EU institutions, treaty law is highly laconic. Article 232 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that "the European Parliament shall adopt its Rules of Procedure, acting by a majority of its Members"[1]. Therefore, the basic information on the principles of forming and operating of political groups, as well as their rights, should be sought in the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament. Internal regulations of the EP pertaining to factions have changed over the years. This was caused primarily by the number of deputies changing after subsequent enlargements of the EC and the EU. The Rules of Procedure of the Common Assembly of the ECSC with 78 deputies adopted in 1953 provide that formation of a political group required only nine members[2]. For a relatively long period of time, that is, until 1999, a faction was formed by deputies from one country, provided the quantitative criterion was met. For obvious reasons, this principle was not conducive to international collaboration, and hindered creation and the functioning of parties at the European level, which have gained a new status and financial privileges since the Maastricht Treaty. In the sixth term of the EP (2004–2009), the following principle was adopted: "A political group shall comprise Members elected in at least one quarter of the Member States. The minimum number of Members required to form a political group shall be 25" (Rule 29.2 of the Rules of Procedure[3]). However, on the basis of the Decision of the European Parliament of 9 July 2008 on amendments to Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, formal requirements were raised and remain effective as of the first day of the first part-session

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[1] *The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* (consolidated edition; OJ EU C 202 of 7 June 2016).

[2] More on the change of rules and the quantitative criterion for creating factions in the EP, see: Kosowska-Gąstoł, 2011, p. 104–107.

[3] *The Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 16th Edition* (OJ EU L 44 of 15 February 2005).

following the 2009 European Parliament Elections. Creation of a political group has since required at least twenty-five deputies elected in at least one quarter of member states. This solution was supported by two major political camps in the EP – Christian democrats – the group of the European People's Party (EPP), and the Party of European Socialists (PES). Minor factions were in favour of preserving previous regulations. For instance, Andrew Duff, representative of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), argued, "minority opinions have just as much right to be organised professionally as majority opinions", adding that "closing down smaller groups would either force reluctant deputies to join larger groups, adding to their incoherence, or inflate the ranks of the non-attached, adding to inefficiency"[4]. On the other hand, Ilda Figueiredo, representative of the Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), justified opposition of her faction in the following words: "This means it will be more difficult to form small political groups in the European Parliament, which is one more obstacle to the affirmation of positions that differ from those of the dominant ideology in this increasingly neoliberal, militarist and federalist European Union. One final remark on the process followed by the majority groups, the PPE-DE and the PSE Groups. They began by presenting a proposal requiring 30 members to form a political group. They then blackmailed some smaller political groups to gain their support for a so-called compromise proposal, the one that has just been approved"[5]. Interestingly, despite the official collaboration of Christian democrats and conservatives, forming the joint faction European People's Party – European Democrats (EPP-ED) since 1999, conservatives did not support the stance of their coalition partners. Timothy Kirkhope, their representative in the Committee, presented the following argument for that step: "The balance between the efficient operation of the Parliament and the need to recognise the plurality of voices and opinions within the Parliament must be struck with care. This would be better achieved by retaining the thresholds for the constitution of a political group as they currently are. Although we recognise there is a fair case for increasing the number of Members required to form a group, any increase in the requirement of the

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[4] Source: *Richard Corbett's Draft Report of 2 June 2008 for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs for the EP on Amendment of Rule 29 of Parliament's Rules of Procedure – Formation of Political Groups (2006/2201(REG))*, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE-+20080709+ITEM-007+DOC+XML+V0//EN, accessed 31 March 2016.

[5] Ibid.

number of Member States would unfairly and unnecessarily disadvantage smaller groups and delegations"[6]. As a side note, at the time when the report was adopted in the Committee, the cooperation of Christian democrats and conservatives was basically losing ground. Due to their ideological differences, conservatives decided to recreate the former collaboration between conservative parties in the EP. Works to this end intensified after David Cameron was elected chairman of the British Conservative Party in 2005. Nevertheless, the separate faction in the EP of the sixth term has not been formed – this took place only after the subsequent elections to the EP, when the group of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) was founded. Conservatives were most afraid of not being able to meet the raised criterion of the number of states deputies were supposed to be elected from. Eventually, at the beginning of the seventh term, ECR was joined by members elected in eight states[7].

Apart from changes concerning quantitative criteria for creating factions in the EP a new solution was adopted, allowing a faction to exist even if it did not reach the required threshold for the number of deputies or if the number of member states deputies were from was insufficient, however, the prerequisite being that such a group has to exist for over a year and that members have to represent at least one-fifth of all member states. Decisions in this respect is taken by the EP President in consultation with the Conference of Presidents, thus, the representation of the already existing factions. A group thus constituted can exist until the end of the term (until next inaugural session). The Rules of Procedure provide that the President may forbid such a faction if he or she considers it abusive. This might occur in the situation where a large faction makes an artificial division in order to gain certain administrational, organisational, or financial privileges.

When considering the principles for creating a coalition between factions in the EP, one ought to mind the ideological cohesion within individual factions. Rule 30.1 of the EP Rules of Procedure of the seventh term[8] provides

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[6]   Ibid.

[7]   Source: *Conservative MEPs Form New Group* (2009), The Official Website of BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8112581.stm, accessed 31 March 2016. The document that constitutes cooperation of conservatives at the EU level is the Prague Declaration of 2009. For more information, see: the official website of ECR – http://ecrgroup.eu/, accessed 31 March 2016.

[8]   Currently Rule 32.1 of the Rules of Procedure, 8th Parliamentary Term, July 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sipade/rulesleg8/Rulesleg8.EN.pdf, accessed 25 March 2016. In terms of the functioning of political groups, the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament of the eight term, in the title I, chapter 4 titled "Political Groups" duplicate the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of

that "members may form themselves into groups according to their political affinities"[9]. The Rules of Procedure also contain an interpretation of this provision, according to which, in principle, Parliament does not assess affinities of the members forming a faction unless they negate each other's opinions. The aim of this protective measure is to guarantee that the EP is guarded against formation of technical factions or, to use a more accurate term, 'rainbow factions', composed of non-attached deputies of various policy options. However, it is hard to imagine a situation where the EP decides to dissolve a group due to programme differences or lack of ideological cohesion. That might be interpreted for an attempt to limit pluralism at the EP level. What is more, taking into consideration also Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure, which states that the free mandate is exercised by MPs and prohibits them from accepting instructions, it seems that the interpretation of Rule 30.1 is only *pro forma*[10]. Rule 31 of the Rules of Procedure of the EP (currently Rule 33) on activities and legal situation of political groups provides that factions fulfil their functions, including tasks imposed on them by the Rules of Procedure, within the scope of the work conducted by the EU. It also ensures them the access to relevant administrative infrastructure. Political groups are mentioned in the Rules of Procedure of the EP in as many as 56 of the total 216 rules. The significance of political groups is evidenced by the fact that in numerous matters only political groups composed of at least 40 members have the right to make a proposal. This solution shows that in order to mark their presence and to propose their ideas for discussion, non-attached members oftentimes have to establish technical alliances. Alliances of this sort are usually formed *ad hoc*. It was once common to form the so-called technical factions, also called 'rainbow factions', which reflected the ideological diversity of deputies forming such groups (Kosowska-Gąstoł, 2011, p. 110–114).

Moreover, the Rules of Procedure pertain to the collaboration between political groups. Rule 32 (currently Rule 34) discusses the possibility to create intergroups by members with the aim to contribute to an exchange of opinions

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the European Parliament of the seventh term, the only element amended being the numbering of individual rules.

[9] The Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament of the Seventh Term, March 2011 (OJ EU L 116 of 5 May 2011).

[10] At present, one could hardly consider that the members exercise free mandate, as the contemporary democracy is based on political parties, which decide who will fill vacancies on tickets, and even in the context of majority systems non-attached candidates are rare and stand little chance of securing an office. As early as in the interwar period, Hans Kelsen postulated that the MPs mandates should be imperative – a party mandate (1936, chapter I).

on specific issues between different political groups, thus bringing together members of different committees. Whereas in Rule 19, which considers the possibility to remove, e.g., the president or vice-presidents of the EP from their duties before the end of the term, it is provided that such a request can be submitted by the Conference of Presidents acting by a three fifths majority of the votes cast representing at least three political groups. In this context, one ought to note that the Conference of Presidents itself is a specific internal body of the EP, where political groups have an exceptionally strong position. The Conference consists of the President of the EP and chairmen of political groups. Non-attached deputies have one representative who is not entitled to vote (Rule 24; currently Rule 26). The Conference takes decisions on, i.a., the organisation of parliamentary work and matters related to planning of legislative work (Rule 25.2; currently Rule 27.2) with its usual goal being to reach a consensus, though if agreement is not possible, voting takes place, in which the votes cast are subject to a weighting based on the number of members in each political group (Rule 24.3; currently Rule 26.3). In this situation, non-attached deputies are deprived of any influence whatsoever, whereas works of the EP are decided on by coalitions of political groups[11].

Thus, in spite of the fact that political groups are not mentioned in the Treaties at all, they prove to be of key importance in the organisation of works of the EP. Considering the permanently growing significance of this institution in the law-making process and the expansion of the EU legislation itself, as well as its effect on individual member states, it is worth to take a closer look on the rules of cooperation between political groups in the EP.

2. GRAND COALITIONS – THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Considerations pertaining to grand coalitions in the European Parliament ought to be started with stressing the importance of discussing "grand coalitions of coalitions" at the very beginning. As mentioned above, pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the EP, formation of a political group requires a representation of

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[11] For more information on the legal status of political groups in the EP and the evolution of their positions, see: Gagatek (2007, p. 83–111). In his article, the author analyses the contents of the Rules of Procedure of the EP and makes a reference to the case law of the Court of First Instance on the interpretation of the regulation concerning the similarity of political opinions. An interesting part of the text is the discussion on the system of financing political groups.

at least 25 deputies from at least one quarter of all member states. This fact alone makes collaboration between members representing at least seven political parties obligatory within a single faction, hence, the term 'coalition' is most appropriate at this early stage. Considering the political diversity of the EU member states, this sort of coalitions oftentimes is quite loose due to ideological differences between individual groups arising from diverse historical backgrounds or other interests at the EU level. An analysis of votes in the seventh term of the EU shows a relatively high level of cohesion among political groups. The highest level of cohesion was found in the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) – 94.68%, followed by EPP – 92.63%. The lowest level of cohesion was exhibited by the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) – only 48.59%[12]. National parties often decide to join a given faction not for ideological reasons but for pragmatic reasons, or bring their national political leaning or animosity to the EP level. 'Pragmatism' can be exemplified by the Hungarian Fidesz, which decided to join the largest faction – EPP, while the programme of this party, especially over the last years, has become very conservative and closer to the faction ECR in terms of ideology. Whereas bringing national cooperation to the European level can be exemplified by the coalition between PO and PSL, in which the deputies of both parties belong to EPP. PiS might serve as a negative example, as since 2004 it has been avoiding collaboration in the group of Christian democratic parties (EPP), though it declares the very same programme. Nevertheless, due to national-level issues, i.e., a dispute with PO, in the seventh and the eighth term deputies of this party joined ECR dominated by British conservatives, whose main postulate is to reduce the financing of cohesion policy or the common agricultural policy – with Poland as its main beneficiary. Considerations pertaining to coalitions within political groups are not subject of this research paper, though.

Elections to the EP held basing on national electoral systems are treated by voters as secondary elections with no direct effect on national policy. This approach results in, first of all, a lower turnout in the elections to the EP compared to national parliamentary elections and, second of all, the voters often giving their votes less rationally, i.e., voting on radical or new parties emerging on the political scene, taking the view that they would not challenge the national *status quo* and that they are showing the ruling elites and mainstream parties a 'yellow

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[12] Data based on: *European Political Groups Cohesion Rates on All Policy Areas (14.07.2009–17.04.2014)*, The Official Website of VoteWatch Europe, http://term7.votewatch.eu/en/political-group-cohesion.html, accessed 31 March 2016.

card'. This makes support of voters disperse and results in major national parties usually recording worse results than in the national parliamentary elections. This, in turn, has an obvious impact at the EP level. First of all, it makes some parties entering to the EP struggle to fit into the existing political configuration in terms of ideology, which makes their deputies often remain non-attached or form quite eclectic factions and, second of all, prevents each of these large political groups from obtaining an absolute majority of votes.

The current research in politics is focused primarily on parties and party systems at national level. Coalition theories refer most of all to this level of interaction between political parties, as well. In general, there are two main schools in coalition studies, namely, quantitative coalition studies, which are based on game theory and developed primarily by American centres, and the European school, which apart from the quantitative factor accounts for the ideological aspect as well. The term 'grand coalition' is most often applied in the context of the German or the Austrian party systems to describe the collaboration between Christian democrats and social democrats. According to the simplest definition of a grand coalition that might be encountered in works dedicated to parties, it is a collaboration between two parties that obtained most votes in elections (Strohmeier, 2009, p. 8). This definition is highly vague, as it points out only to one factor – the election result. Most of all, it does not account for the mechanics of party systems, i.e., positioning of parties on the left-right axis, which is vital for describing the phenomenon of grand coalitions. Moreover, one should also note differences between the grand coalition phenomenon and other types of coalition with a similar yet varying character. In political party theory, the most commonly mentioned coalitions are: minority coalition, majority coalition (and numerous variants of the latter), as well as national unity/national front coalition (government). Minority coalitions occur when the political parties that form them do not have an absolute majority of votes in the parliament. Usually, these are built in times of political crises and constitute the base for a technical government. Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark) are exception here due to the relatively common minority governments, which are not regarded as a manifestation of a political crisis but an adopted standard. This results from the nature of democracy in the said countries, referred to as consensus democracy, in which the conflict between the ruling party and the opposition is not total and both sides are willing to cooperate and develop a common stance on the most important issues of internal and foreign policy. This is a result of political and constitutional changes that delegate numerous powers to the opposition, such as chairing important parliamentary committees (Strøm,

1990, p. 25). In the national-level analysis of party systems and political systems, also one-party majority cabinets and one-party minority cabinets are mentioned (Sokół, 2005, p. 178).

Different variants of majority coalitions based on the quantitative criterion constitute a far more interesting object. With their theoretical basis being game theory, they are modelled on a minimal winning coalition. This model is based on arithmetic – an optimal coalition is a coalition composed of a minimum number of parties that gives an absolute majority of votes in the parliament. This concept is based on the assumption that as rational participants of the political process parties seek to maximise their profits – the profit being the possibility to fill public positions. Hence, the smaller the number of parties, the more favourable the situation, as offices are allocated among a smaller number of entities. This variant is sometimes called a minimal size coalition. A specific type of minimal winning coalition is a bargaining coalition, where the strongest party chooses its coalition partner (assuming that there is more than one party that meets the criterion for coalition formation) based on smaller demands. The partially overlapping quality (ideological) criterion and the quantity criterion within the framework of game theory created a minimal rage coalition model, according to which a coalition is formed by the minimum number of parties that gives a majority of votes in the parliament, based on the assumption that coalition partners are divided by the smallest ideological distance, though this does not mean that they have to be in adjacent positions on the left-right axis. This requirement appears in the minimal connected winning coalition model (Kiełmiński, 1992, p. 12–20; Lijphart, 1984, p. 47–50).

In the European context, coalition models based on game theory in the pure form were not appreciated, among others, due to the fact that they treat minority coalitions as a derogation from the standard, whereas empirical studies show that cabinets of this sort (including one-party minority cabinets) make up for over one-third of the total number in Europe (Sobolewska-Myślik, 2004, p. 146). Only when complemented with the analysis of the rich experience of forming coalitions on the continent could these models be employed in a subsidiary way. The most vital element that one ought to have in mind is the fact that parties are not static entities, as they are ever evolving in terms of programme and organisation, which affects how they perceive the environment (including other parties) and how they are perceived by this environment. What is more, coalitions are not always formalised and can be established *ad hoc*, which complicates the analysis of the grand coalition phenomenon even further.

When considering the principles for forming coalitions at the EP level, the legal and constitutional character of the European Union itself is not without significance. The transposition of concepts and patterns used for describing and explaining phenomena that take place at the national level is not always justified in the case of the EU, which, regardless of its certain *quasi*-national traits, remains an international organisation. Until quite recently, the category of the EU political system spurred concern. Nevertheless, the existence of this system at the EU level might be recognised, yet characterised by numerous specific traits[13]. The main research problem in the view of the discussed subject is the determination of the position of the European Commission (EC) and its political responsibility. The procedure for appointing the EC requires the involvement of the EP, the European Council (EC), and member states. Still, the Commission itself is not a homogeneous institution in the political sense but another grand coalition composed of politicians designated by individual states. The European Parliament takes active part in the procedure of establishing the Commission, while the Treaty of Lisbon put additional emphasis on the meaning of elections to the EP, indicating that the European Council should take into account results of the previous elections to the EP (Article 17.7 of the Treaty on the European Union[14]), which means that a candidate for the President of the European Commission ought to come from the political environment of the victorious factions (or should be supported by that faction, e.g., in a situation where it establishes coalition with other political group). By approving the members of the Commission, the EP gives a vote of confidence to the grand coalition, which does not necessarily have to reflect the political image of the EP and correspond to the current coalition in the EP. Hence, it is difficult to consider the relations between the Parliament and the Commission a reflection of the relations that link parliaments with governments on the national level. The European Parliament does not guarantee stability and sustainability of the European Commission, and a shift in the balance of power in the Parliament by means of creating new coalitions in general does not affect the European Commission. Thus, political groups in the EP must be affected by some other consolidation factor.

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[13] The traits of the political system of the European Union are depicted in detail by Simon Hix. He defines this category by means of, i.a., the cybernetic model of David Easton's political model. See: Hix (2010, p. 28–32).

[14] *The Treaty of the European Union* (consolidated edition; OJ EU C 202 of 7 June 2016).

When writing about formation of coalitions in the EP, Simon Hix notes that "there is no permanent coalition in the European Parliament, and without a government to support, legislative coalitions are formed vote by vote. On many issues the European Parliament behaves as if it were a single actor seeking to promote its own powers and interests against the interests of the second legislative chamber in the EU (the Council) or against the holders of executive power (the Commission)" (Hix, Hoyland, 2011, p. 59). The pragmatics of political groups make coalitions that in many cases would stand no chance to be implemented on the national level common in the EP. The scope of a coalition and its membership often depend on the discussed problem subjected to voting. Therefore, these coalitions can be formed basing on an ideological criterion – in cases pertaining to civil rights and liberties – here, collaboration of social democrats and the greens or social democrats and liberals is most common; economy and monetary policy, where on one side there are Christian democrats with liberals and social democrats with the greens on the other; coalitions on matters related to natural environment and public health are formed by Christian democrats and conservatives, and on the opposite side – by social democrats and the greens or the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL); on matters concerning industry, research and energy, coalitions are most often established between Christian democrats and conservatives or social democrats and liberals[15]. The above summary shows the mechanism of a minimal connected winning coalition. The alliances formed pertain to groups that are adjacent on the left-right axis. It should be noted, however, that due to the eclectic nature of political groups, their situation on the left-right dimension is hindered. One should also have in mind that the position of liberal parties often becomes shifted. Most often, they are positioned in the centre between social democrats and Christian democrats (in the case of social-liberal parties), yet if liberal parties have a more right-wing character, then their position shifts and they will be situated between Christian democrats and conservatives. Basing on the allocation of seats in the chamber of the EP it might be assumed that the left-right axis in the EP of the seventh term was as follows: the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) – the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) – the European People's

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[15] Source: *The Activity Records of MEPs Analysed by EP Group and National Party. End-of-term Scorecard, Part 2*, VoteWatch Europe Special Policy Brief 3/2014, http://www.votewatch.eu/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/votewatch-europe-end-of-term-scorecard-part-2-groups-final.pdf, p. 10, accessed 31 March 2016.

Party (EPP) – the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) – the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/FEA) – the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D) – the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)[16]. Nevertheless, a more commonly applied solution is building grand coalitions independently of the ideological criterion. Usually, in matters of agricultural policy, constitutional or institutional affairs, as well as in legal matters, rand coalitions are established between Christian democrats and social democrats[17]. Here, the role of ALDE can be additionally noted, providing support to EPP and S&D in this voting. The participation of liberals, who are situated on the left on the left-right axis directly next to the Christian democrats, shortens the distance between EPP and social democrats. This situation may represent a 'grand grand coalition'. Still, what determines the establishment of cooperation between Christian democrats and social democrats despite obvious programme differences and ideological distance? Hix, who was quoted above, claims that the crucial role is played here by decision-making procedures in the EP. In the case where an absolute majority of votes is required for a decision to be taken, a coalition composed of several partners is uneconomical and oftentimes impossible due to tenders, in which each group strives to obtain specific advantages. In such case, the best solution is an alliance formed by two largest groups. Hix additionally explains the collaboration between Christian democrats, socialists and liberals by the pro-European character of these groups, in contrast to others which are more or less Eurosceptic (2010, p. 133).

SUMMARY

The European integration of the 2010s bears a slight resemblance to the process initiated in the 1950s. The membership of the organisation was considerably expanded. Each consecutive enlargement of Communities/the Union affected the scope and the level of integration and raised new problems and challenges. One of the attempts made by the Union itself to answer the transforming internal situation and new international challenges was to expand the competencies of

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[16]   Own work based on the official webpage of the European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu, accessed 31 March 2016.
[17]   Source: *The Activity Records of MEPs...*, p. 10.

the European Parliament, which is the only institution to be democratically legitimised directly from the citizens.

Being aware of its specific role in the institutional system and the entire European integration process, the European Parliament strives to develop (also by means of internal regulations concerning organisation of its work) an operating model that would satisfy as best as possible both political and social expectations concerning the Parliament.

One of the characteristic traits of works in the European Parliament is the concentration of majority of rights on the part of political groups. The very fact that *European Parliament deputies*, elected basing on national electoral systems, associate in political groups instead of national groups is a worldwide phenomenon. This provides an undeniable evidence of the success of integration, in which national interests and animosities were managed to be overcome in favour of cooperation focused on ideological and political issues.

Internal regulations of the European Parliament regarding the formation and the functioning of political groups put the emphasis on their greatest possible diversification in terms of nationality, yet at the very same time they introduce a quality criterion, i.e., convergence of political opinions. Thus, by means of formal regulations, the cooperation of parties from different countries becomes a necessity. Nonetheless, at the current stage of integration, it seems that collaboration within individual families of political parties would take place in either situation. Beyond doubt, these regulations aim at forming a pan-European party system, in which this process could be crowned with elections based on one electoral system binding for the entire European Union, where national parties would give up their national names and participate in elections on common European party electoral lists.

A distinct question of great importance in the view of the functioning of both the European Parliament and the EU itself as an international organisation with transnational elements is the formation of a coalition between political groups. Empirical studies and analyses of the EP voting prove that permanent coalitions at the EP level are non-existent. The most common situation is an agreement between two major political groups – Christian democrats (EPP) and social democrats (S&D), yet also other coalitions are possible, including a coalition between Christian democrats (EPP), social democrats (S&D) and liberals (ALDE). The first situation can be called a grand coalition, whereas the second case is a 'grand grand coalition'. While on the national level such situations are rare and occur most frequently when no major party gains an absolute majority of

votes and, additionally, has no possibility to obtain coalition partners from among smaller parties, both types of grand coalitions are standard in the EP and have become a characteristic element of this institution. This is a double-edged sword. One of the advantages is undoubtedly the creation of broad support for specific compromise solutions, whereas one of the disadvantages is blurred programme differences between individual political groups, which might be incomprehensible for the electorate and may lead voters to consequently give their vote in the subsequent election to a party with a more distinct ideological image.

In conclusion, the traditional conceptual framework used in politics for describing a political system fails when it comes to defining the political system of the European Union. Not all terms are applied or are applicable and they not always stand for the same phenomenon both on the national and the EU level. The attempt to typologize the EU party system basing on the functioning of political groups in the EP escapes the classic definition, which does not mean, however, that such attempts should be discontinued.

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THE SOCIO-CULTURAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: CONTINGENCIES AND PROSPECTS*

WYMIAR SPOŁECZNO-KULTUROWY PARTNERSTWA WSCHODNIEGO UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ: UWARUNKOWANIA I PERSPEKTYWY

*Tomasz Stępniewski***

—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The aim of the paper is an attempt at evaluating the Eastern Partnership from the point of view of the socio-cultural dimension in a broad sense. Do cultural and civilisational factors influence relations between the EU and Eastern European and South Caucasus countries? Is the EU capable of further enlargement? The Eastern Partnership is experiencing significant turmoil (Russia-Ukraine war, unstable South Caucasus) which begs the question of the future of the policy. Moreover, the paper tackles the issue of the EU's internal factors and their influence upon relations with Eastern countries.

—— **ABSTRAKT** ——

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest próba spojrzenia na projekt Partnerstwa Wschodniego Unii Europejskiej z punktu widzenia wymiaru społeczno-kulturowego. Czy Unia Europejska jest w stanie nadal się rozszerzać? Czy uwarunkowania kulturowo-cywilizacyjne mają wpływ na kształt stosunków Unii Europejskiej z państwami Europy Wschodniej i Kaukazu Południowego? Partnerstwo Wschodnie poddawane jest silnym wstrząsom (wojna Rosji z Ukrainą, niestabilny Kaukaz Południowy), które rodzą pytania o przyszłość tej polityki. W artykule zostanie również podjęta próba odniesienia się do uwarunkowań wewnętrznych UE i ich wpływu na jej stosunki z państwami wschodnimi.

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INTRODUCTION

The European Union remains the largest and most influential integrational project in modern international relations. This fact is determined by its *differentia specifica*: at present it is comprised of 28 countries; it is an integrational project with historical traditions of actions, an inspiration and a role model for those undertaking similar projects in other regions of the world; it is the most institutionally developed project as regards politics and economy; it maintains its central position when European integration is concerned due to the fact that almost all countries gravitate towards it and develop various forms of cooperation with the Community (some Eastern European countries are among the gravitating states) (for more see Gstöhl, Lannon, 2015, p. 1–7; Korosteleva, Natorski, Simão, 2013, p. 257–375). Apart from the above, the EU remains a vital subject (an actor) of international relations. The dynamic character of these relations is a consequence of the Community's actions and its influence upon external partners. An interesting example of such influence can be seen in the EU's relationship with the Eastern European countries.

The EU's structure features countries which can be regarded as the so-called Eastern Partnership's animators (Poland, Sweden). Such countries are lively interested in cooperating with the Eastern initiative. It is these animators who are, *de facto*, responsible for maintaining the EU's political support for the initiative, raising financial resources to fund it successfully and convincing the eastern neighbours to implement political and economic reforms. The devotion of both Central Europe and the Baltic EU member states towards cooperation with the Eastern European countries cannot be underrated. The European Partnership constitutes a response of Eastern European states towards the so-called enlargement fatigue (Marcu, 2009, p. 409–432). A separate group of countries consists of those whose relations with Eastern Europe reflect the current relationship between the EU and the Russian Federation and are developed with Russia glooming in the distance (the so-called *Russia-first policy*) (Cf. Kapuśniak 2008).

EUROPE'S GEOGRAPHICAL AND CULTURAL BORDERS – GENERAL COMMENTS

Europe's Geographical Borders. As far as geographical features are concerned – especially physiographic characteristics – Europe's borders are well-defined and characterised by significant partition, well-developed coastline, terrain full of contrasts and climate heavily influenced by seas (Czarnocki, 1991, p. 17). There is a consensus as far as the northern, western and a larger part of southern borders are concerned due to the fact that these borders are natural and defined by seas and oceans. Problems arise when the eastern and a part of southern border are discussed. It is agreed that these borders overlap with the current borders of the EU.

Europe's Cultural Borders. As far as culture, language and religion are concerned, Europe is heterogeneous in this respect. It is characterised by numerous divisions and differences originating from history and clashes of several cultures, including extra-European ones. European roots can be traced back to the Mediterranean antiquity – Greek and Roman. The second factor influencing the identity of European nations is Judeo-Christianity (Lobkowicz, 1998, p. 28; Graniszewski, 2007, p. 46–51; Gołembski, 2005, p. 61–67). When considering Europe's origin, one ought to remember that it arose from the ancient world which collapsed as a result of invasion of barbarians (Konopacki, 2007, p. 36–37). This led to the emergence of several civilisations: Islam – encompassing North Africa and the Near East, and two branches of Christianity: Eastern Christianity – Greek and Byzantine, and Roman Catholic Church – dominant in the west of Europe. It was the Roman and Latin branch that became Europe's fundament, especially western part of the continent (for more see Kłoczowski, 2002, p. 13–14). Moreover, Europe is frequently perceived through religion as Christian – *Christianitas*. However, the current academic discussion in the EU indicates that Europe's roots are more of the Enlightenment than Christian origin (a similar perspective can be seen in: Kłoczowski, 2002). The claim can be supported by the model of low culture promoted in Western Europe. The model is based on naïve vision of men[1], leading to social atomisation and promotion of egoistic individualism. Extreme liberalism, which emphasises following one's urges and instincts, is also a feature of the low culture. It is a kind of freedom

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[1] "Naivety" of the vision lies in the promotion of the notion of men perceived as perfect individuals accepting their behaviour, setting their moral norms and, above all, the sense of life.

Map 1. The system of values in Europe presented in the global perspective

Source: Zielonka J. (2007). *Europa jako imperium. Nowe spojrzenie na Unię Europejską*. Warszawa, p. 113.

which creates an illusion that the development of a society where an individual has only rights and no obligations is possible.

Despite the above, the fact that Europe, as opposed to other regions in the world, features a great degree of independence and respect for human dignity, democracy, rule of law, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is undeniable[2]. These characteristics are present in the countries of the region. Societies

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[2]   The worldwide drive towards ecumenism is worth-mentioning at this point. Along with the fall of the bipolar division of Europe, Protestant, Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches have undertaken several initiatives aiming at maintaining the integrity of our continent in the framework of Conference of European Churches and Council of the Bishops' Conferences of Europe (for more information see Karski, 2002, p. 36).

Map 2. Division of Eastern European countries into the western and eastern world

in these countries are based on pluralism, justice, solidarity, and lack of discrimination. The map below, which refers to Europe's values, especially those of Western and Central Europe, and presents them in the global context, can serve as a justification for the above claims. Despite the fact that we are dealing with freedom in several areas of life, numerous differences across the countries of the region are visible. The map below distinguishes Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, Catholic, and post-communist countries.

Taking the above features into account, it ought to be stated that the situation of Eastern European countries can be considered as severely complicated. On the one hand, part of the countries (Moldova, Ukraine) look to Europe, epitomised by the EU, as their geopolitical and civilisational objective. On the other hand, problems associated with this political and economic integration arise – these are issues of geopolitical, cultural, social, etc. character. The objective is of civilisational kind. Notably, when discussing the geopolitical, and civilisational objective in the broad sense, making a reference to Samuel Huntington's concept is worthwhile. Huntington claimed that we are dealing with cross-civilisational border which divides

Map 2. Division of Eastern European countries into the western and eastern world

Source: Huntington S.P. (2011). *Zderzenie cywilizacji i nowy kształt ładu światowego*. Trans. H. Jankowska. Warszawa, p. 263. Map's source: http://www.rogersandall.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Huntingtons--map.jpg [accessed 20.12.2015].

Ukraine and Belarus internally and "leaves the issue of geopolitical and civilisational affiliation open" (Nowak, 2013, p. 90; Stępniewski, 2011, chapter on Russia). The map below presents the division of Eastern Europe into two worlds – eastern and western. The border between them runs across these two countries.

THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURAL AND CIVILISATIONAL FACTORS UPON THE EU-EASTERN EUROPE RELATIONS

The character of the region, and at the same time, all Eastern European countries, is defined by their location on the civilisational borderland. These countries verge on the East and the West. On a smaller scale, the East-West antinomy denotes the opposition of Western Europe vs. Russia, and Roman vs. Byzantine cultural dichotomy. In short, it can be said that the West follows the idea of transcendence, whereas the East is attracted to immanence. The East, defined in the above way, encompasses the vast area of Asia (especially India and China), but also parts of Africa and South America. The West denotes primarily Western Europe and the USA (Olejarz, 2007, p. 43; Stępniewski, 2013).

The dividing line between the eastern and western religions in Europe frequently partitions the linguistically and ethnographically homogenous areas into distinct and often atomised and antagonistic ethnic, national and religious groups. This phenomenon conditions the emergence of different historical processes in these groups (Pawluczuk, 1994, p. 107). Regardless of the relations between the Eastern Christianity and the Asian East, numerous common characteristics are visible. These characteristics stand in opposition to the Latin West. The key antinomy of the issue lies in the fact that both transcendence and immanence are associated with different views of the world, human life and political ideas. Transcendence paves the way for the development of science, technology and economy independent from religion, morality and prevalent secularisation of the world. The following constitute consequences of transcendence: pragmatic morality, parliamentarianism, the imperative of the civil state. The human relations in the East, following the idea of immanence, are devoted to ethical and aesthetic matters. As far as politics is concerned, religious and moral valuation are prevalent. As regards emotional approach, the East-West relations are characterised by permanent ambivalence, i.e., fascination joint with the feeling of civilisational superiority. Samuel Huntington claims that in this civilisational dichotomy, some countries, e.g. Ukraine, can be perceived as

a hybrid due to the fact that their territory is partitioned into two civilisations developed primarily around different religions. The first of the civilisations can be called Latin or Western, the second Byzantine or Orthodox (or Turanian). According to Huntington, such status quo cannot prevail (Pawluczuk, 1994, p. 101–103; also Huntington, 2011).

The above religious and ethnic elements influence the cultural and civilisational identity of Eastern Europe in the broad sense, and condition the Old Continent's cultural and civilisational security. Cultural identity ought to be understood as social identity of a community perceived as autonomy of the particular culture in relation to others (Michałowska, 1997, p. 132). In such perspective, the main element ensuring cultural and civilisational security is cultural identity, especially in situations when unitary states lose their significance in international relations in favour of transnational actors (e.g. the EU). Moreover, intensifying transnational processes considerably weaken the traditional understanding of independence and indirectly influence cultural identity. In such conditions, the essence of cultural and civilisational security lies in the maintenance of cultural and historical awareness. In the external aspect, it constitutes protection against foreign influence, which decreases the internal cohesion. In the internal aspect, offering independence (in a modified version) and harmonious development ought to be ensured (Michałowska, 1997).

In Europe, however, the issue of identity is not reserved to the individual nations taken out of their international surroundings. In case of Europe treated as a whole, national identity of individual states composes the collective, European cultural identity. This identity, however, is not a sum of the individual identities but rather constitutes a synergy. Due to the above, a dilemma arises – a conflict between the European identity (still enigmatic and undefined) and national and even local identity (Eastern European). For that reason, attaining a dynamic equilibrium between the three levels of identity seems particularly crucial, especially in the period of intensifying European integration. Such idea is a very general one and does not specify the character of the common Europe, does not define the European culture and does not offer a solution to the issue of the role and place of the Eastern European countries. This is due to the fact that it is difficult to speak about the European identity at all when fundamental cultural differences between national cultures still exist. Meanwhile, the question whether countries (societies) of Eastern Europe, which are expressing interest in becoming a part of the EU, and in the future may as well become member states, will be able to find their place in the Community, remains valid.

CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, it ought to be stated that the divergence of the Russian Federation's and the EU's interests in Eastern Europe is of lasting and multidimensional character. The issue is conditioned mainly by the following: activation of the EU's policy in Eastern Europe and the evolution of Russia's policy in the Commonwealth of Independent States; Russia's self-perception as a great power and Russia's perception of the EU as a geopolitical competitor; the EU's support for the post-soviet states in accordance with European standards; the Russian Federation's aspirations towards maintaining the *status quo ante* by enforcing its dominant influence in the region and controlling relations of the region with the EU.

While discussing the framework of the EU's eastern policy, Europe's borders, etc., the fact that Europe is not perceived by us in geographical terms but rather ethical ones ought to be remembered. Europe is not defined by its borders but by its values, ideals, behaviour, culture. Therefore, the socio-cultural dimension of the Eastern Partnership ought to be kept in mind. As a consequence, the project cannot be simplified and discussed merely in terms of geopolitical issues and Russia vs. the EU rivalry. It ought to be in Europe's (especially Poland's) best interest to offer the citizens of post-soviet states the opportunity to live according to European values and ideals.

The EU's (and broadly the West's) active involvement in the East will determine the effectiveness of the eastern policy, but also the shape of political systems in Eastern European countries, and above all, the distribution of power in this part of Europe. The lower the West's involvement in Ukraine's transformation and modernisation, the more dependent on Russia the country will become. Therefore, despite the Euromaidan and its aftermath (for more information see: Stępniewski, Gil, Szabaciuk, Visvizi, 2014), the direction the internal policy of these countries will gravitate towards (pro-European or pro-Eastern) is still debatable. Unfortunately, the decline of democratic reforms in the countries of Eastern Europe casts a dark shadow over the region and diminishes the interest of EU decision-makers in it. In addition, the EU's internal problems (economic and migration crises, nationalist parties gaining in significance, European solidarity being crippled, etc.) result in the issues associated with the Neighbourhood Policy being pushed towards the background. Vít Dostál rightly observes that a pressing need for a change in the European Neighbourhood Policy, especially its eastern dimension, has emerged. The change will become possible if the East-

ern Partnership is replaced by a mechanism enabling financial resources being transferred into new areas, and a greater emphasis is placed upon cooperation with organisations of civil society. However, according to the author, the Eastern Partnership ought to be considered as a policy and not an instrument (tool) (*Dostál, 2015*, p. 110–111).

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FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE DISCOURSE HELD ON FEBRUARY 5ᵀᴴ, 2015 IN THE POLISH PARLIAMENT. PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

POLITYKA ZAGRANICZNA UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ W ŚWIETLE DYSKUSJI Z 5 LUTEGO 2015 R. W SEJMIE RP. ANALIZA DYSKURSU PARLAMENTARNEGO

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— **ABSTRACT** —

The article analyses contents of speeches of parliament members in Sejm of the Republic of Poland during the parliamentary discussion of February 5th, 2015 over the information for Sejm and Senat of the Republic of Poland on Poland's participation in the works of the EU between July and December 2014. The purpose of the analysis of the parliamentary discourse was to indicate differences and similarities in opinions of the representatives of major political powers in Poland within the scope of assessment of the foreign policy of the European Union. The analysis shows mainly lack of coherence in the foreign policy of the EU and existence of clear, firm division at the level of assessment of role/meaning of Poland in the given area of activity.

Keywords: parliamentary discourse, political divisions, foreign policy of the EU, conflict in Ukraine, economic development, EU security

— **ABSTRAKT** —

Artykuł stanowi analizę treści wystąpień posłów w Sejmie RP podczas sejmowej dyskusji z 5 lutego 2015 r. nad informacją dla Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej o udziale Rzeczypospolitej w pracach UE w okresie lipiec–grudzień 2014 r. Celem analizy dyskursu parlamentarnego było wskazanie na podobieństwa i różnice postaw przedstawicieli głównych sił politycznych w Polsce w zakresie ocen polityki zagranicznej Unii Europejskiej. Autor ukazuje przede wszystkim brak spójności w polityce zagranicznej UE oraz istnienie wyraźnego, trwałego podziału na poziomie ocen roli/znaczenia Polski we wskazanym obszarze aktywności.

Słowa kluczowe: dyskurs parlamentarny, podziały polityczne, polityka zagraniczna UE, konflikt na Ukrainie, rozwój gospodarczy, bezpieczeństwo UE

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INTRODUCTION

Politics is an inherent aspect of human behavior (Dahl, Stinebrickner, 2007, p. 43). It concentrates on influencing, which makes it practically ubiquitous in interpersonal relations (Dahl, Stinebrickner, 2007, p. 49). Due to that, organization systems are permanently connected to political dimension which shapes them. The possibility of analyzing the political dimension opens possibilities of perception of structure and function of systems. This rather general diagnosis also concerns functioning of the European Union, as integration processes in Europe, both from historical and contemporary point of view, are characterized by three properties distinguished by advantage of political component. First of all – their genesis is definitely political, not economic. Second of all – they have mainly political, not economic targets. Third of all – they depend on precise ideological factor or on combination of different factors, which are viable in the given moment (Kik, 1992, p. 5). Economic, political, military, legal, and social problems join in the process of integration. However, the political component remains decisive, which results in creation of the common decision making mechanism of the participating states and mechanisms of exchange and regulation of activities among them (Łastawski, 2004, p. 17). The level of analysis specifying both possibilities and borders of the research is constituted by a text being a stenographic record of speeches given by parliament members during the discussion held on February 5th, 2015 over the information for Sejm and Senat of the Republic of Poland on Poland's participation in the works of the EU between July and December 2014[1] (Informacja dla Sejmu i Senatu, 2014). The analysis covers speeches – 7 units; questions, rectifications, and answers – 10 units (see Table 1). A special code was assigned to each unit/speech of the parliamentary discussion in order to facilitate identification of speakers and localization of their speeches within the schedule of the debate (see Table 2)[2].

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[1] 7th term of office, sitting no. 86 on 05.02.2015.

[2] The codes are composed of three elements. The first one indicates a role of the speaker: SSinMFA – Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; RC – Reporter for the Commission; L&J – Law and Justice; CP – Civic Platform; PPP – Polish People's Party; YM – Your Movement; DLA – Democratic Left Alliance. The second one informs about the kind of the statement: S – speech; Q – question; A – answer; R – rectification. The third element of the record enables identification of each statement in the schedule of the debate. For example: L&J-Q2 – the 2nd question asked by a parliament member of the Parliamentary Club of Law and Justice during the debate; CP-S1 – 1st speech made by a parliament member of the Parliamentary Club of Civic Platform. The table does not include smaller

Table 1. Number of speeches in the parliament discussion (by speakers/clubs)

NUMBER OF SPEECHES IN THE PARLIAMENT DISCUSSION (BY SPEAKERS/CLUBS)	
SPEECHES	
Rafał Trzaskowski – Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1
Agnieszka Pomaska – Reporter for the Commission of Foreign Affairs	1
Parliamentary Club of Civic Platform	1
Parliamentary Club of Law and Justice	1
Parliamentary Club of the Polish People's Party	1
Deputies' Club of the Democratic Left Alliance	1
Deputies' Club of Your Movement	1
In total	7
QUESTIONS	
Parliamentary Club of Civic Platform	4
Parliamentary Club of Law and Justice	2
Deputies' Club of the Democratic Left Alliance	1
In total	7
RECTIFICATIONS	
Parliamentary Club of Law and Justice	1
In total	1
ANSWERS	
Rafał Trzaskowski – Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1
Agnieszka Pomaska – Reporter for the Commission of Foreign Affairs	1
In total	2
In the aggregate	**17**

Source: Informacja dla Sejmu i Senatu, 2014.

The subject scope of analysis is constituted by language behavior of politicians. Identifying traits building the images presented by the politicians during the parliamentary discussion is to enable meanings of the language of politics to be determined (indirectly also its functions). The purpose of the analysis is to recreate the spectrums of meaning, construction of narration structures of which the discourse is composed, within the frames of the said debate, in relation to the

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units within the frames of particular statements. However, they were separated for the needs of the research.

following levels: (1) manners of perceiving the European Union (EU) by Polish parliament members, vision of the EU (including visions, opinions on Polish place/position/function in the EU); and (2) directions, visions, opinions concerning: perspectives for development of the EU, priorities of common foreign policy. Execution of so defined target allows to demonstrate the important component of the political system of the European Union – the level of the EU member state, Poland, and more precisely the Polish opinion – foreign policy vectors, which independently of their content proclaim peculiar political bond within the frames of this system (Draus, 1999, p. 37), even considering only the fact that the Union itself is a point of reference for politicians' reflection. This direction conditions the selection of parliamentary discourse analyses, because these are the political parties that influence the activity of the EU institutions (Wojtaszczyk, 2006, p. 18). Taking that into consideration, learning about their opinions allows to show the position of Poland in the EU – in the relation dimension. Due to the place where the discourse appeared it is deemed proper to perform the analysis using the politolinguistic approach combining rhetoric, political science, and linguistics (Reisigl, 2011, p. 153).

The next part of the paper (Methodological Assumptions) shows that the cognitive value of the parliamentary discourse has some limits. Shortly speaking, the limits are reduced to the following question: to what degree verbal declarations influence political practice, do they have causative power and possibilities to create reality? This problem approach leads to the next question: what kind of knowledge is gained by a researcher using the discourse approach to examine the reality?

The main accusation that may arise here concerns independence of discourse analysis. It may be assumed that pieces of language phenomenon themselves are kinds of appearances enriching our knowledge of the world, but basing explanation of political actions on them may be an abuse. The key question here seems to be: what kind of relation (if existing) connects the language reality with political practice or practice in general?

For the needs of this paper, which is shown in details in the further part of it, it is assumed that such a relation exists. However, changing the language level into practice is not disturbance free, including abandonment of the given direction and change. Why to examine discourse behaviors at all? It seems that limits of cognition process themselves, minor or major inaccuracy may not constitute an argument in the area of social sciences, due to the fact that tools used by representatives of these sciences are not precise and mainly because possibility to learn variable and multidimensional social reality is very limited.

METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Taking into consideration the fact that the research concentrates mainly on language practices – those characteristic to parliamentary debates – it should be considered that its results may not constitute a convincing (conclusive) explanation of the process of making and executing decisions. It is because the place where the communication processes appear constitutes limits itself. The context of this situation gives the speeches a unique, official character. Supposing that decisions are made in a different place, it should be deemed that their conditions are also different. The context of the situation is different and so is the discourse. Nevertheless, crossing the borders of the language as assumed by the politolinguistic approach requires a researcher to find points of reference that will enable explanation of acts of speech (Cebul, 2013, p. 155). That is the reason for which the assumption that language behaviors provide researchers with information (even if they are not precise) on performed or potential activities and, what is especially important, on appraisal area relating to these activities, is legit. Language is a tool used to evaluate, for example due to the fact that it includes a whole range of means useful to make appraisement (Bartmiński, 2003, p. 65). Additionally, assuming that a representative congregation represents real political situation and not theoretical independence (Crick, 2004, p. 82), it is the language of politics (parliamentary discourse) being a carrier of values that seems to open quite wide possibilities of explaining in relation to the level of political practice. Two conditions have to appear for the term "discourse", in relation to statements made in a parliament, to be used. First of all, statements/rejoinders should be created in one course of language behavior. Second of all, they must be accompanied by identical communication situation. A parliamentary debate meets these conditions. So discourse is a sequence of language behaviors connected by a subject, a target, and a way the speech is shaped. The common subject, manner, and target constitute condition and are conditioned by the style, kind of speech, and communication situation (Laskowska, 2004, p. 13–14).

The social communication processes' analysis described in the above manner makes it possible to explain mechanisms shaping interactions and ways of conscious reciprocal influence of partners (Małyska, 2003, p. 7). Even if due to cautiousness communication is defined as partly conscious process, it is coordination of common social activity enabling the most comfortable conditions of its survival that remains its target (Awdiejew, Habrajska, 2010, p. 7). Obviously

it needs to be underlined that it remains true under the condition of capturing the context in which the above mentioned behaviors appear.

Therefore, for the needs of the analysis the cognitive dimension of the research is not limited to the level of language and meaning of each code and the relations among them. This is since the political discourse is an event conditioned by a political system and at the same time combining its verbal and non-verbal meaning (Rittel, 2005, p. 24). Due to that, the context of the analyzed speeches should be looked into, which is tantamount to attempting to look into and understand the specific political reality.

Table 2. Schedule of the parliament discussion

SPEAKER	CODE
SPEECHES	
Rafał Trzaskowski (SSinMFA)	SSinMFA-S1
Agnieszka Pomaska (CP)	RC-S1
Andrzej Gałażewski (CP)	CP-S1
Arkadiusz Czartoryski (L&J)	L&J-S1
Andrzej Sztorc (PPP)	PPP-S1
Witold Klepacz (DLA)	DLA-S1
Maciej Wydrzyński (YM)	YM-S1
QUESTIONS	
Jan Kulas (CP)	CP-Q1
Joanna Bobowska (CP)	CP-Q2
Marcin Święcicki (CP)	CP-Q3
Maria Nowak (L&J)	L&J-Q1
Tadeusz Iwiński (DLA)	DLA-Q1
Stanisław Pięta (L&J)	L&J-Q2
ANSWER	
Rafał Trzaskowski (MFA)	MFA-A1
RECTIFICATION	
Arkadiusz Czartoryski (L&J)	L&J-R1
ANSWER	
Agnieszka Pomaska (CP)	RC-A1
QUESTION NOT ASKED	
Elżbieta Achinger (CP)	CP-Q4

Source: Informacja dla Sejmu i Senatu, 2014.

CONTEXT/CONDITIONS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE IN THE DEBATE HELD ON FEBRUARY 5TH, 2015

444 parliament members participated in the voting on acceptance of the complete draft of resolution on Poland's participation in the works of the EU between July and December 2014. 260 voted for, 151 voted against, 33 abstained, 15 did not vote (see Table 3) (Głosowanie nad przyjęciem w całości projektu uchwały, 2014).

Table 3. Detailed results of voting on acceptance of the complete draft of resolution on Poland's participation in the works of the EU between July and December 2014

DETAILED RESULTS OF VOTING						
Club/Deputies' group	Number of members	Voted	For	Against	Abstained	Not voted
Parliamentary Club of Civic Platform	202	199	199	-	-	3
Parliamentary Club of Law and Justice	132	127	-	127	-	5
Parliamentary Club of the Polish People's Party	38	36	36	-	-	2
Deputies' Club of the Democratic Left Alliance	34	32	2	1	29	2
Independent	20	19	7	8	4	1
Parliamentary Club of Fair Poland	15	15	-	15	-	-
Deputies' Club of Your Movement	15	13	13	-	-	2
Deputies' Club Security and Economy	3	3	3	-	-	-

Source: Głosowanie nad przyjęciem w całości projektu uchwały, 2014.

The context of the analyzed speeches, having contentious character of parliamentary discussion, should be deemed important (but not exclusive) for the said analysis. It is about the relation between the administration in power and the opposition, which generates a specific way of presenting arguments. For example, statements of opposition members very often join presentation of specific matters with thesis on government's incompetence. Due to that, statement that political argument is a condition of different narrations would be the easiest explanation. If such an explanation was accepted, different points of view should be simply considered equal. This direction constitutes clear limitation in further research of conditions. Therefore seeking firm reference points for the positions stated

during the discussion, other impacts should be consulted (apart from this way of interpretation), including divisions over the field of discussion (understood in wider context of relations) observable among parliamentary groups. It should be pointed here that opinions on the European Union and the place of Poland in the EU significantly influence perception and statements expressed by politicians.

The ongoing process of transformation of the European Union can be described as deepening integration. However, in order to keep judgment prudent, it seems to be a better measure to look at this complex and impossible to interpret process in categories of seeking a safe level of organizational efficiency, that is capacity to adapt (understood as readiness to face both internal and external challenges).

Parliament members treat the EU as a functional environment. For them, the European Union is a particular instrument of execution of Polish foreign policy. Poland is thought of in reference to the Union and in relation with the Union. It is about a Union context of the Polish policy – Poland is in some sense entangled in the European integration. Such a situation is a result of democratic character of the European integration, which allows identification of each entity. Democracy in the EU has its own procedural, representative and participation space (Wojtaszczyk, 2012, p. 13). It should be underlined here that this diagnosis is only an assertion of the existing state of matters and is deprived of any element of judgment.

In order to open a wider context of the discourse in the discussion held on February 5th, 2015 over the information for Sejm and Senat of the Republic of Poland on Poland's participation in the works of the EU between July and December 2014, conclusions of the analysis of the debate of March 20th, 2013 over the information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on basis of Polish foreign policy in 2013 will be auxiliary used. It will allow more profound interpretation of the positions presented during the discussion of February 5th, 2015, as assessment of the European Union and Polish place in the EU are not clearly expressed. The division in the area of judgment of government's activity appeared to be the leading issue in the arguments. Undoubtedly the discussion of February 5th, 2015, as any other parliamentary discussion, was a dispute between a governing coalition and opposition. However perceiving this discussion only from the perspective of the said division can significantly limit the analysis. To avoid such reduction, it is worth to mention the said debate. It will allow the context to be shown more clearly as it draws one more crucial axis of parliamentary disputes – judgment of the integration process.

There are two viewpoints to be mentioned considering assessment of consequences of the integration process, which were raised during the debate on March 20th, 2015. The governing coalition of Civic Platform (CP) and Polish People's Party (PPP) together with the opposition parties: Democratic Left Alliance (DLA) and Your Movement (YM) treat the ongoing integration process as reinforcement of the Union and Poland at the same time. For these parties the deepening integration is not contrary to Poland gaining bigger influence on the decisions made within the European Union. It also does not limit Poland in reaching its own goals. These parties, however, do not accept these goals without conditions. Polish interests are not the only category. The parliament members of the above mentioned parties seem to accept the necessity of growth of responsibility and costs as a particular regulator within this scope. Gaining stability at the Union level constitutes a goal for them, with Poland being a part of the involvement. A different point of view is presented by Law and Justice (L&J) and Solidary Poland (SP), indicating that deepening the integration, increase of interdependence leads mainly to deterioration of the international position of Poland. From their perspective, the European Union should rather remain outside of Polish matters. While it is a significant entity, it still remains to be secondary. These parties concentrate more on particularisms in the European Union and they assume the perspective of variety of different national states' interests and necessity of rather strong and sometimes ruthless competition. In general, it should be assumed the process of European integration is described by the participants of the debate as increase (guarantee) or as decrease (destabilization) of the level of security of the Polish state. CP, PPP, DLA, and YM seem to perceive interests of the Union more as a peculiar but still diverse, at the same time fully underlining the role of conciliatory way of making decisions. In order to describe positions of L&J and SP, the category of decisional independence is more proper. According to it, the European Union should remain, in their opinion, somehow "outside" Polish affairs (Cebul, 2015, p. 168–169).

It should be pointed out that there are no preconditions confirming that this division is out-of-date in the discussion of February 5th, 2015. The discussion on the previously described matters does not organize the discourse, but the elements of it become more visible. A vision of conciliatory and concordant Union is raised. It can be seen in statements SSinMFA-S1, RC-S1, and CP-S1 when their authors talk about the necessity to keep a consistent line of the EU in the case of the conflict in Ukraine. There is also acceptance of the need for

more efficient governing of the Union, deepening the integration on the political level. Confirmation of this direction is visible in statement DLA-S1: "Before the end of the reorganization process of the Union, after the election, Italy had much time to promote their vision of European revival and to influence the direction of key initiatives taken at the beginning of the new term of office mainly in the economic field. These goals were expressed by the slogan […] 'fresh start'. It was to highlight the intention of taking Italian presidency out of purely technical management and making the European Union presidency clearly political. It was also the aim of promoting a federal character of the European Union".

In the light of the analyzed discussion, the European Union, despite of clear presence of critical opinions (distance), for the parliament members is a synonym of security. This observation confirms the thesis that security, which scope is still expanding, is a key category enabling understanding of modern international affairs (Kostecki, 2012, p. 17). It is the European Union where they see the functional area that creates, or relatively can create after implementation of reforms, instrumentation for effective activity, which is a tool to shape the security policy – countering threats.

Undoubtedly, it is the lack of a project alternative to the EU that determines acceptance of this approach. On the other hand, appreciation of the EU potential is visible in international relations. The differences in opinions and visions presented by Polish politicians are results of a wider process going on in the European Union. Variability, as a permanent trait of the system of the Union, is on one hand determined by a lack of balance inside the system caused by continued rebuilding of the integration structure. On the other hand, it derives from the necessity to adjust the system to changes in international relations (Czachór, 2008, p. 31). Since the European integration is a process, changes are a part of it.

ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN THE PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION OF FEBRUARY 5TH, 2015

Main strands being a part of the foreign policy of the EU which are worth explaining, are: (1) the conflict in Ukraine; (2) economic development and building competition; (3) personal changes in the EU institutions; (4) energy security; (5) the EU security including migration policy and fighting terrorism.

THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE

The conflict in Ukraine is an event showing difficulties in reaching common ground within the EU. It shows the power of particularisms. However the experience of this incompatibility of interests does not impair, as shown before, the confidence that the EU should "speak as one" (SSinMFA-S1, RC-S1, CP-S1). This assumption remains an important element of the vision of the integration process for CP: "the most important thing is that the voice of the European Union on what is happening in the east Ukraine was clear, strong, sole, and united" (SSinMFA-S1). The author of the cited speech specifies activities towards developing a common statement by the EU as "absolute priority of the Polish government" and to confirm the efficiency of its activity, the author names coherent steps made by the EU: tightening, in 2014, the economic sanctions against Russia, visa and financial sanctions against the representatives of separatists responsible for organizing elections in parts of Ukraine seized by the rebellion, and also tightening restrictive measures within the frames of the policy of not recognizing the annexation of Crimea (SSinMFA-S1). A similar message is passed in the speech RC-S1, however it also touches on the problem of significant diversification on the level of positions of the EU member states on the conflict in Ukraine: "the Italian presidency, like the whole European Union, has faced external challenges related to the Ukrainian crisis. In spite of numerous differences in opinions and discussions, the Union was able to keep reasonably unitary statements including the one on sanctions against Russia". The requirement of reaching a common ground as a particular condition of efficient functioning of the EU is also confirmed by the statement CP-S1. It also shows, in similar way to statement RC-S1, a major disagreement at the level of opinions of each member state of the EU on the conflict in Ukraine, especially indicating the opinion of the Visegrad Group member states, which is "different" from the Polish one: "During the Italian presidency a unitary statement of the member states on imposing sanctions on Russia was successfully developed and some member states were successfully convinced to help Ukraine within the field of gas supply. It was so valuable due to the fact that in the beginning the Italian administration and some member states were not eager to engage in the case of Russian participation in military actions in Ukraine" – CP-S1.

In statement CP-S1, as in statement SSinMFA-S1, the author underlines that the change of the stance of the presidency was influenced – *inter alia* – by the "firm attitude of Poland". However, strong differences appear among the parlia-

ment groups in the aspect of judging Polish role in execution of the Eastern policy. Different assessment was presented in the speech DLA-S1: "We expect the Polish government to engage even more, to be more active in the area mentioned in the basis of Italian presidency, but also within the scope of solutions to political problems. We are worried by the fact that Poland was excluded from the peace talks concerning Ukraine. So also in this area a possibility of taking a new political initiative that would include Poland should be sought". The clearest opinion contrary to the assessment formed by the governing party is included in statement L&J-S1: "it is a total disaster as far as Polish diplomacy is concerned. Everything happens without Polish participation. Our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, was not invited to join his peers of Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine negotiating solutions to the conflict. The first of these meetings was held in Berlin and is now called a Normandy form. But Poland is not there. Poland is simply not there. [...] it also moved to NATO level". In this context, the author of the speech also mentions the meeting of the President of the USA, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the German Chancellor, the President of Italy, and the President of France with the President of Ukraine, in which Poland did not participate, assessing it as: "completely disastrous situations" (L&J-S1). The above arguments are additionally enhanced by the accusation of lack of action plan from the Polish government: "it can be seen that even the Belarusian president is more successful, as the meetings are held in Belarus. [...] minister Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz was in the European Union Commission and we asked her last year in July if Poland had any plan, our, original one, with which we can go to Brussels and to Ukraine and show that according to that plan, the talks could start. At that time the answers of the minister could be summarized in the following way: 'we are waiting for opinions of those big players'. [...] Today the minister is an ambassador in Moscow, which means that we did not have and we still do not have any plan and because of that, we are totally excluded from these talks. And sitting at this table we could at least ask the Italians if they could hold the sales of Iveco armored vehicles to Russia, which vehicles they sell and they do not want to sell them to Ukraine or they mark some talks literally at the same time. Unfortunately, we do not have such plan and it is a failure, total failure" (L&J-S1). Next to these divergent assessments it should be qualified as natural that the statement PPP-S1 signalized the necessity of supporting Ukraine and YM-S1 presented Polish engagement in Eastern policy as duty since they did not relate to judgment of actions of the Polish government.

Different opinions concerning effectiveness of Poland within the scope of influencing solution of the conflict in Ukraine can be explained in the category of political fight between the party in power and the opposition. Such an approach, however, creates a rotating diagnosis that for the opposition any activity will remain insufficient or improper, and for the governing majority – adequate and optimal. If no consideration is given to that fight, it can be seen without doubts that the Eastern matters, from the perspective of politicians, remain a test for the European Union as a security creator. One can hazard to suggest that politicians hope that the EU is, or can be, such a creator. It is a peculiar requirement for keeping a proper level of sense of security. It leads to a postulate of necessity to work on common opinion in this matter for the whole EU. The direction of this opinion should obviously be stopping Russia, which is somewhat reversing the situation in Ukraine. The creative possibilities of the European Union described in this manner seem to constitute a test of effectiveness for politicians, but mainly strong expectation of this direction of activity should mitigate a gradually increasing deficit of feeling of security.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND BUILDING COMPETITION

As far as the subject of economic development discussed in the parliament is concerned, the following subjects should be deemed important from the perspective of competitiveness of the EU: establishing the European fund for investment (SSinMFA-S1, CP-S1), creating new work places (DLA-S1), support for small and medium business (DLA-S1), entering into a commercial-economic agreement between the EU and Canada (PPP-S1), entering into a free trade agreement between the EU and the USA (CP-S1). As far as subjects approached from the perspective of Polish interests are concerned, the ones to be pointed are: the Eurozone (DLA-S1), transport sector (L&J-S1), the Russian embargo (L&J-S1).

Assessments expressed by the parliament members within the scope of the mentioned issues show existence of division, which also concerns judgment of role and participation of Poland in actions taken within the EU. One side is occupied by statements SSinMFA-S1 and CP-S1. The author of the speech SSinMFA-S1 concentrates on high activity of Poland in works over the European fund for investments: "Poland took and is taking a very active part in this debate. For us the key issue was exactly to stimulate the climate for investments and

very precise solutions which influence management of this fund. Not only was Poland an active participant of this debate, but also co-initiated many solutions which were included in this draft document". Similar narration can be observed in statement CP-S1: "the minister of finance of the Polish government not later than in September last year proposed the establishment of European Investment Fund […]. Drawing up a concept of establishing European Strategic Investment Fund was a development of the Polish initiative. Polish proposal was used here".

In speech DLA-S1, in turn, lack of any plan of Poland entering the Eurozone was criticized: "The term of presidency was also an occasion to develop a dialog with Italy over the future of the European Union, taking into consideration further integration within the Eurozone. Here and now I can repeat our negative opinion on government's actions, as the government has not set any roadmap of reaching the Euro. […] In a longer perspective, it will also bring economic consequences". Stance DLA-S1 should be, however, treated as moderate as it does not include clear criticism and is rather formulated in the form of recommendation: "We expect the Polish government to engage even more in changes which have to be made to the functioning of the European Union, but also in solving those important problems which Europe is currently tackling". On the other hand, strong criticism of the actions of the Polish government is expressed in statement L&J-S1 concerning the situation in transport sector: "We also fail in situations related to not smaller but totally different area, that is transport. Not later than in July last year it was known that Germany, minding their own international transport market, heavy transport, had an idea of serious confrontation with truly very big, as for the European scale, transport sector in Poland. […] Today, information that we receive suggests that the case was settled partly. The situation of the transport industry, this part of our economy, is already very hard due to Russian embargo and the EU member states protecting their markets". In this statement, raising the problem of internal competition in the EU is worth attention. Apart from positions of different member states regarding the conflict in Ukraine, this is another area in which the power of particularism can be seen.

Opinions presented in this part allow to distinguish two approaches to the meaning of economic integration for the purpose of deepening the political one. By some parties deepening economic dependences is treated as objective necessity, being a condition of increasing efficiency of the EU on international stage. Reciprocal economic dependence of states would result in unification and coherence of the EU foreign policy. However, analyzing speeches being skeptical towards execution of such direction, it is worth asking a question on the way

to perform deepening of economic dependence. The skeptical approach underlines the possibility, threat of dependency, which is equal to serious impairment or transfer of decision making functions of a state to a different level or its incorporation to a different entity. The second approach, which may be called conciliatory, assumes, as one can suppose, that the consequences of deepening dependences will be balanced for all states, which will lead to lack of aggrieved entities.

PERSONAL CHANGES IN THE EU INSTITUTIONS

As far as the spectrum of judgment concerning personal changes in the EU is concerned, a division is also visible and it is similar to the previously described one. One group is composed of statements SSinMFA-S1, CP-S1, and YM-S1: "I would like to clearly state here that Poland has succeeded in major way as the Poles hold absolutely key functions in the EU bodies" (SSinMFA-S1). A similar message is found in the speech CP-S1: "Donald Tusk was elected a new President. Being the Prime Minister of Poland for almost two terms of office he successfully led our country through the difficult time of the crisis of world finances and then European finances", and also in the statement YM-S1: "Donald Tusk being appointed as the President of the European Council and Elżbieta Bieńkowska as the Internal Market and Services Commissioner are both very important events. It creates possibilities that can be efficiently used to create responsible and solid image of Poland as the leader of political changes in this part of Europe, which we all count on". The opposite group contains the statement (L&J-S1): "the speakers before me, […] paid attention to the fact […] of election of Prime Minister Tusk for the position of the President of the European Council. […] I started checking the history of prime ministers of France, Great Britain, German chancellors, prime ministers of Spain. What big country of the size of Poland would allow itself to accept a situation of prime minister leaving his office during the term to become the President of the European Council? This is highly ridiculous. After termination of the term of office we could really speak of positive aspects, success, but it was simply abandoning the office in one of the biggest three–four states during its term. This situation had had no precedence and is bizarre".

ENERGY SECURITY

Two contrary positions are also presented in the area of energy security. It should be noticed that the conflict in Ukraine plays a mobilizing role. The statement SSinMFA-S1 includes a following assessment: "our priority, but also the priority of the European Union was to continue works leading to increase of energy security of the European Union and member states and, what is most important in today's geopolitical climate, decrease of our energy dependence both in reference to electrical energy and gas. […] All of these priorities, which are the most important for us, concerning the fact of becoming independent of gas suppliers, questions of contracts being more transparent and finally ensuring the biggest possible number of solidary mechanisms, were included in this work". A slightly different message is passed by the statement CP-S1, which breaks away from the division stipulated before: "The conflict in Ukraine made the presidency recognize energy security of the EU as a priority of this policy. Unfortunately, the energy policy is still related to the climate policy, which in no case makes the energy security a real priority of the energy policy. […] Polish government sought partners to make the climate policy more rational. This is extremely hard as we are a bit lonely in this war". Nevertheless criticism of government's actions in the area of energy security is found in the statement L&J-S1: "of course we have a total failure of such flag project proposed by Prime Minister Tusk which is the project of energy union. Vice-President of the European Commission […] informed that in fact the energy union will not exist. If it exists, it will have a voluntary character, […] if there are European partners who want to reach a voluntary agreement they may purchase jointly but the big ones are not interested. In that meaning, it is a failure. It is a failure as we all know that different states pay different prices for gas, and it is a failure. The government consequently avoids this subject, skips this subject and hides it, but truly it is a failure".

The core of the role of the Union designed by Polish politicians is the dependence between the necessity to enhance the foreign dynamics of the EU expressed in confronting the ability to create order in the East and enhancing the internal potential by self-sufficiency in the area of securing strategic resources. It is worth noticing that this construction of creating the security system shows lack of additional means of executing such a strategy (apart from sanctions, which not accompanied by other instruments do not fulfill their functions and therefore do not allow reaching the set effects). A similar inconsistency, which is not noticing in

adequate manner the necessity to build a complex security system, is also visible in the case of the EU participation in the war against terrorism described below.

THE EU SECURITY INCLUDING MIGRATION POLICY AND FIGHTING TERRORISM

As far as the international security is concerned, in the field of the migration policy one statement was presented: "Italian presidency also focused on promoting European migration policy – Italy itself have the biggest problem in this area out of all European states […] the European Union is facing problems of mass migration, which poses serious thread to security of Europe. Poland as a country which constantly gets richer is interested in regulating the EU policy of incoming immigration. The consciousness of the migration problem not being exclusively related to Italy, Greece, or Spain, but to the entire European Union rises" (DLA-S1). In the speech YM-S1, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, attention was drawn to importance of works over common security and defense policy and a need for a wider discussion on this subject was pointed, especially in relation to the policy of progressive withdrawal of Polish forces from Afghanistan. In this speech questions about percentage participation of particular national contingents and areas of military actions that are taken into consideration as areas of common activity has appeared. In the area of international security Islamic terrorism poses thread, which is also pointed out by politicians. Speech CP-S1 states that the EU is not going to take explicit actions in this area. Conclusion may also be drawn from this message that Poland is rather not eager to play important role in this matter: "The reaction of the European Union to terror of the Islamic State was and remains careful and is limited to increase efficiency of protecting particular member states from individual terrorist acts on their territory. […] The information from the government does not allow to draw conclusions that the EU found an adequate response to that situation at that time as no regional strategy against Syria, Iraq, and the Islamic State was settled".

CONCLUSIONS

The above analysis enables formation of two conclusions. The first one refers to the level of efficiency of the system of the European Union in international environment. The discourse presented in the text concerning the conflict in Ukraine

and also other dimensions of the security policy of the EU confirmed (of course in the scope enabled by the level of speech analysis accepted in the research) the thesis of lack of balance between the level of development of economic and political integration and the deficit in the area of efficient instruments of political management, which significantly influences possibilities of reaching strategic goals by the European Union (Wojtaszczyk, 2011, p. 7). The second conclusion refers to assessments of the place of Poland in the structure of the European Union formed by Polish parliament members. It should be noticed that levels of dispute, which usually locate CP, PPP and often YM and DLA against L&J, range of arguments used by each party kept on a similar level (among others it concerns a manner of using a firmly critical message by L&J against CP-PPP) – which confirms existence of rather solid division. Relatively constant position of major parliamentary groups on respective problems is also confirmed by the results of voting over adopting a resolution on participation of the Republic of Poland in the works of the European Union in the period of July–December 2014 (see Table 3). If the proposal of interpretation of differences within the scope of assessment of the process of European integration presented in the text is to be applied on these observations, a permanent conflict on the Polish political stage can be seen, which may not be treated only as political competition but should be rather seen in a wider context of a system-based dispute, fundamental from the perspective of Polish *raison d'etat*.

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HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE AND THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE

LUDZKA GODNOŚĆ W PERSPEKTYWIE EUROPEJSKIEJ A ZASADA PROPORCJONALNOŚCI

Monika Forejtová*

— ABSTRACT —

The fundamental human right to dignity is the cornerstone of European legal culture. The right has been provided for in international, European, and national legal instruments. Its role as a benchmark reference for all other human rights has developed into a self-standing and self-executing right, especially under the new EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This evolution from the traditional role of the right to dignity is analysed in case study based on a real case before the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in 2015. The analysis brings forward a reflection about the need to respect the concept of dignity and how it actually is observed in the European context.

Keywords: human rights, human dignity, rights of the child, social rights, proportionality principle, constitutional justice, European Court of Human Rights

— ABSTRAKT —

Podstawowe prawo człowieka do godności jest kamieniem węgielnym europejskiej kultury prawnej. Prawo to zostało przewidziane w międzynarodowych, europejskich i krajowych instrumentach prawnych. Jego rola jako punktu odniesienia dla wszystkich innych praw człowieka rozwijała się w kierunku prawa autonomicznego i samowykonywalnego, w szczególności w ramach nowej unijnej Karty praw podstawowych. Ta ewolucja tradycyjnej roli prawa do godności jest analizowana w studium przypadku opartym na sprawie toczonej przed Trybunałem Konstytucyjnym Republiki Czeskiej w 2015 roku. Analiza prowadzi do refleksji o konieczności respektowania pojęcia godności, jakie faktycznie obserwuje się w skali europejskiej.

Słowa kluczowe: prawa człowieka, godność człowieka, prawa dziecka, prawa socjalne, zasada proporcjonalności, sprawiedliwość konstytucyjna, Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka

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INTRODUCTION

International but also domestic legal instruments bring forth the concept of human dignity, which strives to embody the all-embracing foundation for functioning of the society, in which the state cannot behave in breach of the immanent category of human dignity. The evolution of a modern state in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century has transformed our ethical perception of the positive law and also of justice as the cornerstones for functioning of the modern society, which became oriented towards securing the principles of justice and fairness. In the wake of World War II, the concept of human dignity expanded into the constitutional orders of various countries around the globe (Schultziner, Carmi, 2014, p. 461–490), also under the influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which concerns human dignity already in its Preamble, and its Articles 1, 2, 22, and 23. Pursuant to this Declaration, human dignity is inherently common to all human beings, thus it is not a right granted (by any state), but rather recognised (Wagnerová, Šimíček, Langášek, Pospíšil, 2012, p. 55; Neal, 2014). The Universal Declaration takes human dignity for the foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the world. Such recognition does not, however, mean establishment of the right to dignity, but rather it encompasses the active duty of the state not to interfere with this fundamental right of each individual. The right to dignity was further embraced by the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (Kmec, Kosař, Kratochvíl, Bobek, 2012, p. 864), which in its Protocol No. 13 abolishing the capital punishment (Novotný, 2014, p. 371; Repík, 2002) expressly provides for the necessity to fully recognize the unalienable dignity of every human being in all circumstances. The right to dignity is moreover included in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Preamble and Article 10) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Preamble and Article 13), in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine) (Düwell, Braarvig, Brownsword, Mieth, 2014).

   A breakthrough legal framework on human life in dignity is envisaged in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which thanks to the Lisbon Treaty (Forejtová, Tronečková, 2011, p. 23, 81) gained the status of an EU primary law instrument. In its Title I (Dignity), and Article 1 (Human

Dignity), the dignity is presented in the structure of the most advanced human rights document straight at the top and framed in language as follows: "*Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected*" (Forejtová, 2013, p. 78; Tomášek, Týč, 2013, p. 325; Klíma, 2011, p. 379). It is, however, proper to point out that the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on the question of dignity right after the Charter of Fundamental Rights was adopted in Nice (2000), which the present Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU has been drafted upon (2009). In the case *Netherlands v the European Parliament and the Council*[1] a case concerning the challenge to the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council No. 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, in which the human body could fall within the scope of an invention, the Court of Justice ruled that the fundamental right to human dignity is an essential part of the European Union law. In its broader concept, human dignity comprises not only the physical manifestation of a human being, but also its psychical integrity. From the *Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights*, discussing the amendments done by the Lisbon Treaty (2007/C 303/02), it is clear that none of the rights codified in the Charter may be interpreted to the detriment of dignity of another and that human dignity forms the core of all rights provided for by the Charter. The right to human dignity must be respected even in situations in which there are limitations upon the exercise of certain other rights. The purpose of the Charter is, among others, to consolidate the importance of dignity, in other words, the right to living in dignity, with the understanding that the quality of life may be diverging according to the socioeconomic situation in various European countries. The essence of life in dignity of a man or woman consists of a whole range of factors of existence, and the point is to appraise this right in its complex nature. It is clear that especially the wider extent of effectively enforceable social rights contributes to the higher quality and thus dignity of life.

The right to dignity is further developed in the particular European legal orders in the form of specific laws, in the Czech Republic for example the civil code (Lavický, 2014, p. 52), the criminal code (Jelínek, 2014, p. 602), or the law on discrimination (Boučková, Havelková, Koldinská, Kühn, Kühnová, Whelanová, 2010, p. 20).

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[1] Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU in case C-377/98, of 9. October 2001, points 70–77.

Human dignity is thus an idea[2] expressed in the positive law as a general concept enshrining the value protected primarily by, within the Czech legal order, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, by the whole range of human and fundamental rights international treaties, the civil and the criminal code, all being parts to the protection of a person's integrity in its entirety.

The concept of human dignity itself was declared inviolable already in the Preamble to the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms. Even a law of constitutional force may not change this, because Article 9(2) of the Czech Constitution would prohibit such an amendment providing that "the substantive requisites of the democratic, law-abiding State may not be amended" (Molek, 2014; Forejtová, 2014a; Klíma, 2015a; Holländer, 2012, Kubitová, 2015). By this token, the right to human dignity should be considered as being a right of the supra-positive status, and the respect and protection to human dignity and freedom as the top and most universal (final) priority of law[3]. When considering the protection of human dignity, the respect it must be paid and the shield provided to it by public authorities against the interference from third persons must be the backbone of all thinking about the relationship between an individual and the power of the state on the one hand, and the horizontal relationship between private individuals on the other. As the Constitutional Court made clear in its jurisprudence, it is the guarantee of inviolability of human dignity that allows people to fully enjoy their individuality (Pavlíček, Hofmannová, 2014, p. 279–301). The effect of constitutional safeguards is even more intensive in the vertical relationships, i.e. the state versus the individual. Also judicial proceedings that may be initiated and decided by courts *ex officio*, so-called non-adversarial proceedings, should be considered as a kind of such vertical relationship (Zahradníková, 2013, p. 53; Zahradníková, Wipplingerová, Spurná, 2015). In other words, all matters in which the public interest prevails over the interests of private individuals. In these vertical relationships, all fundamental rights must be applied as self-executing rights directly binding the public authorities concerned. Interpretation of the rights and rules must respect the boundaries outlined by the human dignity. Because the Charter of Fundamental Rights gives those rights the status of absolute rights, they may be limited only in order to safeguard

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[2] It concerns a value concept which is to the certain extent evolutionary, rather than a rigid concept amenable to a precise definition.

[3] Judgments of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in cases No. zn. IV. ÚS 2268/07 and No. IV. ÚS 412/04.

fundamental rights of other individuals or to protect the public interest, which is recognized by the constitutional order in forms of a principle or value[4].

Human dignity must be also understood as a constant principle (Mlsna, 2010, p. 125–136) pertaining to the human being on the basis of the natural ethos of a man and woman[5]. Being deprived of dignity may be one way to truly appreciate human dignity. Such loss may occur in instances when an individual loses his or her socio-economic standing, because the status of a modern man and woman is today derived mainly from his or her performance, contribution to the society, or his or her social position and reputation. Human dignity is intimately related to other rights, because it materializes through the exercise of those rights and thus is enshrined in the whole range of other fundamental rights (Popovičová, 2009, p. 225–230).

OVERVIEW OF THE GERMAN AND CZECH LEGISLATION ON THE RIGHT TO DIGNITY

In the Central European context, it is fitting to provide a short overview of the legislation of the Federal Republic of Germany. The German Basic Law (the Basic Law) of 1949 declares in its very first article: *Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority*. Vital in this context is also Article 79(3) of the Basic Law[6] providing that amendments to the Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Article 1 (guarantee of protection of human dignity) and Article 20 (Germany as a democratic and social federation) shall be inadmissible.

The Basic Law (Forejtová, 2014b, p. 56) draws a very clear line between the state of affairs before year 1945, in which the constitutional principles had been but monologues of the legislator on the one hand, and on the other hand the situation after the War, in which the constitution has become the centre of gravity and the departure point for all legislation. That is why Article 1(3) of the Basic Law clearly provides that "The following basic rights shall bind the legislature,

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4   Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in case No. IV. ÚS 412/04.
5   Pavel Holländer comments on the express material core of the constitution as a "metaphysical correlation of the positive law", in the centre of focus of which is exactly the protection of human dignity (Holländer, 2005, p. 330–331).
6   So called Bestandssicherung, Ewikeitsgarantie, Ewigkeitklausel (Forejtová, 2014a, p. 45, 53).

the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law". In 1957, the Federal Constitutional Court commented on the issue that: "legislative power is subject to more stringent constitutional restrictions than under the Weimar Constitution of 1919… [T]he legislature [at that time] could modify or alter constitutional rights [at will]… The Basic Law, on the other hand, erected a value-oriented order that limits public authority. This order guarantees the self-determination, and dignity of man within the political community. The highest principles of this order of values are protected against constitutional change… Laws are not constitutional merely because they have been passed in conformity with procedural provisions… They must be substantively compatible with the highest values of a free and democratic order – i.e., the constitutional order of values – and must also conform to unwritten fundamental constitutional principles as wed as the fundamental decisions of the Basic Law, in particular the principles of the rule of law and the social welfare state. Above all, laws must not violate a person's dignity, which represents the highest value of the Basic Law; nor may they restrict a person's spiritual, political, or economic freedom in a way that would erode the essence of [personhood]"[7]. Already in one of its first judgments the Federal Constitutional Court has also commented on the issue thus: "It is by definition not entirely impossible, that even constitutional provisions are themselves invalid – despite being part of the text of the Basic Law. There exist such constitutional principles so fundamental and are such an emanation of law that they may take precedents even before the Basic Law, and thus are binding the authors of the Basic Law. Other provisions of the Basic law do not possess such a force as these principles, and may be invalid if in conflict with such fundamental principles"[8].

Inspired by Germany, the Czech Republic emphasized the importance of human dignity in Article 1 of its Charter, according to which all people are free and equal in their dignity and rights. The basic human rights and freedoms should not be today viewed only as rights, the aim of which is to protect the individual against the state authority, but must be seen as the fundamental basis of values[9] (Hofmannová, 2011, p. 57). Every person can derive from them the enforceable right to respect and recognition as a human being, which is also the

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[7] Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in case No. BVerfGE 6, 32 (41 násl.) in case Elfes.

[8] Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in case No. BverfGE 1, 14 (32) in case Südweststaat.

[9] Judgments of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in cases No. Pl. ÚS 19/93; Pl. ÚS 36/01; Pl. ÚS 27/09; Pl. ÚS 19/08; 29/09 (Tomoszek, 2015, p. 3–15).

source of Czech Constitutional Court's jurisprudence that humans must not become mere objects of the *volonté général*, and that individuals must not be treated in a way that undermines their status of holders of rights and obligations[10.]

In the Czech legal order human dignity is not built up as a self-standing (self-executing) right, but rather as an interpretative benchmark ("a material criterion"), a value that is projected against all fundamental rights and freedoms listed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms (be it civil, political, or social rights). I believe, however, that in case of lacuna in the constitutional framework, which could not be overcome by means of analogical interpretation, the human dignity would have to be applied directly as a self-executing right that may be enforced (Mlsna, 2011, p. 135). In support of this conclusion I refer also to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and its Article 1[11].

Human dignity is thus inextricably linked to the concept of equality as the universal principle of interpretation with its discrete anti-discrimination nature (McConnachie, 2014, p. 609–629), because the key precondition of freedom and equality before the law is precisely the fulfilment of the dignity of a person (Forejtová, 2013). The equality in rights in this sense means, on the one hand, the equal access to rights, and on the other hand – the prohibition of exclusion of an individual from access to particular rights and freedoms. Aharon Barak, for example, identified four basic features of constitutional guarantee and protection of human dignity, specifically the interrelatedness with the principle of equality, free will, physical and mental well-being (i.e. the guarantee of social rights), and prohibition to treat human beings as objects (Barak, 2008, p. 86–87).

PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE EXERCISE OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS

Thus, according to the constitutional provisions, everyone has the right that his or her dignity be preserved, honour, reputation, and name protected. Limitations to these rights may normally only occur on the basis of public policy, public safety,

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[10]   Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in case No. IV. 412/04 (Güttler, 2014, p. 501– 511).

[11]   Article 1 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU "Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected".

or public health exception. Generally, human dignity means the legal safeguards against the treatment disregarding the dignity of a person as a human being, in other words, the protection against treating a man or woman inhumanly.

In constitutional law, the principle of proportionality is related with the interpretation and application of particular (colliding) fundamental rights and freedoms[12]. Those are, from the most part, contrived as general principles, which may be applied to a certain extent, the extent of which is defined by the impact of the other colliding principles and values. These particular principles (rights and freedoms) must be mutually reconciled and in case of collision one must take precedence, while it is necessary to minimize the impact onto the others. The principle of proportionality therefore lies in the search for an optimal balance between means and ends. This balancing must be put into practice by assessing three elements (criteria, sub-principles) – the test of appropriateness, the test of necessity, and the test of proportionality in its strict sense (Ondřejek, 2012; Kosař, 2008; Holländer, 2012, p. 219; Barak, 2012). An important feature of the proportionality principle is its general applicability[13] normally to all basic rights, both under the abstract or concrete control of constitutionality, and also in the course of an individual constitutional petition procedure (Forejtová, 2014b, p. 87; Filip, 2011, p. 32–45). The application of the proportionality principle is intimately related to the teleological method of interpretation (Wintr, 2013, p. 125).

COLLISION BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE RISK OF SO-CALLED SOCIAL DEATH

From the above propositions it is therefore clear that human dignity radiates into the interpretation and concept of all rights, also economic, cultural and social rights as listed in the Chapter Four of the Charter (Pokorný, 2010, p. 175–208). It

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[12] As the first case of use of the proportionality test by the Czech Constitutional Court is usually referred to the judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in case No. Pl. ÚS 4/94 (Anonymous witness). However, the very first hints of the proportionality test may be traced already in judgment No. Pl. ÚS 43/93 (Defamation of the Parliament).

[13] There are countries, however, which refuse to take the three-prong proportionality test as a universal mechanism (The US Supreme Court and the American academia, which work with different tests – "rational basis test", "intermediate scrutiny" a "strict scrutiny" (Kosař, Antoš, Kühn, Vyhnánek, 2015, p. 363).

is the interrelatedness between those rights, which has manifested in the course
of one specific case, which I will describe and comment here below. The origins
of the case are in the conflict between fundamental rights of a child on the
one hand, and constitutionally guaranteed basic rights of a parent on the other.
The story gets more complicated because it is not only about a conflict of two
opposing rights, but rather a conflict of multiple rights of one individual against
multiple rights of the other. The basic right of a child is, pursuant to Article 33(1)
of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms in the Czech
Republic (the "Charter"), the right to education. As of result of its imprudent
application, a collision may arise between the rights of parents, at least these:
right to human dignity pursuant to Article 10(1) of the Charter, right to freely
choose the profession pursuant to Article 26(1) of the Charter, prohibition of
forced labour pursuant to Article 9(1) of the Charter, the inviolability of the
person and of private life pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Charter, the right to be
protected from any unauthorized intrusion into private and family life pursuant
to Article 10(2) of the Charter, right to judicial and other legal protection under
Article 36(1) of the Charter, and right to due process pursuant to Article 6 of
the European Charter of Human Rights (Molek, 2012; Forejtová, 2014b, p. 188).

The background of the specific case which was before the Constitutional
Court of the Czech Republic, and which ultimately dismissed the petition as
manifestly unfounded[14], begs the following question: Is it permissible that the
exercise of a right of a child manifestly interferes with the constitutional rights
of a parent, especially his or her right to human dignity, free choice of profession,
and with the prohibition of forced labour (Klíma, 2015b, p. 88)?

Now, to the facts of the case. The petitioner had an obligation of maintenance
support to his only daughter under age, imposed by a court in the amount of
$2/_3$ of his monthly salary[15]. The court explained that the amount of maintenance
support was calculated with regard to the particulars on the side of the child,
especially high tuition fees at a prestigious high school. The parent had submitted
that the maintenance should be decreased at least so that it amounts to the half
of his monthly salary, arguing that his salary had gone down materially since the
time of a previous court decision calculating the maintenance. The petitioner
was university educated, a doctor of medicine working for the Czech Academy

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[14]   Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in case No. IV. ÚS 707/15.

[15]   There is no binding legislation in the Czech Republic which would provide for the amount of
maintenance in relation to the level of salary. Such legislation exists in France, for example.

of Sciences[16]. At the time when the petitioner had been employed with this high profile research institute, the employer received a decision initiating enforcement of a maintenance judgment against the petitioner for an alleged default with paying maintenance instalments. In the enforcement proceedings, the authorities issued in total four execution orders, by means of which petitioner's driving license was suspended, his movable assets sold, his salaries had been partially withhold and funds on his bank accounts transferred to the other parent. The conduct of the enforcement authorities apparently paralyzed the petitioner with the result of severe limitations on his ordinary way of living. On the top of that, the petitioner considered his work for the Czech Academy of Sciences as the peak of his career, although it is generally considered that research and academia are not primarily high profit activities, but they are, as profession, viewed as prestigious and respected as valuably contributing to the society. Also as a result of the enforcement, the petitioner was dismissed; or rather his employment contract was not extended by the Academy. The petitioner was thus forced to apply for social security assistance. It may seem paradoxical that general (family) court imposed on the petitioner the duty to work beside his job at the Academy of Sciences, as a self-employed businessman so that he could afford to pay for his underage daughter's elevated needs, but at the same time the court suspended his driving license, which is usually the indispensable and frequent tool necessary for conduct of many business activities. As a result of this court's decisions, the petitioner ended up in a situation in which he could not objectively perform his obligations (Hulmák, 2014, p. 1220; Švestka, Dvořák, Fiala, 2014, p. 485) being forced to conduct business on the one hand, but on the other being prohibited from driving a car that he needed for his business. Thus his daughter's standard of living significantly exceeded that of the parent (the petitioner) and the petitioner could not fully enjoy his personality, encompassing among others his right to self-determination. The right to self-determination and to the responsibility for one's own development has been found by foreign case-law as fundamental rights and freedoms, which form a barrier of citizen as against the interference

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[16] The main tasks of the petitioner's working and research activities were mainly: a) experimenting with animals in the area of diabetes, design of experiments and histological treatment of tissues samples, b) immunohistochemistry, c) immunocytology, d) intracellular visualisation of punctures *in vivo* with the help of fluorescent lentiviral conpunctures. The petitioner has regularly published in journals and expert periodicals in the course of his research. On 5.12.2014 the petitioner received from the České pneumologické a ftizeologické společnosti (Czech pneumological and ftizeological society) ČLS J.E.P. the award as the „1. best publication by authors over 35 years in 2013".

by the state[17]. The limitation of the petitioner's rights to protection of human
dignity was imposed allegedly as a consequence of protecting the rights of an
underage daughter to education at a high school, which incidentally is not even
a constitutionally guaranteed right, because the right to education pursuant to
Article 33 of the Charter only provides for elementary schools in the sense of
compulsory education.

The petitioner's right to freely choose his profession, guaranteed by the
Charter, may be exercised in principle through a self-employed business (the
right to engage in commercial and economic activity pursuant to Article 26(1)
of the Charter), or in an employment relationship (the right to acquire the means
of her livelihood by work under Article 26(3) of the Charter) (Wagnerová et al.,
2012, p. 573). The constitutional right to free choice of profession does not mean
that a particular employment is guaranteed constantly and that an employment
relationship may not be unilaterally cancelled. The Charter in Article 26 rather
provides for a right of each person to free choice of profession, while the aim
of that right is to provide a choice to each individual to decide in which area of
human endeavour he or she would like to perform and apply for jobs (Wagnerová
et al., 2012, p. 777). The Constitutional Court has ruled in its previous case law
that an indispensable requirement for the functioning of a liberal democratic
society is to create an autonomous space for individuals, in which they may freely
accomplish their life among other as economic, social beings who gain their daily
bread by working or otherwise being economically engaged[18]. The petitioner had
studied for many years so that he could be employed as a researcher to achieve
the top position within his particular profession. The law should corroborate the
need to respect the petitioner's decision to work in academic research, also with
the regard to the substantial benefits that society gains out of petitioner's work.
The fact that the petitioner had not been making huge profits out of his work
should not be automatically used against him.

The freedom from coercion into labour relates to the right to freely choose
profession and to engage in commercial or economic activity, and the right to
acquire the means of his or her livelihood by work, which are the examples of
positive freedoms, from which *a contrario* stems a negative freedom, i.e. the
prohibition of forced labour (Wagnerová et al., 2012, p. 262). By forced or obliga-

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[17]   Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in case No. BVerfGE 7, 198.205,
case Lüth.
[18]   Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in case No. I. ÚS 504/03.

tory labour we understand any and all work or service which is demanded from a person under a threat of any punishment, and for which that person has not volunteered. Constitutional Court's case law makes clear that forced labour or services correspond in their characteristics with the labour or services listed in Article 9(1) of the Charter, but that list being not exhaustive. It is usually labour or services that significantly and in a very restrictive fashion interfere with personal rights and freedoms of a citizen and the imposition of which is executed via an administrative act[19]. The constitutional provision on prohibition of forced labour is not strictly speaking a right, but an instruction not to coerce natural persons individually or collectively to engage in a certain activity without their freely given consent (Klíma, 2009, p. 1023). Prohibition of forced labour aims to protect human freedom and dignity in their very essence. The capacity of an individual to make a choice which profession, employment, or other activity he or she will devote the time and endeavour to, and especially in what way he or she intends to acquire the means of livelihood, is a guarantee of the sphere of freedom in the area that has a momentous importance for the development of the personality of any man and woman, and greatly impacts all aspects of their life. It is about the self-actualization of a person, a chance to consider which activity would work best for that person and what he or she herself may offer to the public.

If some authority imposes an obligation to engage in some activity, that obligation also sets the direction in which that person concerned will spend much time of his or her life, which profession he or she will engage in and what kind of remuneration he or she will receive, the amount of which will also have to be set authoritatively. All these circumstances are or may be important for the private and family life of the concerned individual, for his or her standard of living, eventually the social standing, and last but not least – for his or her own feeling of satisfaction. Such a state of affairs and eventually a position of inequality as against some other groups of persons not subject to that obligation may be viewed as degrading and thus begging the question whether his or her human dignity has not been illegally affected[20].

With the right to self-determination, which is reflected among others in the right to free choice of profession, is inextricably linked the concept of inviolability of a person and his or her privacy. As the Constitutional Court posited: "[T]he

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[19] Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in case No. Pl. ÚS 37/93.
[20] Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in case No. Pl. ÚS 1/12-1.

right to protection of personal privacy is the right of a natural person to decide according to his own deliberation whether, or to what extent and in what manner, the facts of his own personal privacy are to be made accessible to other subjects, and at the same time to defend oneself against (resist) unjustified interference in that sphere by other persons. Excessive emphasis on the positive component of the right to protection of one's private life leads to inappropriately narrowing of protection to merely seeing to it that the facts of a person's private life not be [disclosed] without his consent or without reasons recognized by the law, and thus the integrity of the internal sphere, which is essential for positive personal development, not be violated. The Constitutional Court does not share this narrowed understanding, because respect for private life must, to a certain degree, include the right to form and develop relationships with other human beings. Respect for private life, thus understood, includes the commitment of the state to act in a manner that permits the normal development of these relationships"[21]. A person's private and family life is also constitutionally protected, because pursuant to Article 10(2) of the Charter, everyone has a right to be protected from any unauthorized intrusion into her private and family life. The right to privacy also includes a right to respect an identity and honour of a person (Wagnerová et al., 2012, p. 284).

The Constitutional Court ruled in factually similar cases[22]: "the courts, when deciding on the ability to pay the due maintenance, have not taken into consideration the real means of the petitioner to be able to meet such an obligation. (…) It is obvious that the petitioner must pay the due maintenance support (in the amount set by the court), but when deciding on the due date of the debt, the duty to pay up debts must not be mistaken for a "punishment" (particularly where the obligor is willing to pay), but rather the court must respect certain criteria of proportionality, which also in the interest of beneficiaries will prevent the situation, in which the obligor will not be able to perform his obligation in the future, or would himself become a dependent on the social assistance support". The Constitutional Court made clear that in that particular case the lower courts have manifestly interfered with the right of the petitioner to human dignity by imposing an obligation of an excessive maintenance duty on him based purely on a fictional work he might theoretically be able to undertake. When ruling on the maintenance support, the courts must unquestionably respect the principle

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[21]   Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in case No. II. ÚS 517/99.
[22]   Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in case No. II. ÚS 979/13.

of proportionality as set out by Article 4(4) of the Charter. Interference with the constitutionally guaranteed rights of petitioners by disproportionate maintenance support duty is, from the petitioner's point of view, unacceptable under the rule of law. When various rights collide, it is always necessary to give protection to the right guaranteed by the constitution that is hierarchically superior to any rights only guaranteed by secondary legislation.

CONCLUSION

We may of course discuss the degree of harm to human dignity in every single case. If we compare the cases of assaults on human dignity in the environment of armed conflicts, in the state of humanitarian crisis or confinements of a refugee camp, the above described case will appear as marginal in our eyes, if not ridiculous. However, if we consider the context of the entire case and the standard of living in European countries where the Czech Republic belongs, it is clear that a man or woman may be socially and mentally destroyed even by a less "harsh" treatment than inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by international treaties on humanitarian law.

It is vital to stress that the functioning institutions for constitutional protection (constitutional courts in the concentrated constitutional judiciary, or general courts in the system of an abstract constitutional control) (Forejtová, 2014b, p. 35) and the system of protection of human rights in European countries are primarily designed to provide protection to individual human rights. In case of collision of such rights, these institutions are summoned to decide which right should justifiably take precedence. The basic benchmark for their decision-making must always be, however, the respect to human dignity of each person, at least to the extent as it is set out by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Following that standard, it is then inconceivable that these institutions of constitutional protection should resign over conducting the test of proportionality, the very test by means of which the balance between individual rights and the extent of their limitation should be sought.

In case of absence of this balancing exercise and failure to attribute respective values to the protected rights, the individual is deprived of all protection and the proceedings before the institutions become devoid of an effective remedy. Situations such as those in which one right takes unjustifiable precedence over another right thus creating an inequitable distortion of balance to the detriment

of that right, equally protected by constitution and international law, must not be allowed. Underrating the proportional balancing of rights thus results in not minimizing the impact on the other right, but in an absolutely unacceptable interference by the state. Also the lack of reference to the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights[23] by the national institutions for constitutional protection brings about an increase in number of petitions by individuals against the signatory state.

The rule of law means the search for a balance between individual rights, not a situation in which, as a result of judicial decision-making, an individual person is deprived of fundamental rights and freedoms, which are guaranteed by the constitutional order. When the constitutional guarantees of human dignity fail, this distorts the principle of equality and also impacts on free will, the physical and mental well-being of an individual, and to the lost of genuine warranties of social rights under the rule of law at the end of the day.

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[23] Compare with the judgment of the ECHR in case *Schmidt v. Germany* (Complaint no. 13580/88); *Zarb Adami v. Malta* (Complaint č. 17209/02); *Moser v. Austria* (Complaint č. 12643/02), or *Weller v. Hungary* (No. 44399/05).

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THE EASTERN DIMENSION OF THE EU'S AND POLAND'S POLICY

WYMIAR WSCHODNI POLITYKI UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ I POLSKI

Tetiana Sydoruk*, Dmytro Tyshchenko**

—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The article seeks to assess the degree to which Poland exercises power and influence in the Eastern policy of the European Union (EU) from the early 21ˢᵗ century until now, focusing on the attributes of Poland's latest contribution to the EU policies – the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The article examines also challenges and discussions on Polish strategy towards Eastern Europe. The authors prove that the main points of Poland's Eastern policy are that the improper attention to it will result in loss of status positions in the international arena; Poland should not be limited by the role of the architect artist in Franco-German project in Europe; *European perspective* is the only incentive that can encourage the reforms in Eastern Europe; the failure to provide such a perspective would lead to social and economic instability in the region and the drift towards the participation in reintegration projects in post-Soviet space with Moscow; the Eastern Partnership should be considered as a step towards the joining the EU; Europe will take Poland into consideration only as a regional

—— **ABSTRAKT** ——

Artykuł stara się oszacować, w jakim stopniu Polska sprawuje władzę i wykorzystuje wpływy w ramach polityki wschodniej Unii Europejskiej (UE) od początku XXI wieku do chwili obecnej, skupiając się na właściwościach ostatniego wkładu Polski w politykę Unii, mianowicie programu Partnerstwa Wschodniego (EaP). W artykule poddano również badaniu wyzwania i dyskusje dotyczące polskiej strategii wobec Europy Wschodniej. Autorzy dowodzą, że główne punkty polskiej polityki wschodniej koncentrują się wokół następujących zagadnień: 1) Niewłaściwa uwaga przywiązywana do tej polityki będzie skutkować utratą statusu na arenie międzynarodowej; 2) Polska nie powinna być ograniczana rolą statysty we francusko-niemieckim projekcie dla Europy; 3) *Perspektywa europejska* jest jedynym bodźcem zdolnym pobudzić proces reform w Europie Wschodniej; 4) Porażka w promowaniu takiej perspektywy może prowadzić do społecznego i ekonomicznego zachwiania w regionie, a tym samym do pchnięcia go w kierunku udziału w projektach reintegracyjnych odbywających

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leader; Russian neo-imperialism is a challenge for Poland's security and needs a strict reaction.

Keywords: Eastern Europe, European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, Polish foreign policy

się w przestrzeni postsowieckiej pod dyktando Moskwy; 5) Partnerstwo Wschodnie powinno być postrzegane jako krok w kierunku integracji z Unią Europejską; 6) Europa będzie liczyć się z Polską tylko jako liderem regionu; 7) Rosyjski neoimperializm stanowi wyzwanie dla bezpieczeństwa Polski i wymaga zdecydowanej reakcji.

Słowa kluczowe: Europa Wschodnia, europejska polityka sąsiedztwa, Partnerstwo Wschodnie, polska polityka zagraniczna

INTRODUCTION

Eastern European countries have a special place in the Polish external policy. Their stabilisation through democratisation and structure of the market economy is one of the most important priorities for Poland. Despite some, not always reasonable, doubts and hesitations, which took place in Polish politics in the 1990s, Poland since 1989 tried to become a European lawyer to its eastern neighbours. This position stemmed from the fact that not only the political elite, but also Polish society saw their democracy as the best realisation of its own national interests and benefits for Europe.

The article is focused upon the influence and contribution of Poland in developing of Eastern policy of the European Union. Further, it aims to achieve these objectives: to analyse the Polish contribution in the European Neighbourhood Policy elaboration and the Eastern Partnership, to determine challenges for Poland in Eastern Europe and to consider discussion on Polish strategy towards Eastern neighbours.

POLAND AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

After Poland's accession to NATO (1999) and the EU (2004), East became the main vector of Polish foreign policy. The role of Poland in relations between the European Union and the countries of Eastern Europe has several factors. The key ones are: historical (good awareness on Eastern policy, understanding of important cultural aspects), economic (interests in bilateral trade, energy,

competition, etc.), status reasons (location, Polish role and influence in the EU, according to many Polish politicians, depend on Poland's ability to assume the role of 'provider' in Eastern policy).

With the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (hereinafter ENP) in 2003–2004, which defined the format of relations between the enlarged EU and its new neighbours to the East, Poland has been continually emphasizing the necessity to intensify efforts to strengthen the relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours. It has been for many years advocating an *Open Door Policy* of the European Union to the countries of Eastern Europe. Moreover, Warsaw believes that although the EU dialogue and cooperation with Russia is necessary, this should not lead to the perception and evaluation of EU initiatives in Eastern Neighbourhood in terms of Russian interests (Wojna, Gniazdowski, 2009). Poland believes that aid in the socio-political and economic transformations in Eastern Europe must be one of the main objectives of the EU, achievement of which cannot be treated depending on the development of relations between the EU and Russia.

Poland has shown a particular interest in the future development of the relations of the enlarged EU and its eastern neighbours early in its efforts to join the European Union in 1998. It was confirmed and clearly outlined in the document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, adopted in July 2001, entitled *Eastern Policy of the European Union in the context of its enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: the Polish vision*. In December 2002, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs detailed the Polish approach to the EU's Eastern policy as a non-paper with Polish proposals for future relations between the enlarged EU and its new eastern neighbours (Non-paper, 2003). This document was provided for future EU membership for the countries of Eastern Europe, which was to serve the main EU policy instrument towards Ukraine, Moldova and possibly Belarus, aimed to encourage the modernisation processes in these countries. It was obvious that the priority was given to relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, while Russia was assigned to the secondary role.

The Polish paper emphasizes the particular importance of Ukraine to Europe: "As far as Ukraine is concerned, it is in our opinion in the interest of the enlarged EU to recognise the European choice of this country, which is so important for stability and security in the eastern part of the continent. It is also in its interest to appreciate gearing long-term European policy towards the country's membership of the EU. Although Ukraine's progress in reforms and some aspects of its internal as well as foreign policy are disappointing and are a source of our

concern, the policy of critical engagement, dialogue and developing co-operation combined with assistance seems for us to be the most effective and relevant. Otherwise we would risk weakening reformistand pro-European forces in Ukraine" (Non-paper, 2003, p. 88).

Polish offers were discussed during the debate on the future relationship of the enlarged EU with its Eastern neighbours. This discussion ended with a result of a concept of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which was implemented in May 2004. However, not being a member of the EU then, Poland had a restricted impact on the final format of the EU policy towards its eastern neighbours.

After joining the EU, Poland has been actively involved in various activities aimed at developing the EU's Eastern policy. Warsaw collaborates closely with other Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) to strengthen the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Menkiszak, 2014). These problems often become the subject of consultation with the Baltic countries. Poland aims to revise and improve the ENP so that it takes into account the expectations of the Eastern European countries, as well as to convince the _old_ EU members to develop closer relationships with the latter.

In 2006–2007, the Polish government institutions prepared the following documents: _The European Neighbourhood Policy – Eastern Dimension_, and _The EU–Ukraine Relations: Polish proposals_, which emphasised that the format of the European Neighbourhood Policy was unsatisfactory because it combined different states of historical, geographical and civilizational ways of regions (Eastern Europe and North Africa). While the EU eastern neighbours are European neighbours, European countries, the neighbours on the South are not European ones. Moreover, Poland required balancing in funding the Eastern and Southern areas of the ENP. In April 2008, the Polish Sejm Speaker B. Komorowski criticized the fact that 70% of funds for Neighbourhood goes to the South (Menkiszak, 2014).

Poland has also repeatedly pointed on differences between Southern and Eastern dimensions of the ENP, in particular, that the latter lacks the mechanisms of multilateral cooperation. Polish efforts in this direction led to adopt by the European Council in December 2007 the Polish–Lithuanian Proposals to develop the Southern and Eastern dimensions of the ENP by not only bilateral but also by multilateral action (Wojna, Gniazdowski, 2009).

Polish government continues to advocate for further enlargement of the EU, with a special focus on Ukraine. President Kaczynski at all occasions stressed that his country was interested in maintaining _Door to Europe_ open for Ukraine and that the EU needs further enlargement (Mościbrodzki, 2015, p. 28). President

Komorowski in October 2010 noted that the European Union should not stop the enlargement process and close to Ukraine the European integration prospects (Mościbrodzki, 2015, p. 28).

POLAND AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

The chances of implementation of Polish intentions towards Eastern policy increased in 2008, which was caused by the activities of France in the Mediterranean area. In March 2008, after European Council Meeting where leaders of the EU member states approved the project of the Union for the Mediterranean, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland R. Sikorski promised to soon submit proposals for deepening ties with its Eastern neighbours within the European Neighbourhood Policy. Poland hoped that after the adoption of initiatives aimed at strengthening the Southern dimension of the ENP, it will be easier to obtain support of the EU to deepen relations with its Eastern neighbours (Sydoruk, 2012).

Eastern Partnership initiative was presented jointly by Poland and Sweden at the meeting of foreign ministers on May 26th–27th, 2008. It should be noted that the Czech Republic, thus in April 2008, presented its own initiatives to deepen the Eastern dimension of the ENP, and provided strong support for this initiative. Prague also participated in developing more detailed Polish-Swedish project of the Eastern Partnership, which was submitted to the European Commission in October 2008 (Wojna, Gniazdowski, 2009).

Later Poland focused on campaigning for support for the Eastern Partnership initiative in the EU structures and Member States[1]. Polish politicians and government officials held intensive consultations with the European Commission aimed at incorporating proposals contained in the project of the Eastern Partnership and in the European Commission's forthcoming Communication on this issue. Poland also sought to create a *front* of countries that would support Eastern Partnership. November 24th, 2008, in Warsaw, a meeting of the Visegrad Group took place, where Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, and

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[1] See: *Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o Zadaniach Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej w 2009 r*. Typescript of the 35th Sitting of the 6th Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 12 February 2009. Retrieved from: www.sejm.gov.pl.; [accessed 2.03.2014]; *Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers*. Warsaw, 5 November 2008. Retrieved from: http://www.msz.gov.pl; [accessed 2.03.2014].

Sweden also participated. The participants were in favor of the EU to offer its Eastern neighbours new forms of cooperation within the Eastern Partnership in order to help them get closer to EU norms and standards, to create a free trade zone and start the process to facilitate the movement of citizens, which in the long term will *abolish* the visa regime. Poland also conducted intensive consultation with Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other Member States at different levels.

In the onset, the absence of any mention of the possibility of enlargement to the East in the Eastern Partnership project has caused some reservations among some Polish political forces. For example, the largest opposition political party – *Law and Justice* (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*) called the project insufficiently ambitious. Nonetheless, ultimately none of the Polish political forces opposed the Eastern Partnership.

Poland, like other EU Member States who support enlargement eastwards, sees the Eastern Partnership as a pragmatic response to the "enlargement fatigue". From Polish point of view, if the initiative directly discussed the possibility of the EU enlargement, it would not have any chance of being approved by all its Member States. In addition, the current format of the Eastern Partnership can help the recipients actually become closer to the EU and to prepare them for potential full membership in the future. The Association Agreements, the introduction of free trade area and visa liberalization will play an important role in this process. Finally, a report on foreign policy, presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sikorski in the Sejm in 2009, also confirms that Poland has not abandoned the pursuit of the EU enlargement to the East.

It seems that Poland, as the largest border country in the eastern part of the EU, should naturally become the representative of the EU's Eastern policy. Particular stress has been put on relations with Ukraine, which is a new neighbour for the EU, but a traditional partner for Poland, collaborating with responsibility in shaping the EU's relations with its other eastern partners, e.g., Russia and Belarus, which is sometimes hard.

The Polish government intended to intensify its activity for improving the Eastern Partnership during its Presidency in the second half of 2011. Polish politicians intended to make their first attempts at encouraging other states to strengthen their relations with the Eastern neighbours at the Budapest summit concluding the Hungarian Presidency of the EU. They expected that they would be able to convince, in particular, the countries of the Visegrad Group to strengthen the eastern direction of the EU policy.

Notwithstanding the aims and hopes for Polish Presidency, almost all experts and politicians admit a complete Polish failure in the sphere of Eastern Partnership, namely, Eastern Partnership summit, which took place in September 2011 in Warsaw. European Commissioner for Budget Janusz Lewandowski states that the EU Eastern Partnership Summit could not bring better results. *However, this meeting reminded the EU that Europe does not end on the river Bug… We did everything we could, unfortunately, neither Ukraine nor Belarus helped us*, added Commissioner (Sydoruk, 2012, p. 123).

Eastern dimension of the Polish Presidency in the EU has been important but turned out to be a big political defeat, said Krzysztof Szczerski, politician of opposition party Law and Justice. He added that in the case of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, steps of progression and regression occurred. Another opposition politician, Konrad Szymański, pointed out that Warsaw allowed French and German position in eastern affairs being imposed upon itself, and their position was reluctant to deepen political and economic relations between the EU and Eastern Partnership countries, namely Ukraine (Sydoruk, 2012, p. 123).

Nevertheless, the Polish authorities claimed success in Eastern policy in the official rapport of the results of Polish Presidency in the EU: *Established development and strengthening of the Eastern Partnership should be considered completed. We have successfully carried out the second Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw. The participants adopted the Joint Declaration, according to the demands of the presidency: the records confirming the intention to further enhance the integration of partner countries with the EU, recognizing their European aspirations, the pursuit of economic integration with the EU market and to establish a visa-free regime, as well as the deepening of cooperation sector and opening of EU agencies and programs for the citizens of the partner countries.* The document also referred to the commitment of the EU to devote to achieving the objectives of the Eastern Partnership of 1.9 billion euro in 2010–2013, this amount was further increased by the EU of 150 million euro, allocated for the period up to 2013… *The unity of the EU concerning the policy towards Belarus during the presidency has been maintained*[2].

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[2]   See: *Przewodnictwo Polski w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Raport końcowy z przygotowania i sprawowania prezydencji złożony przez Pełnomocnika Rządu ds. Przygotowania Organów Administracji Rządowej i Sprawowania przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską Przewodnictwa w Radzie Unii Europejskiej na podstawie § 1 pkt 2 Rozporządzenia Rady Ministrów z dnia 15 lipca 2008 r.* (Dz.U. Nr 133, poz. 843 z późn. zm.). Rada Ministrów, 2012.

In March 2012, Polish government adopted the first multiannual foreign policy strategy since 1989 – *The Priorities of Polish Foreign Policy 2012–2016* (Priorytety polskiej polityki zagranicznej)[3]. The strengthening of influence on Polish Eastern policy and European Eastern Neighbourhood was one of the main objectives of this key document. Here was also mentioned that Poland should support the liberalization of visa regime and creation of free trade areas with Eastern European states. Developing relations with Ukraine, as a strategic partner, has a great importance for Warsaw.

POSITION OF POLAND ON THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

Poland has been responding to the crisis in Ukraine since its early days. The Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, the question of signing the Association Agreement with Ukraine and prevent of further violence in Ukraine were central issues in Polish bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the Ukrainian government and its EU and NATO partners. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, together with his French and German counterparts, were intermediary in negotiations between the protesters and the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych on February 20th, 2014, aiming at ending the violence and encouraging the dialogue between Euromaidan and V. Yanukovych. However, despite its early activity and practical action, Poland was not included into the "Normandy format".

President Bronisław Komorowski and Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and Defence Minister Tomasz Siemoniak condemned the annexation of the Crimea and the Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine. B. Komorowski in an interview with German radio station on August 30th, 2014 stated the fact of Russian invasion in Ukraine, warned Europe on the policy of appeasement of Russia, supported sanctions against Moscow, and called for the strengthening of the eastern flank of NATO (Kyrydon, Troyan, 2015).

From then onwards, Poland has been focusing primarily on actions that could be implemented within the European and transatlantic organisations in response to the Russia's behaviour. Within the European Union, Poland supported the visa restrictions and economic sanctions against Moscow, and their expansion in

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[3] See: *Priorytety Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2012–2016*, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Rzeczpospolita Polska. Retrieved from: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/prioryte-ty_polityki_zagr_2012_2016; [accessed 2.03.2014].

response to the continuing military aggression of Russia against Ukraine; within NATO, Poland actively advocated for confirmation guarantees of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty through practical steps to strengthen the territorial security of the eastern suburbs of the Alliance. Poland defended the idea of increasing the presence of allied troops on the northeast side during the preparations for the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014.

Poland has allocated 100 million euro credit assistance to Ukraine and 2.5 million to the scholarship programme for students of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, Crimea (in 2015). Ukraine was also provided a humanitarian assistance by more than \$1 million. The Polish government also allocated 170 000 euro for treatment and rehabilitation of the Ukrainian military (85 people) (Ua.112, 2015).

As to the military assistance to Kyiv, officially Warsaw did not take a clear position. It is willing to sell weapons to Ukraine, but does not propose any specific decisions on this matter. The continuous discussions on the weapon supply to Ukraine show that when it comes to the military aspects of the conflict, the Polish reaction to the Russian invasion into Ukraine is not univocal.

Such situation caused a barrage of criticism of the government for allegedly drifting in the conflict in Ukraine. Namely, Poland agreed to limit its military assistance to Ukraine with non-lethal equipment, it postponed the entry into force of the fourth chapter of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU related to the deep and comprehensive free trade area, and had more than modest results at the NATO summit in Wales. The legendary leader of Solidarity Zbigniew Bujak called the passivity of the Polish authorities on Ukraine a "treason" (Polska na granicy zdrady, 2015).

The behaviour of the Polish Government follows a certain logic: Poland will not affect the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, the best that the Polish government can do is act systematically with partners in the EU and NATO. As newly appointed Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz said in her address to the Sejm on October 1st, 2014:... *it is important to prevent the isolation of Poland as a result of unrealistic targets it sets for itself* (Baranowski, Cichocki, 2015, p. 36). Another statement was made by Grzegorz Schetyna, successor of Radosław Sikorski as foreign minister, towards the Sejm on November 6th, 2014: *The rush of isolationism and anti-Western sentiments and denial of European values will build a wall that will separate Russia from Europe. Critical assessment of the policy of Russia does not change the fact that we will remain neighbours and economic partners* (Baranowski, Cichocki, 2015, p. 36).

This position is not surprising, taking into consideration that at the beginning of the first term, the D. Tusk government's Eastern policy was based upon the fact that open scepticism towards the EU co-operation with Russia and too much ambition on EU relations with Ukraine could lead to isolation of Poland on the international arena, as it was under the previous 2005–2008 government. Hence, the Polish government offered Russia a "normalisation" in 2008, hoping that it would return Poland into the mainstream of the policies of the EU and NATO and improve its position in these organisations. Some subsequent events may indicate that this assumption was correct, including D. Tusk election as the President of the European Council.

Despite the importance of the official position of Warsaw, what should be noted is also an extremely high level of support for Ukraine from Polish public. Many Poles, journalists, politicians, diplomats, students, human rights activists, volunteers, have become direct participants of Euromaidan and events in Eastern Ukraine. According to surveys of the Fund "Transatlantic Trends", 78% of Poles are in favour of economic assistance to Ukraine, 77% supported sanctions against Russia, and 67% supported aid to Ukraine, even if it will increase the danger of conflict with Russia (Baranowski, Cichocki, 2015, p. 35). Jarek Podworski, a member of association "Generation" in Katowice, organiser of humanitarian convoys to the Maidan and ATO combatants, points out: *In Poland, first and foremost, the society worried about Ukraine, not the state... We were collecting warm clothes and money to the Maidan and ATO. This was not done by the state, but by donations of ordinary Poles, private foundations and volunteers...* (Loginov, 2015).

As for the prognosis, we need to talk about the willingness of Poland – at the level of Warsaw officials and Polish society, and systematically at the EU and NATO levels – to continue supporting Ukraine. Poland realises that stability and security in Ukraine is a guarantee of its own stability and security. If the "Normandy format" (repeatedly publicly criticised by Polish President A. Duda as German-French tandem that does not reflect the true position of the EU and whose activities are not always in the interests of Ukraine) exhaust its potential, Warsaw must play a more active role in the new diplomatic forums aimed at resolving the conflict. In this respect, Poland should intensify its activities when it comes to offer new ideas for the long term. It seems that the format of the Weimar triangle, that once worked well in terms of promoting European integration of Poland, could be useful in the settlement of certain aspects of Russian-Ukrainian conflict. These capabilities have been demonstrated during the *Ukrainian crisis*,

as it was discussed above. Today, there are favourable circumstances for deeper involvement of Poland in the EU's Eastern policy formation within the mechanisms of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership – it is the presidency of the former Polish Prime Minister D. Tusk in the European Council and his close interaction with A. Merkel (whose grandfather was Pole).

CONCLUSIONS

Poland's attempt to reconstruct and consolidate its place in Europe after the collapse of communism plays a significant role in formulating its policies towards its Eastern neighbours and its preferences for EU policies towards its Eastern neighbours. Polish decision-makers clearly see Poland's role in the East as a promoter of the EU's norms, translator of the EU's law, and an *intelligent agent*. The EaP initiative constitutes an important part of Poland's attempt to re-establish itself firmly in Europe through positioning itself as the lynchpin between the West and the East, both in a normative sense and institutionally. Poland's decision-makers realised that becoming a big and influential EU member is possible through negotiation and understanding of the EU's policy-making processes. This contends that the consensus between political realism and idealism in Poland's foreign policy may be possible to achieve through the advancement of European norms and values in Polish foreign policy.

The Polish political and intellectual elites have attempted to reconcile their perception of Poland as a big and important state with the realistic objective of implementing their national objectives in the EU.

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SOCIAL-POLITICAL STUDIES

THE STRUCTURE OF TRANSITIONAL REMEMBRANCE POLICY. A REPORT ON INTERNAL CORRELATIONS*

STRUKTURA TRANZYCYJNEJ POLITYKI HISTORYCZNEJ. RAPORT Z BADAŃ KORELACJI WEWNĘTRZNYCH

*Joanna Marszałek-Kawa**, Patryk Wawrzyński****

—— **ABSTRACT** ——

The research report presents results of the comparative study on relationships between remembrance narratives and transitional identity policy. It is based on the qualitative-to-quantitative narrative analysis of six cases: Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, South Africa, and Spain. It discusses internal correlations within the structure of transitional remembrance policy with reference to three levels of analysis: the general level, the areas of impact (objectives of the policy) level, and the fields of impact (aims of the policy) level. As a result, it offers two models – the General Model of Correlations, and the Model of Internal Correlations. These two drawings show main features of remembrance story-telling during democratisations, and they develop present

—— **ABSTRAKT** ——

Raport prezentuje wyniki badań porównawczych nad związkami między narracjami pamięci a tranzycyjną polityką tożsamości. Badania zrealizowane zostały poprzez zastosowanie jakościowo-ilościowej analizy narratywnej sześciu przypadków: Chile, Estonii, Gruzji, Hiszpanii, Polski i Południowej Afryki. Arrykuł omawia wewnętrzne korelacje w ramach struktury tranzycyjnej polityki historycznej w odniesieniu do trzech poziomów analizy: ogólnego, przestrzeni oddziaływania (celów polityki) i pól oddziaływania (zadań polityki). W efekcie przedstawia dwa modele – ogólny model korelacji i model korelacji wewnętrznych. Nakreślają one najważniejsze cechy opowiadania o przeszłości w toku demokratyzacji i rozwijają obecne rozumienie

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understandings on the way in which historical arguments may influence transitional identity reconstruction.

Keywords: remembrance narratives, story-telling, democratisation, transformations, comparative analysis

sposobu, w jaki argumenty historyczne mogą oddziaływać na tranzycyjną rekonstrukcję tożsamości narodowej.

Słowa kluczowe: narracje pamięci, opowiadanie, demokratyzacja, transformacje, analiza porównawcza

POLITICS OF DEMOCRATISATION AND REMEMBRANCE STORY-TELLING

The changes of the last four decades has established democratisation as the key concept within contemporary political science. Following Barbara Geddes (1999), we may ask ourselves what do we know about this process, and are we closer to understand how it develops and changes social and political structures. Previous studies have showed us how democratisation influences economic growth (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008) and what are its origins, general features and basic rules (Blind, 2013; Bogaards, 2016; Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010; Geddes, 2009; Godlewski, 2014; Kadivar & Caren, 2016). However, we may still identify spaces where the democratisation seems to be unexplored, and where political science is not able to deliver explanations based on research evidence. One of these topics is a dynamic of relationships between the democratisation and remembrance story-telling.

Despite the advanced development of political science and memory studies over recent decades, the consolidation of these disciplines has not been realised yet. We know that remembrance narratives are an effective political asset to legitimise government's strategies, decisions or actions, to shape contents of social identities and shared values, to mobilise citizens and involve them in ongoing political processes, as well as to manipulate citizens' commitment to the public life (Khalili, 2007, p. 222; Westen, 2008, p. 41–49; Wawrzyński, 2015, p. 160–166; Wawrzyński et al., 2015, p. 126–127; Kącka, 2015, p. 63–66). The interest in a role of politicised remembrance during political transitions has led us to the question of how governments use interpretations of the past to support their policy during democratisations. But we have not stopped there and we have followed it with another question: what we can learn about the nature of democratisation from the structure of transitional remembrance story-telling?

In this report we would like to present some results of our comparative study on relations between transitional identity politics and the government's remembrance policy (Marszałek-Kawa & Wawrzyński, 2016). We have investigated how transitional political leadership uses interpretations of the national history to support the promoted vision of a democratic society. Therefore, we have placed the politicised remembrance in the complex landscape of transitional narratives and we have referred it to the future-oriented nature of democratisation. The application of qualitative-to-quantitative narrative analysis enabled us to code collected data, and – then – to observe relationships within a structure of transitional remembrance story-telling. As a result, we were able to measure a degree of significance for different items[1] and a strength of correlations between them. Moreover, we were able to draw evidence-based models of the government's remembrance policy during democratisation.

In our study we compared six cases of post-authoritarian transformations in Chile, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, South Africa, and Spain. The selected sample represented different types of democratisation and each country is characterised by different features (Marszałek-Kawa et al., 2016a, p. 9–10; Marszałek-Kawa et al., 2016b, p. 19–21). Our investigations considered eight areas of transitional story-telling as legitimisation of: (1) new elites, (2) former elites presence in post-authoritarian public life, (3) adopted model of transitional justice or a lack of it, (4) social and economic costs of transformations, (5) introducing new social and political standards, (6) symbolic roles of democratisation, (7) need for national unity, and (8) new state's role in international politics. These areas were divided into thirty-seven fields of impact that represented individual aspects where the multifactor analysis and the extended literature review showed possible links between transitional identity politics and remembrance story-telling. This division enabled us to observe the structure on three different levels: the general comparative level, the areas of impact level, and the fields of impact level. As a result, we were able to identify significant relations not only between same-class items, but also to cross all three levels of analysis and to discuss advanced features of the transitional remembrance policy.

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[1] In the study we used a five-level Likert-type scale, where 1 point represented very low degree of impact on identity politics during democratisation, 2 points – low degree, 3 points – moderate degree, 4 points – high degree, and 5 points – very high degree (see: Marszałek-Kawa & Wawrzyński, 2016).

THE GENERAL MODEL OF CORRELATIONS

The fundamental aspect of our study was to identify correlations between the general shape of transitional remembrance story-telling and individual aspects of this process. On the second level of analysis, we have noticed that the most significant influence on a degree in which governments used remembrance narratives had presentation of symbolic – trans – and intergenerational – roles of democratisation ($r = 0.96$) and explanation of social and economic costs of transformation ($r = 0.91$). Less influential were legitimisation of the transitional justice ($r = 0.71$) and explanation of new social and political standards ($r = 0.67$). Correlations for other four research categories – as it is presented on Image 1. – were weak and rather irrelevant to the general model.

On the third level of analysis our comparative study has delivered some informative observations that may help us to understand which aspects of the remembrance story-telling are essential during democratisations. The strongest correlations we have observed for two fields of impact – use of the national history to explain adopted procedures of transitional justice as a punishment of human rights violators or authoritarian criminals (item 3–2; $r = 0.81$), and adaptation of popularised narratives on the past to symbolic needs of the democratisation (6–3; $r = 0.84$). Moreover, the first item was strongly correlated with the explanation of social and economic costs of transformation ($r = 0.96$), while the second one with the presentation of symbolic roles of the changes ($r = 0.91$), therefore, their relations with the general shape are clearly seen on two different levels.

The discovery of these multi-level relationships has encouraged us to consider an indirect influence on the general shape. We have noticed that there are two relevant areas of impact and two relevant fields of impact. Thus, we asked ourselves, which items were correlated with their average scores. For social and economic costs that were: transitional justice as a legitimisation of the rule of law (3–1; $r = 0.87$), discussed above transitional justice as a punishment for human right violators (3–2; $r = 0.96$), and new organisation of time as a medium to transfer ideas from elites to the society (6–5; $r = 0.84$). For symbolic roles of democratisation that were: remembrance narratives as an inspiration for a new definition of patriotism (5–4; $r = 0.84$), discussed above adaptation of stories to needs of the democratisation (6–3; $r = 0.91$), and narratives on national heroes as a source of knowledge on democratic and civic models of political behaviour (6–4; $r = 0.90$). When we moved to the field of impact level, we noticed that

transitional justice as a punishment was observably correlated with three items: presentation of dealing with the past as a legitimisation of the rule of law (3–1; r = 0.85), historical justifications of new economic attitudes and behaviours (4–2; r = 0.88), and new organisation of time as means to transfer ideas from elites to the society (6–5; r= 0.88), while the pro-democratic selection of narratives was correlated with: explanation of former elites presence in public life as a historical legitimisation of democracy (2–2; r = 0.85), remembrance narratives as an inspiration for a new definition of patriotism (5–4; r = 0.88), national heroes as role models of democratic and civic behaviour (6–4; r = 0.87), and the past as a justification of the need for national unity (7–1; r = 0.94).


Image 1. The General Model of Correlations between the shape of transitional remembrance policy and its objectives and aims. In black—positive correlations, in red—negative correlations

Source: Marszałek-Kawa et al., 2016b, p. 103.

It is obvious that two fields of impact that are directly correlated with the general shaper – transitional justice as a punishment (3–2) and pro-democratic selection of narratives (6–3) – are essential for the structure of transitional remembrance policy. But what about other aspects of story-telling during democratisation? Four items – transitional justice as a legitimisation of the rule of law (3–1), remembrance narratives as an inspiration for a new definition of patriotism (5–4), commemoration of national heroes as a source of democratic and civic role models (6–4), and new organisation of time as means to transfer ideas from elites to the society (6–5) – were correlated both with relevant areas and relevant field, so they should also be considered as essential for the structure. Among remaining four items we agreed to highlight two – historical explanations of new economic attitudes and behaviours (4–2), and the past as a legitimisation of the need for national unity (7–1) – that were semi-relevant to the general shape of transitional remembrance story-telling (4–2: r = 0.72, 7–1: r = 0.63). As a result, our considerations delivered a draft theoretical framework of **eight significant relationships** within the structure of transitional remembrance policy (described with reference to a process of identity reconstruction during democratisation). This framework not only informs us about the way how governments narrate the past and transform the remembrance into a valuable political asset, but it also shows which narrative aspects increase the general significance of historical argumentation during post-authoritarian transformations. Therefore, these results may lead us to interesting conclusions on the nature of the democratisation in general, as they show which topics are more significant for intensity of transitional government's remembrance story-telling (Marszałek-Kawa et al., 2016b, p. 102–108).

THE MODEL OF INTERNAL CORRELATIONS

It is obvious that the General Model presents only a small part of the complex picture. It only slightly discusses relationships between items, which – as we have shown in the case of indirect correlations – can be used to answer a question: what shapes transitional remembrance policy? In fact, we may consider at least three different groups of these relationship that can be classified with reference to levels of analysis. And inclusion of them enables us to identify another features of remembrance story-telling during democratisations.

Firstly, we measured how strong correlations are between areas of impact (objectives of the policy). Besides two significant relations between the general shape and categories that we have discussed in the previous section, we have observed three interesting links within investigated area. The strongest one characterised relationship between justification of the selected model of transitional justice and explanation of social and economic costs of transformations (r = 0.85). Social costs were also linked with symbolic roles of the change (r = 0.83), a fact which one cannot be surprised by in the face of previously discussed general results. Moreover, legitimisation of the presence of former regime's representatives in the nation's public life was significantly correlated with the use of the past to justify the historical need for national unity (r = 0.81). Other relations between categories were weaker and in few cases there was almost no correlations between individual areas of impact.

Secondly, we studied correlations within areas of impact. In general, we identified thirteen cases of strong relationships that should be included in our considerations of the transitional remembrance's structure. The legitimisation of new elites was influenced by the use of the past to justify their dominant position (item 1–1; r = 0.86), use of national symbols and heroes as a source of legitimisation (1–3; r = 0.80), and justification of their position as a result of historical necessity of internal conflicts prevention (1–5; r = 0.88). The explanation of former elites' presence in democratic life was correlated with explanation of their involvement as a legitimisation of democracy and pluralism (2–2; r = 0.89) and as a definition of the democratic competition and the pluralist society (2–3; r = 0.96). The justification of transitional justice procedures was connected with its presentation as a legitimisation of the rule of law (3–1; r = 0.96) and as a source of forgiveness (3–2; r= 0.96). In case of social and economic costs and popularisation of new social and political standards, no strong internal correlations were observed in the selected sample. The explanation of symbolic roles of the change was highly influenced by pro-democratic selection of narratives (6–3; r = 0.91) and presentation of national heroes as role-models of democratic and civic behaviour (6–4; r = 0.90). The justification of the need for national unity was observably connected with the use of the past as a reason for national unity (7–1; r = 0.89) and historical motivation for reconciliation and forgiveness (7–2; r = 0.83). The last category, the new state's identity in international politics, was correlated with the use of the past as a reason for new international aspirations of a country (8–1; r = 0.90) and presentation of new role within the

international community as an accomplishment of transitional objectives and a historical challenge (8–2; r = 0.93). It shows that only fourteen of thirty-seven aims of remembrance policy have an impact on the way in which governments realise transitional objectives of historical story-telling.

Image 2. The Model of Internal Correlations between the transitional remembrance policy's fields of impact, including correlations stronger than r=0.80. In black – positive correlations, in red—negative correlations

Source: Marszałek-Kawa et al., 2016b, p. 72.

Thirdly, we investigated correlations between individual fields of impact (aims of the policy). Within categories we observed ten of them – item 1–1 with item 1–3 (r = 0.82), 2–1 with 2–2 (r = 0.89), 2–2 with 2–3 (r = 0.94), 3–1 with 3–2 (r = 0.85) and with 3–3 (r = 0.98!), 5–2 with 5–4 (r = 0.88), 6–3 with 6–4 (r = 0.87), 7–1 with 7–2 (r = 0.88), 7–3 with 7–4 (r = 0.87), and 8–1 with 8–2

(r = 0.80)[2]. Besides them, we identified other thirty-nine positive correlations between categories and next – twelve negative ones. The composition of them enabled us to draw the Model of Internal Correlations – presented on Image 2. – which offers a complex map of all observed strong correlations between fields of impact. For items assigned to new political elites we noticed eleven positive and five negative relations, for presence of former elites – eighteen positive and one negative, for transitional justice – fourteen positive and two negative, for social and economic costs – twelve positive and three negative, for new social and political standards – thirteen positive and four negative, for symbolic roles of democratisation – nineteen positive and one negative, for national unity – seventeen positive and one negative, and finally, for new role in international politics – four positive and seven negative correlations (Marszałek-Kawa et al., 2016b, p. 75–80).

The Model of Internal Correlations shows us which spheres of transitional remembrance policy have the most significant impact on its other objectives or aims. On average, the highest correlations rate per a field characterises the need for national unity (5.00) that has the strongest links with the presence of former regime's representatives and the explanation of democratisation's symbolic roles. Slightly less correlations per one item we observed for legitimisations of transitional justice (4.50), justification of former regimes' representatives in democratic public life (4.20), and explanations of symbolic roles of the democratisation (4.20). Less than four links per one field we identified for social costs of transformations (3.75), adaptation of new standards (3.60), new role in international politics (3.00), and legitimisation of the dominant position of new elites (2.63)[3].

Moreover, the Model presents spheres that have the strongest negative impact on the general intensity of transitional remembrance story-telling – the highest average per one field we observed for new state's identity in international relations (1.75, what is more than a half of all observed correlations for this area), position of new elites (0.83), new standards (0.80), social costs (0.75), transitional justice (0.50), national unity (0.25), presence of former elites (0.20), and symbolic roles of the change (0.20). Therefore, the use of remembrance narratives to legitimise state's new international position was involved in seven of twelve negative correlations: three times with new elites, twice with transitional justice

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[2] For explanation of the coded names, see the annex.
[3] Correlations between categories were counted once, while correlations within categories were counted as two-sided.

and once with social costs and new standards. Other negative correlations linked new elites with symbolic explanation of the democratisation and adaptation of new standards, former elites with social costs, as well as new standards with social costs and with national unity. These observations show us an additional context of the dynamic of politicised remembrance during democratisations.

DRAFT CONCLUSIONS

In this research report we have presented the most significant results of our investigations on relations within the structure of transitional remembrance policy. The application of qualitative-to-quantitative narrative analysis enabled us to investigate links between individual objectives and aims of this policy in a context of governmental involvement in identity politics during democratisation. As a result, we present theoretical models that develop current state-of-arts in studies on political transformations and that may deliver valuable perspective for the theory of democratisation.

Our comparative study has delivered evidence to support a hypothesis that the intensity of use of remembrance narratives to explain symbolic roles of the change and justify social and economic costs of transformations has the strongest impact on the general intensity of remembrance story-telling during transition. It means that governments which try to present the national history as an argument for understanding the process in a wider, trans – and intergenerational context and which use it to explain long-lasting causes of social stratification and economic inequalities are more probable to be characterised by a higher interest in historical argumentation in general. However, as we noticed limitations of this discovery, we used our findings to construct a developed research tool – based on eight most relevant fields of impact – that can be used to predict the intensity of transitional remembrance story-telling (Marszałek-Kawa et al., 2016b, p. 102–108).

ANNEX ONE

The Intensity of Use and the Strength of Correlations for Transitional Remembrance Policy's Areas and Field of Impact

Research category	Code	Field of impact	Intensity	Correlation
Legitimization of new elites	1–1	The past as a legitimization	**3,67**	0.37
	1–2	Use of the idea of state's continuity	**3,17**	0.12
	1–3	Use of national symbols and heroes	3,00	0.44
	1–4	New landscape of memory	2,67	-0.36
	1–5	Counteracting internal conflicts	2,17	0.46
	1–6	Remembrance as a source of reconciliation	1,67	0.27
		average:	**2,72**	**0.31**
Presence of the former elite	2–1	Counteracting internal conflicts	3,67	0.39
	2–2	As a legitimization of democracy	3,00	0.43
	2–3	As a definition of pluralism	2,00	0.27
	2–4	Building new political community	2,83	0.30
	2–5	Division between the past and the present	1,50	-0.66
		average:	**2,60**	**0.46**
Transitional justice	3–1	As a legitimization of the rule of law	2,17	0.67
	3–2	As a punishment for human rights violators	1,50	0.81
	3–3	As a source of forgiveness	2,00	0.56
	3–4	Limited scope of the transitional justice	3,00	0.51
		average:	**2,17**	**0.71**
Social costs of transformations	4–1	The necessity of social costs of change	2,33	0.09
	4–2	New economic attitudes and behaviors	1,17	0.72
	4–3	The past as a source of stratifications	1,50	0.56
	4–4	The legitimization of the capitalism	2,33	0.02
		average:	**1,83**	**0.91**
Adaptation of new social & political standards	5–1	The historical necessity of changes	2,83	0.24
	5–2	The role of the intergenerational agreement	2,33	0.23
	5–3	National heroes as role-models	2,67	0.57
	5–4	Balance between the tradition and the modernization	2,83	0.00
	5–5	The past and a new definition of patriotism	3,00	0.67
		average:	**2,73**	**0.67**

Research category	Code	Field of impact	Intensity	Correlation
Symbolic roles of the democratization	6–1	The intergenerational character of changes	3,67	0.42
	6–2	Democratization as a tribute for victims	2,67	0.64
	6–3	The pro-democratic selection of narratives	3,00	0.84
	6–4	National heroes as examples of behaviors	3,50	0.75
	6–5	New organization of time	2,50	0.59
		average:	**3,07**	**0.96**
Historical need for the national unity	7–1	The past as a legitimization of the national unity	3,50	0.63
	7–2	Reasons for reconciliation and forgiveness	2,83	0.25
	7–3	Diversity of the landscape of memory	2,33	0.07
	7–4	Reconstruction of national heroes' pantheon	2,17	0.46
		average:	**2,71**	**0.56**
New state's identity in international relations	8–1	Reasons for membership in IGOs	2,83	0.19
	8–2	New identity as a fulfillment of transformations	3,17	-0.24
	8–3	(Re-)Gaining an appropriate position in IR	3,83	-0.18
	8–4	Adaptation of new standards	2,17	0.11
		average:	**3,00**	**-0.04**
general average:			**2,63**	-

Degrees of the use of remembrance narratives: 1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – moderate, 4 – high, 5 – very high.

Calculations by Patryk Wawrzyński.

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BROKEN DEMOCRACY, PREDATORY STATE AND NATIONALIST POPULISM (PART 2)

ZEPSUTA DEMOKRACJA, PAŃSTWO DRAPIEŻCZE I NACJONALISTYCZNY POPULIZM (CZĘŚĆ 2)

András Bozóki*

——— **ABSTRACT** ———

The main aim of the article is to try to analyze the functioning of Victor Orbán's regime in Hungary in the period from 2010. Analyses oscillate between considering issues such as the development of democracy in Hungary after 1990, history and background of functioning of the Fidesz party, and the course of Orbán's exercise of power. In the paper, the reasons behind the taking of power by Fidesz party were analyzed by taking into account the specifics of Hungarian democratic experience after 1989, processes of state's reforms and economic crises. The article ends with the analysis of five pillars of Victor Orbán's policies.

Keywords: system transition, political parties, Hungary, Victor Orbán, Fidesz, democracy

——— **ABSTRAKT** ———

Głównym celem artykułu jest próba analizy funkcjonowania „reżimu" Victora Orbana na Węgrzech w okresie od 2010 roku. Rozważania oscylują wokół takich zagadnień, jak: rozwój demokracji na Węgrzech od 1990 roku, historia i tło funkcjonowania partii Fidesz oraz przebieg sprawowania władzy przez Orbana. W tekście podjęto analizę przyczyn przejęcia władzy przez Fidesz, odwołując się do doświadczeń węgierskiej demokracji od 1989 roku, procesów reformowania kraju i kryzysów ekonomicznych. Artykuł wieńczy analiza pięciu filarów władzy Victora Orbana.

Słowa kluczowe: tranzycja systemowa, partie polityczne, Węgry, Viktor Orban, Fidesz, demokracja

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THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE SYSTEM

As a result of events described in the first part of the article, Hungary, a member state of the European Union, which used to be a consolidated democracy, has suddenly found itself skating on thin ice. The uniqueness of the situation lies in the fact that there is no example for a reverse transition within the European Union so far. No EU member state has ever returned from democracy to autocracy. Perhaps the most troublesome development of this reverse trend was the constitutional *coup d'état* which created a one-party constitution in April 2011 (Basic Law) that went into effect on January 1st, 2012. Quoting Kim Lane Scheppele, the "revolutionary" legislation went through the following way: "[Fidesz] won two-thirds of the seats in Parliament in a system where a single two-thirds vote is enough to change the constitution. Twelve times in a year in office, it amended the constitution it inherited. Those amendments removed most of the institutional checks that could have stopped what the government did next – which was to install a new constitution. The new Fidesz constitution was drafted in secret, presented to Parliament with only one month for debate, passed by the votes of only the Fidesz parliamentary bloc, and signed by a president that Fidesz had named. Neither the opposition parties nor civil society organizations nor the general public had any influence in the constitutional process. There was no popular ratification. […] By James Madison's definition, Hungary is on the verge of tyranny. […] Fidesz political party has gathered all the powers of the Hungarian government into its own hands, without checks from any other political quarter and without any limits on what it can do" (Scheppele, 2013).

The new Basic Law approved by the governmental majority was the result of a unilateral governmental process which did not reflect a national consensus. The new text kept several portions of the 1989 Constitution. However, it "protects" individual freedoms by lumping them together with communal interests, and as such, it does not in fact value individual freedoms. The Basic Law openly refers to Hungary as a country based on Christian values, which is not only an exception for Europe, but also unusual among the neighboring Visegrád countries. Though the Basic Law (in one sentence only) formally maintains the form of a republic, it breaks with the essential notion of a republic, by changing the name from "Republic of Hungary" to simply "Hungary". The text increases the role of religion, traditions and national values. It speaks of a unified nation, yet certain social minorities are not mentioned with the same degree of importance.

In its definition of equality before the law, it mentions gender, ethnicity, and religion, but it does not extend this definition to include legal protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The 1989 democratic constitution was inclusive and consensual. By contrast, the new Basic Law serves as an expression of a "national religious belief system" – paganized Christianity – it is a vow, in which Hungarians list all of their sources of pride and hope, and pledge to join hands and build a better future, parallel to Orbán's "system of national cooperation". The Basic Law was signed on the first anniversary of the electoral victory of Fidesz on Easter Monday, April 25th, 2011, which blasphemously claimed to symbolize the alleged rise of Christianity in Hungary. All of this drew bizarre parallels between the rise of Jesus and the new Fidesz constitution, which also made it clear how one is to interpret the "separation" of church and state in Hungary today.

The shortcomings of liberal democracy discussed above, the global economic crisis, and the determined anti-liberal democratic policies of the Fidesz government have together produced a perfect political storm.

Though Fidesz was silent during its 2010 campaign about the most important tasks that it would need to carry out after its anticipated victory, once in power, Orbán began constructing a new system to replace, as he called, the "turbulent decades" of liberal democracy. As a first step, he issued the "declaration of national cooperation", making it obligatory to post this declaration on the walls of all public institutions. In fact, the essence of the new system is that anyone can be a part of "national cooperation" provided they agree with the government. However, those who disagree cannot be a part of the system, because the system is based on submission to the ruling party.

The government majority, upon Orbán's recommendation, chose not to reappoint László Sólyom as President of the Republic, who – while previously making significant pro-Fidesz moves – nevertheless guarded the autonomy of the presidency. Servile Pál Schmitt, a former presidential member of Fidesz and European Parliament representative, was appointed instead. In addition, the new government saw the 1989 Constitution as a heap of purely technical rules, which Orbán had since shaped to fit the needs of his current political agenda. If any of his new laws proved to be unconstitutional, it was not the law, but the Constitution that had to be changed. An extreme example of this was when the parliamentary majority enshrined the concept of "decent morality" into the Constitution in July 2010, and then the provision was removed in November. Meanwhile, it cited "decent morality" only when it suited its interests. As such,

this amendment sent the message that in the name of the "majority" the concept of "decent morality" can be modified at any time.

When, in the autumn of 2010, the Constitutional Court repealed a statute that had retroactive effects which it found to be unconstitutional, Fidesz immediately retaliated by amending the Constitution and limiting the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction. Thus, the Constitutional Court turned from being a controlling body, a real check of the legislature, into a feeble controller of the application of the law overnight. The chairperson of the Constitutional Court hitherto had been chosen by the members from within their own rank. However, according to the new rules, it was the parliament that was to appoint him or her. In addition, the number of judges was increased from eleven to fifteen, and the Court was packed with right-wing personalities and former politicians known to be close to Fidesz. The governmental majority did not (despite the long-standing criticism of the rule) do away with the possibility of re-appointing the judges, and hence they may continue to be kept under check politically.

The propaganda of the government aimed to equate Fidesz voters with "people". Thus, it justified the arbitrary decisions of the government by referring to the "mandate" it has from voters. Public institutions, for instance, have been renamed "government" institutions. Furthermore, the Orbán administration has introduced laws which make it possible to dismiss public employees immediately without justification, and, in this way, to cleanse the entire government apparatus. As a result, central and local public administration has quickly become politicized, riddled with conflicts of interest. All important positions, including those in the independent institutions, have been filled with Fidesz cadres. For the position of the attorney general, they appointed an official who had previously been a Fidesz political candidate, and who subsequently, during the first Orbán government, was the "trusted candidate" for the job. As the President of the Court of Auditors they appointed a person who, until May 2010, had worked as a Fidesz parliamentary representative. Another former Fidesz representative became the President of the Media Authority, and the spouse of an influential Fidesz representative was appointed the head of the newly-created National Judicial Office, which serves as the administrative body of the judicial branch. Similarly, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority and the Budgetary Council came under political party influence. A Fidesz politician became the President of the National Cultural Fund, who simultaneously served as the President of the Parliamentary Cultural Committee, and, for this reason, the person oversaw his own job. A right-leaning government official took charge of the ombudsman

office, thus forever doing away with the independence of the institution. Most of the above-listed cadres have been appointed for nine to twelve years. Therefore, they can stall or indeed prevent subsequent governments from implementing policies that go against those of the current one.

The members of the executive and President Pál Schmitt competed over who would become the most effective "engine" of legislation. They imposed a retroactive, 98% punitive tax on individuals linked to the previous governments. Moreover, they launched a central campaign against certain former politicians, members of the government or office-holders, as well as left-wing and liberal intellectuals, with the aim of criminalizing them. The state-sponsored television news reports increasingly started to resemble criminal shows. Instead of political debates, for example, they broadcast news of denunciations. Furthermore, the attorney general accused former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (2004) of influence-peddling (a statutory crime)[1]. Another example is the smear campaign that was launched against the philosophers and employees of the former Budapest School, who were accused of having received too much support for their research[2]. These latter accusations had anti-Semitic undertones.

State-backed media replaced public radio and television channels. Their programs heavily underrepresented opposition politicians and intellectuals leaning towards the opposition. The media laws of 2010 created a media supervisory authority, and the individuals who are in the decision-making positions of this body are all close to Fidesz. The media authority can issue financial penalties at its discretion for failing to abide by the media laws not only to radio or television programs, but also to print or electronic media, and even to bloggers. The sum of penalties can be so high that media may become completely silenced. The government can apply all sorts of measures to influence the media, ranging from personnel policies to state-led advertising. Its actions are facilitated by the fact that the Hungarian language media market is relatively small and can be fairly easily shaped by financial means. Measures aimed to curtail press freedom

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[1] The official accusation was later dropped due to the lack of evidence.

[2] There was a public accusation and a police investigation against Ágnes Heller and other left-liberal philosophers in Hungary regarding the alleged misuse of public funds. A politically-motivated attack (those allegations that have been tried in court to date have ruled in Heller's favor), the charge against the philosophers has been challenged by intellectuals across the world, including Jürgen Habermas and Julian Nida-Rümelin, who published a letter in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* on January 25th, 2011. An English translation of the letter is available at: http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/01/translation-of-habermas-and-nida-r%C3%BCmelin-on-the-hungarian-situation.html#_ftn1.

(such as controlling the policies of news agencies and state television, the new editing practice of outright forgery and manipulation, and the mass dismissal of employees) created the atmosphere of fear and self-censorship among journalists and television reporters. As a response to the introduction of the media law, the European Parliament stated that these laws violated press freedom. Widespread European protests ensued. Under the pressure from the European Commission, the Hungarian government withdrew some of the provisions of the media law, and the Constitutional Court repealed some of the other provisions. However, the possibility of limiting the freedom of the press remains on the books. The broadcasting operations of Budapest's last opposition radio station, *Klubrádió*, were suspended[3]. In its aftermath, television reporters carried out a hunger strike, calling for honest and transparent public media to be restored.

The minimal requirement of every democracy is to hold free and fair elections, which makes a peaceful change of a government possible. This in turn enables an incoming government to implement policies that are very different from the ones of its predecessor. After coming to power, the Fidesz government filled the National Electoral Commission, the body which is responsible for conducting transparent and smooth elections, with its own people. The government majority, shortly before the municipal elections of the autumn of 2010, changed the electoral laws to make it more difficult for smaller parties to gain seats in local governments. New laws have been passed to govern the parliamentary elections. This means – under the pretext of aiming to reduce the differences between the numbers of voters among electoral districts – a change to a one-round system and a complete redrawing of electoral districts according to partisan interests (i.e., gerrymandering). That said, the boundaries of electoral districts were drawn to make the left-wing districts more populous than those of the right, to ensure that the votes from the left count for less. Until 2014, only the parties who lost an election could receive compensation for the votes cast for the losing candidates; however, from now on, winning parties will also receive additional parliamentary seats as "compensation". The mixed system in place since the 1989 Hungarian

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[3]   The attack on *Klubrádió* represents the last phase of a long lasting tendency, in which, since 2006, Fidesz systematically has occupied countryside media outlets and created their own newspapers, radio and television channels. Among newspapers one can mention *Helyi Téma*, *Metropol*, *Magyar Nemzet*, *Magyar Hírlap*, *Heti Válasz*. As regards radio stations: *Lánchíd Rádió*, *Class FM*, *Mária Rádió*, and television channels: *Hír TV*, *Echo TV*. Since 2010, public radio and television channels have become strongly influenced by government propaganda (the channels of *Magyar Rádió* and *Magyar Televízió*).

Electoral Law largely remained[4], but the proportionality of the system further decreased. The total number of parliamentary representatives radically decreased (from 386 to 199), so there are fewer electoral districts and they are generally larger.

Overall, the new electoral law aimed to filter out smaller parties and political opponents. Meanwhile, Hungary became one of Europe's least proportionate electoral systems, by maintaining the 5% threshold to enter the parliament, and by increasing the number of representatives to be elected in the individual districts to the detriment of the spots to be gained for the votes cast to party lists. The goal of the new law was to increase the chances of Fidesz to win an election, to be achieved by reducing the electoral campaign period, removing policy issues from elections, banning campaign advertisements in the commercial media, and by mobilizing voters to keep presumably opposition voters away from polling stations. The electoral procedures in the law tied the participation in an election to previous permanent addresses, which affects the lower tiers of society, especially the Roma and the poor, diminishing their opportunities to participate in elections.

A SNAPSHOT OF THE SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

By introducing a flat tax system, the government made it clear that its social policies are intended to support the upper middle classes rather than the lower middle classes and the poor. The original goal of the government was to make Hungary competitive amongst other Central European countries that have lower tax rates (Todor, 2013). However, the result of all of this was a substantial budgetary deficit, which the government tried to reduce by levying "crisis" taxes on banks and telecommunications companies, alongside a 98% penal tax, which was levied on severance payments and which cannot be reconciled with the concept of the rule of law. In addition, the government increased sales taxes (VAT) to

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[4] The Hungarian electoral system at the time of the 2010 elections was a mix of a direct election of representatives in a single-seat constituencies (176 members in the National Assembly), proportional representation (152) and 58 "compensation" seats, which were determined through a complex system in connection with voter turnout and votes that in each electoral round did not get counted because they did not go to the winning member. The aim of this mixed system was to try to optimally capture voter preference in the actual numbers of representations of each party in the parliament.

27%, the highest rate in Europe, nationalized private pension funds, and cut spending in the areas of culture, healthcare, education, and welfare significantly.

Fidesz's sweeping electoral victory in 2010 was at first sight seen as a populist reaction to previous weak governments. After all, Fidesz promoted economic nationalism and "unorthodox" economic policies by imposing taxes on banks, launching anti-bank campaigns, and attacking foreign investors and multinational financial institutions. In an effort to balance the budget, the government levied "crisis taxes" on banks and primarily foreign-owned large companies. At first sight, these measures may appear as typically "left wing" economic policies. However, this is a misleading interpretation, because Fidesz's "unorthodox" economic policies were complemented with distinctly "anti-welfare" social policies, as it were. For example, the government now grants tax benefits to families of working parents with children, which means that by definition families where the parents are unemployed and who live in deep poverty (most notably the Roma) are excluded. Social spending on the homeless and the unemployed has been decreased, homelessness has been criminalized. The time frame for disbursing aid has been reduced, meaning that recipients should receive aid more quickly. On the other hand, more money has been allocated to those mothers who temporarily leave the job market to remain at home with their child. These measures have been justified with the notion of a traditional, patriarchal family values. The Orbán cabinet openly defended its anti-welfare policies, which were rare in continental Europe, where, since World War II, the majority of countries have aimed foremost to establish a social market economy, which they have since labored to protect.

In the meantime, the government nationalized the reliable private pension insurance system in such a speedy way that people were left with no other rational choice but to move back into the state-supported pension system. By absorbing these pension funds, the government was able to meet the Maastricht criterion of 3% annual budget deficit for 2011. One year later, the government forced even those who had chosen to remain in the private system to join the state pension system. By this point, there was no question of a "freedom of choice": the government behaved like a cop turned thief: it put its hands on the wealth of people. Thus, in Hungary, the basic principles of the constitutional law, such as the respect of private property, the freedom of contract and legal certainty, came into question. Whilst the government's propaganda played anti-EU tunes, it designed measures to reduce costs, following EU directives, all in the name of the economic crisis. The leaders of the government launched a verbal crusade,

lambasting the sins of economic neo-liberalism, by promising a "national rebirth". However, in reality, the government itself was carrying out neoliberal policies, and the sole purpose of these policies was to protect and benefit its own elites and a narrow class of people.

The government took several steps to prevent people from expressing opposition or dissatisfaction in a formal and organized fashion: it made the Labor Code stricter, which hurt workers, and it abolished traditional forms of dialogue between employers and employees. Moreover, trade unions were forced to merge with an emerging corporate structure. Limiting union rights curtailed the rights of workers to call for a strike. Furthermore, government-supported media outlets launched a smear campaign against the new generation of union leaders.

Shortly after coming to power, the government established a new, so-called "Counter-terrorist Center", partly to guarantee the personal safety of the prime minister himself. The annual budget of the organization exceeds the amount set aside for the National Cultural Fund. One year after, it seems that the strengthened security services cannot sufficiently guarantee the safety of those in power, either. The Minister of Internal Affairs has proposed to establish a new secret service, though this is still under debate in the cabinet; as those in power could keep each other parties in check via this service, this measure has (understandably) aroused controversy.

The new law ensured that public education was managed and controlled by the central government. Local government and foundation schools have been nationalized, and a significant number of these schools have been placed in the hands of churches. Moreover, through these new laws the government has been homogenizing the curriculum of public schools, and it has reduced the age until which students must attend school from 18 to 16 years. The law on public education merged the anti-liberal traditions enshrined in the dogmas of Communism and Catholicism; it was no longer about education, but about discipline, and it declared that the state had the right to intervene in the lives of children and parents. The self-proclaimed "family-friendly" government strives to "re-educate" families for them to become "worthy" of participating in the system of national cooperation. Similar patterns can be observed in higher education. The bill on higher education aimed to limit the number of students that could be accepted to universities and colleges with financial aid from the state. The new laws even required that students retroactively repay tuition fees should they choose to live abroad after completing their studies. On top of it all, the government proposed that some university degrees can only be pursued

upon payment of full tuition, which would make the more lucrative professions available to only the wealthy. It was the unspoken goal of the government to reduce social mobility, to bring the process of change of the elite to a close, and to "finally" entrench the social hierarchy that emerged through a "revolutionary" process in the post-Communist era.

Though the government stressed that it did not wish to return to the past, it nonetheless fed nostalgia for the period between 1920 and 1944, characterized by Admiral Miklós Horthy's nationalist and revanchist policies. Prime Minister Orbán has proclaimed the day of the Trianon Peace Treaty that concluded World War I as the "day of national unity". Moreover, the government ordered to erect a statue of German occupation of 1944 in the heart of Budapest, suggesting that all Hungarians had been victims of German Nazism[5]. The government was politically absolving individuals extolled during the Horthy regime by conferring new awards upon them. Under the guise of "national unification", the government granted citizenship and voting rights to Hungarian minorities living outside Hungary to increase the number of right-wing voters, given that the majority living in diasporas tended to vote for the right-wing parties (and would perhaps return the favor for receiving the automatic right to Hungarian citizenship). Orbán declared that he wished to politically deal with the extreme right party, *Jobbik*, the same way that Horthy dealt with Nazi "*nyilas*" (Arrow Cross) movements back in the day: "give them two slaps on the face and send them home". Meanwhile, various extremist right, paramilitary organizations have appeared in villages across Hungary, bearing a range of eerie names, such as "*Magyar Gárda*" ("Hungarian Guard"), "*Véderő*" ("Protective Force"), and "*Betyársereg*" ("Outlaw's Army"). These organizations take away the government's monopoly on force and launch racist campaigns aimed to intimidate the Roma. Courts that banned these extremist paramilitary groups were unable to prevent them from reorganizing under different banners.

The central propaganda rose to protect nationalism, patriarchal family values, power politics and "law and order". The Criminal Code has also been modified so that teenagers can now be thrown behind bars for minor retail theft or painting graffiti. The independence of the justice system has also suffered: the government is making the Office of the Attorney General dependent upon personal loyal-

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[5]   By doing so, the Orbán cabinet disregarded the fact that Hungary was an ally of Nazi Germany in World War II. Moreover, the Hungarian authorities effectively helped Eichmann and his squad to transport most Hungarian Jews to extermination camps.

ties; it is curbing the rights of lawyers in criminal proceedings; and by forcing early retirement upon Supreme Court judges, it is launching a siege against the courts. When it created the "Kúria" (i.e., the Supreme Court in Hungary before the judicial system was reorganized after World War II), it did not extend the term of the chairman of the Supreme Court (though his mandate had not yet expired). Instead, the government replaced him with an official loyal to the ruling party. In 2010, the Fidesz majority in Parliament changed the Constitution nine times in a six month period. Thus, the government itself placed the principle of legal uncertainty under doubt, shaking its own credibility.

The government paid special attention to the members of the national bourgeoisie and placed high expectations on these individuals to carry out certain functions. The Orbán system created incentives through tax breaks for popular team sports, such as football, the prime minister's favorite. Sándor Csányi, the CEO of OTP Bank, became the President of the Hungarian Football Association. The government announced its plans for building a state stadium and several others. It has spent hundreds of millions of forints[6] on football academies, such as the Ferenc Puskás Academy, which has ties to Orbán. Due to this forced, "generous" support of different agencies, the local football team of the prime minister's village managed to rocket up to the first league within two years[7].

In the area of culture, the policies of Fidesz and Jobbik overlap: both have an exclusionary interpretation of the idea of "national values". Under this label, both parties go against the equal opportunities policy of recent years. Though the government protected the National Theater's director against homophobic and extreme-right attacks, it finally replaced him with a new, pro-Fidesz director. Moreover, the mayor of Budapest appointed an extreme-right wing actor as the director of the New Theater – a person who had worked alongside István Csurka, the ex-President of *Magyar Igazság* és Élet *Pártja* (Hungarian Truth and Life Party, MIÉP), a former extreme-right party. To the helm of the Hungarian State Opera, Orbán (deceiving his own minister) placed a government commissioner, who through his deeds and declarations would within a few weeks come into confrontation with the major representatives of Europe's cultural scene. Within a year and a half, all theater directors across Hungary were replaced. In many

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[6] 1 EUR equals approximately 300 Hungarian Forints.
[7] The village where Orbán lives, Felcsút (near Budapest), has slightly more than 1,700 inhabitants. However, a small stadium has been constructed there to host 3,500 viewers at the home games of the football team of the village.

towns, relatives of the Fidesz clientele have become the directors of theaters. Cultural programs that aimed to decrease social and cultural inequalities were terminated. By stopping the activities of the public foundation for film, the government in effect halted one of the most successful branches of Hungarian cultural life, film production[8], for three years. The government even decided which religion could be regarded as "established" (Islam and Mormonism, for instance, were not), and it still has the authority to conduct a complete data search on all "non-established" congregations.

The Orbán regime considered some of the most outstanding artists and scholars to be its enemies[9] (Bozóki, 2012). The government had requested some of its artist friends to create illustrations for the new basic law, so that it may leave visual footprints of the historical periods of its preference next to the text, displayed on the mandatory "basic law tables" in government offices. They redesigned Kossuth Square, the large area just in front of the Parliament, to remove certain statues and restore the "conditions of 1944". Their actions were full of contradictions: they simultaneously lauded Chinese Communism and the anti-Communist neo-conservatism in the United States; they banned pro-Tibet protests during the Chinese Communist Party Chairman's visit and at the same time put up a statue of President Ronald Reagan, who had called Communism the "Evil Empire". They turned away from previous symbolic figures of Hungarian democracy, such as István Bibó[10] (Bibó, 1991) and Imre Nagy[11], turning instead towards the successors of Li Peng, with whom they "forged an alliance". In addition, not only did they declare that the Communist Party of the past was a "criminal organization", but they put its predecessor and successor organizations in the same category. On the other hand, they welcomed some of the former members of the Communist party in the government; what is more, they had these former members write parts of the basic law.

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[8] Film producers dependent on the government have secured the "right to the last cut", and as such, censorship in filmmaking has become institutionalized yet again. No wonder that the new Hungarian cinema follows Hollywood-type comedies and none of the film touches upon social problems.

[9] The list includes the pianist András Schiff, the Nobel Prize winner writer Imre Kertész, conductors Ádám Fischer and Iván Fischer, filmmaker Béla Tarr, economist János Kornai, sociologist Zsuzsa Ferge, philosophers Ágnes Heller, Mihály Vajda, Sándor Radnóti, and many others.

[10] István Bibó was a major democratic political thinker in the post-World War II Hungary.

[11] Imre Nagy was a reformist Communist leader, who served as Prime Minister during the 1956 revolution. He was executed by the Kádár regime in 1958.

It was surprising that – despite its qualified majority in parliament – the steps of the Fidesz government could be characterized as *Blitzkrieg* tactics, especially as regards legislation. If a government announcement of a new law was expected, parts of it were leaked days before, and thus the government could "prepare" public opinion for its receipt. Thereafter, the party's parliamentary group leader, or the prime minister's spokespersons, duly delivered the announcement, which was then immediately submitted to the parliament, and, by way of an individual representative's motion, the bill was voted into law. Consequently, the Minister of Justice, who in theory should be responsible for legislation, had no say in the legislative process. There was no society-wide debate, no professional talks, no impact assessments, and there was no need for other such procedures considered "orthodox" in democracy. The opposition's voice was divided and it did not filter through the state-sponsored media. Furthermore, a modification of house rules limited parliamentary debate explicitly: proposals deemed important by Fidesz passed through parliament smoothly. This clearly contradicts the notion of parliamentary democracy, which is based on the idea of holding public debates. Since 2010, analysts, journalists and commentators have hopelessly chased after events as they unfolded; they could barely keep track of this chaotic pace of legislation, which had been intentionally accelerated. By the time the involved parties and non-state controlled media outlets realized what happened, the event had already concluded.

At first sight, this raid tactics gave the impression of a government determined to govern. Yet, what has become clear is the fact the government is determined to centralize power. When criticized, the government has regularly responded by saying that the "most important talks" with the society had already taken place, namely at the polling stations in 2010. Thus, the government claims that its policies reflected on the „will of the people". Work, home, order, and family have become the regime's catchwords. The popularity of the Orbán regime can partly be explained by the coordinated governmental communication about the advantages of a "strong man rule", and by the socially "unorthodox" policies of the government. The Orbán regime offered favorable neoliberal policies for the rich, a corporatist and clientele system for the middle class, a mix of ethno-nationalist, anti-capitalist and anticommunist rhetoric for the lower middle classes, the policies of social exclusion and demobilization against the Roma and the poor, and finally, the familiar Kádárist paternalism to pensioners.

Yet what is not clear is the following: if it is true that the majority stands behind the government, why did the government have to govern in a coup-like

fashion? Because there is no denying that between 2010 and 2012, a constitutional coup unfolded in Hungary, and the speed of this coup was dictated by Viktor Orbán and his close political circle.

POWER AND SOCIETY

During his first administration between 1998 and 2002, Prime Minister Orbán was more *primus inter pares* in his leadership. After 2010, by contrast, the informal center of power, composed of the Prime Minister, his advisors and Fidesz cronies, was simply in agreement with the decisions of the "system's founding father". For Fidesz, the idea of the "center of power" served the purpose of limiting the possibility of fair elections. Regarding the government's mandate, it was Orbán's explicit goal to create additional qualified majority rules, which killed off the possibility for a change of government. And even if a change in government did take place, the administration strives to ensure that the would-be new government cannot carry out policies that contradict its own. Furthermore, the government has restricted the right to strike and the rights of employees; it has reduced the rights to assembly, religious freedoms, educational freedoms, and social rights. Rather than maintaining the system of local government, the Orbán administration, after restricting the resources of local governments, placed the majority of their functions under the jurisdiction of the central government.

The Fidesz government promised that after gaining its exceptional majority in government it would take on the fight against poverty and the social crisis. It promised jobs, homes, order and security. It suggested that although some of its measures would be controversial from a rule of law perspective, it would in turn guarantee economic and social development. Millions believed this promise. Perhaps they thought that certain democratic practices could be sacrificed in exchange for economic well-being. However, the government has dismantled the limits on the rule of law and it has bid farewell to liberal democracy; yet in return, not only did it fail to lessen the social burden of the Hungarian population, but it also sent a message that it has (and had) no intention of doing this. Thus, it opened the avenue for the rise of the extreme-right party Jobbik.

To guarantee a return towards liberal democracy, strong opposition parties are needed that are willing to cooperate, along with social movements and independent press, civic organizations and heightened international attention. In 2011, the main points of opposition began to appear, including independent

unions and increasingly active civic groups that overshadowed the dispersed
opposition parties, which today remain unable to join forces.

In January 2011, a group named "One million people for the freedom of the
press!" (this name was later shortened as "*Milla*") sent ten thousand protestors to
the streets; by March 15th, and October 23rd, two of Hungary's most important
national holidays, their numbers had swollen to 30,000 and 70,000, respectively.
Labor unions organized larger gatherings in April and June in the same year. In
October 2011, the Hungarian Solidarity Movement was formed. It organized
a demonstration of 30,000 people in front of parliament, and in December, it
announced that it would become a countrywide organization. A day before
Christmas of 2011, representatives and activists of opposition Green party (LMP)
chained themselves around the parliament building to prevent parliamentarians
from entering. They aimed to draw attention to the legislation that the parliament
was considering and which threatened the rule of law. The police, acting in the
Ukrainian and Belorussian style, accused the protestors of "restricting personal
freedoms". On January 2nd, 2012, about one hundred thousand people protested
against the new Constitution and the rise of autocracy in the streets of Budapest.
Further protests occurred on March 10th and March 15th, 2012, with the attend-
ance of tens of thousands. The Orbán government aimed to counter this series
of protests by creating its own government-sponsored "civic" movement, the so-
called Forum of Civic Union (*Civil* Összefogás *Fóruma*, CÖF), which organized
counter-protests in defense of the regime. Flash mobs, scattered protests, new
movements by civilians (university students and artists) emerged in the period
of 2011–2012, challenging the political monopolization of power increasingly
seen as mafia state.

The biggest rally of the democratic opposition movements occurred in
Budapest on October 23rd, 2012, when the leaders of three civic organizations
– Gordon Bajnai (former Prime Minister, leader of *Haza* és *Haladás*, Patriotism
and Progress, a technocratic think tank), Péter Kónya (*Szolidaritás*, Solidarity,
an employees' organization with nationwide network), and Péter Juhász (*Milla*,
a broad political platform of the urban youth) – declared their decision to form
an umbrella organization, called *Együtt* (Together), inviting other parties of the
democratic opposition to create a united electoral bloc for the 2014 elections.
With this public announcement, these movements started walking on the long
way of party-formation. Since 2012, former civic organizations within *Együtt*
have made several attempts to collaborate with other Parties (MSZP, LMP) for
an electoral coalition, but internal rivalry between leaders, the growing distrust

towards politicians in the society, and the strong negative campaign of Fidesz did not allow them to make a strong alliance early. The green party named *Lehet Más a Politika* (Politics Can Be Different, LMP) broke up on this issue: a segment of the party joined the opposition alliance as a new party, *Párbeszéd Magyarországért* (Dialogue for Hungary, PM), while others, staying at LMP, decided to let their party run alone in the elections.

Despite the efforts of the government, Hungary has still retained a few of the basic characteristics of a multiparty democracy. Liberal democracy, however, has been replaced with a wrecked version of "majority" rule, where the freedom of speech is limited by self-censorship (people do not speak up, for fear of losing their jobs) and press freedom is clearly being reduced to the blogosphere. State-run television channels have taken a turn towards the tabloid. The aim is to depoliticize the news or remove political issues from media reports. State-sponsored media outlets, for instance, either did not report or underreported mass protest rallies and demonstrations. The country arrived at the 2014 general elections with Fidesz having a clear advantage.

The period of mass protests (2011–2012) had been followed by a long and increasingly self-destructing set of negotiations among the leftist opposition parties (2013). The momentum, offered by the civic initiatives, was lost when still unpopular leaders took over the political process in the opposition. In the meantime, the government introduced its policy of utility-cost cut to regain the support of lower class voters. Finally, in January 2014, a leftist electoral alliance was created, just three months before the April 2014 elections. It was far too late. The influence of civil initiatives was not strong enough to promote new leaders to the democratic opposition, which was still dominated by the ones who had lost credibility before 2010. Among several other factors, weak organization, poor capacity for innovation, and the lack of imagination resulted in an electoral defeat in 2014.

FREE AND UNFAIR: THE ELECTIONS OF 2014

Hungary's parliamentary elections in April 2014 saw a 61% turnout, the lowest since 1998. The high abstention rate was a sign of disaffection with Hungarian politics: four-tenths of the electorate believed it was left without a genuine political choice.

Fidesz, the right-wing populist party led by Viktor Orbán, received 44.5% of the votes, giving it a strong mandate to continue to govern. Thanks to the more

disproportional voting system introduced by Fidesz, the party retained its two-thirds parliamentary majority. However, of a total of 8 million citizens eligible to vote, only 2.1 million cast their ballot for Fidesz; this was 8% (or 600,000 voters) less than in 2010. Although this result was far from representing "national unity", Orbán's charismatic leadership and his anti-EU, Christian-nationalist rhetoric managed to forge an alliance between conservative voters and the lower middle class, which expected the state to halt its existential decline. In 2002 and 2006 – when the previous election system was still in place – this solid, two million-strong voter base did not suffice for a Fidesz victory. This time, it secured the party a supermajority.

The alliance of leftist opposition parties came second with 26% of the vote. Led by the socialist leader, Attila Mesterházy, the alliance is made up of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Together (*Együtt*), Dialogue for Hungary (PM), the Democratic Coalition (DK), and the Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP). Since the previous elections, the alliance managed to increase its vote by nearly 300,000, receiving a total of 1.2 million votes. Nevertheless, its performance at the polls was rightly seen as a crushing defeat. In the last four years, the left has been unable to reinvent itself from the ground up. It has failed to communicate a clear identity or program; its leaders, who are engaged in constant rivalry, decided to field a joint list only at the last minute. The primary message of the alliance was a desire to run Viktor Orbán out of office; it had nothing to offer in terms of a genuine and positive vision. The list was dominated by MSZP politicians, held responsible by voters for the policy failures in the period up to 2010. Following their defeat, the leaders of the coalition parties announced that they would be running separately in the European parliamentary elections in May.

The third place went to a far-right party Jobbik, with 20.5% of the vote. This represented some one million voters, 3% (100,000 votes) more than in the previous election. The results for individual constituencies show that in half the country Jobbik beat left-wing candidates. The elections were, in a way, a great victory for Jobbik, which promoted Hungarian nationalism, radicalism, anti-globalization, and racism. Analysts blamed Orbán for the growing support of right-wing extremists and said that Europe could no longer ignore the far-right. In the months before the elections, Jobbik assumed a more moderate tone, campaigning with the slogan of "livelihood, order and accountability" and muting its standard racist message. It not only ran successfully in the poorest, north-eastern region of the country, but also managed to gain new positions in counties in the west.

The green party, Politics Can Be Different (LMP), came last with 5.2% of the vote. Although this falls short of the party's 2010 performance, it may grant green policies a new lease on life. Keeping an equal distance from both the rightist and the leftist bloc, LMP sent middle-of-the-road, anti-establishment messages to its voters during the campaign.

The OSCE found that the elections themselves were effective and partly transparent, but it cast doubt on the legitimacy of Orban's landslide victory, commenting on the "undue advantage" enjoyed by Fidesz and the lack of freedom for the opposition during the campaign. The European Parliament, the European Council, the United States, and several EU member states have also openly criticized this abuse. All of them pointed out that the act on electoral procedure was passed without meaningful public debate, in violation of both Hungarian and international practice. Constituency boundaries were shifted around to make left-wing districts more populous than right-wing districts, causing a left-wing vote to carry less weight. Different rules applied to Hungarian nationals working abroad and so-called "Trianon Hungarians" living beyond state borders. Moreover, under the new system, extra mandates were added to the list of the winning party, which made the regulation extremely disproportionate. These rules violated the principle of equal vote. There has also been a failure to properly regulate a number of important areas connected to campaign financing, such as the campaign activities of satellite organizations. Using public funds, Fidesz outsourced part of its campaign to an allegedly civic organization with close ties to the party, the Civil Alliance Forum (CÖF). Thanks to new financing regulations, the transparency of the system and its accountability has been compromised.

The Media Council set up by Fidesz has not been politically neutral. The acquisition of media companies by investors with close ties to Fidesz undermined the plurality of the media and forced journalists to self-censor. Regulations introduced by Fidesz prohibited commercial television stations from running financed promotions, which did not prevent government ads from being aired. The majority of television channels broadcast reports that were biased towards Fidesz. Together, these factors granted the government significant and unfair advantages and restrict citizens' access to proper information. The result has been a loss of public confidence in the electoral system. Not only did Fidesz as a party campaign, as it is usual in any multiparty democracy, but also the Fidesz-controlled state administration "campaigned" by using taxpayers' money and creating an uneven playing field. The boundaries between party and the

state became blurred. This violated the principles of fair competition laid down in OSCE's 1990 Copenhagen Document (Scheppele, 2014).

The lower middle classes and the poor, victims of the discriminative governmental social policies of the past four years, have been compensated with utility-cost cuts before the election year. While advertising on utility-cost cuts are delivered regularly to all Hungarian citizens, the burden of special taxes is borne by various segments of the population in isolation. The majority of the public has been convinced by the media that, despite a permanent economic stagnation, "Hungary has been performing better" over Fidesz's four-year term. Nationalist sentiments, paternalism, "strong man rule", and an overwhelming populist discourse captured the largest segments of the Hungarian voters. By carefully calculating the social impact of his policies, Orbán could effectively minimize the losses of his constituency and could keep the relative majority for his party. The victory of Fidesz can be metaphorically described as a successful "rebellion of the countryside" against the previous political setup widely perceived as "elitist democracy".

The Hungarian public has been constantly reminded by its current political leader of the importance of national pride. Individual rights and the democratic institutions that protect them have taken a backseat to constitutionally endorsed policies of collective identity and cultural uniformity. With government propaganda about "order", "home", "fatherland", and "family" drowning out all other voices, many are voting with their feet: in the past four years, half a million people have left the country.

If the society is unable to balance the system against governmental leadership, democracy is in danger. The proponents of autocratic measures, however, can hardly cement their power and they cannot stop the clock, adjusting the present moment – which is favorable for them – for eternity. It is an important lesson for those who believe in liberal democracy: they cannot pretend that everything is OK as they have in the past decades. History does not end with the transition to democracy, because democracy is never a complete condition; instead, it is a dynamic process, full of tension. In essence, it is but a fragile balance of forces and counter-forces.

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If the Hungarian democracy survives the current challenge thanks to resistance from the society, there is a chance that it will subsequently be stronger than ever. However, the protest movements and the democratic opposition have proved to be too weak, fragile and fragmented to alter the dominant, illiberal trend in the past few years. The crisis of liberal democracy calls attention to the fact that democracy cannot be narrowed down only to institutions, because institutions can be easily hollowed out by leaders who do not respect freedom. Democracy can only be preserved if, along with its values, a plethora of dedicated people help it thrive.

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ANXIETY DETERMINANTS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE

LĘKOWE UWARUNKOWANIA POSTAW POPULISTYCZNYCH WŚRÓD OSÓB MŁODYCH

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— **ABSTRACT** —

In 2015, so-called double (i.e., presidential and parliamentary) elections were held in Poland. The unquestionable winner of these elections was Law and Justice *[Prawo i Sprawiedliwość]*, using slogans such as "good change" or "we'll make it" in the campaign. The leitmotif of this campaign was discrediting any activities, including achievements, of the Civic Platform *[Platforma Obywatelska]* / Polish Peasant Party *[Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe]* coalition, addressing a "simple man" or the nation, and pointing out the need to involve the state institutions to implement the "good change" in favor of the "simple man". Thus, Law and Justice adopted the anti-elitist position, pointing to the "pathologies of democracy in Poland", mainly caused by the rule of the Liberals. Initiating the populist style of thinking was one of the reasons for the party's success. This was an interesting research problem for us, especially that Law and Justice gained the trust of many young voters, aged 18–24.

— **ABSTRAKT** —

W 2015 roku w Polsce odbyły się tzw. podwójne wybory: prezydenckie i parlamentarne. Niekwestionowanym zwycięzcą tych elekcji zostało Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, posługujące się w kampanii wyborczej między innymi takimi hasłami wyborczymi, jak „dobra zmiana" czy „damy radę". Lejtmotywem kampanii było dyskredytowanie wszelkich działań, w tym także osiągnięć koalicji rządowej Platforma Obywatelska–Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, zwracanie się do „prostego człowieka", narodu, a także wskazywanie na konieczność uruchomienia instytucji państwa w celu realizacji „dobrej zmiany" na rzecz tegoż „prostego człowieka". Tym samym PiS zajęło pozycję antyelitystyczną, wskazując na „patologie demokracji w Polsce", których przyczyną były przede wszystkim rządy „liberałów". Uruchomienie populistycznego stylu myślenia było jedną, choć nie jedyną, przyczyną sukcesu ugrupowania. Zwróciło to naszą uwagę badawczą,

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The success of Kukiz'15 Election Committee, based on the third place achieved by musician Paweł Kukiz in the presidential election, was also very significant for our research questions. It was fascinating because Kukiz'15 Electoral Committee, apart from the popular slogan about the need to establish single-member electoral districts (JOW) and anti-elitist approach, did not offer the voters any vision of socio-political order in terms of ideology or programme. Still, it managed to persuade citizens to vote for Kukiz'15 in the parliamentary election.

These premises led to a research problem concerning the analysis of anxiety determinants that contributed to the positive reaction of voters, especially young ones, to the populist elements of the electoral campaign. Obviously, the fact that so-called soft populism is an inherent characteristic of all electoral campaigns was taken into account. Furthermore, we took into consideration the widespread occurrence of populist slogans in virtually all political programmes. Still, some questions remained unanswered, and the aim of the present study was to answer them. The primary question to answer is about the degree to which individual anxiety dispositions influence the development of populist attitudes among young people. Another important question is whether these are strong populist attitudes or just populist tendencies. The research results presented below are exploratory in character: this is only an introduction to further search for the answers to the above-mentioned questions.

Keywords: anxiety, populism, young elector

tym bardziej że PiS zdobył duży poziom zaufania wśród młodych wyborców, w wieku 18–24 lata.

Duże znaczenie dla stawianych przez nas pytań badawczych miał także sukces Komitetu Wyborczego Kukiz'15, stworzonego na bazie zagospodarowywania sukcesu odniesionego przez muzyka Pawła Kukiza w wyborach prezydenckich (trzeci wynik). KW Kukiz'15 bowiem, poza nośnym hasłem o konieczności stworzenia jednomandatowych okręgów wyborczych (JOW) oraz antyelityzmem, ideowo i programowo nie oferował wyborcom żadnej wizji porządku społeczno-politycznego. Pomimo to udało się przekonać obywateli do pomysłu oddania głosu na Kukiz'15 w wyborach parlamentarnych.

Powyższe przesłanki spowodowały pojawienie się problemu badawczego dotyczącego analizy lękowych uwarunkowań, które przyczyniły się do pozytywnej reakcji wyborców, szczególnie osób młodych, na populistyczne wątki w kampanii wyborczej. Oczywiście pod uwagę został wzięty fakt, że tzw. miękki populizm jest nieodłączną cechą wszystkich kampanii wyborczych. Ponadto uwzględniono także powszechność haseł populistycznych – ich obecność w zasadzie we wszystkich programach politycznych. Pomimo to pozostały pytania, na które przeprowadzone badania miały dać odpowiedź. Do podstawowych należy przede wszystkim to, w jakim stopniu dyspozycje lękowe jednostki wpływają na kształtowanie się postaw populistycznych wśród osób młodych. Nie mniej ważne jest pytanie, czy mamy do czynienia ze zdecydowanymi postawami populistycznymi, czy jedynie z tendencjami populistycznymi wśród młodych. Zaprezentowane poniżej wyniki badań mają charakter eksploracyjny – są jedynie wstępem do dalszych poszukiwań odpowiedzi na postawione pytania.

Słowa kluczowe: lęk, populizm, młody wyborca

INTRODUCTION

In 2015, so-called double (i.e., presidential and parliamentary) elections were held in Poland. The unquestionable winner of these elections was Law and Justice *[Prawo i Sprawiedliwość]*, using slogans such as "good change" or "we'll make it" in the campaign. The leitmotif of this campaign was discrediting any activities, including achievements, of the Civic Platform *[Platforma Obywatelska]* / Polish Peasant Party *[Polskie Stronnictwo Ludo*we*]* coalition, addressing a "simple man" or the nation, and pointing out the need to involve the state institutions to implement the "good change" in favour of the "simple man". Thus, Law and Justice adopted the anti-elitist position, pointing to the "pathologies of democracy in Poland", mainly caused by the rule of the Liberals. Initiating the populist style of thinking was one of the reasons for the party's success. This was an interesting research problem for us, especially that Law and Justice gained the trust of many young voters, aged 18–24.

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These premises led to a research problem concerning the analysis of anxiety determinants that contributed to the positive reaction of voters, especially young ones, to the populist elements of the electoral campaign. Obviously, the fact that so-called soft populism is an inherent characteristic of all electoral campaigns was taken into account. Furthermore, we took into consideration the widespread occurrence of populist slogans in virtually all political programmes. Still, some questions remained unanswered, and the aim of the present study was to answer them. The primary question to answer is about the degree to which individual anxiety dispositions influence the development of populist attitudes among young people. Another important question is whether these are strong populist attitudes or just populist tendencies. The research results presented below are exploratory in character: this is only an introduction to further search for the answers to the above-mentioned questions.

POPULISM – AN IDEOLOGY OR AN ATTITUDE?

Populism is a heterogeneous category and phenomenon that occurs in many areas of social and political life. According to Pierré-Andre Taguieff (as cited in Nalewajko, 2013, p. 40), some premises for the development of populism are the activation of the dissatisfied, the presence of a charismatic leader (both of them likely to occur in authoritarian, presidential and semi-presidential systems), the lack of a uniform ideology (which means that conservative and progressive attitudes coexist), and the belief that the virtue is in the simple people, being the vast majority, and their collective tradition (Wiles, 2010, p. 25). This can also be supplemented with the idea of change in social relations, characteristic for populism, although this change is not necessarily tantamount to progress. The intervention of the state as the institution that solves the problems of the "simple people" plays a role here, too.

Populism is regarded to be a very common phenomenon and often mistaken for demagogy (Szacki, 2007, p. 10; Karwat, 2006, p. 225–230). This is mostly the result of quite thoughtless use of the term 'populism', even applied as an insult, typically with reference to politicians, regardless of their party affiliation, especially by the media. The concept of populism has actually become the weapon of opponents of certain individual or collective political actors, aimed at discrediting them. We tend to forget that populism, as a widespread phenomenon (Szacki, 2007, p. 11), is apparently moving from the peripheries to the centres of the contemporary world. The context in which populism is discussed nowadays is, first of all, the perspective of Western political democracy, although it was only in the 1990ˢ that the West really discovered the problem of populism as its own problem (Szacki, 2007, p. 12).

A question emerges, therefore, what the premises of contemporary populism are actually based on, if it is not a concrete ideology. Jerzy Szacki rightly observes that populism is not really about particular ideas, values, or institutionalization of the masses. Populism is a special understanding of democracy (Szacki, 2007, p. 14), which cannot be described using commonly known patterns. Thus, although it is a common phenomenon, it is hard to grasp. Populism not only refers to manipulations applied by politicians but first of all is the expression of dissatisfaction of people's masses, which manifest it in any possible way: often not very professionally but very emotionally. This is fostered by the so-called "empty core", pointing out the populists' lack of attachment to any values or ideas: the values and ideas are selected depending on the current needs of the activists. That

is why it is so easy to find populist attitudes in activists identifying with great ideologies, such as conservatism or liberalism. It should also be underscored that populism draws both on the ideas of the left and right wing, and quite often serves as a counterbalance to the leading ideologies. It is supplemented by the "heartland", being the embodiment of the customs and wisdom of the people. The occurrence of this principle in all types of populism is partly explained by the fact that this construct is idealized very much within a community. It can even be regarded as a specific kind of founding myth forced through in politicians' utterances and actions. The "heartland" is obviously inhabited by people, and the people gives meaning to all interpretations and invocations from populists (Taggart, 2010, p. 84).

Both the "empty core" and the "heartland" are the elements populists resort to in crisis situations. It is worth mentioning here that populists are generally against the political system, especially against its representative formula, and against being engaged in politics. They even consider functioning in a party and parliament configuration to be abhorrent, since both institutions are barriers to achieving the set goals. The paradox is that politics is the only form in which populists can manifest their views.

Despite the negative attitude to politics and activity in its organized form, there are situations when populists become active in it. These are crisis situations. Truly, it is very difficult to objectively say what socio-political situations are considered as critical ones. Hence, a crisis may be the effect of belief in the occurrence of crisis, not the actual socio-political condition. As Paul Taggart observes, populism emerges when a serious process of changes causes the sense of crisis at least in one social group (Taggart, 2010, p. 80). At the same time, this social group is characterized by growing self-awareness and the sense of separation from power centres.

It is worth emphasizing that these social groups usually have low social, economic and civic competence. It is mainly promoted by the anti-intellectualism of populism and the already mentioned association with the category of "people" and their inherent traditions. Another important belief is that anti-intellectualism has one more significant task: it is negation, escape from anything that symbolizes the elite of a certain community. Hence, it provides the basis for building the "new order".

Populism is a substitution category, often used as an insult because it cannot be classified and presented from the perspective of the known ideological models or patterns connected with ideological divisions and standards of thinking which

prevailed in the West at the turn of the 21st century. It is also a specific strategy of action for the community, and thus, it can undoubtedly help achieve very different goals. The main dimension of populism, understood in this manner, is the instrumental one (Dzwończyk, 2000, p. 18).

ANXIETY AS A PERSONALITY TRAIT

Just like populism, anxiety is an ambiguous and multidimensional term. In source literature, there are many approaches and concepts whose aim is to grasp the specific features of anxiety reactions. The first psychological concept of anxiety was developed by Sigmund Freud. He defines anxiety as a negative subjective state one gets into because of the perception of increasing excitation of the organism resulting from the development of a certain affect, e.g., sexual arousal, aggression, or hatred (Freud, 1957, p. 354–355). The psychoanalytical concept of anxiety was also presented by Calvin S. Hall (1995, p. 61). The author defines anxiety as a negative emotional experience caused by the stimulation of the organism, which may occur as a result of a stream of stimuli from the inside or the outside and is controlled by the autonomic nervous system (when a person faces new, dangerous or unclear situation, their heart begins to beat more quickly, hands begin to sweat, the throat goes dry, etc.). Anxiety differs from other negative experiences in that it persists in one's consciousness. Karen Horney (as cited in Siek, 1993, p. 260–261), originating from the circle of psychoanalysts, emphasizes that anxiety is the response to a danger, which involves physiological reactions such as sweating, trembling, or heat pounding. She considers this danger to be hidden and subjective. Horney underscores that anxiety is one of the most tormenting experiences. This persistence of reactions is connected with the fact that anxiety is permanent and the person becomes helpless in the face of it. Thus, he or she is helpless in the face of something that mostly has no rational explanation, which may lead to the development of low self-esteem. Raymond Cattell (1966, p. 36–38), in turn, defines anxiety from the operational perspective, as groups of reactions and reaction patterns related to anxiety, e.g., uneasiness, excitation, or irritation. Edward J. Murray (1964, p. 252–255) points out that the disposition to experience and reveal anxiety reactions is inborn, but its development greatly depends on whether the closest environment provides the person with anxiety causing or anxiety reducing stimuli.

When analysing concepts of anxiety originating from different psychological schools, it must be emphasized that most authors define anxiety as a group of emotional reactions that can be evoked both by external and internal stimuli and have the following characteristics:

a) are perceived as a negative and persistent state,
b) are accompanied by the sense of helplessness and irrationality,
c) coexist with physiological reactions of the organism, such as quickened heart rate, quick breathing, higher blood pressure, quicker metabolism, or a set of opposite reactions: lower heart rate, stupor, and an urge to urinate,
d) authors identify different kinds of anxiety. Raymond Cattell identifies 'anxiety as a state', which involves a broad range of identical response patters, repeated in a similar form, independently of the stimuli that cause them, and 'anxiety as a trait', which differs from the state with the duration and recurrence of anxiety reactions (1966, p. 36–38).

Experiencing persistent anxiety reactions and helplessness in the face of these states is the source of even more anxieties, which may lead to changes in self-perception. In order to defend themselves from negative feelings, individuals apply different defence mechanisms. Anna Freud identifies the following most common defence mechanisms: *repression* – a sudden and uncontrollable removal of the threatening impulse, thought, image, or memory; *introjection* – taking over the beliefs and/or behaviours from an esteemed person; *isolation* – the loss of contact with the feeling associated with a traumatic event with retained consciousness of cognitive details: emotions remain out of the awareness; *denial* – blocking access to consciousness for any external event that is temporally or symbolically associated with a threatening impulse (in: Strelau, 2006, p. 666). According to Karen Horney, there are four main techniques of coping with anxiety: *rationalization* – looking for possible logical explanations for the incident of anxiety; *denial of anxiety* – repression, suppression, efforts to reduce external anxiety responses; *substance abuse* – reducing the anxiety by taking drugs, drinking alcohol, or excessive sleeping; *avoidance of thoughts or impulses that may evoke anxiety* – avoiding any situations than may cause anxiety reactions (as cited in Siek, 1993, p. 45–47).

The authors of the work are particularly interested in the differentiation between anxiety reactions made by some researchers: anxiety as a state and anxiety as a trait (disposition). Dispositional anxiety is especially significant when we refer it to personality psychology. In the light of contemporary psychology, we understand a personality trait as a relatively permanent, individual, general-

ized tendency to certain behaviours, expressed in different situations consistent with this tendency (Strelau, Doliński, 2008, p. 771). Thus, the anxiety trait is understood as a behavioural motivation or disposition which makes a person susceptible to perceiving a broad spectrum of objectively harmless situations as dangerous and responding to them with anxiety states, disproportionately strong given the seriousness of the objective danger (Sosnowski, Wrześniewski, 1983, p.. In this definition, special role is attributed to cognitive processes, which play a considerable role in an anxiety causing situation. In this respect, some stability of anxiety responses occurs. Stanisław Siek (1993, p. 271) emphasizes that when we use the expression 'anxiety trait', we may have in mind either a relatively permanent consistent pattern of anxiety behaviour, which differentiates the individual from other persons (the understanding of a trait by Joy Paul Guilford[1]), or a disposition, hypothetical power organizing certain anxiety reactions, a hypothetical neuropsychological system of the person, initiating and controlling anxiety behaviours (the understanding of a trait by William Stern[2]). The development of traits is determined by internal mechanisms, which are inborn or acquired, but they are also affected by a number of other factors. Thus, the tendency to react or behave in a certain way has a genetic basis, but it can be modified by ontogenetically developing physiological mechanisms and by other environmental factors that influence the individual (Strelau, Doliński, 2008, p. 772).

Anxiety understood as a disposition is a relatively permanent quality of the person, and its development is to a great extent determined by internal mechanisms. Anxiety as a trait is latent and cannot be observed directly. It is a variable mediating between the stimulus that has an impact on the person and the person's reaction. Anxiety cannot be directly perceived, and its level estimated, unless the person is in a situation conducive to the revelation of that trait, a situation in which certain stimuli influencing the person actually cause anxiety. Then, the trait is revealed in the person's reactions.

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[1] He identifies a personality trait as a relatively permanent, distinct pattern of behaviour, different from other persons.

[2] According to him, a personality trait is a disposition that purposefully organizes sets of actions and psychological phenomena.

RESEARCH MODEL

In a situation of anxiety, cognitive processes play a significant role, potentially distorting the received message. They make a person react quickly, often on the basis of stereotypes, typical patterns, and heuristics. Populism, with its specific rhetoric, is supposed to fit the communication pattern desired by persons with high level of anxiety. Populism is often identified with agitation and demagogy, or a little more broadly, treated as a strategy, a style of action, and a method of political discourse (Taggart, 1995; Minkenberg, 2002). Following Cas Mudde (2007), it must be highlighted that a fundamental aspect of populism is perceiving the society from the perspective of a division into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the *people* and the *corrupted elite*, accompanied by the belief that politics should be the expression of general will of the society. In addition, as argued by Paul Taggart, Yves Meny and Yves Surel, populists express the view that politics is filled with corrupt behaviours to the brim, while real virtue and chastity are inherent to the people (Taggart, 2002, p. 76). Maintaining this division on the basis of highlighting the "us" and "them" borderline will draw on fears, anxieties and clear objection to the existing order, since negation and opposition to the existing situation is pointed out as the key element in the system of values upheld by the populists and the proposed ways of achieving their goals (Laclau, 2000, p. 17).

Activation of the people, being the centre of the world's vision for the populists, requires a specific message, which will be a tool to activate broader circles of the forming community. Populism makes use of popular superstitions and stereotypes as the tools of social activation (e.g., by short, catchy slogans), it also gives simple answers to complex questions; usually, however, these solutions are unrealistic. This rhetoric mostly fits the issues full of emotion, reflecting people's problems in the face of which they are often helpless (e.g., crime, prices, taxes, or patriotism). These problems may be additionally exaggerated by people with high anxiety disposition.

The subject of the analysis is dispositional anxiety, but it needs to be emphasized that persons with high anxiety disposition also display an increased tendency to experience situational anxiety. It may mean that in such people it is much easier to arouse fears and anxieties based on the current socio-political situation and the negation of the existing "threatening" order. Providing properly formulated messages that offer simple solutions to the experiences of anxiety may prove to be the desired response to persistent feelings of anxiety connected with the socio-political situation.

On the other hand, in a threatening situation individuals activate a number of defence mechanisms aimed at the elimination of the negative sensations connected with the occurrence of anxiety. As a result, when experiencing anxiety related to the socio-political situation, a person can decide to activate the defence mechanism involving complete withdrawal from the area of influence of messages connected with the problem. This may lead, for example, to not engaging in the narratives of the election campaign, discussions on the topics proposed by politicians, not reading articles on the subject, etc.

In our study, the main research question was: *Is dispositional anxiety a predictor of populism among young people?* The analysis involves differentiation of the respondents in terms of sex, place of residence, and the monthly amount of money the respondent has.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES

The study was carried out among 153 people aged 18–24, including 96 women (62.7%) and 57 men (37.3%). There were 63 rural residents (41.2%) and 90 urban residents (58.8%).

The diagnosis of the level of dispositional anxiety was conducted with the use of *Inwentarz Stanu i Cechy Lęku* (Form X-2). It is an adaptation of the American *State-Trait Anxiety Inventory* (STAI) drawn up by Charles D. Spielberger, Richard L. Gorsuch, and Robert E. Lushene. According to Charles D. Spielberger, dispositional anxiety should be understood as relatively permanent individual differences in the inclination to experience anxiety states. Anxiety as a trait is an indicator of individuals' potential capabilities to react in stressful situations. It can also be expected that people displaying stronger anxiety disposition experience anxiety as a state more often than others do when they are in new situations, unclear situations, or situations they perceive as threatening (Siek, 1993, p. 303).

The indicator of populist tendencies were the responses given in an original scale, originally made up of 15 statements (e.g., "Balcerowicz must go away", "Donald Tusk is to blame", or "You have to steal the first million"). The participants were asked to respond to each of them using a five-point scale ("strongly disagree", "disagree", "hard to say", "agree", or "strongly agree"). In the preliminary part of the research procedure, the designed tools for diagnosing populism were verified. The conducted analysis of discriminatory power of the test items showed

weak factor loadings of 6 statements, which were then excluded from further analysis. Finally, a 9-item instrument was used in the analysis.

RESULTS

In the study, young people were asked to express their opinion on the statement ending the sentence "As I think of Poland,…". These statements were slogans functioning in the public space, also during the electoral campaigns after 1989, such as apparently the most famous one, "Balcerowicz must go away". Out of the 15 prepared statements, only 9 had satisfactory factor loadings. These were: "The state should provide jobs for the unemployed, The poor will always be poor and the rich will always be rich, More of the state in the economy, You have to steal the first million, I pay taxes and expect the state to give me healthcare, education, a job, etc., Do whatever you want, Donald Tusk is to blame, Poland deserves an economic miracle, The state should care about work safety".

The final form of the scale indicates the coexistence of populist attitudes in different dimensions. This first of all refers to the role of the state and anti-intellectualism (identified with political elites). With regard to the statement _Donald Tusk is to blame_, which reflects the strongest populist tendencies, it can be said that the participants could not see any positive effects of the rule of the Civic Platform. This is also confirmed by the level of correlation of the statement _Poland deserves an economic miracle_. This result indicates strong anti-intellectualist tendencies, being a form of objection to political elites. It must also be remembered that this statement reflects a tendency towards social changes. Taking into account the character of changes Poland has been undergoing after the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015 (not evolutionary but rather revolutionary), it can be said that the analyzed slogan and the level of correlation indicate clear populist tendencies among the young generation.

A separate and distinct group was comprised of the statements referring to the role of the state, such as: "The state should provide jobs for the unemployed, More of the state in the economy, I pay taxes and expect the state to give me healthcare, education, a job, etc., The state should care about work safety". This group shows that a strong populist trend is emerging, clearly pointing to the role the state should serve. At the same time, this group includes solutions of basic social problems (e.g., unemployment), which on the one hand are a "prediction"

of a social change, and on the other hand can be used by "people's spokesmen" to influence the vision of the "new order" and manipulate the "people".

Three statements, *Do whatever you want*, *You have to steal the first million*, *The poor will always be poor and the rich will always be rich*, deserve to be analyzed separately. The obtained study results lead to the thesis that they reflect certain attitudes, such as disappointment with the political and economic system and anti-elitist approach, and they are the basis for a specific style of thinking about democracy.

The study produced a positive correlation between the *populism* and *dispositional anxiety* variables r = 0.23 at the significance level 0.01. This outcome confirms some relations but also general differences between the dimensions.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the analyzed variables with consideration of participants' sex and place of residence

Variable	Sex	N	Mean	Standard deviation	Standard error of mean
Populism	women	96	3.0891	.49642	.05067
	men	57	3.1871	.62657	.08299
	town	63	3.0171	.55340	.06972
	village	90	3.1265	.54311	.05725
Dispositional anxiety	women	96	2.2185	.44259	.04517
	men	57	1.9783	.42398	.05616
	town	63	2.0650	.45028	.05673
	village	90	2.1739	.44633	.04705

Source: original study.

The mean populism ration of the respondents was 3.12 (SD = 0.548); there were no statistically significant differences between men and women and between urban and rural residents. The mean dispositional anxiety of the respondents was 2.12 (SD = 0.450) and was significantly higher for women than for men (df = 151, t = 3.296, p = 0.001). The place of residence did not differentiate between the level of dispositional anxiety. It is worth noting that the mean scores concerning dispositional anxiety in our study were around sten 4, both for men and for women.

In order to verify the level of prediction of the populism dependent variable on the basis of the level of *dispositional anxiety*, univariate regression analysis was carried out. Dispositional anxiety is a poor explanation for the level of

populism: the R-square value for the univariate model was 0.055, which means that *dispositional anxiety* explains 5.5% of the variance. The model is statistically significant; the value of F statistics is $(1, 151) = 8.753$, $p = 0.004$.

Table 2. Estimation of the regression coefficient for dispositional anxiety

Model	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Significance
	B	Standard error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.412	.246		9.790	.000
Dispositional anxiety	.335	.113	.234	2.959	.004

Source: original study.

SUMMARY

Anxiety is one of weak but significant predictors of adopting populist attitudes, so it gives the potential for further research. We are aware that our sample was small, but we want to emphasize that this was an exploratory study which opens the way for subsequent analyses. However, our research enables us to conclude that some populist tendencies occur in the group of young people we studied, being first of all a consequence of politicians taking over anxiety dispositions. The occurring tendencies cover all the aspects of populism: both the ones concerning the "heartland", and the "lack of hard core". Anti-elitism and demanding attitude towards the state and its role in the contemporary society were also very strongly articulated.

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REVIEWS

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Polish Political Science Studies
Polskie Studia Politologiczne

Carl Schmitt, *Legalność i prawomocność*, translation into Polish Bogdan Baran, ALETHEIA, Warszawa 2015, pp. 215

Judyta Bielanowska*

Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) is one of the most significant, yet on account of his NSDAP membership, one of the most controversial science luminaries in the matters of the state and international law; a social philosopher and theoretician of law. His political writings on the legitimacy of power, parliamentary tradition, sovereignty and authority of the institution are regarded as the canon of contemporary conservative thought. His most well-known works that have been translated into Polish include: *Political Theology and Other Works* (2000), *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes* (2008), *Constitutional Theory (2012), Legality and Legitimacy* (2015).

The latter of Schmitt's books mentioned, *Legality and Legitimacy*, completed on July 10th, 1932, contains two major chapters (*The System of Legality of the Parliamentary Legislative State and Three Extra-ordinary Lawgivers of the Weimar Constitution*) divided into subchapters, preceded by the author's preface and concluded with the summary of the considerations from the main content. Moreover, the 2015 publication includes an editor's note, a list of corrections made either by Carl Schmitt in the respective editions, or the editors, as well as the facsimile of the author's copy and the text of the Constitution of the German Reich of August 11th, 1919.

At the very beginning of his considerations, short after the preface, Schmitt reveals the main points of his analysis, which he successively develops in further sections. The distinction between 'legality' and 'legitimacy' becomes the centrepiece of his reasoning, and his further reflections focus on the polarity of these concepts. Gradually, the author draws the reader into the complex nature of legal science, points to multiple possible interpretations of the term 'law' on the ground of understanding the state as a 'political community', with the

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law determining the type of this community. According to Schmitt, the law, which is both omnipotent and understood as a set of abstract, general, not specific norms, provides fertile ground for totalitarian systems, and therefore may become a double-edged sword, as on the one hand, it becomes a tool for oppressing the society which has no constitutional guarantees of inviolability of its rights and freedoms, nor a possibility to resist the tyranny which seeks legitimacy of its actions in the relativity of the law; on the other hand, a normative system in the legislative state, which Schmitt puts on equal terms with the parliamentary republic, remains in the condition of permanent threat from the existing competitive law-making entities, such as the nation giving vent to its most pressing needs and emotions through the participation in a referendum, or President's decrees, which have *the force of law* on the grounds of an incompetently constructed constitution.

The overall picture that emerges from Schmitt's analysis is explicitly pessimistic and painfully true. Demonstrating his unquestionable knowledge of the science of law, the author proves that the *legality* of parliamentarianism is a fallacy which has nothing in common with the 'rule of law'. The relativity of each and every aspect of individual and collective existence, which is an inherent feature of a democratic legal state, and the lack of permanent axiological systems contribute to the fact that the law expressed in a given legislation, such as the basic law, remains a dangerous tool

of manipulation which every parliamentary majority may take advantage of for its current needs with regard to elections and power. The law which is applied in a consistently *democratic* manner lifts the responsibility for all actions taken in a relatively short term of parliamentary office. According to Schmitt, it is not only a manifestation of a basic pathology of the democratic system, but also an indelible contradiction, paradox of the most basic functions of the law, as for these shortcomings to be removed one would have to resign from democracy, which is cherished by the privileged but depersonalised *majority*.

Carl Schmitt's main message conveyed by the *Legality and Legitimacy* consists in indicating the danger arising from a dogmatic perception of legalism constituted by the majority. For it is in the name of legality that the majority, which constitutes the main pillar of the parliamentary system, may cancel the minority's right to any resistance. Therefore the law is not even a democratic fiction. It does not exist at all. The applicable law is nothing more than a dictatorship of a currently governing party, as there is no permanent connection of legal standards with the unalterable, permanent axiological content. In addition, in this context, Schmitt proves that what is identified uncritically in the widespread awareness, namely law and justice, have very little in common and most of the time they are mutually exclusive, as in the parliamentary system, the law, which is inherently dependent of the current political

decision-maker, may not guarantee justice, which is a permanently universal value.

The reader will not find a light narrative and a loose style in the book. Quite the contrary, *Legality and Legitimacy* is a profound, scientific analysis, written by an unquestionable authority in the field of the science of law. From the very beginning, by adopting a strictly legal language, Schmitt exposes the most essential, and at the same time the most dangerous pathology of democracy, namely the inefficiency of the legal system which consists in the complete freedom to interpret legal regulations, separation of legal standards of substantive law and their practical implementation, as well as changeability, which also regards the basic law, depending on the majority understood in arithmetic terms. On the one hand, the legal style of the work is conducive to a scientific, impartial *sine ira et studio* analysis, but on the other hand, it hinders any discussion with the author's key ideas, especially if the readers have not enough competence in jurisprudence.

However, regardless of the nature of Carl Schmitt's text, the main advantage of the work under scrutiny is its timeless appeal. It must by noted that the text was completed in 1932, so it was being written in certain well-defined circumstances, and its main purpose was the criticism of the Weimar constitution of 1919, whereas the secondary goal, voiced quite expressly, was the disparagement of parliamentary democracy. Schmitt achieved something truly spectacular. He anticipated what was to happen in the 21st century when the opinions for the need of changing the Constitution (*nota bene*, the only legal act which should remain unalterable), or even writing it anew, are voiced across the entire political scene in a manner which is so explicit that the average citizen has lost the ability to discern where democracy ends and where totalitarianism starts, what is a value *sensu proprio*, and what is a tool for achieving a morally questionable goal. It is thus hard to disagree with Schmitt when he concludes his work with a bitter afterthought: "the fiction of neutral functionalism in the face of the truth shall soon draw to a close. Then the truth shall take revenge. It shall take revenge – but it shall not be victorious" (p. 153). It is fair to add: as much then as now.

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Przemysław Wywiał, *Organizacje proobronne w systemie bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski*, Difin, Warszawa 2016, pp. 175

Patryk Tomaszewski*

In the recent years, there is a steady increase in the interest in pro-defensive organizations in our country. There are a few reasons for that.

– Since 2008, we have been witnessing rapidly changing foreign policy exercised by the Russian Federation towards its neighboring countries. What is mainly meant by that is the war against Georgia – regardless of the mistakes committed by the authorities in Tbilisi, the mistakes still giving pretext to Russian intervention. Next, what we witness is the annexation of Crimea by Russia or the outburst of the hybrid war in the eastern Ukraine.

– The debate on the change in Polish Military Power – reorganizing National Reserve Forces and founding Territorial Defense Forces.

– The increasingly imminent threat of terrorist attacks in Western Europe.

– A certain trendy inclination towards patriotism as well as combat and shooting sports among nowadays youth.

In the present year, there have been two books published dedicated to pro-defensive organizations. One of them is of journalistic nature – *Militarni. Już wojskowi czy jeszcze cywile. Polskie organizacje proobronne* [The Military Ones: Between Army Men and Civilians. Polish Pro-defensive Organizations] – was written by journalists Wojciech Chełchowski and Andrzej Czuba. The other one – being the one reviewed here – is the monograph written by the scholar of Instytut Bezpieczeństwa i Edukacji Obywatelskiej Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego w Krakowie [the Institute of Safety and Citizenship Education of the Pedagogical University of Cracow], dr. Przemysław Wywiał.

The monograph by Wywiał is not the first publication raising the issues pertaining to pro-defensive organizations. Much earlier, in 2006, there was an extensive work

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by prof. Aleksandra Skrabacz on NGOs, the work bearing a title *Organizacje pozarządowe w Bezpieczeństwie Narodowym Polski* [Non-government Organizations in the National Security of Poland].

Just to commence the debate on pro-defensive organizations, one should raise the question of which non-governmental organizations should be subsumed under the category of pro-defensive ones? Obviously, the ones regarded as pre-defensive ones are granted the larger scope for operations and thus they might enter such realms as education or life-saving. On the other hand, paramilitary organizations will be organized in a sheer military manner although they do not constitute the army as such (Wywiał, p. 63).

Typologies of pro-defensive organizations can be many. For instance, they can be divided using the criterion of the purpose (educational-pedagogical organizations, the ones specialized in the Common Safety sector, veteran, reservist, the ones spreading the problems of defense, and finally – paramilitary ones).

In his book, Przemysław Wywiał attempts to present the said issues possibly extensively. The monograph poses problems which it attempts to solve. In the successive chapters, the author presents to the reader such issues as the characteristics of civil society. What is also included is the historical sketch of pro-defensive organizations ranging from World War I up to 1989. In the next, third chapter, the author raises the problem of the functioning

of pro-defensive organizations in selected democratic countries (Sweden, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland). He points out that these units are considerably endorsed by the states and they fall into not only the defensive system but also into the extra-military one, that is anti-crisis one. In the next chapter, dr. Wywiał depicts particular organizations operating in Poland. It is a cross-sectional collection, however selective. The author's selection is based on the official information on particular organizations. It is regrettable that he does not conduct any qualitative research – at least in the form of leading activists of respective organizations. He also skips quite a large number of strictly training and paramilitary organizations, such as, say, Fundacja "Szturman" [The "Szturman" Foundation], Polski Związek Instruktorów i Trenerów Formacji Ochronnych [The Polish Association of Security Units Instructors and Trainers], or Fundacja Byłych Żołnierzy Jednostek Specjalnych GROM [The Former Special Forces Soldiers of GROM Foundation].

The next chapter, the fifth one, is related to a really significant issue which is the cooperation of the said units with the army. From this chapter the reader can learn what are the nowadays legal regulations and how to sign up for the cooperation with MON [Ministry of National Defence]. The author also presents the selected samples of specific contracts.

Chapter six raises the issue of the Federation of Pro-defensive Organizations. The idea of more efficient use of the poten-

tial of associations of this sort emerged in the Ministry of National Defence in 2014. Who was appointed then was the spokesman of the Ministry of National Defence for the Social Pro-defensive Initiatives, and the one granted this function was general Bogusław Pacek. The initiative was met with considerable approval from the part of non-governmental organizations; however, despite the far-reaching plans of cooperation and consolidation of the organizations, the more extended operations of the Federation failed to materialize. So, the author of the monograph rightly concludes: "Unfortunately, it seems that the Federation, as it is shaped these days, neither meets the expectations of the defensive associations, and nor will it contribute to building the system of the territorial defense in Poland, which was originally the subject of great expectations" (p. 121). Eventually, after the change in the administrative board of MON, the new concept of forming the brigades of Territorial Defense was put into practice, the building of which many pro-defensive organizations were involved in.

The next chapter of the book describes the operations conducted by one of the most active organizations for Territorial Defense. What is meant here is Stowarzyszenie Obrona Narodowa.pl – Ruch na Rzecz Obrony Terytorialnej [The Movement for Territorial Defense].

The last chapter is devoted to the role of veteran organizations in promoting patriotism.

The book by Przemysław Wywiał is of the nature of the synthetic review of the problem. Unfortunately, what it provides is the descriptive overview of the organizations operating in the broadly construed realm of defense. However, it does not answer the question what role, in fact, these organizations are supposed to play. Are they to be considered, as General Pacek originally assumed, rather as a reserve unit for the army or, alternatively, some support for the actions during peacetime, for example, supporting emergency management. Or should it be a component of Territorial Defense, and thus, in fact, a part of military forces? The book lacks interviews with the activists of pro-defensive organizations, or politicians and scholars dealing with said problems. In conclusion, one might say that the book concerns the most important aspects of the functioning of contemporary pro-defensive organizations. Regrettably, it does not provide any answer as to in which direction these organizations should be heading and what is their place in the system of national defense in the currently changing international environment.

Guy Standing, *Karta Prekariatu*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2015, pp. 426

Patrycja Rutkowska*

Precariat is a concept that has been present for several years in society, but it is not very popular among ordinary people, because of the fact that it is inconvenient for the ruling elites. Guy Standing gave attention to the precariat phenomenon by, creating a book called *The Precariat. The New Dangerous Class* (2011). The author in the first part of the book refers to statements that often appear in the scientific community, that the class division created by Karl Marx, is obsolete. Presenting the phenomenon of precariat Standing relies on specific examples and phenomena in Europe.

A Precariat Charter: From Denizens to Citizens is another part of the author's reflections on precariat. In Poland, it appeared thanks to Scientific Publishing House PWN. Guy Standing is the author previously of mentioned book entitled *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*, but also

most recent entry, entitled *Basic Income: A Transformative Policy for India.* He is considered as the creator of the concept of precariat.

Precariat Charter consists of five chapters in which the author clarifies, step-by-step, the social phenomenon which is precariat, as well as the mechanisms by which precariat grows and becomes inevitable for modern society. The author has also decided to present his vision of 'precarity card', which, as described by the author, would "tame the anger and disappointment with old political programs". Standing proposes changes and institutional reforms which will deal with issues directly relevant to the way of life and aspirations of the precarious class.

In the first chapter, the author specifies the term precariat, which under the influence debates author deepened and improved. The author presents in short, by historical facts, citizen characteristics and they rights. Then he presents the concept of the

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citizen, which also fits into the historical background. The author also proposes the distinction between the work which is important to preserve life balance and gainful employment. First kind of work is being done to develop our personality. Work in this sense is a pleasure. According to second sense, work does not give a pleasure and is usefull only to earn money. Finally, the author tries to explain why precariat can be a dangerous class.

The next chapter the author devoted to issues related to liberal ideology, as well as issues of crises that have occurred in recent years in the world. He also referred to a global migration and policy issues in developing countries as well those that build the rentier economy. The effect of this policy is economic stagnation, employment crisis and continuation of the era of austerity. The issues of the policy pursued by the governments the author called Faustian pact between governments and people of the countries which entered, as the author described it, in "deadly embrace of financial capital".

The third chapter, entitled *Precariat is Increasing*, refers primarily to the consequences that cause the expansion of the precariat. The main result of this process is fact, that citizens are transformed into "denizens". Based on facts and data, he presents circumstances that are not conducive to improving the situation and public sentiment, but rather exacerbate dissatisfaction and change of citizens into denizens.

The next chapter the author devoted to reflection on the usability principles that guided the conduct of social policy. The author present and compare two different way of social policy: the utilitarian thinking and the progresive thkinking. The main objective of this presentation is to create common debate about this issue. He also notes that the examples which are presented during the creation of the chapter may be controversial and may be regarded as lack of objectivity, as they refer only to the UK. However, the author considers this as the right direction, which he also justifies. Extremely interesting are the sections about making social policy more religious, as well as about dividing society into two opposing groups (respectively: Making social policy religious, p. 105, Dividing society into "Them" and "Us", p. 109).

In the fifth chapter, the author presents proposals for evolution. He presents advantages of this evolution and benefits of his card which is kind of guide which may be useful to solve presented social problems. In twenty eight articles he defines the main problems with which society can fight, bringing in the ruling elite. These are demands which begin with the words calling for joint action.

The last, sixth chapter Guy Standing devoted to some kind of summary and explanation of why everything that is presented in the *Precariat Charter* is so important for society and precariat themselves.

The book is a commendable position in which the author presents a problem that has affected society, offers a debate, but also tries to mobilize people to action. It should also be recognized that it is not only a scientific position, because the author, although trying to get rid of subjective opinions and specific examples to present the facts, often undertakes polemics.

Still, this book is worthy of recommendation, written in a manner accessible to the average reader, thereby not forcing him to have a strictly economic experience.